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i i
Within the context of nineteenth century 
imperial relations, the maintenance of economic power 
by white creole elites in Barbados and Martinique can be 
regarded as unique cases of survival. They can be viewed 
as ’deviant cases’ to the more general historical process 
which took place in all the other sugar islands of the 
Caribbean at the same period, in which the sugar industry 
passed out of the hands of an independent local planter 
class to a number of metropolitan-based British, French 
and American mercantile houses.
This study represents an attempt to construct 
a causal explanation for these two cases of survival, in 
terms of a consciously evolved set of strategies to main­
tain established sources of economic, social and political 
power. The Weberian trichotomous model of class, status and 
power has been employed to construct the three main indepen­
dent variables in this study, and a comparison' between the 
Barbadian and Martiniquan cases is effected in terms of 
these variables. From a temporal perspective the focus is 
diachronic: the emphasis being on changes in the elites’ 
organization, structure and power from the second half of 
the nineteenth century up to the present. By employing an 
historical perspective, I have sought to depict elite 
strategies of power maintenance as necessary responses to 
crisis and change, during a period which witnessed the 
’fall’ of indigenous planter elites elsewhere.
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THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES
PART I
2CHAPTER I : DEFINITION OF THE PROBLEM
1.1 The Sociological Case for White Creole Studies
1.2 Alternatives to the Pluralist Approach
1.3 Patterns of Survival as Strategies of 
Power Maintenance
31.1. The Sociological Case for White Creole Studies
Sociological studies of multi-ethnic or so-called 
fplural societies’ in the Caribbean have so far largely 
ignored white creole sectors of the population. To date 
only one full-scale anthropological study of the white 
planter elite in the Caribbean has emerged (Kovats, 1969).
On the other hand there is certainly no dearth of historical 
material on plantation society and economy. However, from 
a sociological perspective the treatment accorded to the 
social structure of the plantocracy has been tantalizingly 
tangential, since it has usually been studied as part of a 
wider historical process, such as the history of sugar and 
slavery, or the colonization of the New World.
Detailed accounts of the changing fortunes of the 
planter elite wrought by the depression in the sugar industry 
in the 1880s and 1890s still needs to be documented. A work 
of immense value to the student of this hitherto relatively 
neglected period, detailing the changes that came about in 
the British West Indian sugar industry between Abolition and 
1900 (Beachy, 1957), was published over twenty years ago and 
has yet to be surpassed. In so far as it in part provides 
some basis for an analysis of why the old plantation system 
survived in the case of Barbados, whereas it was completely 
transformed in all the other major sugar islands of the 
British Caribbean, it is an invaluable contribution indicating 
some of the factors which account for the survival of the 
resident planter class.
No comparable full-scale work exists on the sugar 
industry in the French Antilles for the same period. One 
study has been carried out on Guadeloupe (Fallope-Arnassalon, 
1975), but it covers the earlier period of 1815 to I860.
Both Renard (1975) and Chartol (1975) deal with the sugar 
industry in Martinique and Guadeloupe respectively up to 
1870, but only very briefly within the context of wider 
social and economic issues. With respect to the physical 
transformation of the plantation system in the second half 
of the nineteenth century, some acknowledgement must be
4extended to the work of two French geographers, Eugene Revert 
(194-9) and Guy Lasserre (1961), and that of two Antillean 
scholars of the Centre Universitaire Antilles-Guyane, Rene 
Acheen (1972, 1974-) and Jacques Adelaide (1969, 1971).
The reasons for this neglect of white planter elites 
in Caribbean sociology may be possibly one of several.
Hoetink (1967: 57-59) argues that European and North American 
social scientists have a built-in bias against studying white 
creole communities. This he attributes to an internalized 
cultural misconception on the part of the sociologist or 
anthropologist, which is expressed in his theory of ’the 
counterpart of colonial derangement’. In his prolegomenon 
he observes that:
11 In the Caribbean there live white natives who have 
a European appearance but who participate in what 
may be called a Caribbean culture. This fact is 
not clearly recognized by the present-day outsider 
in the mother country.
There is not room in the outsider’s image for a 
white native segment in the population. He is 
incapable of conceiving of a people with the same 
physical characteristics as his own as full 
participants in a segmented tropical society. In 
the outsider’s view such a society ought to consist 
of non-whites”.
Hoetink goes on to argue that for the metropolitan outsider 
the social organization and cultural patterns of whites in 
segmented tropical societies are based upon an image of 
colonial society, which is modelled upon the Asian and 
African colonies of the European powers with their ’alien* 
expatriate groups of planters and administrators, who never 
in any real sense became the inhabitants of those countries. 
Since the European or North American social scientist cannot 
conceptualize the notion of-a ’native’ having similar 
phenotypical characteristics to his own, he commits the error 
of subsuming white creoles under his own cultural frame of 
reference. It might therefore be inferred that studies of 
white minority groups have been neglected because their 
phenotypical ’disguise* hides social and cultural 
peculiarities which pass unobserved, and that within the 
context of an ’exotic' environment they are not regarded as 
having any interest as a research problem.
5There is no way of assessing the validity of 
Hoetink’s argument; that would require an attitudinal survey 
among practitioners in the field of Caribbean studies. 
Intuitively it sounds convincing, but it could be argued that 
he is wrong in isolating phenotypical similarity as an 
independent variable to explain this lacuna. An alternative 
explanation might be methodological, to the extent that 
carrying out social research on high status groups always 
poses the problem of accessibility. In Barbados and 
Martinique this general problem of accessibility is com­
pounded by- the extreme closure of white elites. To the 
casual observer they are remarkably invisible to public 
scrutiny, and access is restricted to only a few intimate 
spheres of activity. It could be argued even further that 
this neglect of white elites derives from an assumption that 
the demise of white hegemony with the birth of new leadership 
groups in a post-colonial era, has led to a loss of their 
traditional economic power base and hence their elite status. 
In this respect it is relevant to note that when attention 
has been paid to white creoles by Caribbeanists, the focus 
has invariably been upon the ’subordinate classes’ rather 
than the upper echelons of white creole social structure. 
Examples of this preference are to be found in the studies 
of Watson (1971) and Sheppard (1977) on the ’redlegs’ of 
Barbados, and in the detailed attention that Lasserre (1961) 
gives to petit blanc communities in his work on Guadeloupe.
1.2. Alternative to the Pluralist Approach
For two decades theoretical attempts to construct 
a suitable framework for analysing the social structure of 
Caribbean societies has been dominated by anthropologists 
working within a pluralist tradition, modelled upon 
Furnivall’s analysis (1948) of multi-ethnic colonial societies 
in South-East Asia, and developed in the Caribbean context by 
M.G. Smith (1965). The pluralist approach may be commended 
in so far as it represents the first attempt to theorize about 
the nature of Caribbean societies. However, in terms of its 
end results it must be deemed a failure. As a piece of
6a-priori theorizing many of its propositions remain untested. 
Empirical studies have been piecemeal and unsatisfactory, and 
some of their results contradictory, threatening the validity 
of its most basic propositions.
To the sociologist concerned primarily with the 
dynamics of group interaction, the contributions of pluralism 
to the theoretical underpinnings of his work must be con­
sidered. minimal, since they are unable to distinguish the 
structure of groups or to describe systems of social stratif­
ication. By concentrating on cultural phenomena a social 
structure does not emerge. It has very little value as an 
analytical concept, since it does not enable the researcher 
to progress any further than the descriptive level. Thus 
the exercise tends to be restricted to a taxonomic breakdown 
of a given society along institutional lines, through the 
cataloguing of cultural labels. In the final analysis a 
horizontally segmented social system emerges, the config­
uration of which is more true of the immediate post- 
Emancipation period than the present.
In the opinion of the present writer, the fundamental 
error committed by scholars of a pluralist persuasion lies in 
their failure to make an analytical distinction between culture 
and social structure. A disregard for this distinction has 
led pluralists into the trap of subsuming social structure 
under culture, with the result that social structure has been 
defined by the pluralist school in terms of cultural 
attributes. In borrowing Furnivall’s ideas Smith stood them 
on their head, by making, as both Rex (1970) and Cross (1971) 
have argued, economic and political differences explainable 
in terms of cultural factors rather than colonialism and 
economic exploitation. It is not culturally determined sets 
of norms and values which ultimately place individuals in 
social groups, but the differential access to scarce 
resources and power, modes of interaction and integration, 
and particularly important in the Caribbean context, the 
historical placement of successive waves of migrants within 
a system of highly institutionalized inequalities. In adopting 
this set of structural parameters as opposed to those 
utilized by the pluralists, the way is opened up for analysing
7just how these plantation societies in the Caribbean became 
polarized along racial and ethnic lines and stratified in 
favour of a European minority. By contrast the pluralist 
approach lacks explanatory power. In the economic sphere 
for example, it classifies the ’traditional* occupational 
activities for the different cultural sectors of society, 
but cannot explain, as in the cases of Barbados and 
Martinique, the persistence of a type of micro-latifundia/ 
minifundia distribution of land resources skewed in favour 
of a white minority, and its continuing control over the 
most remunerative spheres of import/export, whole­
saling, commission agencies and the larger retail distributive 
trade outlets.
With respect to the formulation of a research 
problem, I have attempted quite briefly to draw attention to 
a preferred concept of social structure, the structural 
parameters of which refer to social differentiation and 
relationships to^  the means of production, as opposed to those 
associated with value integration. Civen the normative basis 
of the Durkheimian structural-functionalist tradition upon 
which the British anthropological school is founded, it could 
be argued that pluralists do operate with a concept of social 
structure, based upon value integration which is so embedded 
in a problematic concerned with the existence of overarching 
norms and values, that it has so far obfuscated rather-than 
clarified quite basic issues in Caribbean sociology. Thus, 
from a pluralist analysis, it is possible to infer that the 
dominance of white creole minorities in Barbados and 
Martinique is founded upon cultural•differences, rather than 
the exercise of a particular set of strategies devised to 
maintain their power intact.
1.3. Patterns of Survival as Strategies of Power Maintenance
In setting out to make a comparative analysis of 
those factors which contributed to the survival of the 
indigenous planter class in one English island and a French 
one, which ’fell’ in most other parts of the Caribbean in the 
second half of the nineteenth century, I have chosen to view
8their response to crisis and change in terms of a set of 
strategies to maintain traditional sources of power. These 
include strategies to keep land resources and sugar 
production in local white hands, strategies to maintain 
political power and influence whether of an overt or 
covert nature, strategies to maintain the status boundaries 
of ethnicity through endogamy and segregation in communal 
and associational life, and finally, through the institution 
of the plantation system itself, strategies to maintain social 
control through the exercise of ’traditional authority’.
Since the central concern in this study is with 
power and its maintenance by the white elites, these three 
sources of power indicated above - economic, political and 
social - will constitute the three major independent variables 
in this study. The comparison between the Barbadian case and 
the Martiniquan one will therefore be effected in terms of 
these three variables. Having stated a position in 
opposition to the cultural pluralist one which views class 
as a dependent variable, since the distribution of power, 
status and socio-economic differences are held to be deter­
mined by membership of the respective cultural sectors, I 
also take the view that an orthodox Marxist perspective of 
social structure cannot be imposed tout court in the Caribbean 
context. The entrenched economic power of the white elite in 
both islands which has not changed in its essentials in the 
twentieth century, plus the fact that ’being white’ continues 
to be a necessary though not sufficient condition for member­
ship of both groups, indicates that both ethnicity and class 
continue to play important roles in the social structure.
Their relative importance and interaction must therefore be 
considered in any theoretical perspective on the problem of 
power maintenance.
Although the central problem is directed towards 
analysing contemporary strategies of power maintenance, the 
perspective in this study is essentially a diachronic one, 
since it attempts to assess the changes which have taken place 
in the groups’ organization, structure and power from the 
post-Emancipation period up to the present. From a socio- 
historical perspective the problem is particularly interesting.
9Within the context of nineteenth century imperial relations, 
the survival of indigenous plantocracies in Barbados and 
Martinique can be regarded as ’deviant cases’ to the more 
general historical process which took place in the rest of 
the Caribbean at the same period, in which local interests 
were completely displaced by the incursion of metropolitan 
monopoly finance capital. Given the specificity of the 
Barbadian and Martiniquan cases it has also been necessary 
to ascertain what pre-conditions favoured the retention of 
local interests. To this end particular attention has been 
paid to such factors as the operation of established systems 
of credit, the development of local sources of finance 
capital in the mid-nineteenth century, colonial relations 
with the respective metropolitan powers, and the structure 
and composition of white creole society itself. In order to 
elucidate many of the issues treated in this study, essential 
background material on population and land is presented in 
Part II. In Chapter 3 an attempt is made to analyse the 
foundations upon which the white creole social structure of 
these islands was built, and to deal with broad lines of 
demographic change from the period of mature plantation 
society up to the present. Chapter 4 focusses upon changes 
in the organizational structure of the respective plantation 
systems in Barbados and Martinique between I860 and 1920, and 
provides comparative material on the corporatization of the 
plantation sector in a number of other West Indian sugar 
islands at the same period. Chapters 5 - 9 in Part III in 
which a comparative analysis and assessment of strategies of 
power maintenance is made, deals with the central issues of 
this study. The theoretical foundations of this work follow 
in Chapter 2 : "Towards a Theory of White Elites'*.
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CHAPTER 2: TOWARDS A THEORY OF WHITE ELITES
2.1 Historical Development of Elite Theory
2.2 From Plantocratic Ruling Class to Strategic 
Elite: A Case of Functional Specialization
2.3 Class, Status and Political Power
11
In present day elite theory a somewhat functional, 
pluralist view has replaced the earlier notion of an elite 
as a monolithic ’ruling class’, which placed emphasis upon 
the exercise of political power. Within this tradition two 
main approaches can he singled out, the Marxist class 
analysis and the elitist approach. For Marx forms of 
economic dominance were directly translated into sources of 
political power. Political institutions in Marx’s view 
were therefore to be regarded as epiphenomenal, having a 
role which was ultimately determined by economic class 
relations. For Pareto the power of a 'governing elite’ was 
derived from inequalities of individual endowment, which were 
assumed to be inherent, and which permeated every sphere of 
social life to such an extent that the distribution curves 
for intelligence, moral qualities and special abilities, were 
coterminous with the distribution of wealth and political 
power. In the elitist scheme there was therefore held to be 
a coincidence between hierarchies of ’excellence' and 
hierarchies of wealth, power and prestige, which had its 
precursor in the writings of Burke (1793) and De Tocqueville 
(1835), who regarded the distinctions of rank implicit in 
social hierarchy as being based upon talent, merit and ability. 
Within this elitist tradition which stood counterpoised to the 
social democratic movements of the nineteenth century, mention 
must also be made of Saint-Simon (1859) who proposed a re­
organization of post-Revolutionary society in France based 
upon the principle of a hierarchy of merit. Although the 
background assumptions of Marx and the elite theorists were 
radically different, plus the fact that a distinction is 
usually made between elite and class theories in the sociology 
of power, there is some similarity to be observed between the 
dichotomized pairs of bourgeoisie/proletariat and elites/ 
masses, which is highly suggestive in both cases of a res­
tricted minority which governs and an undifferentiated 
majority which simply obeys.
In tracing the career of the term ’elite’ as a 
theoretical concept in sociology, it is unfortunate that the
2.1. Historical Development of Elite Theory
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meaning conveyed by the term has not been fully liberated 
from its original formulation. This has resulted in a 
dichotomous tendency to juxtapose ’elite theories’ against 
’class theories’, and to regard those writers operating with 
a set of structural parameters defined by the former in a 
negative light. Why this is so is fairly evident, since the 
formulation and application of the concept itself is rooted 
in elitist assumptions about the nature of the social order: 
the bland assumption that a minority dominates simply through 
some supposed, ill-defined, innate superior quality, rather 
than through the exercise of social, economic and political 
controls. In this respect the Marxian class theory says more 
about the actual basis of domination than the uncritical 
assumptions of the early elite theorists. Set within its 
historical context, the background assumptions of the early 
elite theorists stemmed from a social and political philosophy 
which opposed the egalitarian principles of the French and 
American revolutions, and later on in the mid-nineteenth 
century it developed as a conservative reaction to the Marxian 
notion of a classless society. Bottomore’s analysis 
(1964: Ch.I) of the birth of elite theory places emphasis 
upon its development as part of a nineteenth century 
political doctrine, which emerged as a reaction to parlia­
mentary social democracy and the growth of socialist ideas. 
Referring to the work of Carl Friedrich (1964: 15), he 
states that:
"...the nineteenth century doctrines of rule by an elite of superior individuals - doctrines which encompassed Carlyle’s philosophy of the hero and 
Nietzsche’s vision of the superman as well as the 
more prosaic studies of Mosca, Pareto and Burckhardt - were all offsprings of a society containing as yet 
many feudal remnants, and that these doctrines represented so many different attempts to revive 
ancient ideas of social hierarchy and to erect obstacles to the spread of democratic notions...”
For Georg Lukacs the social environment in which these 
doctrines were generated was even narrower:
’Lukacs... suggests that the problem of political leadership was raised by sociologists practising 
in those countries which had not succeeded in 
establishing a genuine bourgeois democracy”.
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Thus Pareto’s concept of ’elites’ as well as Max Weber’s con­
cept of ’charismatic authority’, -as exercised in the political 
sphere ”by the elected war lord, the plebiscitarian ruler, the 
great demogague, or the political party leader’ (Gerth and 
Mills: 1970, 79), were generated in societies in which the 
feudal elements were particularly strong.
Ever since the classical period, however, there has 
existed the germ of a third approach which has sought to 
combine both elite theories and class concepts into a theory 
of dominant groups. Mosca (1 939), unlike Pareto (1935) who 
emphasized the universality of the distinction between 
governing elites and masses, argued that an important 
characteristic of late nineteenth century parliamentary 
democracies was that of representativeness, in which the 
absolute power of a political class was restrained by a 
plurality of different interests in society. Thus in Mosca’s 
view a governing elite ruled by consensus rather than force, 
through the representation of a variety of other competing 
interests. Mosca also points to the existence of an 
intermediary sub-elite, a group which finds its later equiv­
alent in Veblen’s ’engineers’ (1921) and Burnham’s ’managerial 
elite’ (1943). In hypothesizing the birth of a new middle 
class in capitalist society made up of functionaries and 
intellectuals, who interpret and execute the orders of the 
political class in accordance with the wishes of a plurality 
of other interest groups in society, Mosca suggests ways in 
which elite theories and class theories can be incorporated.
In recognizing that there were qualitative differences bet­
ween parliamentary bourgeois democracies and the types of 
polity which preceded them, Mosca dismissed Pareto’s notion 
of a rigid separation between the rulers and the ruled, in 
which the relationship was one of simple dominance, regarding 
this relationship as a two-way process in which the personnel 
of the political class could change over time. In attempting 
to account for change through the ’circulation of elites’ by 
the emergence of social forces representing new economic 
interests, Mosca posits a relationship between elite minorities 
and classes through a process of social mobility.
In the literature on elites•the shift in emphasis
14
away from dominant groups as monolithic ruling classes to 
attempts to -uncover the existence of ’power elites’, whose 
power is related to inter-locking institutional interests 
rather than social and cultural homogeneity (Mills: 1956; 
Domhoff: 1967, Miliband: 1969; Westergaard: 1975), has also 
led to a view of them as pluralities of functional, 
occupational groups. These are what Keller (1965) terms 
’strategic elites’, and she argues that in twentieth century 
industrial society:
•'No single social stratum exercises all key social 
functions; instead, these functions and the elites associated with them are specialized and differentiated. 
The predominant justification for holding elite status is not blood or wealth as such but, rather, merit and 
particular skills. Accordingly, these elites are recruited in various ways adapted to their 
differentiated tasks and are marked by diversity as 
well as by impermanence”. (1965: 27).
Keller admits the existence of elites in society who are 
’non-strategic’. These may be comprised of groups of 
artists, writers, intellectuals and stars of stage and 
screen, who having risen to the top of their profession 
through talent, merit and ability, and having thus achieved 
'excellence* in the sense of the term used by the early elite 
theorists, do not hold strategic elite status. These are 
instead 'segmental elites’ whose influence extends over 
limited spheres of social life, unlike strategic eliteswhose 
influence is pervasive throughout the whole society. Thus:
’Whether or not an elite is counted as strategic does not depend on its specific activities but 
on the scope of its activities, that is, on how many members of society it impinges upon and in 
what respects”. (1965: 20)
In making this distinction between strategic elites and 
segmental elites, Keller poses the problem of how to isolate 
the boundaries which separate them due to the fine gradations 
of authority that may exist. This problem may be overcome 
in cases of highly organized elites where it is possible to 
determine their boundaries and membership, as for example 
economic and political strategic elites, as well as rep­
resentatives of the higher echelons of the civil service 
and the armed forces.
15
From the current perspective Keller’s approach to 
the study of elites is of more than theoretical interest. 
Adopting a functionalist view, Keller posits an evolutionary 
model of societal leadership, in which elites undergo a 
process of increasing differentiation and specialization of 
function from the ancient world up to twentieth century 
industrial capitalist society. As societies become 
increasingly more complex and more highly differentiated, 
leadership roles become more specialized, moving away from 
a pivotal social core based upon blood or religion (as in the 
cases of hereditary landed aristocracies or the Hindu Caste 
system), to ones based upon wealth and property (such as 
nineteenth century ruling classes in industrially advanced 
European societies), and to the stage reached in the second 
half of the twentieth century, where leadership roles are 
based upon skills and other achieved qualities. Thus both 
the monolithic and pluralistic conceptualization of dominant 
groups may be empirically valid, but at different points in 
time, or alternatively within different societies.
Dahrendorf’s characterization of nineteenth century capitalist 
society as a monolithic political economy, and twentieth 
century ’post-capitalist’ society as one where industry and 
politics has become separated into functional units (1959), 
provides a sociological basis for arguing that qualitative 
changes in Western capitalist societies have resulted in a re­
distribution of power, from a solidary ruling class to a 
number of strategic elites, in whose hands political and 
economic power has been widely dispersed.
2.2. From »Plantocratic Ruling Glass to Strategic Elite :
A Qase of Functional Specialization
The central research problem, is to provide a 
comparative analysis of the strategies employed by white 
elites in Barbados and Martinique to maintain traditional 
sources of economic, social and political power, from the 
second half of the nineteenth century up to the present. 
Expressed in this way as a study in the sociology of power, 
the formulation is highly problematical and begs a number 
of questions. For example, what is meant by ’traditional
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sources of. ..power"? In Chapter 3 which deals with the 
foundations of white creole society in the early colonial 
period, I will show that the plantocracy during the ’sugar 
revolution’ very quickly acquired all the characteristics 
of a ’ruling class’ in Keller’s sense of the term. It can 
quite correctly he considered a ruling class, since the 
coincidence between hierarchies of wealth, status and 
political power enjoyed by the planter elite gave them a 
power which was monolithic. Given the development of a 
’white bias’ which was rooted in the legal status accorded 
to the majority population in slave society, and the 
ideological justification needed to maintain the ’peculiar 
institution’ of slavery, it can also be shown that the 
plantocracy- developed elitist perceptions of itself as a 
dominant group in the Paretian sense.- However, from the 
perspective of white creole society itself, the ethnic factor 
from the earliest period of plantation society has been 
secondary to the economic one, since white creole society 
has been highly stratified internally, making wealth and 
access to land the prime determinants of elite membership.
Based upon a knowledge of recent changes in white;, 
elite social structure and role in Barbadian and Martiniquan 
society, which emerged in conversations with a number of 
informants in both Britain and France, I advance the 
hypothesis that the- elite has- undergone a functional change 
in the twentieth century. I want to argue that during the 
period of my study, power in these two Caribbean societies 
has been increasingly functionally differentiated, and that 
the power of the former plantocracy has now become 
specialized and concentrated in the sphere of the economic. 
Thus following Keller’s analysis (1963), with the emergence 
of strategic elites both groups today are more precisely to 
be regarded as economic elites rather than plantocratic 
ruling classes. With the emergence of competing elites and 
the absence of any universal hierarchy of values imposed 
from above, Keller (1963: 124) posits a corollary to this 
process:
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"The absolute predominance of an elite is possible 
only under fairly simple social conditions when 
an elite enjoys a diffuse, overall superiority 
by virtue not of its specific functional con­tributions to society, but of its general attributes and characteristics”.
It must therefore be stated that no analysis of changes in 
the power of the white elites nor indeed as will emerge from 
this study, changes in their structure and patterns of 
recruitment, can be undertaken without proper reference to 
historical context. This process involving a narrowing of 
their power base will therefore be set within a diachronic 
framework, dealing with a time-span from the post- 
Emancipation period up to the present. The fact that 
particular emphasis is given to the period from I860 
onwards in the Martiniquan case, and from 1880 in the Bar­
badian one, highlights a central concern in my study: the 
question of social and economic change in the latter half 
of the nineteenth century brought about by a 'circulation 
of elites' in colonial society, involving the displacement 
of a traditional plantocracy by a group of usiniers in 
Martinique and a new mercantile class in Barbados.
2.3. Class, Status and Political Power
Based upon the premiss that the distribution of 
power in systems of social stratification is reducible to 
three factors - the economic, the social and the political - 
the Weberian three-dimensional model of class, status and 
party has been employed as a framework in this study to 
analyse elite strategies of power maintenance. Although 
the dominance of the white elites can be defined in terms 
of three separable but interrelated sources of power, the 
nature of this relationship must be regarded a contingent 
rather than a logical one. Thus as Runciman argues (1970), 
economic class, status and power are to be properly regarded 
as three qualitatively different sets of terms, encompassing 
in the first case such other terms as "wealth, income, price, 
capital and market situation”; in the second case notions 
of "esteem, gentility, exclusiveness, deference and con­
descension”; and in the third case such notions as "command,
18
obedience, autonomy, tyranny and rebellion”. The fact that 
there is no logical relationship between these different 
sets of terms may be seen in the case of Hindu India, where 
cases of an inverse relationship between ritual status and 
economic class are to be found in such examples as Brahmin 
cooks and wealthy Shudra merchants. Another example can be 
drawn from Europe in the Middle Ages, where the wealth of 
Jewish money lenders contrasted sharply with their low 
parish status. In Barbados and the French Antilles the high 
status honour with which poor white communities accorded to 
themselves contrasted sharply with the actual conditions of 
their material existence.
Although it is conceptually valid to regard these 
three different types of power as separable dimensions by 
which all societies are stratified, it does not follow that 
they describe separate arenas into which the power holders 
may fall. According to Weber’s understanding of the 
phenomenon, class and status overlapped in such a way that 
both propertied and non-propertied classes could theoretically 
belong to the same status group, partaking of a common life 
style which reflected similarities in education, culture and 
occupation. This observation is particularly relevant in the 
case of plantation societies, where Europeans by virtue of 
shared ethnic background formed a status group apart from 
the majority black population, but at the same time were 
internally stratified into a number of different socio­
economic categories: large planters, ’middling’ planters, 
small planters, and small holders and-non-propertied freemen. 
The same conclusions can be drawn from studying the relation­
ship between ethnic status and political power, since the 
power holders were only drawn from a restricted minority 
from within the status group.
According to Runciman (1970) a society can be 
regarded- as ‘three dimensional in the terms already discussed, 
if the position of each individual is capable of being 
designated as a vector in a three-dimensional space. In the 
case of white creole planter elites we are presented with an 
analytical problem. In plantation society there was 
traditionally an exact coincidence between hierarchies of
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class, status and power, which means that society was one­
dimensional since the distribution of economic, social and 
political power was monopolized by a tiny minority. This 
would therefore appear to invalidate the empirical and 
analytical usefulness of making a distinction between 
hierarchies of class, status and power, not only because 
such a distinction would be irrelevant in this case, but also 
because it presents the problem of how to categorize the 
power holders. This problem has been overcome by 
characterizing them as elites, rather than regarding them 
more narrowly in the Marxist sense as economic classes, or 
as status groups as implied by the use of the term ’planto­
cracy1 , or as ruling classes which places undue emphasis 
upon the exercise of political power.
From the perspective outlined above, along one 
dimension the elites can be viewed as being in a class 
situation in so far as they can be regarded as a social 
group having in common:
”(l)...a specific causal component of their life 
chances, in so far as (2) this component is represented exclusively by economic interests 
in the possession of goods and opportunities 
for income, and (3) is represented under the 
conditions of the commodity or labour markets”. 
(Weber, 1968: II/9, 927).
The traditional mainstay of this "component” was property, 
which Weber regarded as a basic category of a class situation. 
It is through the ownership of property that some members 
of the planter elite also acquired an entrepreneurial 
function, by transferring the wealth generated by sugar 
and land sales to the sphere of capital. Weber’s generic 
concept of class is particularly apposite to the situations 
portrayed here, since he not only considers property as a 
determinant of class situation, but also the part played by 
services in a market situation. In the twentieth century 
the traditional basis of the elite’s economic power has 
been considerably extended, embracing the spheres of 
finance capital, agri-business, trading, commerce and 
tourism as well as land. Following Weber, if class position 
is regarded as being dependent upon the kinds of services 
offered and the use to which property is put, not all members
20
of the elite can he regarded as belonging to the same 
economic class. It will become apparent in this study that 
white creole society is highly stratified internally by 
class, and that an individual's position is very much deter­
mined by the extent of his participation in a wide variety 
of economic activities.
Along another dimension they can be regarded as 
status groups, or more accurately as forming parts of status 
groups, of which the chief component is a "...specific, 
positive...social estimation of honour" (Weber, 1968: II/9, 
932), which in this context is defined primarily by reference 
to ethnicity. It is hypothesized that a particular feature 
of these status groups is their 'caste-like' nature. Each 
group practises closure to a greater or lesser degree, 
maintains interaction with other groups in society as a 
minimum, or only in certain circumscribed spheres of activity, 
retains forms of social and spatial distance and distinguishes 
itself by reference to a number of ascribed qualities, such 
as name, phenotype, ethnicity and inherited wealth and 
occupation. For these reasons they can be regarded as extreme 
types of status groups sharing features in common with 
castes, since the restrictions imposed on social inter­
action are taken to their logical conclusion:
"Where the consequences have been realized to their 
full extent, the status group evolves into a 
closed caste". (Weber, 1968: II/9, 933).
Weber's statement, however, makes this formulation somewhat 
problematical when he says that:
"Status distinctions are then guaranteed not merely by conventions and laws, but also by religious 
sanctions". (Weber, 19b8: II/9, 933).
In the case of Hindu India these religious sanctions devolve 
upon the dual ritualistic notions of purity and impurity.
Quite clearly the role played by religious sanctions cannot 
be applied to the case of inter-ethnic relations in the 
Caribbean. That is not to say, however, that sanctions do 
not exist which back up these "conventions and laws".
Two further points raised by Weber are of utility 
in refining the concept of caste as it pertains to the
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Caribbean situation. Firstly, when a status group evolves 
into a caste the underlying differences are ethnic. Thus 
caste develops when ethnic differentiation is present in 
a society:
,!The caste is, indeed, the normal form in which 
ethnic communities that believe in blood relation­ship and exclude exogamous marriage and social intercourse usually associate with one another".
(Weber, 1968: II/9, 933).
Secondly, in cases of ethnic stratification the hierarchical 
principles upon which the society is founded ab initio are 
consequent upon the presence of caste:
"A status segregation grown into a caste differs in its structure from a mere ethnic segregation: the 
caste structure transforms the horizontal and unconnected coexistences of ethnically segregated groups into a vertical social system of super and 
subordination".• (Weber, 1968: II/9, 934).
However, it is doubtful whether "a vertical social system 
of super and subordination" based purely upon ethnicity 
existed even in early plantation society, due to the fact 
that white creole society itself was highly stratified by 
class. The development of an intermediary category of free 
men of colour, some of whom became slave holders, landed 
proprietors and merchants themselves, indicates that class 
became increasingly interwoven with the variable of 
ethnicity in a highly complex fashion over time. In 
characterizing these white creole status groups as 1 castes’, 
therefore, I am not putting forward a case for arguing that 
they were ever situated in a perfect system of ethnic 
stratification. Unlike those purists such as Dumont (1970) 
who prefer to reserve the term itself for the Hindu variety 
proper, like Blau (1976) and Berreman (1972) I prefer to 
treat caste as a continuous rather than a discrete variable, 
and not to regard the phenomenon as necessarily being a 
special type of stratification. Moreover, my main intention 
is not so much to depict caste as a structural variable, but 
as a form of behaviour which X. refer to as ’status boundary 
maintenance’.
A problem arises along the third dimension in 
attempting to place the white elites. Having lost their
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formal political power base they can no longer be said to 
"live in a house of power", in so far as they have political 
organizations directing actions towards goals which are 
"striven for in a planned manner" (Weber, 1968: II/9, 938). 
They can therefore no longer be regarded as "parties" 
representing the interests of class and status. Until their 
power was contested, it is questionable whether they can be 
regarded as ever having been constituted as political parties 
in the sociological sense used by Weber. The main problem 
is a conceptual one, since political power rested in the hands 
of a tiny plantocratic oligarchy whose interests were so 
narrowly defined in terms of economic interests, it is 
difficult to isolate a separate arena of power which may be 
properly regarded as ’political*. Another problem lies in 
the structure of domination in relation to the metropolitan 
power: the degree of political power enjoyed by each group 
being dependent upon the nature of colonial policy and rule. 
From a comparative perspective this will form an important 
independent variable in this study, and will be employed to 
highlight differences between the results. Given the 
limitations placed upon the concept of a separate dimension 
of political power, I will be primarily focussing upon the 
wielding of covert forms of power and influence during a 
period when the basis of formal power had been removed. In 
the case of Martinique this period happens to coincide with 
the period dealt with in this study. In Barbados it was not 
until the 1940s that the elite lost its formal political 
power, which means that the phenomenon as a strategy of 
power maintenance is of relative recency.
Although I have hypothesized that the two groups 
studied here are to be more narrowly regarded as strategic 
economic elites today, it is my contention that the 
maintenance of economic power cannot be analysed without 
reference to all three dimensions of power. What I would 
argue is that the survival of these economic elites is 
causally related to a wide range of strategies which 
impinge not only on the economic structure,but upon the 
social structure and political life. The strategies adopted 
for survival, therefore, determine more than just the 
distribution of scarce resources. They also determine
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elite mechanisms of social reproduction and patterns of 
associational life, as well as their political role and 
relations with the metropolitan power. In viewing the 
maintenance of power as the outcome of a series of con­
sciously evolved strategies on the part of the elites, it 
is my intention not only to highlight the scope of these 
strategies, but to suggest ways in which their inter­
relationship has performed the function of maintaining 
vital social and economic structures intact.
PART II 
POPULATION. AND LAND
CHAPTER 3 : POPULATION
3.1 Introduct ion
3.2 The Tropical Pounding Fathers: Barbados
3.3 The Tropical Founding Fathers: Martinique
3.4 A Comparative Overview: Population, Social 
Structure and Elite Composition in Mature 
Plantation Society
3.5 Demographic Changes Between the Mid- 
Nineteenth and Twentieth Century
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There would appear to he two diametrically opposed 
views held by the white elites in Barbados and Martinique 
today with respect to their origins. On the one hand, and 
this is particularly true in the Barbadian case, many 
planters assert that the wealth of the colony was built up 
by an ill-assorted "bunch of rogues, ruffians and vagabonds" 
who represented the worst elements of the Old World. On the 
other hand, and this is a view more representative of the 
Grands Bekes of Martinique, is a belief in the nobility of 
their origins. However, the real truth lies somewhere in 
between the first highly coloured version and the second 
with its assumption of aristocratic pretension. The origins 
of both social groups are actually far more complex than 
these received stereotypes suggest, and I would tentatively 
proffer the view that in the historical process of growth and 
development, each society’s ideas about itself have been 
subjected to a process of unconscious distortion and myth­
making. That is not to say that the illusions a given 
society may have about itself are any less socially 
significant than the documented facts. However,, in the 
pursuit of some semblance of ’truth’, a distinction must be 
drawn between the image a society chooses to project of 
itself and the reality which lies behind the social mask.
Undeniably, "rogues, ruffians and vagabonds" were 
to be found in great abundance in early colonial society, 
since the Old World used the New as a dumping ground for its 
social outcasts.1 Non-conformists of other kinds, both 
political and religious, also "paid for their unorthodoxy by 
transportation" (Williams, 1944 : 13). Quakers who refused 
to take the oath of allegiance to the King, Cromwell’s Irish 
prisoners after the rebellion of 1649, a group of Scottish 
rebels in 1667 and 400 Monmouth rebels in 1685, were 
several categories of the latter who endured the horrors of 
the first Middle Passage on their way to indentureship in 
the New World. The French monarchical state similarly 
transported its ne’er do wells and political and religious 
dissidents to the colonies as bonded servants. It is also
3.1. Introduction
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an undeniable fact that the granting of patent rights to 
groups of individuals and companies in the islands 
instituted a social system akin to that of feudalism, in 
which patentee and settler stood in relationship to each 
other as feudal lord and vassal. However, as I will 
attempt to show, the sugar revolution altered the social 
structure of these islands profoundly, and the individuals 
who played a central role in this economic and social 
transformation were a new breed of industrial entrepreneurs, 
with huge capital resources by the standards of the day and 
a business acumen to match. They were neither aristocratic 
nor could they by any stretch of the imagination be portrayed 
as a motley crew of adventurers, gamblers and petty felons. 
They were in fact essentially bourgeois, particularly in the 
English islands, and were the representatives of mercantile 
interests rather than landed ones, though in the course of 
time many were absorbed into the ranks of the nobility and 
landed gentry in both the. European and the colonial context.
The approach adopted in this chapter does not pur­
port to be a straight historical narrative of the foundation, 
settlement and demography of these two colonies. Rather 
through a process of sociological abstraction it is an 
attempt
(i) to analyse the foundations upon which the 
social structure of these islands was built;
(ii) to highlight the long-term demographic 
effects upon the white creole population as a whole of the 
transition from colonies of settlement to colonies of 
exploitation;
(iii) to suggest in comparative terms some 
difference between the nature and composition of the Barbadian 
and Martiniquan planter class which had emerged by the mid­
eighteenth century;
(iv) and to detail demographic changes in the white 
creole population during the main period of this study, from 
the second half of the nineteenth century up to the present.
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"In all of the islands before the close of the 
century a few big landholders monopolized all the best 
sugar acreage, reaped most of the profits, managed 
island politics and dominated their society in every way.
These nouveau riche slave owning gentry far outshone the 
leading Chesapeake planters of the day" (Dunn, 1973:46/7).
Between 1627 and 1640 Barbados showed no signs 
of developing the kind of restricted planter elite des­
cribed by Dunn. Initially Barbadian agriculture was 
predominantly based upon small peasant proprietors 
cultivating tobacco, cotton and indigo for export, and 
subsistence crops for domestic consumption, on five to 
thirty acre smallholdings. During this period the 
possibility of Barbados becoming the richest colony in 
the English Caribbean before the end of the seventeenth 
century seemed remote.
However, this pattern of small proprietorship and 
land utilization was to change rapidly over a brief period 
of fifteen years, with the introduction of sugar cane plants 
from Pernambuco and Bahia in the late 1630s. When Ligon 
arrived in Barbados in September 1647 "the great work of 
sugar-making" was already underway:
"Some of the most industrious men, having gotten 
Plants from Fernanbock, a place in Brasil, and made tryal of them at the Barbadoes, and finding 
them to grow, they planted more and more, as they 
grew and multiplied on the place, till they had 
such a considerable number, as they were worth the while to set up a very small Ingenio and so make 
tryal what sugar could be made upon that soyl"(Ligon, 1970:20/21).
The history of the sugar industry in Barbados can be said to 
have started in 1642, with the first attempts at sugar 
manufacture backed by Dutch merchants who supplied equipment 
for the first mills on credit against the first crop. One 
measure of the boom which immediately followed the introduction 
of the manufacturing process was the ten-fold increase in real 
estate values during the 1640s: from an average of ten
3.2. The Tropical Founding Fathers : Barbados
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shillings per acre in 1640 to £5 in 1646. In the late 
1640s plantations were rapidly changing hands at between 
£1,800 and £4,500 per 100 acres, but later on after 1650 
during the Restoration period the real estate value of a 
100 acre plantation settled at roughly £2,000 (Dunn, 1973:
Ch.2).
Within a space of three to four years after the 
introduction of sugar manufacturing, a planter elite was 
already in the process of formation and Barbados rapidly 
developed all the attributes of a plantation society, with 
labour intensive agricultural methods for the cultivation 
of cane and land distribution skewed in favour of the big 
entrepreneur. In the 1640s and 1650s some 300 Barbadian 
planters managed to seize the monopoly of cane cultivation 
and manufacture. When Governor Atkins compiled the first 
Census in 1680, land distribution and sugar production was 
monopolized by an even smaller elite of 175 planters.
The new social group of sugar planters which 
developed in the 1640s and 1650s was more akin to the 
entrepreneurs of the English Industrial Revolution than 
the small cultivators who preceded them, in terms of 
business ideology and access to finance capital. It is 
this second factor, the one of access to capital, which was 
vital to the establishment of a sugar industry in the island. 
The need for high capital investment was inevitable, given 
the need to produce sugar commercially on much larger units 
than five to thirty acres, the necessity for labour 
intensive methods of cultivation and the setting up of 
industrial units to transform the raw product. The extent 
of the resources required and the costliness of such an 
enterprise, was clearly stated in the earliest contemporary 
account given by Ligon in 1657. He is here indicating the 
enormous capital investment required to set up a sugar 
plantation, which is reflected in the eighteen-fold increase 
in the value of one Nicholas Hilliard’s plantation in the 
Parish of Christ Church. He also points to the complementary 
pre-requisite: that of land resource concentration.
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"For before the work began, this Plantation of 
Major Hilliard’s, of five hundred acres, could have been purchased for four hundred pound 
sterling; and now the halfe of the stock upon 
it, was sold for seven thousand pound sterling.And it is evident, that all the land there, which has been employed to that work, hath found the 
like improvement. And I believe, when the small Plantations in poor man’s hands, of ten, twenty or 
thirty acres, which are too small to lay to that work, be brought up by great men, and put together 
into Plantations of five, six or seven hundred 
acres, that two thirds of the Hand will be fit for Plantations of sugar, which will make it one of the richest spots of earth under the sun." (Ligon,
1970: 22).
The above value quoted by Ligon of a plantation after 
"improvement" for the cultivation of sugar is typical, during 
a period when plantations of 500 acres were fetching £16,000 
on average, which is more than the Earl of Carlisle offered 
for proprietory rights of the whole island a decade earlier.-^
During a forty year period between 1642 and 
Atkins’s Census of 1680, this process of a movement away 
from the formation of colonies of settlement in both 
Barbados and the French islands, based upon a balanced 
subsistence economy, to the formation of plantation societies 
based upon the monocultural production of sugar, radically 
altered the socio-economic characteristics of these societies. 
In the case of Barbados, by the 1660s we can point to the 
emergence and firm entrenchment of a plantocratic elite 
situated at the apex of the colonial social structure, 
enjoying a monopoly over land and wealth. Concomitant with 
the concentration of resources in the hands of a few hundred 
individuals, was the ecological polarity to be observed in 
the distribution of land resources : an opposition between
a.type of micro-latifundia and minifundia.^
The statistical data gathered by Sir Jonathan Atkins 
gives us perhaps the richest, most comprehensive and detailed 
picture of early plantation society, from which can he con­
structed a fairly accurate analysis of the Barbadian social5structure of the period. The following Table^ presents an 
analysis of landownership by freeholders with at least ten 
acres (the property qualification which gave eligibility to
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vote in colony elections), and information on the free and 
unfree labour force, which can be regarded as an important 
form of investment:
TABLE I : DISTRIBUTION OF FREEHOLDINGS AND LABOUR
FORCE BY PARISH IN BARBADOS IN 1680
Parish Number of Freeholders AcreageOwned Slaveholding ChristianServants
St.Michael 225 7,063 5,746 303
St.George 121 9,569 4,316 111
Christ Church 410 12,979 4,723 178
St.Philip 407 12,150 4,702 115
St.James 185 6,742 2,895 113'
St.Joseph 98 4,668 2,072 72
St.Lucy 437 6,800 1,965 122
St.Thomas 192 7,425 3,396 226
St.John 124 7,659 3,303 156
St.Peter 208 6,651 3,977 375
St.Andrew 109 5,597 2,248 47
Totals 2,514 86,303 37,343 1,818
(Source: Public Records' Office, The Barbados Census of 1680, 
C.O. 1/44: 246/7)
In spite of the fact that contemporary sources 
reveal that the Barbados Assembly of the period considered 
a plantation of about 200 acres, equipped with two or three 
sugar mills and a workforce of 100 slaves., to be the optimum
size for efficient production, the evidence from the Census
indicates that a very small minority (less than 4 per cent) 
actually owned plantations of such a size. According to 
the same Assembly such a plantation required a capital 
outlay of £8,000, plus an annual running expense of £1,100.
It is obvious that only the largest and wealthiest planters 
had the resources available to take advantage of the economies
of scale which favoured the really large enterprises of 200
acres and over.
In his classificatory analysis of Barbados landholders,
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Richard Dunn (1969) employs slaveholding alone rather than 
acreage as an index of size, since he argues that land in 
Barbados was of variable quality, whereas labour represented 
a concrete investment. Basing his analysis upon data con­
tained in the Census, Dunn distinguishes between three 
categories of planter: "big” — - planters with slaveholdings
of sixty or more; "middling11 planters with twenty to
fifty nine slaves; "small" --- one to nineteen slaves. In
the late seventeenth century Barbados had the most fully 
developed agricultural system in English America. Unlike 
Jamaica and Virginia, Barbados with only a total land area 
of 106,000 acres had a closed land resource situation. 
Plantations in Barbados were therefore small, and remained 
small by later eighteenth century Jamaican and mainland 
standards. However, in the late seventeenth century most 
prominent Jamaican planters, could not be considered "big" 
by Dunn’s definition. One good illustration of this is 
provided in Craton and Walvin’s study of Worthy Park (1970), 
in which it is documented that the central arable area of 
500 acres owned by the Price family in 1701 had a very small 
slaveholding for its size of only twenty-two slaves.
Due to the ecological limitations imposed upon the 
Barbadian planter, intensive cultivation and consequently 
large capital investment was necessary. Bearing these 
factors in mind when comparing Barbados with territories 
enjoying an open land resource situation, Dunn’.s planto- 
cratic elite forms a highly restricted group of 175 "big" 
planters, whose consolidated affluence dominated the 
island economically in 1680:
TABLE II : "BIG" PLANTERS’ SHARE OF PROPERTY IN 1680
Planters with 60 °/° All other %slaves and over landholders
Number of planters 175 6.9 2,417 93.1
Acreage 46,775 53.4 40,804 46.6
Christian Servants 1,032 53.9 883 46.1
Slaveholdings 20,289 54.3 17,054 45.7
(Source: Dunn, 1969)
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Thus with the establishment and development of an economy 
based upon the highly lucrative monoculture of a product
7which came "thither as a stranger from beyond the Line", 
a pattern of landownership and resource distribution was 
established in these plantation societies, the basic 
features of which have persisted in both Barbados and 
Martinique up to the present.
It is possible to isolate an even more exclusive 
group which occupied the higher echelons of this plantocratic 
elite. A total of ninety-one planters met the optimum 
requirements of the Barbados Assembly, and all except five 
qualified as "big" planters in Dunn's terms. A glance at 
Appendix II will reveal that the average sized holding of 
this group was well over 300 acres, that seventeen landholders 
owned plantations of over 400 acres, and that nine of the 
latter each owned over 500 acres.
A substantial nucleus of Dunn's group of 175 "big"
planters, sixty two out of a total of 159 families which
formed the island elite, were already landowners in Barbados 
8in 1638. He regards these sixty-two families as the "charter 
members" of the Barbados elite. Included in this core group 
were such important names as Alleyne, Codrington, Bulkeley,
Drax, Guy, Hothersall, Frere, Yeamans and Pears, and all of 
these names appear in the list of the largest ninety-one 
landowners in 1680. The social origins of this group are of 
particular interest, since three-quarters of its members came 
from English merchant families that had considerable invest­
ments in overseas trading companies.^ The affluence and 
dominance of this tiny minority over land resources and 
access to labour is indicated by the following:
TABLE III: 91 LARGEST PLANTERS' ACCESS TO LAND RESOURCES AND LABOUR IN 1680
Planters with 200 % All other %acres and over landholders
Number of planters 91 3.6 2,423 96.4
Acreage 50,032 34.8 56,271 65.2
Christian Servants 619 34.1 1,199 65.9
Slaveholdings 12,790 34.2 24,553 65.8
(Source: Public Records' Office, C.O. 1/44, 142-379)
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Initially the social structure of this plantation 
society was defined in terms of two factors: the economic 
and the juridical. In An Account of His Majesty's Island 
of Barbados of 1676,^  which dealt specifically with the 
composition of colonial government, constitutional law and 
the status of its inhabitants, four groups were legally 
defined:
"The Inhabitants of this Island are of four sorts: 
Freeholders.
First the Freeholders who formerly held their lands 
from the Earle of Carlisle, under the acknowledgementof 40 lbs of Cotton per head --  and since the
surrender of that Patent from His Majesty in free 
and common Soccage, Yeilding and paying every year 
for the same one Eare of Indian Corne in full discharge of all Rents and services whatsoever.
Freemen.
The next sort are those they call Freemen, who 
are such as having served out their time they contracted for, are freed from their masters and 
now serve in the country for wages.
Servants.
The third sort are of those they call Christian 
Servants for distinction, whose time of service is not yet expired.
Slaves.
The last sort are the Negroes brought thither 
from the Coast of Guinny, Cormantine, and 
Madagascar, who live as absolute slaves to their masters".
It is evident from the treatment given in this 
document to the legal status of the inhabitants of the 
island, that the hierarchization of the social structure 
was far more complex than the simple "wealthy planter"/ 
"oppressed slave" dichotomy suggested by Eric Williams 
(1944: 25), when describing the wealth created by sugar in 
seventeenth century Barbados. Both contemporary travellers' 
accounts and the data contained in Atkins' Census, clearly 
indicate that the sugar plantocracy itself was highly 
stratified. Another important hierarchical principle in 
plantation society was that of the distinction between 
freeholder and freeman; the latter not enjoying the same
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constitutional rights as the former. In the same document 
of 1676 referred to above, we are told that
"The Assembly is composed of Twenty-Two persons, two being chosen out of every Parish by the 
Voices of the Freeholders, who must have 10 acres of freehold Land a peice or else they 
cannot Vote."^
Richard Dunn (1969) estimates that about 1,200 
male landowners were able to qualify as freeholders in 1680, 
plus a further 2/500 householders from Bridgetown whose 
property realized an annual minimum rentable value of 
£10. By this reckoning about one-quarter to one-third
of the white adult male population were eligible to elect 
or be elected assemblymen, vestrymen and jurors. However, 
in spite of this measure of popular participation in govern­
ment, the biggest planters dominated island politics in much 
the same fashion as they dominated the economy.
In 1680 seventy-three of the ninety-one largest
planters held at least one civil or military post. Between
1675 and 1686 102 out of Dunn’s 175 "big" planters held
12office in Barbados. The majority of the remainder of this 
group were mostly women, minors or Quakers. One fact emerges 
from this analysis of office holding amongst "big" landowners, 
and that is that the large landowners in Barbados at the end 
of the seventeenth century were locally based and not 
absentee. This factor of planter residence which remained 
primarily local over a period of 300 years (though at some 
periods to a lesser degree than in 1680), has had an 
important influence upon the rather special character of 
Barbadian society, and the plantocratic elite’s conception 
of itself as a social group.
The hierarchical principle which was seen to be 
evident in the distribution of land resources, played an- 
equally important role in the distribution of elective and 
appointive offices. In his summing up of the Census 
material, Dunn (1969: 9) clearly points to unambiguous 
coincidence between hierarchies of economic and political 
power enjoyed by the planter elite:
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"Small freeholders deferentially elected their _betters as assemblymen and jurors, while 
Governor Atkins distributed.practically all the 
important offices in his island amongst members 
of the Barbados elite. There was little to choose between the appointed Council and the 
elected Assembly in wealth and dignity...the 12 councillors in 1680 averaged 420 acres and 190 
slaves apiece. The 22 assemblymen averaged 340 acres and 153 slaves apiece."
The members of both Houses in the Government were therefore 
drawn from the highest echelons of the elite:
COUNCILLORS AND ASSEMBLYMEN IN 1680
COUNCIL
Sir Peter Colleton
Colonel Henry Drax
Li eut enant-General Henry Walrond
Colonel Samuel Newton
Thomas Wordall
John Pears
Colonel John Standfast 
John Witham 
Richard Howell 
Edwyn Stede
ASSEMBLY
Colonel William Bate Colonel Richard Guy
Major Roland Bulkeley Samuel Husbands
Richard Seawell 
Major Richard Williams
Major Richard Pocock 
William Goodall
Colonel Christopher 
Codrington 
Colonel Thomas Colleton
Colonel William Sharpe 
Captain Edward Binney
Captain Merrick Captain John Gibbes
Lieutenant-Colonel Samuel Tidcombe 
Captain Thomas Maycocke
Major William Foster Colonel Richard Baylye
Edward Littleton 
James Walwynd
Lieutenant-Colonel James Carter John Davis
(St. Michael) 
(St. George) 
(Christ Church) 
(St. Philip)
(St. John)
(St. Joseph) 
(St. Andrew)
(St. Lucy)
(St. Peter)
(St. James)
(St. Thomas)
(Source: Public Records' Office, C.O. 1/44: 142/579)
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The legal distinctions employed in the 1676 
Constitution which circumscribed the privileges, powers, 
and rights of the four main strata of Barbadian society, 
serve as only a guide to an understanding of the basis of 
colonial social structure. It is only when these legal 
distinctions are combined with socio-economic ones, that 
a working model of the social hierarchy becomes apparent 
in real terms. The following factors are of prime importance 
in this analysis-:
I. The sugar plantocracy was not a homogeneous group.
It was internally stratified and as I have already 
indicated, political power and wealth was monopolized 
by a small minority.
II. The distinction between freeholder and freeman; the 
latter being exempt from decision making and 
political office in the island.
III. The distinction between free and unfree labour; the 
difference also being homologous with culture and 
race, hence the important .distinguishing cultural 
tag applied to the white indentured labour force of 
"Christian Servants".
Summarizing Governor Atkins's data, it is possible 
to construct the following rough demographic breakdown for 
1680:
"Big"Planters 175
"Middling"Planters 200
"Small" Planters 1,000
Bridgetown House­
holders 400
Freemen 1,200
Christian Servants 2,300
Slaves 40,000
(All freeholders)
(two-thirds qualifying as freeholders)
(a half to three-quarters qualifying as freeholders)
(Majority owned smallholdings of five acres and under)
(including 400 from Bridgetown)
(including 1,320 from Bridgetown)
In legal and economic terms, the overall social 
structure at this period could be differentiated and stratified 
in the following manner: (Diagram over page)
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DIAGRAM I. SOCIO-ECONOMIC CATEGORIES AND LEGAL STATUS 
IN BARBADOS IN 1680
I. 175 "Big" Planters
II. 200 "Middling" Planters and 2/300 Bridgetown Householders 
in professions and trading: 
doctors, lawyers, merchants.
III. 6/700 "Small" Planter free­
holders .
IV. 3/400 Non-freeholder "small" 
planters and 1/200 non­freeholders in Bridgetown.
V. 1,200 Freemen filling various posts as plantation employees: 
overseers, foremen, carpenters, 
masons, smiths.
VI. 2,300 indentured labourers, the 
majority serving their inden- tureship working alongside unfree 
black labour on the plantations.
(Categories I, II and III united by
their joint control of political 40,000 Slavespowers vested in a local legislature, with office holding concentrated 
in the top echelons of the planto­cracy) .
3.3. The Tropical Founding Fathers : Martinique.
The social structure which developed in the French 
Antilles during the ’sugar revolution'* of the 1640s and 
l650s, grew out of a similar dual system of stratification 
that we have already observed for Barbados. French migrant 
society in Martinique developed its own system of habitants 
and engages; the latter group signing indentures for a 
considerably shorter period than the indentured labourers 
of Barbados. Because their indentureship period was limited 
to three years, they also became known as the trente-six mois. 
Another group which made up the European presence in the 
mid-seventeenth century was a body collectively known as the 
engages forces. These were in effect transported persons, 
comprising in the main common criminals and political and
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religious dissidents. One of the latter were a group of 
Hugenots who arrived after the annulment of the Edict of 
Nantes in 1687.
Apart from the colonial administrators sent by 
the French monarch to represent the central metropolitan 
government, three main social categories could be dis­
tinguished in French Antillean society in the last quarter 
of the seventeenth century. Firstly, the Grands Blancs, 
both noble and bourgeois, whose families had obtained 
large concessions of land in the 1650s and 1660s, were 
now the true masters of the French islands, having 
entrenched their position economically through, a monopol­
ization of sugar production. Lower down in the social 
hierarchy was an intermediary group of Petits Habitants, 
which constituted a middle-class of small proprietors 
cultivating coffee, cocoa and basic foodstuffs (vivres) 
for local consumption. Also included in this category 
were professional and trading groups, such as doctors, 
solicitors and lawyers, and merchants and large shopkeepers.
In plantation society it was the existence of this inter­
mediary strata which provided an avenue for social mobility, 
whereby small cultivators, merchants and professionals who 
acquired capital could obtain large concessions of land and 
thus join the ranks of the Grands Blancs. At the lowest 
level of the social hierarchy the Petits Blancs formed a 
less homogeneous stratum than groups I and II, being made 
up of a composite of small shopkeepers, artisans, dock 
workers and those engaged as plantation supervisory staff.
A very small minority were still officially engages. For 
the most part they were former engages who had been unable 
to acquire concessions of land, or else the now landless 
descendants of petits planteurs who cultivated tobacco, 
indigo and vivres during the early colonial period, who
were subsequently squeezed out after 1645 when the French14state accorded priority to sugar cultivation.
The rapid transition from a relatively egalitarian 
society of small peasant proprietors, to one of extreme 
inequalities based upon an access to land and labour resources
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skewed in favour of the big entrepreneur, was a process 
which was duplicated in the French islands, and like 
Barbados determined the nature and composition of the 
social structure once sugar had been firmly established 
as a crop of high export value. However, the process was 
not entirely contemporaneous, and the composition of the 
social structure and the distribution and utilization of 
land resources all have some -unique features. These are 
necessarily a reflection of the French island’s geophysical 
peculiarities and French colonial policies and practices. 
Social and cultural aspects of . French metropolitan 
society itself are also important variables to consider 
when making a comparison between the two territories.
In both Martinique and Guadeloupe the method of 
distributing land was through the granting of concessions, 
firstly by the Grands Compagnies up to 1674 who had 
received proprietory rights from Louis XIV. After 1674 and 
up to the French Revolution, land in the Antilles was 
directly attached to the Crown, and in addition to land 
being granted to time-expired engages and colons libres who 
had paid their own passage to the islands, concessions were 
also granted to individuals for service to the Crown.
In principle land was granted to those wishing to 
become settlers and could not be obtained for a purchase 
price. In Martinique, Guadeloupe and the smaller dependencies 
of the latter, the Compagnies des Isles d'Amerique were 
solely responsible for the administering of these land grants 
in the first forty years of colonization. Initially these 
corporations which were financially supported and accorded 
exclusive commercial rights by Richlieu, "grand maitre, chef 
et surintendant general de la navigation et du commerce de 
France",, were instrumental in executing a conscious policy 
of French aggrandizement which sought to create in the old 
colonies extensions of the mother country overseas. One 
indicator of this policy is to be found in the names given 
to the collectivities of territories which formed the vast 
domain of France d'Outre-Mer : Nouvelle France (Canada),
France Septentrionale (Region, on the Great Lakes in North
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America),France Merid'ionale (Louisiana), France Orientale 
(Madagascar), France Equinoxale (the Antilles and Guiana).
It is therefore apparent that any study of 
early French Antillean social structure must 
take into - account the highly centralised 
colonial policy of the French. As intermediaries of the 
French Crown in this policy of aggrandizement, the Grands 
Compagnies were accorded commercial privileges and given 
publicity and financial support by the Crown in order that 
they might procure shareholders. Individuals from all 
social classes contributed to their formation: courtisans, 
the clergy, the nobility and the bourgeoisie. Shareholders 
were attracted by the prospect of ennoblement and lettres 
de noblesse were auctioned off to the highest bidder, which 
were given in exchange for investments to fund the activities 
of the corporations. One of these corporations, the 
Compagnie des Cent Associes, was accorded twelve letters of 
anoblissement by Richlieu, which were all left blank so that 
the titles of chevalier, baron, marquis and comte could be 
conferred upon the largest subscribers.
The active role of publicity agent by the French 
Crown in the launching of these corporations would appear to 
have been vital to their success. Unlike England of the 
period there was little accumulation of capital, and liquid 
assets were not so freely available. The Crown was therefore 
forced to intervene and to organize intensive publicity 
campaigns in order to raise the capital to cover the 
corporations’ operating costs. One of the most intensive 
of these publicity campaigns was launched in 1664 to acquire 
funds for the Compagnies des Indes Occidentales. One writer 
(Girault, 1927: 47) commenting upon this campaign depicted 
it as
"...a publicity stunt worthy of a Barnum. The money 
lent by the king to the Corporation was loaded on a 
wagon and driven through the streets of Paris under 
escort, its passage heralded by the blast of a trumpet. 
Added to this a shameless official pressure by means 
of a circular letter from the king, which was addressed 
to the various municipalities asking them to subscribe, 
and the menacing letters sent by Colbert to government 
officials who delayed in making their subscriptions, was employed to extort funds”.
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Because of this official intervention it could he 
said that-the creation-of the Compagnies was the work of 
the French Crown rather than that of private entrepreneurs.
The relationship between the Crown and the Compagnies has 
been likened by several authors to that of feudal lord 
and vassal, and at the same time the Compagnies themselves 
were accorded feudal rights as Seigneurs Proprietaires. By 
an Act dated February 12th 1635, Cardinal Richlieu provided 
that
"Les Seigneurs de la Compagnie recevront a perpetuite le propriete des isles ... en toute justice et seigneurie. (Ils) disposeront desdites choses a eux accordees ... distribueront les terres entre eux 
et & ceux qui sfhabitueront sur les lieux."(Quoted by Bernissant, 1916: 9).
In addition to these seigneurial rights the Compagnies also 
enjoyed a monopoly of all commerce in the islands, and were 
exempt from all duties upon imports and-exports between the 
Antilles and metropolitan France. They also enjoyed full 
rights of sovereignty delegated by the king, since they were 
permitted to raise armies, build forts and dispense justice.
To them was also designated the responsibility of imposing 
Catholicism upon the indigenous Carib population.
The reign of the Seigneurs Proprietaires ended in 
1674 when the Antilles were brought under the direct 
administration of the Crown. Data from the land survey of 
1671 carried out by Pellisier,1  ^indicates the effects that 
the substitution of a diversified agriculture for the 
monocultural production of sugar had on the distribution of 
land resources. The survey indicates a total of 677 
separate concessions on a total area of roughly 33,000 
hectares, which represents less than one-third of 
the island’s total area (in 1680 80 per cent of the total
area of Barbados was cultivated). The tendency for a con­
centration of land resources in fewer hands is shown by the 
following land resource distribution table, which is broken 
down by plantation size:
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TABLE IV : LAND RESOURCE DISTRIBUTION IN MARTINIQUE IN 1671.
Plantation size No. of plantations Total Area (hectares)
0-10 hectares 248 1,430
10-20 161 2,560
20-40 159 4,912
40-100 79 6,109
Over 100 30 11,450
Totals 677 26,461*
(*Does not include 6,464 hectares granted but still uncultivated 
in 1671).
(Source: Pellisier, "Estat du Procez-Verbal des Terres de l'Isle de la Martinique". Data reproduced by 
M. Sobesky in 1941: Carte des Terres de la 
Martinique concedees par la Compagnie des lies, 
les Seigneurs Propri§taires et la Compagnie des 
Indes Qccidentales en 1671).
The results of the survey clearly indicate the erosion of a 
land resource distributive system based upon small proprietor­
ships. Overall the average plantation size was just under 
forty hectares. Plantations over forty hectares account 
for two-thirds of the total area conceded, and over 
40 per cent- of the total area cultivated was monopolised 
by 4.5 per cent of the concessionaires. Within this 
latter group of very large plantation owners of over 100 
hectares, the average plantation size was 382 hectares and 
three out of the group are indicated in the survey as having 
a total of 5,559 hectares.
This transition from smallholding to grand domaine 
on which agricultural and industrial operations were combined
-1 rinto a unity where "chacun avait ses champs et son moulin", 
signalled the formation of the habitation sucrier. This was 
accomplished by the absorption of ten to twenty hectare 
holdings by the new class of habitants sucriers. Pere Labat 
(1722: IV, 522) and Abbe Raynal (1770r III, 336) both des­
cribed a process after the imposition of heavy duties on 
tobacco in 1664, of numerous small landowners in the Antilles 
being forced to sell out to owners of sugar estates.
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Intendant Patoulet who headed a commission on land use in 
1679, was constrained to comment in a letter to the Minister 
of Colonies in the following year:
"Because tobacco has no value, a considerable 
proportion of the habitants have had to sell 
their land to sugar planters who have need of 
large holdings”.
In his Voyage some of Labat’s comments upon the 
method of obtaining land concessions and the policy of the 
Crown government which regulated them, indicates that the 
big entrepreneur was clearly favoured:
"Those who hardly have any land and cannot or do not 
wish to purchase any, request a concession from the Royal domaine. He makes his application to the 
Governor General and the Intendant ... indicating his status in life, the number of his children, and 
his slaves and his other assets...”(1722: III/3, 43).
It is evident that slaveholding was regarded as an important 
form of investment, together with other undefined assets 
termed "autres facultez”, and it is also evident that the 
size of concessions granted was commensurate with the capital 
resources of the applicant:.
"Upon this application these Crown officials'make a concession of land, of which the area conceded 
is in proportion to the needs and resources 
of the applicant..." (1722: III/3, 44).
The size of concession in the Antilles had never 
been fixed by law, but by the custom and practice of 
allocating ten to twenty hectare lots. However, in the 
last quarter of the seventeenth century land holdings were 
increasingly greater in area; this tendency as I have already 
shown being quite marked in 1671. The size that Pere Labat 
gave for his model habitation sucrerie was between 150 and 
200 hectares, with a recommended slaveholding of 120 slaves 
(1722: 111/12, 416/17). In official circles a concession of 
between 100 and 300 hectares was considered necessary to form 
a sugar works and plantation. Ideal models and official 
recommendations apart, it is only by looking at an actual 
example that we can gain some idea of the new economic 
organization. I can do no better than to refer to Labat’s
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description of the Marquise d'Angenne’s habitation just 
outside Saint-Pierre:
"On this habitation there are more than 300 slaves 
and 2 sugar mills, one driven by water power and the other by horse power; a refinery in the town, 
and a very fine cocoa plantation". (1722: 1/4, 91/2).
The Dominican Friars own habitation sucrerie at Fonds Saint-
Jacques was much larger than the optimum size quoted above.
200 hectares was granted initially in 1654 by du Parquet,
and later on two further concessions of 200 hectares each
were granted. By 1694 the Habitation Fonds Saint-Jacques
*1 Rstood on 600 hectares of land.
Since the process of change was slower in the French 
islands, for comparative purposes it is probably most useful 
to refer to the Census of 1709. By this date a more mature 
plantation system had emerged, in that the definitive 
features of plantation economy and society had been laid 
down, just as they had been in Barbados by 1680. Between 
1671 and 1709 the total number of habitations sucreries had 
increased from 184 to 274. The Census provides us with a 
list of ‘155 principal sugar planters, hut does not give us 
any detailed information on relative size, so it is not 
possible to distinguish between "big", "middling" and "small" 
planters. In the earlier colonial period the social structure 
of Martinique had been defined primarily in terms of economic 
differences, or as one French historian has so succintly put 
it, by "la richesse et l’etendue des terres" (Daney, 1850:
I, 128). A study of the data on the principal sucriers 
contained in the 1709 Census is very revealing, in so far as 
it provides clues to the hierarchical principles defining the 
social structure in the early eighteenth century, and the 
extent to which hierarchies of wealth, prestige and power 
coincided and were already institutionalized. The 
information contained in the Census is broken down into four 
geographical areas: the north-western coastal area with Saint- 
Pierre at the centre, the north-eastern coastal area of 
Capesterre on the Atlantic, the southern area of the island 
and the central plain of Lamentin and Fort Royal. The 
following table indicates the distribution of the white
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population, slaveholdings and habitations sucreries of the 
period:
TABLE V- : WHITE POPULATION, SLAVEHOLDINGS AND SUGAR PLANTATIONS 
IN MARTINIQUE-IN 1709.
Region Sucreries Slaveholdings White Population
North-Western Coast 33 6,551 3,178
Capesterre 50 6,165 2,046
South and East Coast 86 6,159 2,262
Lamentin and Fort
Royal 105 7,990 1,948
Totals 274 26,865 9.434
(Source: Archives D'Outre-Mer, Carton Gl, Dossier 470 bis)
These four areas were of more than mere geographical 
significance, since their boundaries were determined by the 
deployment of the Martiniquan militia's four regiments: each 
regiment being responsible for the defence of one of these 
areas.
From the Census data sixty-one out of the 155 
principal planters are indicated as being officers in the 
militia, (see Appendix III). Under the ancien regime the 
posting of officer was reserved only for the nobility, 
however, the impossibility of finding nobles to fill these 
posts in Martinique led successive governors to recruit 
wealthy planters, who were nevertheless commoners.*1"^  The 
prestige accorded by this policy of recruitment gave the 
Martiniquan plantocracy an undeniable advantage, which con­
ferred if not always actual ennoblement,, certain pretensions 
to an elevated status:
"To be an officer ... was the unquestionable sign of elevation. The authority conferred by this title and the practice of command, established and 
heightened a consciousness of that elevation..." 
(Hayot*? 1965: 11).
In a number of ways they enjoyed the same privileges of the 
noblesse d'epee in France itself:
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"Accepted in positions in the kingdom reserved for 
.the nobility, used to authority from a very early 
age, accustomed to being obeyed and served, and to 
risking their lives in the service of the king with 
the same sang-froid and enthusiasm as the most gallant scions of the aristocracy, they had moreover 
the privilege of carrying a sword." (Hayot, 1965: 12)
Further information on the principal sugar planters contained 
in the Census also reveals that high political offices were 
distributed among the group. Many are indicated as being 
conseillers in the Conseil Souverain, which was composed of 
nominated members under the direct control of the French 
crown. At the local level this Conseil Souverain was under 
the immediate jurisdiction of a military governor and an 
intendant, a civil administrator responsible for justice, 
economic affairs and finance. According to Labat of the 
dozen conseillers in Martinique in 1705, two were French 
lawyers and "...the others were notable planters or merchants 
..." (1722: II/5, 118/19). For the most part throughout the 
life of these local parlements, conseillers tended to be 
wealthy planters or merchants from Saint-Pierre, who at the 
same time were invariably high ranking officers in the militia.
In order to illustrate the actual process whereby this 
Martiniquan elite came to consolidate its financial and landed 
interests, and to monopolize all the positions of prestige and 
political power in the island, I can do no better than to refer 
back to Pere Labat and his description of the social ascendance 
of one of these families. In the following excellent account
he is referring to the family of le Vassor, of which several
members are mentioned in the 1709 Census:
"Monsieur de-la Chardonniere.* (le Vassor) was one of 
the oldest habitants of the island. He had brothers 
living in the same island. The elder was Monsieur
le Vassor who was a Council member of the Conseil,whose plantation adjoined that of Madame le Marquise d'Angennes. He was Captain of the militia at Saint- 
Pierre. He came to the islands when very young, took part in the war against the savages, and had seen 
active service against the English and the Spanish.He had always served with distinction. He had married a rich widow, and such good fortune had accompanied 
him, that within a few years he was able to build a 
sugar factory. When his wife died, childless, she left 
him sole inheritor."
(1722: 1/ 5 , 120/ 21).
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The younger brother of the latter, a captain in the 
militia, came to Martinique some years after his eldest 
brothers, and for a while worked as an overseer on the 
aforementioned brother’s plantation. He too married a 
rich widow:
”He married the widow of one Jolly, habitant of the .neighbourhood. Dying a short while after their 
marriage, she left her property to be shared bet­
ween her husband and a. son from her first marriage.
He negotiated with this son, and in return for certain financial considerations, he remained owner 
of the habitation...” (1722: 1/5, 121).
For some families hypergamous alliances were evidently very 
important means of social ascendance. Almost in a tone of 
incredulity, Labat goes on to tell us that M. le Vassor made 
a trip to Paris after the death of widow Jolly, and married 
one of the daughters of sieur le Quoy, an officer of the 
Hotel de Ville. When he returned to Martinique he brought 
back one of his wife’s sisters to marry his eldest brother 
La Chardonniere.
Finally, one further important mark of social 
distinction should not be overlooked, which is that of 
anoblissement, or the conferment of titles upon commoners 
by the king either freely for services rendered or by pur­
chase. As with the ennoblement of those private investors 
who were the largest contributors to the Compagnies in the 
Metropolis, so in the colonial context members of the 
Martiniquan plantocracy purchased lettres de noblesse, 
or had honours conferred upon them for political, 
administrative and military service. However, the 
fact should not be overlooked that the numbers
ennobled in Martinique up to the French Revolution 
were quite small: twenty-seven cases in all rep-r
resenting no more than 1 per cent of the white
population (Hayot, 1965).
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3.4. A Comparative Overview: Population, Social Structure 
and Elite Composition in Mature Plantation Society.
Concomitant with the changes in the distribution of 
land resources and the social structure in the second half 
of the seventeenth century, were a number of demographic 
changes resulting in an altered ethnic composition 
and overall total.population increase. At the beginning of 
the 'sugar revolution1 in the 1640s, from being a majority 
the European settlers-were in a minority within a quarter 
of a century. For the case of Barbados census material 
reveals that a racial imbalance of 5:1 in favour of a black 
slave population had been created as early as 1680. In 
Martinique the same trend was evident though the process was 
a slower one. The prevailing direction was clear. To quote 
Philip Sherlock: "The Europeans had become a small garrison 
among the slaves." (1956: 70).
Despite the observable direct relationship between
the introduction of sugar and the numerical decline of the
Caucasian population in favour of an African one, white
indentureship continued for some time after the introduction
of sugar and slavery. There were still some 2,300 white
28indentured servants in Barbados in 1680,. living in a state 
of semi-servitude and increasing misery. The social con­
ditions of the group were particularly wretched, since the 
majority were forced to continue working alongside an unfree 
labour force as wage labourers after the expiry of their 
indentureship. This had the effect of creating a class of 
poor white landless labourers out of those whites who did 
not emigrate at the end of the seventeenth century, thus * 
becoming the ancestors of today's ’redlegs'', '
From Pere Labat's evidence (1722: III, 428/29) 
there were no longer any engages working as agricultural 
labourers in the French Antilles at the end of the 
seventeenth century. According to him they were only to be 
found as overseers and foremen on the sugar plantations, as 
well as occupying specialized roles in the sugar factories. 
The system of engagement was officially suppressed in the
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French islands in 1774. However, the role of the engages 
in the populating of the Antilles ended before this date. 
Statistics available for Guadeloupe indicate that their 
numbers fell rapidly from 800 in 1662 to 600 in 1695, and 
further declined to 175 in 1730. (Lasserre, 1961: 1,286).
The same rate of decline took place in Martinique, and the 
system of engagement disappeared completely between 1730 
and 1740.
In order to combat the anomalous situation whereby 
free whites worked alongside enslaved blacks, the colonial 
legislature in Barbados passed a series of Deficiency Acts 
to improve the conditions of poor whites and to create 
avenues of employment for them. In one respect these Acts 
had something in common with the general tenor of Colbert’s 
Code Noir of 1685. Both pieces of legislation had the 
effect of differentiating and stratifying Barbadian and 
French Antillean society in terms of cultural and racial 
differences, whereas in the case of Barbados society had 
been formerly differentiated and stratified along legal 
and economic lines, and in Martinique according to these 
same economic differences and the somewhat feudal privileges 
granted by the Crown. It should be noted that in passing 
this legislation the colonial authorities were primarily 
motivated by the fear of servile mutiny. Behind the 
apparent altruism of the Deficiency Acts lay the authority’s 
alarm at the growing disproportion between the European and 
the African population, and the perceived need to halt the 
emigration of poor whites in order to fill the ranks of the 
militia. The Code Noir as well as circumscribing the rights 
and legal status of slaves throughout its sixty articles, 
also made it incumbent upon the plantocracy to maintain a 
rigid internal discipline. With the introduction of this 
legislation the actual picture of the social structure which 
emerged at the end of the seventeenth century was that of 
a three-dimensional model, in which the rigid ascriptiveness 
of 'caste-like' racial differences must be superadded to the 
existing legal-and feudal distinctions of status and socio­
economic differences. During a brief span of fifty years, 
economic and demographic change and the enactment of
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legislation in response to these developments contributed to 
the emergence of social structures, the details of which in 
terms of their complexity were radically different from the 
simple duality of colonizer and indentured servant of the 
1620s and 1630s.
With the development of a mature plantation society 
during the eighteenth century, the white population declined 
progressively in both islands over the next 100 years. In 
Martinique where the trend was slower, the white population 
peaked at just over 16,000 in 1740 and thereafter declined 
to about 10,500 on the eve of the French Revolution. (Benoist, 
1963: 260). In Barbados the white'population reached its 
peak much earlier. As early as 1653 it had reached 26,000 
(Bridenbaugh, 1972: 226). By the early years of the nine­
teenth century it had declined to under 13,000 (Sheppard,
1977: 63,). In both islands the monopolization of scarce 
land resources by a restricted planter elite through the 
absorption of smaller holdings and the creation of large 
estates and domaines, and the substitution of indentured 
labour from the home country for African'slave labour, ended 
the era of mass white immigration and signalled its reverse:
the emigration of landless whites to mainland America and
22other West Indian colonies.
In comparing the composition of elite membership 
in both islands throughout the eighteenth century and early 
nineteenth century, it is apparent that the Martiniquan 
plantocracy enjoyed far greater continuity than the 
Barbadian one. The extent to which a high proportion of the 
founding planter class in Martinique survived into the 
nineteenth century, can be seen if the names of sugar 
proprietors contained in the Census of 1709 are compared 
with those which appear in the Marquis de Sainte-Croix*s 
statistical survey of Martinique carried out in 1822. Many 
of the names of prominent Beke families which feature in 
both sources still exist today. Kovats’s patronymic 
analysis carried out in the 1960s (1969) indicates that the 
highest percentage of Beke families today (.39 per cent)came 
to Martinique before 1713. Indeed as I will
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later show, it is from the oldest families that the highest 
echelons of the elite have been recruited. In spite of 
this high degree of continuity and stabilityj a parallel 
process of renewal and replacement has also taken place. 
Kovats’s data also indicates that a substantial proportion 
of today’s families came to Martinique during the eight­
eenth and nineteenth century(22 per cent and 35 per cent 
respectively). A patronymic analysis of families which 
came to Martinique during the seventeenth and eighteenth 
century, reveals that most of them no longer had descendants 
in Martinique in the nineteenth and twentieth century. Out 
of a total of over 350 families who settled during the first 
two centuries of colonization, I would estimate that only
between one-seventh and one-eighth have survived up to the 23present day.
In the case of Barbados there is ample evidence
indicating that the composition of the planter elite has
fluctuated quite considerably over time. A good indication
of this can be seen by comparing the lists of House of
Assembly and Legislative Counoil members at different periods.
For example, a comparison of the twenty-two members of the
House of Assembly in 1700 with the names of members in 1800
indicates that prominent Barbadian planter names had changed
completely during the eighteenth century. The same is also
evident when a comparison is made of Legislative Council24members between roughly the same two dates. One unique 
aspect of Barbadian elite composition, however, is hidden 
when making an analysis of elite membership using this kind 
of data, and that is the continuity of absentee proprietor­
ship. By I860 just over one-quarter of the sugar estates 
in Barbados were absentee owned, which accounted for almost 
half the total acreage under sugar (See Ch.4 Table IX).
It is instructive to note that those estates which remained 
in the same hands for a period of at least 100 years (see 
Appendix V) belonged for the most part to absentees. It 
can therefore be said that absentee proprietorship played 
a primary role in whatever continuity existed in elite 
composition from the development of mature plantation society 
up to the end of the nineteenth century. It will become
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apparent later on that a greater degree of social mobility 
existed in Barbadian planter society, which is indicated by 
an absence of continuity within the local planting community 
as estates changed hands with a frequency unknown in 
Martinique.
5.5. Demographic Changes between the Mid-Nineteenth and 
Twentieth Century
After rapidly declining by over 2,000 in the years 
immediately preceding Abolition, the white population in 
Barbados very quickly increased again and remained fairly 
stable throughout the rest of the nineteenth century. A 
slight decline in the intercensal period 1871-1881 
reflects the emigration of a number of poor whites to 
Grenada and St. Vincent. During a thirty year period between 
1891 and 1921, however, the white population decreased quite 
sharply by one-third. Thereafter during the twentieth 
century the white population declined more slowly in both 
absolute terms and as a proportion of the total population.
The following Table showing the distribution of Barbados’s 
three main ethnic sectors in the population from the mid­
nineteenth century up to the present, indicates this absolute 
and relative decline of the white population. (Seq Tafrle VI 
overleaf).
This dramatic decline in the white population during 
the intercensal periods 1891-1911 and 1911-1921, was primarily 
due to emigration and the departure of the English troops in 
1905- Commenting on the situation in 1911, the compiler of 
the Census noted that
"During the last twenty years ... the decrease has 
been abnormally large and has been caused by
(l) the withdrawal in 1905 of the European troops,
778 in number, who were stationed in the Island when the Census of 1891 was taken,
and (2) the exodus of persons belonging to this sector, 
within recent years, to the United States of 
America and Canada" . ^
That this exodus continued apace into the second decade of the 
twentieth century, is indicated by the statistics and remarks 
of the compiler of the next Census:
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"There seems every probability that the white 
section will continue to decrease, as the 
opportunities of obtaining suitable employment 
in the colony are very limited, and young 
persons of both sexes are continuing to emigrate 
to the less rigorous latitudes of the United States of America and Canada".
It may be safely assumed that these white emigrants 
for the most part came from the poorer classes of white 
Barbadian society. According to Sheppard's evidence 
(1977 : 99), the colonial government of the day accepted 
the principle of assisted emigration to alleviate the 
situation of the poor whites in response to the findings 
of the Poor Relief Report of 1877. However, the setting 
up of an Emigration Commission in 1893 seems to have 
stimulated little practical aid, apart from the establish­
ment of the Victoria Emigration Society in Diamond Jubilee
28year. From the evidence it is apparent that the official 
contribution to this problem was minimal,, and that emigration 
for the most part was secured by private initiative. In 
the absence of any comprehensive official data it is 
therefore difficult to say exactly what socio-economic 
categories the emigrants were drawn from and the numbers 
involved. However, the comments of the Colonial Secretary 
in the Blue Book for 1899 on white emigration indicate that 
the phenomenon was linked primarily with the condition of the 
lower ranks of- white society:
"The condition of the poorer class of whites is 
becoming pressing. They are simply without 
resources: young men and women willing to work, are unable to find work ... For this class the Government does what its means permit, and many emigrants are sent to the U.S. and Canada each 
year, for the most part finding work and prosperity; but the aid given is but a drop in the bucket to what is needed".
The economic pressures upon the poorer sections of the white 
population in the nineteenth century were aggravated by the 
enactment of the Militia Act in 1839. Under this Act the 
system of military tenancy was abandoned, and 2,000 poor 
whites were thrown off the estates where they had occupied 
military tenancies for over 140 years. The land they had 
formerly subsisted upon was either absorbed into the
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plantation, or sold to the newly emancipated slaves. With 
the exception of St. John this resulted in a progressive 
depopulation of the rural parishes throughout the 
nineteenth century and into the twentieth. In the case of 
the latter, some former military tenants joined the ranks 
of the ’redleg' community which had remained stable in that 
parish for a century and a half, on marginal rocky land just 
above or below the coastal cliff. The extent to which the 
white population also maintained a relatively steady presence 
in the parishes of St. Andrew and St. Joseph, is a 
reflection of this move eastwards to the Scotland area, the 
traditional preserve of marginality for the poor white rural 
populace subsisting outside the plantation system.
A systematic analysis of demographic changes within 
the white population over the last 100 years, reveals that 
in addition to the process of external migration, internal 
migration also took place, which resulted in the white 
population becoming more urbanized. The following Table 
indicates that this process of urbanization has continued up 
to the present, increasing from 54.3 per cent in 1891 to 78.8 
per cent in 1970 of the white population living in Bridgetown 
and the parishes of St. Michael and Christ Church. From the 
data it is also evident that the process of rural de­
population has gone on in a complementary fashion:
(See Table VII overleaf).
The gravitation of the poorer classes of non-landowning
whites to the City of Bridgetown and the parishes of St.
Michael and Christ Church in the early twentieth century,
reflects the new opportunities for employment afforded by the
expansion of the commercial sector. In particular the large
department stores located along Broad Street and the retail29outlets of the ’Big Sixr offered respectable job opportunities 
for the new ’clerkly Glass'-, which if very poorly paid as 
some of the Moyne Commission’s evidence indicates, were 
commensurate with their status as whites. The numbers of 
businesses owned by white merchants which operated in early 
twentieth century Bridgetown (See Chapter 5) give some idea 
of the salaried openings that were available to poor whites 
at this period.
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It is evident that these population changes were 
directly related to the emigration of the mass of poor whites 
in Barbadian society. However, the reliance on demographic 
data alone to analyse changes in the white social structure 
disguises the fact that the composition of the planter elite 
altered radically during the period 1891-1921. Most of the 
absentee proprietors, for example, who had had a substantial 
stake in the economy of the island for nigh on 150 years, 
departed as an influence for ever. In the twentieth century 
their estates were taken over by a new mercantile elite and 
a number of salaried whites from the managerial and super­
visory class. Thus unlike the case of Martinique where the 
Grands Bekes have their origins firmly rooted in early 
plantation society, no such continuity and sense of the past 
exists for most of the members of the Barbadian elite.
With the exception of a brief period during the mid­
eighteenth century, the white creole population of Martinique 
has never been as great as that of Barbados. Throughout most 
of the nineteenth century.it was smaller roughly by half, and 
was approximately equal to today's greatly reduced population 
size at the time of Abolition in 1848. Apart from these 
general points of comparison and being able to show that the 
white creole population in Martinique is now less than one- 
quarter of that recorded for the period immediately prior to 
the destruction of Saint-Pierre in 1902, there are no 
official statistics of population broken down by ethnicity 
after 1848. Estimates from various sources fluctuate con­
siderably, and can therefore provide us with only an 
approximate idea of the downward trend. Some of these 
estimates are wildly inaccurate, and this is no less true 
of those given by the Bekes themselves as Kovats discovered 
in the 1960s. Even the total population figures available 
in the official censuses are not always reliable in a number 
of cases. With respect to the problems of obtaining accurate 
census data, it is worth quoting the following passage from 
a letter sent by a prominent white member of the Conseil 
General to the Governor, in which he comments upon the 
inaccuracy of the Census results for 1910:
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"I will not fail to point out to you the defects 
.which have been allowed to occur in the enumer­
ation of the population.
It is regrettable that our colonial apathy 
prevented this enumeration from being carried out 
in twenty-four hours, as is prescribed by law.
It is certain that communes which have taken five or six days and more to complete the count must have registered individuals already counted else­
where .
I admit that it is very difficult in our countryto arrive at exact figures 51
The dimensions of the problem in obtaining accurate census 
data have always gone further than is suggested by the 
phrase "our colonial apathy". The writer of this letter 
failed to point out that many communes consistently sub­
mitted inflated population figures in order to benefit from 
a number of fiscal measures, such as the distribution of the 
octroi de mer. In spite of these shortcomings it is possible 
to give some idea of the extent to which the white population 
has declined in both absolute and relative terms since the mid­
nineteenth century:
TABLE VIII: PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF THE MARTINIQUAN
POPULATION BY ETHNICITY, 1847-1959
White
Black and Mixed
Other
1847'
7.9
92.1
1883'
4.7
83.5
11.8
1910-
2.2
94.4
3.4
1959
0.7
94.2
5.1
Totals
(Sources:
100.0
(N=121130)
100.0
(N=170000)
100.0
(N=184004)
100.0
(N=260000)
1. Martinique, Etats de Population, 1831-1847.
2. Jour.jon, Chemin de Fer a Voie Etroite de laMartinique.
3. Martinique, Recensement de la Population en 1910
4. Martinique, Recensement de la Population en 1959
Figures for the white population unofficial.
Data obtained from a household survey in July 
1959, undertaken by Jean Benoist and Christian Crabot).
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The factors responsible for this decline in the 
white population are not linked with any mass exodus of 
a poorer propertyless class as in the case of Barbados.
In Martinique the families who departed during the second 
half of the nineteenth century were principally habitants 
sucriers, who could not compete with the advent of a new 
kind of highly industrialized capitalist exploitation, 
based upon free labour, extensive landholdings and a 
central factory system. The depression in the sugar 
industry after 1884 accelerated a process already begun, 
and it is quite striking to note that many of the sugar 
plantations advertised for sale in the colony's official 
gazette in the 1880s and 1890s, belonged to families no 
longer existing in Martinique in the twentieth century.
The loss of the American market for producers of muscovado 
in 1892 sounded the final death knell for the traditional 
habitation sucrerie as a social and economic unit, and this 
constituted yet another push factor in overseas migration.
However, it was a natural disaster rather thaaan
economic one which contributed to the greatest decline in
the population. Prior to the eruption of Mont Pelee on
May 8th 1902, the town of Saint-Pierre itself had a total
population of 30,000 of which 4,000 were white. 40,000
perished in the holocaust including the entire white creole
population of the town. The effect of the disaster upon the
white creole community was traumatic, particularly since it
effectively reduced it by half at one blow. The most
graphic and stark descriptions of the event are still to be
found in the telegrams sent to the Ministry of Colonial32Affairs in Paris:
"All communications broken off with Saint-Pierre.Abrupt explosion. Saint-Pierre on fire at a single eruption..."
"Rain of fire has destroyed Saint-Pierre and ships in harbour about eight o'clock in the morning.Suppose population completely annihilated..."
"Very few survivors out of a population of 26,000
.souls. Unable to give information on the con­
flagration of Saint-Pierre which has been terrible. Town has completely disappeared in a quarter of an hour..."
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It is also worth quoting at length the reactions of one 
Monsieur Peyrouton, an official of the Treasury in Saint- 
Pierre, who returned from Canada a day late on the 9th 
May to discover that the town no longer existed:
"The great disaster ... it is less a material 
loss ... than the disappearance of the most intelligent and most active part of the popu­
lation. Martinique is decapitated. Those who disappeared were the producers of wealth. More than three-thousand whites are dead: all the 
merchants of the island, the owners of business 
houses, their sons, their families, those who had tradition behind them and influence ... This old and noble race of colonist gentlemen ... has been 
struck down. Although outnumbered for a long time by the coloured population, it is this race 
of creoles who owned the land, this race who ran 
trade and owned the banks. It is they who fed the island.
The impact of the disaster which annihilated one half of 
Martinique's "noble race of oolonist-gentlemen" at one blow 
had a profound and lasting effect upon the remaining white 
creole population, and is still keenly felt today. A 
number of older respondents interviewed had friends and kin 
who had perished on that fateful day three-quarters of a 
century ago. The loss of the town and its inhabitants 
also meant the loss of a whole way of life for ever, and 
the cosmopolitan sophistication of Saint-Pierre which earnt 
itself the title of the "Paris of the West Indies" has never 
been fully re-created in the new capital of Fort-de-France. 
Founded by Pierre d'Eanambuc in 1635, it had been the centre 
of all commercial activity in Martinique and throughout the 
rest of the French Antilles. Sugar from all parts of the 
island was sent to Saint-Pierre for export and all plantation 
supplies, foodstuffs and slaves were handled by its 
commercial houses.. It was the nerve centre of Beke interests. 
In it were located all the financial and banking institutions 
of the colony, as well as the Chamber of Commerce, the 
publishing house which printed the mouthpiece of Beke 
interests, Le Propagateur, as well as the offices of the 
Land Registry, Customs and Excise and Taxation. As the seat 
of the Bishop of Martinique it boasted a cathedral, and was 
the centre for several religious orders. The town also had
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its own theatre, botanical gardens and secular institution 
of learning, the Lycee Colonial, which was founded in 1883. 
The importance of-the town as a focal point for white 
creole society was symbolized by the fact that it was there 
that the Beke ’Club de l'Ermine1' was located, an association 
reserved strictly for whites which systematically excluded 
the town's middle-class gens de couleur.
A further reduction by half again between 1902 and
the present day, has resulted in the white creole population
becoming in the twentieth century a very small minority of
less than 2,000. For the reason already stated above, it
is not possible to chart precisely this decline. From
information received verbally from a wide variety of 34sources, however, it is possible to state that this 
decline is accounted for by emigration to metropolitan 
France and other overseas departments, the southern states 
of America, Switzerland, Venezuela and Colombia. The bulk 
of this emigration took place after 1948, and was partly 
the consequence of Bekes re-investing their capital over­
seas .
These demographic changes in the two white creole 
communities resulting in the Martiniquan one today being 
only one-quarter of the Barbadian one, are the consequence 
of a number of factors, not least of all the eruption of 
Mont Pelee in 1902. However, natural disasters apart, it 
is possible to point to two factors which further account 
for this difference in size. In the post-Emancipation 
period the white creole population in Martinique was already 
smaller by half. This may in part be explained by the fact 
that in the French island there was no large body of poor 
whites living on the margins of plantation society, which 
considerably swelled the numbers of the white population 
in Barbados. Another factor accounting for the white creole 
population being such a restricted minority in twentieth 
century Martinique, was the extensive nature of the re­
organization and modernization of the sugar industry from 
the 1860s onwards. Unlike the Barbadian situation where 
the old plantation system survived longer and where
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ownership remained more widely dispersed, the introduction 
of central factories in Martinique financed on the 
initiative of the home government resulted in the concen­
tration of economic power in fewer hands. From a com­
parative perspective these differences in the speed and 
extent to which the sugar industry was rationalized, a 
process dealt with in the next chapter, further indicates 
why the white creole population in Martinique over the 
last 100 years has become such a restricted minority.
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NOTES AND REFERENCES
1. This became a conscious policy of the English after 1655, 
when pardons were issued to felons under the Great Seal on condition of their going overseas.
2. Content of Atkins's Census broken down as follows:
Printed map of Barbados drawn by Richard Ford in 1674, 
indicating sugar plantations and names of planters; 
lists of King's councillors, assemblymen and judges; muster roles for the 5,588 men in the eight Barbados 
regiments; inventory of military stores; a list of fifty-one ships exporting enumerated commodities bet­
ween April 1678 and October 1679; a certificate of 
1,909 negroes imported between December 1678 and January 1680; baptismal and burial records for the eleven parishes, 
March 1678 to September 1679; alphabetical list of the 595 persons given tickets to leave Barbados during 1679; 
alphabetical lists, parish by parish, of the 2,639 
Barbadian landholders in December 1679 with number of acres, servants and slaves; list of 405 householders in 
Bridgetown, showing which were married and the number of 
children, servants and slaves for each household.
(Source: P.R.O., C.O. 1/44, 142-579).
3. The Earl of Marlborough's proprietory rights granted by 
James I in 1625 were revoked three years later, and sole proprietory rights of all the Caribbee islands were 
granted to James Hay, the Earl of Carlisle. The history of the proprietorship of Barbados is well documented by 
Poyer (1808: Ch.2) and Edwards (1807: Vol.I). See also the preamble to the Charter granting Carlisle the 
proprietory of Barbados (Source: P.R.O., C.S.P.C.1574-1660. 85).
4. The application of these terms borrowed from mainland
Latin America to describe a system of land resource dis­
tribution in the Caribbean islands, is useful only in so 
far as it describes a system of ecological polarity. Here 
I have described the plantation as a "type of micro- latifundia", since the latifundia of Spanish and 
Portuguese America were considerably larger than the 
landholdings in the Caribbean. Moreover, as social political and economic units, the plantation societies of Latin America were structured differently and according to quite different precepts:
"In Brazil the senhor de engenho. or lord of the mill, was, as his name implies, a grandiose manor lord. He owned a huge tract, maintained a large force of salaried 
artisans, tenant farmers, and slaves, lived nobly in his Big House, and presided over a self-sufficient, patern­
alistic community complete with church, oourt, police 
force and social welfare agencies...The English organized their sugar making in a different way ... which were more 
clearly capitalistic and less paternalistic than in 
Portugal...Accordingly, when the English farmers in the
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West Indies turned to sugar making, their prime goal was to make money, not to become seigneurs... (The planter)did 
not attempt to produce food, clothing and equipment for his work-force on his own estate, but depended on outside 
supplies... Whatever religious, educational and charitable 
institutions there were in the English islands existed out­side of the plantation..."
(Dunn, 1973 s 64/55).
Strictly speaking, therefore, in applying the term "latifundio" we cannot ignore its social and cultural characteristics. Fraginals (1976 : 21) emphasizes its distinctiveness when he states:
"Property is only the external aspect of the latifundio. Socio-economic attributes are necessary for 
its real existence: the land as a means of production and social nucleus. In sum, the latifundio is not a quantitative concept..."
5. Statistics in the Census relating to land ownership and labour are most likely to be conservative estimates, as a result of planters underestimating these figures in Census returns to avoid heavy taxation.
6. Source: P.R.O., Proceedings of Council and Assembly,
7. "Yet, there is one brought thither as a stranger, from beyond the Line, which has a property beyond them all, 
and that is sugar cane, which though it has but one single taste, yet, that full sweetness has such a benign faculty, as to preserve all the rest from corruption, which without it, would taint and become rotten..."
(Ligon, 1970 : 85).
8. This calculation reached by correlating the names of "big" planters in the 1680 Census, with the list of 764 
"Inhabitants of Barbados, in the Year 1638, who then possessed more than ten acres of Land".(Source: P.R.O., C.S.P.C.,, 1574-1660)
However, Dunn (1973 : Ch.2) points out that the population was extremely fluid and transient during the early days of 
sugar. The majority of "big" sugar planting families had not yet appeared by the early 1640s, and many great men of this period had no descendants who were prominent or wealthy two generations later. The most prominent to disappear 
were Sir William Courteen, the Earl of Carlisle, Governor 
Henry Hawley, John and Henry Powell who worked for Courteen, Peter Hay and James Holdip who worked for Carlisle,
Marmaduke Royden, William Perkins and Alexander Bannister who headed the merchant syndicate backing Carlisle, and two "big" planters, Edward Oistin and William Hilliard.
9. TK Rabb (1967) lists over 6,000 individuals who invested in overseas commercial ventures during the seventeenth 
century. Forty-five out of the core group of sixty-two 
Barbadian planter names are included in Professor Rabb's 
list.
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10. Source: P.R.O., C.O. 29/2, 5-9.
11. Ibid.
12. Source: P.R.O., C.O. 1/44, 142-579.
13. At a later period one of the most novel of these 
engagements forces was that of the transportation to the 
island of Desirade of "mauvais sujets", who according to 
the Royal Statute of July 15th 1763 which sanctioned 
their deportation, were "jeunes gens tombes dans des cas de derangement de^conduite capables dTexposer l’honneur
et la tranquillite des families". By July 1765 forty-five 
of these "mauvais sujets" were to be found on Desirade.Two years later the Statute had to be revoked due to its 
success: too many aristocratic families in the French kingdom saw this measure as a chance to get rid of their ’black sheep’1 and ne’er do wells.(Lasserre, 1961:1, 269).
14. One of the best historical overviews of the development 
of white creole social structure in the French Antilles 
is to be found in Leiris (1955: 17-51). See also Petit Jean-Roget's analysis of Martiniquan society in the early eighteenth century (1966: Ch.I).
15. Pellisier was one of the directors of the Compagnie des Indes Occidentales.
16. This process has been described by Bernissant (1916: 77/78) as follows:
"... the colons were not only sugar planters; they 
were also sugar manufacturers. They did not separate the 
agricultural operation from the manufacturing one: each one had his fields and his mill. (As a structural 
prerequisite of the new economic order) ... the area of the former had to be increased so that the returns from the latter were high enough to cover costs and ensure 
profitability ... small landowners had no place in this 
new undertaking: they were squeezed out and their best lands amalgamated to neighbouring large plantations."
17. < Source: Bibliotheque Nationals, Margry Papers, 9»523 fol.452.
18. Labat explains that the order’s original concession in 1654 was granted in return for "three high masses and 
some several low masses eabh year" (1772: 1/5, 22).
19. In Saint-Christophe Governor de Poincy conceded land to his family and friends, and this group of nobles recreated in the Antilles the social system of The ancien regime.The same process occurred in Guadeloupe, where the noble 
families of Houel and Boisseret had likewise conceded land to their own families and friends, and had obtained 
permission from the king to establish their landed properties as Marquisates. The situation in Martinique 
was quite different. The family of Du Parquet came to 
Martinique after his death when most of the concessions 
were already granted. At the time of his death in 1658
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the number of nobles was very small. The Census of 1664 
indicates only ten householders with the title of ecuyer 
(squire), and more emphasis was placed on wealth than 
distinctions of rank between noble and bourgeois planters 
with large estates.
(Hayot> 1965: 9/10).
20. It could be argued that this parvenu "nobility" enjoyed 
greater power and certainly more independence than the 
hereditary aristocracy in France at the same period, 
since as Lucien Goldmann argues in. . The Hidden God 
(1964: Ch.6), the nobility had become "domesticated" 
and "transformed into a noblesse de cour" by the early 
eighteenth century.
21. Op.cit.
22. Bridenbaugh (1972: 205) estimates that the numbers leaving
Barbados for mainland America and other West Indian
colonies exceeded 12,000 as early as the period 1650-1660.
Atkins’s Ctensus contains a list of 583 passengers sailing
from Barbados during the period January 1678 to December 
1679.
23. Estimate based upon a comparison of patronyms still 
existing in Martinique today, with a list (Petitjean- 
Roget, 1949: 105-119) of white creole families who settled 
in the colony during the first two centuries of 
colonization.
24. Source: Barbados House of Assembly, Record of Members of 
the General Assembly (Compiled by E.W. Shilstone).
25. No comment is made by the compilers of the Census Reports 
between 1921 and 1970 upon this apparent decline of the 
coloured population. Since ethnic identity in the Census 
is self-assigned, it must be assumedi that this decline in 
association with a marked percentage’ increase in the black 
population, is the product of a re-assessment of ethnic 
identity by the non-white population.
26. Source: Report on the Census of Barbados for 1911. 13.
27. Source: Report on the Census of Barbados for 1921. 22.
28. The Society was set up to finance the passage of
"respectable" working class and middle-class women "in
reduced circumstances" to the United States, and to aid 
them in finding employment there.
29. This refers to the six major subsidiaries of the trading 
company Barbados Shipping and Trading. See below (Ch.5) 
for details of its history.
30. Source: Archives d ’Outre-Mer, Martinique: Etats de 
Population, 1831-1847. Generalitds 232..
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31. Source: Archives d'Outre-Mer, Martinique-- Recensement
de la Population en 191C+ Carton 48 Dossier 384.
32. Source: Archives d'Outre-Mer, Telegrammes: Saint-Pierre 9 
Carton 25 Dossier 228.
33. Interview material of Jean Hess a journalist who reported 
on the destruction of Saint-Pierre. His interviews and 
impressions are recorded in a limited edition:
La Catastrophe de la Martinique: Notes d'un Reporter (1902). 
(Peyrouton interview: page 138).
34. Interview material.
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CHAPTER 4: LAND
4.1 Introduction
4.2 Changes in the Organizational Structure of 
the Plantation System in Other Parts of the 
Caribbean in the Nineteenth Century
4.3 The Barbadian Variant.: Factors Inhibiting 
Organizational and Structural Change
4.4 The Martiniquan Variant: The Centralization 
of Sugar Production in the l860’s
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By comparison with the complete transformation of 
the organizational structure of the plantation system which 
took place in Barbados after 1900, and in Martinique from 
I860 onwards, the form of the plantation as an, agricultural 
and industrial unit remained unchanged during the preceding 
150 years. In the years following Abolition sugar estates 
in both islands continued to be attached tq the person of 
the planter and his family, and managed individually as 
separate units by a mainly resident planter class in 
Martinique, and by a mixture of both resident planters and 
estate attorneys for absentees in Barbados. In a number of 
respects personal relations and the day to day running of 
an estate continued along the same lines and according to 
the same precepts as those which had existed under slavery. 
Each plantation continued to grind its own cane and to 
produce its own sugar, and the production of the finished 
article still depended upon the open tayche method.
(See Appendix IV). The technology involved in manufacturing 
sugar had altered little, and this is indicated by the 
traditional sources of power which continued to be employed 
by the mills of the period, which were mainly wind in 
Barbados and water and animal power in Martinique. Steam 
mills, vital to the introduction of vacuum pan technology, 
were in evidence in only a handful of estates in each island.
However, in spite of the continuity of the old 
plantation system, there was one significant change taking 
place during the eighteenth century and well into the nine­
teenth. This involved a process whereby the smaller planter 
of twenty acres and under was gradually being squeezed out 
by the larger planter, who incorporated these small 
plantations into his own holdings. In the case of Barbados 
this process of amalgamation and concentration of land 
resources is well documented, and one can point to a number 
of estates which grew in size during the eighteenth century. 
Examples include The Belle which increased from 477 acres 
in 1714 to 549 acres in 1846, and Friendship whose size 
increased from 240 acres in 1747 to 361 acres in 1785.1 <From
4.1. Introduction
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the standpoint of those families who suffered in this process 
and were reduced to a poor yeomanry or 'redleg1 status, the 
McConney family and the Armstrong family (see Appendices XXVIII 
and XXIX) provide typical examples. Apart from the comments 
of one or two informants and the somewhat piecemeal evidence 
gleaned from several collections of private papers, it is not 
possible to document this process with any degree of accuracy 
in Martinique due to the complete absence of any land survey 
since 1671. * One further point needs to be added to this 
brief overview concerning land utilization, which distin­
guishes the Martiniquan plantation system from the Barbadian 
one during the eighteenth century. Unlike Barbados the 
Martiniquan plantation system was not entirely geared to the 
mono-cultural production of sugar, since it had a well- 
developed tradition of cultures secondaires. At the end 
of the eighteenth century 45"per cent of the total 
cultivated area was given over to the growing of coffee, 
cocoa, cotton and food crops. Such was the difference in 
the pattern of land utilization between the two islands, 
that the officials of a ■Martiniquan sugar commission which 
visited Barbados in 1853 were astonished by the extent to 
which sugar took precedence over all other forms of cultivation, 
and were constrained to comment:
"The aspect of Barbados is amazing from an agricultural 
and manufacturing point .of view. The entire island 
is one vast cane field ... The cultivation of sugar 
occupies all hands and unites all interests. There 
is no sanctuary, no refuge from sugar; nor is there 
any other crop to compete against it."^
4.2. Changes in the Organizational Structure of the
Plantation System in Q-fcher Parts of the Caribbean in 
the Nineteenth Century
Before proceeding to a discussion of changes in the 
organizational structure of the Barbadian and Martiniquan 
plantation systems in the latter half of the nineteenth 
century and the early years, of the twentieth century, I 
wish to deal briefly with the process of change which took 
place in other parts of the Caribbean during the same period. 
From the presentation of this comparative material, it will be
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evident that the minimum amount of change to accomplish a 
revolution in the sugar industry was introduced into 
Barbados and Martinique. The fact that this was undertaken 
by local elites had far-reaching consequences for the social 
organization of the plantation system in the twentieth 
century, and the economic base of each island.
By the 1890s control of the sugar industry in 
Jamaica, British Guiana, Trinidad and in the smaller Windward 
and Leeward islands, had passed out of the hands of private 
individuals into the hands of a corporate sector, which was 
based upon West Indian mercantile houses located in the 
Metropolis. The plantation system in Barbados in the last 
decade of the nineteenth century was by contrast still 
supported by a resident and non-resident planter class, 
privately owning and separately managing over 420 sugar
5estates. In the other British West Indian sugar islands, 
the passage of the West Indies Encumbered Estates Act of 
1854 to facilitate the sale and transfer of land held by 
heavily mortgaged and insolvent proprietors, played a 
central role in reducing the numbers of estates and 
amalgamating them into larger units. West India houses had 
one advantage over local buyers with the setting up of a 
Central Court in London, since it enabled them to buy up 
plantations often below their market value in the face of 
very little competition. The Act was initially adopted by 
St. Vincent and Tobago in 1854, and over a period of thirteen 
years the local assemblies of eight other territories had 
voted in favour of adopting it: the Virgin Islands and St.
Kitts (i860), Jamaica (1861), Antigua (1864), Montserrat (1865), 
Grenada (1866), and Dominica and Nevis (1867) (Beachey,
1957: Ch.l).
From the data contained in Royal Commission Reports 
between 1842 and 1897, the evidence indicates that there was 
an overall reduction in the number of sugar estates in the 
British West Indies from about 2,200 at the time of Emancip­
ation, to about 800 at the beginning of the twentieth 
century (Beachey, 1957: 127). For the most part the motor 
force in this process of amalgamation and concentration was
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provided by the metropolitan merchant houses, aided by the 
speedy and efficient workings of the Encumbered Estates 
Court in London in the conveyance of property rights. 
However, the adoption of the Act was not a necessary and 
sufficient pre-requisite for the formation of corporate 
plantation structures in all of these colonies. Where this 
trend was most marked in British Guiana and to a lesser 
extent in Trinidad and St. Lucia, the Act was not adopted, 
the local assemblies of these colonies considering a 
sufficient remedy to lie in the laws already prevailing, 
based on Dutch, Spanish and French legal systems.
In the case of British Guiana the process of 
estate amalgamation and concentration of ownership started 
relatively early.^ Between Emancipation and 1870 the number 
of sugar estates in cultivation declined from 404 to 135.
By 1890 this figure was further reduced to fifty. For 1870 
it has been calculated that eighty-five out of a total of 
135 estates were owned by absentee proprietors, and that 
fifty of these estates were in the hands of merchant houses:
"Among the non-resident proprietors, the largest 
holder was the Colonial Company with nine large 
estates. Messrs. Daniels of Bristol also owned 
nine estates; Messrs. James Ewing, Messrs. Sandbach, 
Parker and Company, Messrs. Bosanquet, Curtis and 
Company, and other well-established houses such as 
Booker Bros., Barber and Company, and Winter and 
Preston, either by themselves or their partners 
individually held a large portion of the remainder." 
(Beachey, 1957: 119).
The domination of the sugar industry by these metropolitan 
merchant houses was even greater than is first apparent from 
the above, since estates owned by the merchants were the 
largest and best situated in the colony, and some three- 
quarters of the attorney business was in the hands of a 
number of these merchant houses. As early as 1870 a totally 
new organizational structure had emerged within the 
plantation system, with export agriculture dominated by a 
total of seven metropolitan merchant houses. One important 
aspect of the change in organizational structure was that 
of size. With the substitution of a resident planter class 
for an absentee one, the average acreage of plantations
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increased three-fold: from 256 acres in 1852 to 757 acres 
in 1884 (Adamson, 1972: Ch.5).
In Trinidad by the end of the nineteenth century 
practically all the sugar estates were concentrated in the 
hands of a limited number of merchant houses and a few 
individuals. After Emancipation many small muscovado estates 
in less favourably situated areas such as Toco and Mayaro 
went out of production, and sugar was increasingly concen­
trated in the western counties of Caroni and Victoria, and 
in the Naparima district. In this process the total number 
of sugar estates declined from 110 in 1865 to fifty-six at 
the end of the century. By 1900 estate ownership was con­
centrated in the hands of four merchant houses and two 
families: the Colonial Company, Burnley and Company, Craig 
and Company, Messrs. Turnbull and Company, and Sir Charles 
Tennant and the Lamont family. Beachey, (1957: 122) takes the 
case of the Lamont family’s acquisition of land as a typical 
example of the kind of process which took place during these 
years:
"This family concentrated on choice sugar areas in 
the Naparima district by purchasing old musvocado 
estates, scrapping machinery, cultivating only the 
best land, and tagging them on to adjacent actively 
cultivated estates."
The Colonial Company similarly built up a compact area of 4,000 
acres out of the purchase and amalgamation of old muscovado 
estates, thus forming one large domain to serve the require­
ments of the new central factory of Sainte-Madelaine.
The case of Jamaica provides an outstanding example 
of the adoption of the Encumbered Estates Act being directly 
responsible for the monopolization of land resources in the 
hands of a limited number of merchant houses. Jamaica out 
of all of the British West Indian islands in the mid­
nineteenth century, was most desperately in need of measures 
to deal with the transference of property rights and debt 
settlement. Jamaica had the particular problem of having a 
high percentage of landed property held on very long-term 
leaseholds, which was therefore unsaleable and transferable 
only to successive generations of the families in whose name
it was held. Mainly as a consequence of this, by the early 
1850s 168 estates had been completely abandoned and a 
further sixty-three partly abandoned. The important part 
played by the Encumbered Estates Act in alleviating this 
situation, is shown by the number of estates which were 
disposed of through the Court during its life between 1858 
and 1892. During this period 148 estates realized a total 
sale purchase of £253,483, which represented 40 per cent 
of the grand total sale purchases recorded for all ten 
islands. The merchant houses which acquired estates in 
Jamaica included J. Bravo and Company, Davidsons and Company,
H. Sewell and Company, Hawthorne, Shedden and Company, and 
Bosanquet, Curtis and Company. The 600 sugar estates in 
cultivation at Emancipation were by 1865 reduced by half, 
either through abandonment or conversion to other purposes, 
such as grazing or logwood and pimento estates. By the 1890s 
on^ -y 140 sugar estates remained.
In the smaller Leeward and Windward islands a 
similar process was taking place during this period. In 
Grenada the 119 sugar estates which had existed at Emancip­
ation had disappeared by 1900. In Antigua the number of 
estates had halved from 107 in 1865 to fifty-three at the 
turn of the century. In Tobago, Dominica and Montserrat 
the small mus'covado estates went out of production in 1884 
never to recover again. In St. Kitts, Nevis, Antigua and 
St. Vincent, the English merchant houses became sugar 
proprietors and monopolized the estates sector as they had 
done in the larger colonies, the principal companies being 
Cavan Bros., Porter and Company, Messrs. Ewing, Messrs.
Boddington and Fryer and Company.
The case of Guadeloupe is an interesting one when 
compared with the direction taken by its sister colony 
Martinique. Like Martinique it had a well-established local 
planter class of similar size at the time of Emancipation,' 
comparative systems of credit and the same access to finance 
capital for long-term capital projects. However, the situation 
of the Grands Blancs in Guadeloupe was radically different 
from that of the Bekes in Martinique in 1848. Whereas
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Martinique was occupied by the English during the French 
Revolution, who supported the ancien regime and the 
interests of the plantocracy, the Victor Hughes Convention 
established in Guadeloupe forced those planters who escaped 
the guillotine into exile. In spite of the boom of the 
restoration period, the returning planters were unable to 
compete with the well-financed corporations from metropolitan 
France, which were already■investing in the new central 
factories. During the 1860s and 1870s the initiative in the 
modernization of the sugar industry was therefore taken by 
metropolitan corporations, rather than by groups of local 
planters which was the case in Martinique. During this 
period the Grands Blancs1 share of the total sugar produced 
in the colony declined dramatically. By 1883 ninety-seven 
habitations sucreries owned by local interests produced only 
one-fifth of the colony’s sugar. The remaining four-fifths 
was produced by twenty usines centrales controlled for the 
most part by metropolitan interests (Buffon, 1979: 267).
By the early 1900s two-thirds of Guadeloupe’s sugar 
production was controlled by three metropolitan joint 
stock companies: La Societe Industrielle et Agricole de 
Pointe-a-Pitre, La Societe Anonyme des Usines de Beauport, 
and La Societe Marseillaise des Sucreries Coloniales. Having 
created a number of vast domaines of over 1,000 acres, these 
three companies between them controlled a total of 30,000 
hectares in Basse-Terre and Grande-Terre (Legier, 1905).
From the comparative data presented above, it is 
evident that metropolitan finance capital played a dynamic 
role in all the other areas of the British and French 
Caribbean in the second half of the nineteenth century. This 
was a general pattern which was duplicated in Cuba and Puerto 
Rico, with the difference that structural change was initially 
attempted by indigenous plantocracies in Cuba from the 1840sry
onwards, and in Puerto Rico in the 1880s.® However, in both 
these islands no real impetus was attained until the early 
twentieth century, when the United States forged an 
imperialist role for itself which resulted in the penetration 
of American monopoly finance capital. It was during the 
years leading up to the First World War - that really large
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central factories were established in Cuba. By 1913 United 
States sugar investments in Cuba totalled 200,000,000 
dollars, which represented 18 per cent of all that country's 
investments in Latin America. Extensive American involve­
ment in the sugar industry is reflected in a doubling of 
annual production between the late 1890s and 1918: from
1,000,000 to 2,000,000 tons of sugar (Thomas, 1971: 536-556).
In Puerto Rico during the same period sugar production 
increased eight-fold from 57,000 tons to 489,000 tons per 
annum (Clark, 1975: 107). By 1920 the several hundred 
small family mills owned by haoendados at the end of the 
nineteenth century were reduced to seventy-five, and-.60 per 
cent of the sugar industry was controlled by American interests,, 
with four corporations owning 46 per cent of Puerto Rico’s 
sugar lands (Lewis, 1963: 72/73).
In the British Caribbean monopoly corporate power 
was achieved by two companies in the twentieth century. Tate 
and Lyle and its subsidiaries came to monopolize the sugar 
production of Jamaica, Trinidad and British Honduras. Booker 
McConnell became the successor to the seven merchant houses 
which monopolized the sugar industry in British Guiana in the 
late 1850s, and within a space of seventy years came to 
account f or 9 0 'per cent of that colony’s total output of 
sugar. By the early 1970s in Puerto Rico, as well as in 
Haiti and the Dominican Republic, most of the sugar exported 
was produced by five American corporations. In Guadeloupe 
the monopoly exerted by overseas interests increased in the 
twentieth century. The three major French corporations main­
tained their share of output, but a new factor entered the 
market: the creation of latifundia and factories capitalized 
by the Martiniquan elite in a process of ’secondary 
colonization1. Today ' 85' per cent of the sugar production in 
Guadeloupe is accounted for by eight corporations of 
metropolitan arid Martiniquan origin, on 80 per cent of the 
total area under sugar.
In Chapter 5 I will argue that Barbados and 
Martinique must be regarded as variants of this more general 
process, and that the avoidance of outside capitalist 
exploitation was dependent upon the access to finance capital
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by local elites. What follows is essentially descriptive, 
being an attempt to plot the changes in land resource dis­
tribution, organizational structure and technology in the 
respective plantation systems of both islands.
4.3. The Barbadian Variant: Factors Inhibiting Organizational 
and Structural Change
An examination of plantation lists from the last 
quarter of the nineteenth century up to the present (1977), 
reveals a substantial increase over the period of locally 
based ownership. The shift from absentee to resident 
proprietorship was particularly swift and dramatic between 
1885 and 1920. One piece of conventional wisdom among the 
sugar planters of Barbados themselves, which is purported 
to explain why the Barbadian sugar industry survived the 
crises of 1884, 1892, 1905 and 1921/22, and was able to 
remain consistently more efficient than that of other British 
West Indian islands, is due to the fact that the practice of 
absenteeism was rare. However, prior to the crisis of 1884 
absentee ownership played quite a considerable role in 
Barbados. The following Table clearly indicates that 
absentee ownership a quarter of a century before the depression 
of the 1880s was an important factor in land resource dis­
tribution (Table IX overleaf).
From this data the most startling fact to emerge 
is the disproportionate economic power of the absentee 
proprietors. Compared with the residents the absentees 
owned a total acreage vastly disproportionate to their 
numbers. Although just over a quarter of all the plantations 
in Barbados were absentee owned, this accounted for nearly 
one-half of the total acreage. It must be concluded, there­
fore, that absentees owned the largest estates on the island, 
and from Table IX it is also evident that these estates were 
in the most fertile and most easily cultivable parts of the 
island. Their dominance was most clearly marked in the 
Parishes of St. Philip, Christ Church, St. George and 
St. Thomas. Within the bi-polar scheme of land resource 
distribution with its added feature of a high degree of
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concentration of wealth in the hands of a small minority in 
plantation society, the absentees of I860 are a forceful 
reminder of Governor Atkins's group of 'top'- ninety-one planters 
in 1680.
By the late 1880s the total number of absentee owned
qestates had declined from 135 to 116. This was still^a sub­
stantial proportion accounting for an area of just over
54,000 acres, which meant that overseas metropolitan interests 
still effectively owned one-third of the island of Barbados.
Who were these absentee proprietors of the 1880s? The 
largest of these was not an individual but a corporate body; 
the London merchant house of Thomas Daniel and Sons. In the 
late nineteenth century Thomas Daniel and Sons owned eleven 
estates in Barbados totalling 5,892 acres,10 which had been 
acquired in default of payments for bad debts. However, in 
actual fact the Company effectively had financial control 
over some 10,000 acres of plantation land in Barbados at this 
time, by means of liens and outstanding debts on numerous
other estates.11 Another absentee proprietor, the Earl of 
12Harewood, a descendant of Henry Lascelles who founded the
London merchant house of Lascelles in 1740, owned 1,566
acres at this period. One of his properties was The Belle
Plantation in St. Michael, which was purchased by his great
great uncle Daniel Lascelles in 1780 from the estate of
Gedney Clarke junior, the son of one of Henry Lascelles's 
13partners. Two of these absentees were the descendants of
the only survivors of the very early charter members of the
planter elite dating back to 1658. The family of AlleynelZf
continued to be substantial landowners in the 1880s, with
estates in St. George,. St. James, St. Philip, Christ Church
and St. Andrew totalling an area of almost 5,000 acres. The 
15Drax family continued to own Drax Hall in St. George, a 
very large estate by Barbadian standards of over 800 acres, 
as they had done in 1680 when it belonged to Colonel Henry 
Drax.
What is remarkable when comparing estate ownership 
in 1880 with ownership in 1920, is the rapidity with which 
the bulk of this class of absentee proprietor disappeared to 
be replaced by a new social strata, a new mercantile elite
8 l
which bought into estates and founded the first central 
factories in the early years of the twentieth century. The 
consequences of this transformation in the social composition 
of the planter class were far reaching. One of these con­
sequences has been the phenomenal turnover in estate owner­
ship, and in many cases changes in ownership have been 
frequent over a seventy year period. It is instructive to 
compare the frequency of changes in estate ownership in the 
twentieth century with the list of forty-seven estates in 
Appendix V , which had remained in the same family for at 
least 100 years up to 1846.
A comparison of the sugar industry in Barbados with 
any of the other British or French West Indian plantation 
economies in the late nineteenth century, is most striking 
in terms of their respective organizational structures and 
productive processes. What is unique about Barbados is the 
extent to which the archaic, pre-Emancipation plantation 
system had survived almost intact the half a century of 
radical change and re-adjustment that had gone on in all the 
other sugar islands. The concentration of ownership and 
corporatization of the plantation sector, and the parallel 
development of central factories which was accomplished 
elsewhere during the second half of the nineteenth century, 
did not get under way in Barbados until well into the 
twentieth century. The plantation system in Barbados in the 
last decade of the nineteenth century continued to be supported 
by a resident and absentee planter class, privately owning and 
separately managing some 420 sugar estates. Only one met­
ropolitan merchant house had any substantial stake in the 
economy of the island, and that was Thomas Daniel and Sons of 
London, whose eleven estates were thrown into the Chancery 
Court in 1892 and their assets liquidated within three years.^ 
When corporatization and amalgamation of the plantation sector 
did develop to any significant extent, it was not until the 
formation of Plantations Ltd. in 1917 and Barbados Shipping 
and Trading in 1920, and corporatization involved in 
Barbados not the participation of metropolitan merchant houses, 
but the penetration of a locally based commercial sector.
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The evidence would suggest that there had been some 
amalgamation of estates in the years following Emancipation,
but that it had been quite limited. From a total of just
18over 500 sugar estates of ten acres and over in 1846 to a
similar number in 1860,^^ the drop to 448 in the late 
201880s does not indicate any particularly dramatic changes 
in organizational structure and ownership during this period. 
Moreover, the total acreage of estates calculated by Police 
Magistrates1 returns was roughly the same for the late 1880s 
as that for-I860: 90,782 acres in the earlier period as 
against 91,172 in the later.
With respect to technology, innovations in the
productive process were limited. This was most evident in
the practice at the end of the nineteenth century for
individual sugar estates to continue to grind their own
cane. A total of 463 mills continued to operate on 448
plantations: 373 were still powered by wind and only ninety
had been transformed by steam. The most important
technological advance in the sugar industry during the second
21half of the nineteenth century, the vacuum pan, was to be 
found in only nine sugar mills in the island, representing a 
very small quantity of sugar produced by the new method from 
less than 3,000 arable acres. Some of Anthony Trollope's 
comments (1859: 210) on the out-dated methods used to produce 
sugar were no less true several decades later:
"It is certainly the fact that they do make their 
sugar in a very old-fashioned way in Barbados, 
using windmills instead of steam, and that you see 
less here of the improved machinery for the manu­
facture than in Demerara, or Cuba, or Trinidad, or 
even in Jamaica".
As I have already shown, the passage of the West
Indies Encumbered Estates Act of 1854 played a central role
in the transfer of estates in other British West Indian
colonies into the hands of metropolitan merchant houses.
Barbados by contrast adopted its own version of the English
Chancery Court system, which ensured that indebted estates
22were re-sold to local buyers. During a thirteen year 
period between 1854 and 1867, when ten colonies accepted 
the Encumbered Estates Act, and over half of the estates
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sold through the Court were purchased by merchant houses, a
total of forty-one estates in Barbados entered the Chancery
Court and the majority were subsequently purchased by
23resident buyers. It could be argued that Barbados's non- 
acceptance of the Encumbered Estates Act was signal proof 
of the far greater internal power of the Barbadian planto­
cracy, compared with that of planters in other islands, due 
to the fact that Barbados had managed to retain the Old 
Representative System and never had direct rule imposed by 
Crown Colony Government. However, it is more likely that 
both the Home Government and the local Legislative Council 
did not see fit the need to apply the Act to Barbados, since 
no land was indebted to the extent that it was abandoned.
In the Report of the Committee on Central Factories
of 1895, which was the outcome of an enquiry into the need
for setting up centralized sugar factories in Barbados, it
was concluded that there had been no need for central
factories at an earlier period because profits from muscovado
were substantial enough. When this situation changed in the
1880s and 1890s, and the demand for muscovado in the U.K. and
U.S.A. declined in favour of a white semi- or fully-refined
beet sugar, it was evident that the traditional argument
against central factories no longer held good. Moreover, the
demand for molasses had also dropped and did not attain its
former importance again until the opening up of the Canadian
market after 1905. Given the perceived need for technological
change in the light of changing market demand, in conjunction
with competition from French and German beet sugar and Asian
and Pacific cane, there were factors which inhibited the
implementation of a central factory system in Barbados.
These factors were inherent in the structure of the
plantation system itself. Firstly, the small size of
estates operated against the erection of mills with a greater
grinding capacity. It was pointed out in the enquiry that
three-quarters of the estates in Barbados were less than 500
acres. Another source reveals that about one-third of the
24estates in the island were less than 100 acres in size.
At the bottom of the 'size league1' there were still 
eighty-five sugar estates of fifty acres and less in 1888,
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and many of these were as small as ten, fifteen and twenty-
five acres. At the other end of the scale the number of
estates of any considerable size was small: only 18 were
as large as 500 acres and over. By comparison with an
average sized estate in some of the smaller Leeward and
Windward islands of the period, they were still relatively
modest in size. Secondly, plantation size alone did not
necessarily hinder any projected re-organization of the
sugar industry. The smallness of average plantation size
in Barbados (about 145 arable acres) was further complicated
by the structure of ownership, and the scattered nature of
the most prominent owners' landed assets. In terms of total
acreage, in 1888 350 individuals owned 86,292 acres and 3
merchant houses owned 4,880 acres, which represented 452
25and 16 estates respectively. J In the 1895 Central Factories 
Report a plan was put forward to organize factory co­
operatives of planters, but the plan was never put into 
operation. Co-operatives of planters and peasants have 
never been viable propositions in Barbados, due to the 
society's cult of extreme, individualism which is difficult 
to both objectify and rationalize. Despite this it is a very 
real attitude, a principle fiercely defended across all 
sectors of island society, which may be counted as yet one 
more factor inhibiting organizational and technological 
change.
Despite the extensive distribution of ownership at 
this time, there were some thirteen families and one merchant 
house enjoying multiple ownership, each controlling between 
one and five thousand acres apiece. Given the concentration 
of land resources within this group, the introduction of 
central factories to exploit a substantial proportion of cane 
lands appeared to be a potentially viable proposition. 
However, the scattered nature of these multiple holdings was 
yet one more stumbling block in the way of change. The data 
on multiple holdings for the year 1888 contained in 
Appendix VI indicates the importance of this point, where it 
can be seen that the multiple holdings of individuals, 
families and Thomas Daniel and Sons were all scattered 
across several or more parishes. Thus the advantage conveyed
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by the fact that almost one-third of the estate land in 
Barbados was concentrated in the hands of a minority, was 
far outweighed by the scattered nature of these multiple 
holdings.
The process of estate amalgamation and concentration 
of ownership into fewer hands, pre-requisites for the 
development of centralized sugar factories, evolved very 
slowly at first in the early years of the twentieth century. 
As estates in the Parishes of St. Michael, Christ Church 
and St. James disappeared in favour of urban and tourist 
development, and as others were wholly or partially sub­
divided into small lots or transformed into tenantries, the 
total number of sugar factories declined. A precedent for 
this process of rationalization of the plantation system, 
initially forced upon the plantocracy by sheer economic 
necessity, had been established as early as 1897 when the 
Royal Commission of that year recommended the fragmentation 
of bankrupt estates and the creation of peasant smallholdings
"As sugar lands fall out of cultivation they can 
.either be sold in small lots or leased at low rents 
to small cultivators. This policy would probably 
be adopted at once by the Court of Chancery in the 
case of sugar estates, which clearly could not be 
carried on except at a loss..-.”^
In the twentieth century a process of internal migration 
towards the capital had the effect of speeding up estate sub­
division. The compiler of the Census for 1911 noted that 
tenantries and "extensive villages" had been recently 
established "just outside the borders of Bridgetown proper". 
Woodville Marshall (1975: 94) argues that this internal 
migration expressed a demand for land and that internal 
migrants seeking work and opportunities around the capital
"...naturally set up considerable pressures on the 
restricted land space around Bridgetown and St.
Michael ... Obviously ... this internal migration 
helped to accelerate a process of partial sub­
division of estates in St. Michael, and provided 
opportunities for land speculation which were 
exploited".
Marshall's view of estate sub-division as a means of 
providing "opportunities for land speculation", adds a new
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dimension to that of mere "rationalization", and was not 
entirely antithetical to the perceived need of the period 
to modernize the antiquated organizational structure of the 
plantation system. This is a theme which will he taken up 
more fully in Chapter 5 .
A comparison of the list of sugar estates for 1888
27with Sinckler's list for 1912, is a good guide to the 
changes which-were just beginning to make themselves felt 
in the Barbadian sugar industry in the aftermath of the 
depression. Sinckler's list indicates a total of 358 sugar 
estates for 1912: 529 of these are shown as still having 
mills (217 wind and 112 steam) and the remaining twenty-nine 
are "without sugar works". Between the dates of these two 
lists it is apparent that some ninety estates disappeared 
during a twenty-five year period, and that the total area 
under estates decreased by 7.7 per cent. From a variety of 
sources it can be concluded that this decrease in the number 
of estates and the total area monopolized by the estates1 
sector, can be accounted for in three ways: (i) amalgamation 
with other estates; (ii) the purchase of estates in St.
Michael and Christ Church for urban development; and (iii) the 
sub-division of those estates formerly in Chancery, which 
during the 1890s had consistently failed to find purchasers, 
into quarter acre lots, which were either sold or let off 
into tenantries. In.St. Michael alone twelve estates at this 
period went out of agriculture, and were incorporated into 
Bridgetown's rapidly expanding urban nucleus and periphery. 
Many of the names of suburbs around Bridgetown today point 
to the former existence of sugar estates which were sub­
divided in the early years of the twentieth century. Ivy 
(75 acres), Jacksons (212 acres) and Jackmans (150 acres) 
were all broken up very early on at the turn of the century. 
Sinckler refers to a number of estates in St. Michael which 
were being sub-divided in 1912, their former locations 
identifiable today as place names: Bay (128 acres),
Brighton (56 acres), Mount Clapham (545 acres), Spring 
Garden (72 acres), Kensington (73 acres), Goodland (110 acres) 
and Whitehall (208 acres). This process of sub-division 
continued long after 1912, and other estates such as
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Bank Hall (145 acres), Kew (44 acres), Bush Hall (147 acres) 
and Brittons (164 acres-) were still being broken up and parts 
of their land sold off into the 1920s and 1950s. In Christ 
Church a further thirteen estates went out of agriculture, 
forming the nucleus of new housing and hotel developments 
which did not, however, reach an impetus until a decade or 
two later in the 1920s and 1950s.
It is interesting to note that in the 1912 list those 
estates indicated "without sugar works" were already under­
going a process of-partial fragmentation. A high proportion 
of them are indicated as being either "in tenantry" or as 
"land being sold out in small lots". A group of five
estates in St. J a m e s  Carlton, Mount Standfast,- Sion Hill,
Westmoreland and Reid's Bay --- which originally totalled 1,495
acres, is indicated as undergoing a partial erosion in size: 
"Portions of these plantations have been sold out in small 
lots. Sugar from remainder of land manufactured at 
Porters (Factory)".
Here as in several other cases is an indication that the
development of central factories was already underway.
Mullineux's windmill in St. James is indicated as "not used",
and this sugar estate of 250 acres was now having its cane
ground .at Sandy Lane, a larger estate of 456 acres belonging
like Mullineux to the Thorne' family. A small estate of 51
acres, Selmans in St. Ceorge, is indicated as now having its
"sugar manufactured at Applewhaites". By 1921 sixty sugar
estates no longer had their own factories, and the appearance
of nineteen central factories sited on and developed from
older plantation mills were in operation to service the
28grinding requirements of these sixty estates.
4.4. The Martiniquan Variant: The Centralization of Sugar 
Production in the I860s
In one respect the plantation system in Martinique 
at the end of the nineteenth century shared something in 
common with the Barbadian one,- and that was the continuing 
predominance of local interests over land resources. With 
respect to..ownership, however, a slightly different situation
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did pertain, in so far as there was no sizeable group of 
absentee proprietors playing an important role in land
p  Qresource distribution. With one exception, notable 
however, the Beke plantocracy had also managed to 
successfully prevent the incursion of metropolitan cor­
porate interests. Any similarity between the respective 
plantation systems ends here. In the early 1880s only
54 per cent of the total cultivable area of 33,000 hectares
30in Martinique was under sugar caneto whereas in the case of 
Barbados something like 85 per cent of the total area of the 
island was covered by sugar estates. Spread out over an area 
of some 18,000 hectares were to be found a total of 424 sugar 
estates. Slightly less than a half of them continued to 
function as habitations sucreries grinding their own cane.^1 
Thus about 200 of them still performed their traditional dual 
functions of cultivation and manufacturing, utilizing exactly 
the same methods advocated by Pere Labat two centuries 
earlier to produce a moist musvocado. Existing alongside 
this antiquated technology were a total of seventeen newly 
created central factories, producing a ’clayed1 semi-refined 
sugar from the other 200 or more estates.
The case for establishing a central factory system
in the French Antilles based upon free labour, had been
advanced as early as 1781 by the protestant Pastor Schwartz
in his tract Reflexions Sur L ’Esclavage Des Negres. However,
no serious attempt was made to offer solutions to the actual
mechanics of the problem, nor to advance economic arguments
for the creation of central factories in the light of the new
32threat offered by beet sugar, until the 1830s and 1840s when 
a number of pamphlets and tracts on the subject were published 
in France. Among the most influencial of these was Call and 
Company’s Mesures pour changer la situation de nos colonies 
des Antilles (1838), and Paul Daubree’s Question coloniale au 
point de vue industriel (1841). In response to this publicity 
the first usine centrale was constructed in Martinique in
1845,. by the French foundry Derosne et Cail, who also con­
structed a total of six usines in Guadeloupe in the same 
year. The existence of the first Martiniquan usine, however, 
was short-lived. It closed in 1848 due to a lack of adequate
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cane supplies, the result of labour shortages after Abolition.^
After a false start it was not until the 1860s and 
1870s that a central factory system was really established, 
which altered the organizational structure of the plantation 
system profoundly, and re-organized it along corporate lines 
such that many usiniers owned large domaines as well as con­
trolling the manufacturing process. In 1880, however, the 
concentration of estate lands in the hands of usiniers in a 
process of horizontal integration, had not yet developed to 
the extent that it would in the years following the crises of 
1883/4, 1891/2 and 1905.
The extent to which the development of a central
factory system in Martinique had transformed the organizational
structure of the plantation system in the second half of the
nineteenth century, is borne out by the process of estate
amalgamation that occurred during a twenty year period from
the formation of the Credit Colonial in 1861 to the publication
of a survey of sugar plantations in 1882, carried out by a
Beke newspaper of the period, Le Propagateur. Prior to the
formation of the Credit Colonial, "a colonial loan society
set up for the purpose of advancing credit for the trans-
34formation of sugar manufacture in the colonies", there had 
been 900 habitations sucreries in Martinique all with their 
own mills powered by water, wind and oxen (Chemin-Dupontes, 
1908: 206). By 1882 this number had more than halved. By 
April 1870 five usines centrales were already in existence in 
the central and eastern zones of the island, in the communes 
of Fort-de-France, Lamentin, Francois and Robert. At the 
same epoch an additional seven usines were also in the 
process of being constructed: a second one in Fort-de-France,
another in Francois, two in the northern communes of Trinite 
and Sainte-Marie, and in the south two in Riviere Salee and 
one in Marin. In addition a further three were projected 
for Lamentin, Saint-Pierre and Vauclin.^ By the early 
1880s seventeen of these new central factories were functioning 
and serving the major sugar growing areas of the central 
plain of Lamentin, the north-eastern communes bordering the 
Atlantic coast, the hinterland region of Saint-Pierre, and 
the south from Riviere Salee to Marin and Sainte-Anne.
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During the period that this revolution occurred 
in the sugar industry, individual habitations sucreries still 
continued to play an important part in sugar production 
throughout the 1860s and 1870s. Their survival, for a brief 
time at least, can be accounted for by the abolition of 
duties by the Conseil General in 1866, which ended the res­
trictions imposed by the 200 year old pacte coloniale. The 
abandonment of protectionist principles in trade opened up 
the U.S. to the French islands, which created vitally 
important markets for the several hundred owners of small 
habitations sucreries which survived for a time alongside the 
usines centrales. In 1880 200 small sucreries still handled
518,000 tons of cane and produced 19,000 tons of sugar,
against 508,000 tons of cane and 25,000 tons of sugar
36produced by the usines. The recovery rates suggested by
these statistics are interesting, since they reveal the 
technological superiority of the new steam mills over the 
traditional methods 'a la Pere Labat still employed on the 
habitation: the usine requiring 13.4 tons of cane against 
the sucrerie's 16.7 tons to produce a ton of sugar. The 
depression in the 1880s and the re-imposition of duties 
sounded the final death knell for the habitations sucreries, 
and by 1887 only 5,000,000 kilograms of sugar were produced
by the sucreries, compared with 34,000,000 kilograms
37produced by the usines.
The grinding requirements of the usine were met from 
two sources. Firstly, from, plantations owned by the usine 
itself. This was either land owned by the usinier and his 
family prior to the installation of modern equipment, in the 
case of private ownership; if the usine was corporatively 
owned it was land that had been formerly owned by several 
Beke families who were now shareholders, who had possessed 
traditional sucreries before the advent of a centralized 
system of production. The second source of supply was 
external, and came from-the habitations of less wealthy Bekes 
for whom it was no longer an economically viable proposition 
to manufacture sugar by outdated methods. About one-fifth 
of this external source also came from a large number of 
black and coloured smallholders and colons partiares, 
cultivating lots of varying sizes.
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Evidence of the wholesale process of change in the 
organizational structure of the plantation system towards 
amalgamation and concentration of estates in the hands of the 
usiniers, which led to the formation of large centres agricoles 
in the twentieth century, is contained in the list of sugar 
estates published in Le Propagateur in 1882 (See Appendix XI). 
From this list it is possible to identify groups of estates 
which were now incorporated into the domain of the usine.
The process was most advanced at this period in the cases 
of Galion in the north-east, which had acquired eleven estates 
totalling 2,278 hectares, Lareinty in the central plain of 
the island, which had eight estates covering an area of over
2,000 hectares, and two usines in the south, Petit Bourg and 
Riviere Salee, which now owned 1,200 and 1,600 hectares 
apiece.
In 1900 eighteen usines centrales were in existence 
in Martinique. A total of twenty-one had been created in the 
second half of the nineteenth century and 'three had failed 
during the depression. All but two had been built by the 
French foundry owner Jean Francois Call, who had played a. 
central role in the modernization of the sugar industry in 
the French Antilles, Reunion and Cuba. Of the surviving 
eighteen usines, nine were organized as public limited 
liability companies, four were privately owned family cor­
porations and six were owned by individuals. The nine 
public corporations controlled the following: Riviere- 
Monsieur- (Fort-de-France), Soudon (Lamentin), Riviere-Salee 
(Riviere-Salee), Francois (Francois), Robert (Robert),
Trinite and Bassignac (Trinite), Sainte-Marie (Sainte-Marie), 
and Basse-Pointe (Basse-Pointe). The four privately owned 
corporations were Petit Bourg (Ducos), Marin (Marin),
Riviere Blanche (Saint-Pierre), -and Galion (Trinite). The 
usines owned by individuals were Lareinty (Lamentin), 
Trois-Rivieres (Sainte-Luce), Vauclin (Vauclin), Pointe-Simon 
(Ducos), and Saint-Jacques (Sainte-Marie). In 1903 the 
construction of Vive (Marigot) made the proprietor of 
Lareinty the owner of a second factory.
As a consequence of these differences in the extent 
to which technological change and structural re-organization
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of the plantation system had taken place by the early 
twentieth century, there were marked differences in the 
composition of the new elites which emerged in the 
twentieth century, as well as in the degree of concentration 
of economic power. It will be seen in Chapter 5 that an 
essential element responsible for this variation was the 
metropolitan state, which in making funds available to the 
Martiniquan plantocracy for the building of central factories, 
contributed to it assuming a directive economic role in the 
twentieth oentury. By contrast a non-interventionist policy 
by the British Colonial Office in the face of economic ruin 
experienced by many Barbadian planters in the late nineteenth 
century, resulted in the demise of a great part of the old 
established planter class, whose land passed into the hands of 
a new commercial elite.
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I have already described in Chapter 4 the changes 
that came•about in the organizational structure of the 
plantation system in Martinique in the second half of the 
nineteenth century, and in Barbados in the early years of 
the twentieth century, and provided comparative data on 
the process of change which took place elsewhere In the 
Caribbean during the same period. In the cases of Barbados 
and Martinique the maintenance of economic power by local 
white interests is linked with the emergence of new social 
classes in the second half of the nineteenth century, in a 
process which was coterminous with the birth of monopoly 
capitalism which was local rather than international. In 
each island the concentration of mercantile and planter 
interests in the same hands produced something of a social 
hybrid, which I have chosen to designate as an 'agri-business 
bourgeoisie*. By the early twentieth century these' new 
economic elites had usurped the traditional commercial and 
productive functions of both metropolitan merchant house and 
indigenous plantocracy, emerging phoenix-like out of the 
ashes of the depression of the 1880s and 1890s. The social 
origins of the new elite were different in each case. In 
Barbados the nucleus of the agri-business bourgeoisie was a 
locally based commercial class, which forged financial and 
familial ties with the surviving remnants of an older 
established planter class. In Martinique the origins of 
the group were somewhat different, having developed out of 
the oldest white creole planter families who had played a 
central role in the foundation of the island's first central 
sugar factories.
Set within the context of nineteenth century 
imperialism, West Indian plantation economies like those of 
most other colonial possessions throughout the world, were 
fully integrated into the capitalist system via the emergence 
and development of international monopoly corporations. The 
re-organization of the plantation system along corporate lines 
in the Caribbean by the introduction of metropolitan finance 
capital, has therefore to be seen within a global context.
5.1. Introduction
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This process which took place in nearly all of the sugar 
islands of the Caribbean, was also to be observed con­
temporaneously in the tea and rubber plantations of Asia 
and in the banana and sugar plantations of Central America.
By the 1890s control of the sugar industry in Jamaica,
Trinidad, British Guiana, Guadeloupe and the smaller 
British colonies of the Windward and Leeward Islands, had 
passed out of the hands of private resident and absentee 
proprietors to a metropolitan corporate sector. In Cuba 
and Puerto Rico local control was maintained slightly longer 
by the hacendados, but the same process took place quite 
rapidly after 1899 with the invasion of the United States 
and the penetration of American finance capital between 
1900 and 1920.
Viewed against the background of this near universal 
phenomenon the cases of Barbados and Martinique must be con­
sidered unique, in so far as they successfully avoided the 
penetration of metropolitan corporate interests and kept the 
sugar industry in local hands. This is particularly remarkable 
when we consider that this occurred against a background of 
successive crises in the sugar industry between 1884 and 1905, 
fuelled primarily by the competition from subsidized European 
beet sugar which sent world prices plummeting after 1884.
The reason as to why economic power remained in local hands 
can be analysed in terms of the internal structuring of 
these two colonial societies, which gave rise to the formation 
of new elites in the late nineteenth century who were the only 
groups financially powerful enough to keep the sugar industry 
afloat during the depression.
In dealing specifically with the economic power of 
the elites in this chapter, my aim will be two-fold. Firstly,
I intend to examine the strategies employed by local 
interests to maintain their established monopoly over land 
resources and sugar production during the second half of the 
nineteenth century, a period which heralded the demise of 
local planter hegemony elsewhere. Secondly, in a trans­
formational process in the twentieth century, in which 
merchants became planters in one island and planters became 
merchants in the other, I will attempt to show how these new
elites consolidated their newly won position of power and 
achieved a virtual monopoly over the primary, secondary and 
tertiary sectors of the colonial economy. However, before 
preceeding to a detailed examination of these variant 
cases, I should like to emphasize what I believe to be 
separate aspects of the problem of power maintenance.
During the first period it is possible to point to several 
pre-conditions which favoured the maintenance of local 
interests after Abolition. What is striking, however, is 
that these pre-conditions did not ensure that economic power 
remained in the same hands in Barbados, nor did it ensure 
that it remained in the hands of all but a minority element 
within the plantocracy in Martinique. The radical structural 
transformation of the white elite in the late nineteenth 
century, and the rapidity with which the economic power of a 
new social class in each island became institutionalized and 
entrenched in the first two decades of the twentieth century, 
suggests a second aspect of the problem: that of a rcon­
spiracy theory1 to explain the new elites’ rise to power.
5.2. The Barbadian Variant: The Rise of the Bridgetown 
Commercial Clalss
In the case of Barbados one can point to two main 
factors which provided conditions favourable to the main­
tenance of local interests after Abolition. Firstly, the 
existence of a relatively large resident planter class and 
the retention of the Old Representative System, which in 
almost all other British West Indian islands gave way to 
direct rule by Crown Colony Government, gave the white 
oligarchy in Barbados a power of internal control which 
was unrivalled elsewhere in the Caribbean. Vested with the 
power to make its own laws, a number of measures were adopted 
by the Barbadian planter class in the second half of the 
nineteenth century which had the effect of retaining estate 
ownership in local hands, though these measures did not have 
the long-term effect of keeping estates in the same hands. 
Most important of these measures was the refusal of the 
local legislature to accept the Encumbered Estates Act of 
1854, through which estates in other British West Indian
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islands were sold on the London market for the most part to
merchant consignees, aided in this process by the Court's
acceptance of the principle of consignee priority of lien.
Barbados by contrast adopted its own version of the English
Chancery Court system,1 which ensured that indebted estates
were re-scld to local buyers. Another important measure
adopted by the local legislature at the height of the
depression in 1887 was the enactment of the Agricultural 
2Aids Act, which helped to prop up an ailing sugar industry
and thereby prevent its total collapse. Under this Act the
legislature voted for funds to be advanced out of the colony's
budget for continuing the cultivation of estates in financial
difficulty, both in and out of Chancery. By 1897 roughly one-
third of the sugar estates in Barbados were supported in this 
3way.
A second factor which favoured the maintenance of
local interests was the way in which the sugar industry was
traditionally financed by local capital. Prior to 1838 the
most common source of credit to plantations in the British
West Indies was via the 'consignee system'. Under this
system planters acquired the necessary supplies for the
running of a plantation on credit from an English merchant *
A planter's crop would then be automatically consigned to
the same merchant who would arrange for its sale on the
English market. After the sale of the crop,, the consignee
made deductions on the planter's account for supplies
shipped to the estate on credit and duly charged his
commission. Finally the balance was credited, or sometimes
even debited, to the planter's account. In the years
following Abolition this source of credit was available to
Lonly the most financially secure plantations. This arrange­
ment whereby the consignee made it a condition of the loan 
that the planter ship all the produce of the mortgaged 
estate to him in the merchant's vessels, and to receive in 
turn from the merchant all supplies for the estate, was not 
originally subject to express contract. However, this 
informal arrangement resting upon a 'gentleman's agreement'- 
became the subject of express contract at the end of the 
eighteenth century. Since land was considered to be a first
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rate security in Barbados and because mortgages were one 
of., the few avenues for investment in the island, it seems 
to have been the established practice for most Barbadian 
planters to have obtained credit locally rather than from 
English merchants. Confidence in this form of investment 
which provided a steady income for mortgagees, is reflected 
in the way in which mortgages were commonly kept on 
properties over a long period of time with no attempt being 
made to realize the principal, so that sales of property 
often included their encumbrances.
Referring to the financial independence of the 
Barbadian planter community in the second half of the 
eighteenth century, Richard Pares (1956: 100) noted that 
"Barbadians had owed money not so much to Englishmen as 
to other Barbadians..." Trollope's observations (1859: 121) 
in the mid-nineteenth eentury upon the financial independence 
of Barbados, as an island that "owes no man anything" and 
"pays its own way", reinforces the impression that the 
financing of the sugar industry was primarily a local affair. 
An analysis of Chancery Court records accords this impression 
the status of fact, since they clearly indicate that the 
plaintiffs represented in bills of complaint in a majority 
of cases were other planters and local merchants. Between 
1840 and 1920, out of a sample of 600 cases of debt fore­
closure, in only eighteen cases was the plaintiff an English 
merchant.^ In a typical example produced below of liens 
against Claybury plantation, it can be seen that members of 
local planter families had first, second and third priority 
claims (sharing fourth place with. Michael Cavan and Co.), 
with fifth and sixth places being accorded to English 
merchant houses:
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Priorities Claimants Sums owed
LIENS AGAINST CLAYBURY (1882)
1 Miss A.S.E. Boxill £500
1 Cooper Boxill 500
1 Mrs. M.A. Hinkson 500
1 W.H. Boxill 1300
1 Estate of James Frost 1200
2 Estate of R.W. O ’Neale 1987. 10. 0.
3 W.G. Lyall 3017. •o•HH
3 Mrs. A.J. Pile 857. 3. 0.
3 Mrs. Rose Bell 857. 2.10.
3 Mrs. Thos. H. Sealy 857. 2.10.
3 Mrs. G. Laurie Pile 857. 2.10.
3 Miss A.E. Lyall 857. 2.10.
3 Miss Charlotte Lyall 857. 2.10.
3 Chas. B . Lyall 857. 2.10.
4 Anna Belfield 570
4 M. Cavan and Co. 287. 5.11.
5 Thos. Daniel and Co. Ltd. 2196. Ul » o •
6 Louis Son and Co. 1474. 4. 8.
19532. 16. 7.
(Source: Barbados Museum and Historical Society, Cottle and 
Catford Deposit)
The foundation of the Barbados Mutual Life Assurance 
Society by a group of prominent Bridgetown- merchants in 1840, 
occurred within the same decade as the collapse of the West 
India Bank. Since virtually the only form of local invest­
ment was upon mortgages secured on sugar estates, and the 
Colonial Bank under its Charter of 1836 was not authorized 
to give loans against land as a security, the BMLA, together 
with the Barbados Savings Bank, became the major-financial 
institution supplying credit to the sugar industry in the 
mid-nineteenth century. The importance of this move on the 
part of local commercial interests was three-fold. Firstly, 
the inauguration of an institution of finance capital
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provided a means of local capital accumulation, which gave 
the sugar industry in Barbados far more stability than 
most other British West Indian islands in the years after 
Abolition. - Secondly, its foundation and capitalization 
by local merchants ensured the retention of local ownership. 
Thirdly, the returns made by the BMLA from substantial 
investments in the sugar industry- provided for further 
capital accumulation, which was subsequently re-invested 
in commerce and used to purchase sugar estates out of 
Chancery in the early years of the twentieth century, and 
to capitalize the construction of the first central sugar 
factories. The importance of the BMLA as a source of 
credit to the Barbadian sugar industry in the nineteenth 
century, is indicated by the fact that by 1877 the Society 
had already over £150,000 invested in the form of loans to 
planters. The importance of its investments in the sugar 
industry is also reflected in the rate of interest paid to 
policy holders on these investments, indicating a direct 
relationship between the bonus paid and the state of the 
international sugar market at any given period.
The collapse of eighteen West India merchant houses 
in 1846, and the subsequent shift of .trading operations by 
the survivors into other parts of the British Empire, created 
a vacuum which was soon filled by local commercial houses.
The origins of some of the largest firms and the backgrounds 
of their founders are of particular interest, and should not 
be passed without comment. Gardiner Austin and Co. Ltd., 
the largest sugar and molasses exporter by the 1930s, can be 
traced back to the London merchant house of Cavan Bros, and 
Co., founded in 1797. Cavan's separated from the parent 
company in the 1830s upon the death of one of its partners, 
Michael Cavan, and became a Barbadian concern, Michael 
Cavan and Co., run by Cavan's nephew, Michael McClery. In 
1872 John Gardiner Austin became a senior partner of the 
firm. ■ Gardiner Austin was born in Demerara and came from a 
long-established West Indian colonial family, which had been 
associated with Barbados and British Guiana for 200 years. 
Upon his death in 1902 Cavan's went into bankruptcy and the 
old business was subsequently revived by his two sons under
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the name of Gardiner Austin and Co. Alister Cameron, the 
founder of A.- Cameron-and Co. one of the foremost commission 
houses of the early twentieth century, originally came to 
Barbados from England as an estate attorney for Thomas 
Daniels and Sons. When the company's Barbadian assets 
were liquidated in 1891, Cameron bought its largest sugar 
estates in St. Philip, Sunbury and Hampton (761 acres), out 
of the Chancery Court and subsequently purchased other 
estates to form Sunbury Estates Ltd. Another prominent 
commission agent, Arthur Sydney Bryden, came to Barbados 
from England as an agent for Lloyds Marine Insurance. He 
founded the firm of A.S. Bryden and Sons in the 1890s, and 
henceforth operated as.a commission agent, wholesaler and 
retail distributor. John Hadley Wilkinson, the son of a 
partner of the London based West India merchant house of 
Wilkinson and Gaviller (formerly the business of Maxwell 
and Lascelles), came to Barbados in 1908 to take charge of 
the local branch of the firm. In 1920 the Barbados branch 
detached itself from the parent■company and went into partner­
ship with an old-established planter family, to form the 
commercial house of Wilkinson and Haynes Co. Ltd. A final 
example in this series of organizational transformations is 
afforded by the case of Da Costa and Co. Ltd., a firm of 
general merchants founded in 1868 by David Campbell Da Costa, 
a trader of Portuguese Jewish extraction from St. Vincent, 
out of the former eighteenth century Barbadian commercial
7house of Barrow and Dummet.
It is evident from these examples that the Bridge­
town commercial houses did not develop entirely out of a 
total vacuum created by the failure or departure of English 
firms-. Several businesses in fact grew out of established 
metropolitan merchant houses which 'went local* in the 
Barbadian context. It must also be-noted that-the acquisition 
of sugar estates during the depression by mercantile interests 
is not novel in Barbados's history. Leading English firms 
in the past like* the Colonial Companyj Maxwell and Lascelles, 
Higginson and Stott, Thomas Daniels and Sons and Thomas Louis, 
as well as prominent Barbadian merchant houses like Barrow and 
Dummet and Gibbes, have all been landed proprietors at one time
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or another. What needs to he explained are the factors res­
ponsible for the ultimate exclusion of metropolitan mer­
cantile interests in the twentieth century, in favour of a 
local trading sector which between 1880 and 1920 succeeded 
in achieving a virtual monopoly over all three sectors of 
the colonial economy.
The development of a strong local trading sector is 
linked with the abandonment of protectionist principles in 
trade. The repeal of the Navigation Acts in 1849, which 
came as a logical sequel to the equalization of duties on 
foreign and British colonial sugar products under the Sugar 
Duties Act of 1846, enabled the British West Indies to tap 
new markets, particularly in Canada and the United States. 
Access to the North American market was particularly vital 
to Barbados in the second half of the nineteenth century, 
since the maintenance of an outmoded technology continued 
to yield a low-grade sugar which could not compete with more 
refined products in demand on the European market. With the 
introduction of a lower scale of duties for muscovado the 
American market grew rapidly after 1872. It quickly became 
a more attractive proposition than the U.K. one, particularly 
after the complete abolition of all sugar duties in 1874, 
which set ’bounty-fed’ refined beet sugar in open competitiongwith unrefined muscovado. The extent to which the pattern 
of Barbados’s trade shifted from the U.K. to the U.S.A. in 
the last quarter of the nineteenth century, is indicated by 
the growth of sugar exports to the American market from 
7,383 hogsheads in 1874 to 43,807 in 1896. During the same 
period exports to the U.K. dwindled from 36,760 hogsheads to
Q1,101. Commercial houses like Musson’s,Da Costa’s and 
Cavan’s were the largest commission agents of the period 
which built up trade connections with the North American 
market.10 With this shift in trade away from the European 
market, greater proximity and hence lower freight charges 
resulted in lower overheads for both merchant and planter.
The Bridgetown commission houses benefited doubly from the 
American market: lower freight charges in particular 
encouraged the importation of cheaper foodstuffs and estate 
supplies as return cargoes. In this way the Bridgetown 
merchants did not restrict their commercial activities to
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the export of sugar and molasses; they also actively engaged 
in food importation and wholesaling, dealt in dry goods and 
acted as manufacturers' agents and shipping agents. 
Technological advances such as the development of steamships 
and the inauguration of a telegraph service in 1871, lowered 
transportation costs even further and made for speedier 
delivery and controlled the flow of merchandise more 
effectively. Some sense of the impact that this revolution 
in transportation and communications had upon the commercial 
life of Bridgetown is conveyed by this description 
(Campbell, 1969 : 26) of the institution known as Commercial 
Hall, the local nerve centre of the business world:
"In 1885 Commercial Hall was more than a place for 
meetings; it was a place where businessmen obtained 
information vital to their business ... in the Report 
Room they could see the day's market prices from 
overseas and the manifests of ships that had recently 
arrived; and on the slate the signalman would enter 
the names and particulars of ships sighted from the 
signals station of the Island and signalled to the 
Hall by flags or semaphore. The daily market prices 
of certain commodities ... were furnished free of 
charge by the Telegraph Company in consideration of 
the subsidy received from the Barbados Government."
In those islands where metropolitan merchant houses 
became sugar proprietors, they became their own consignees, 
exporting sugar in the newly established steamship lines 
directly to the New York, market. These consignee merchants 
usually sold their sugar through the American agencies of 
brokers like Czarnikow and Bookers, which was unloaded into 
refineries on the New York waterfront. In Barbados this 
marketing role was undertaken by the Bridgetown merchants, 
which was somewhat analogous to that of the pierrotine 
commissionnaire who had handled sugar as a factor from the 
French islands since the 1730s, merely as a broker without 
any financial risks. The commission agents of Bridgetown 
benefited enormously from this direct system of marketing. 
Their role was relatively simple and required very little 
capital to operate. It merely involved obtaining shipments 
of sugar from the numerous individual proprietors 
scattered throughout the island, and supplying a commission 
merchant in the United States who paid the local merchant a
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With the expansion of their commercial activities 
the new mercantile class became increasingly differentiated 
into several strata. At the apex of the hierarchy were to 
be found the commission agents, manufacturers' representatives 
and steamship agents. These included such well-known names 
as Da Costa and Co., S.P. Musson and Co., Wilkinson and Co.,
R. and G. Challenor Ltd. and J.A. Lynch and Co. At a 
lower level in the hierarchy were to be found firms which 
operated as wholesalers. Some of the most prominent firms 
in this category were J.R. Bancroft and Co., Evelyn, Roach 
and Co., A.S. Bryden and Sons, Manning and Co., Collymore 
and Wright and James H. Inniss and Co. At the same time a 
number of the largest firms in the first group also acted as 
wholesalers. Situated at the lowest rung of the ladder were 
those firms operating solely as retail distributors, supplying 
dry goods, provisions and hardware. The retail sector is the 
most difficult to characterize, since it included a wide 
range of both large and small businesses which operated 
throughout Broad Street, Swan Street and to a lesser extent 
Roebuck Street, which was primarily the location of wholesale 
firms. Included within this category were also to be found 
numerous small entrepreneurs-: black Barbadians who operated 
rum shops and small provision stores in the capital itself 
and scattered across the length and the breadth of the 
island, as well as an army of almost 3,000 hawkers and 
pedlars, purchasing goods in Bridgetown and selling on credit 
to the rural proletarist located in the tenantries and free 
villages.
As early as the 1880s we begin to see the emergence 
of a process of horizontal integration, in which the most 
powerful commercial houses begin to monopolize all three 
strata of commercial activity in Bridgetown. The last two 
decades of the nineteenth century was a period of intense 
cut-throat competition in which wholesalers and retailers 
were at the mercy of the commission agents, who controlled 
the supply of goods, fixed prices and decided who they would 
sell to. The power of the major commercial houses was far
commission.
reaching. As well as controlling the granting of credit to 
merchants and traders which they manipulated through three
trading associations, the Commission Merchants* Association, 
the Traders* Association and the Provision Dealers Association, 
they also wielded a great deal of influence in the estates 
sector which was dependent upon them for extending credit, 
either as individuals or through the BMLA as policy holders. 
Their control over the credit system was an important mechanism 
which gave them the power to make or break a business, or to 
force a planter into bankruptcy. The following incident 
provides a very good illustration of the extent to which the 
major commercial houses exerted a control over business 
activities at this period. From April 1889 Commercial Hall 
operated a sales room where importers sold their produce to 
wholesale merchants. In March 1896 nine leading firms1  ^
announced their intention to withdraw from the sales room, 
which resulted in its closure. Prior to 1889 these largest 
firms enjoyed a virtual monopoly, since as the largest firms 
all wholesale buyers came to them in order to save time. The 
opening of a sales room under one roof meant that the large 
firms had to compete with the smaller on an equal footing.
An agreement by a combine of the nine largest firms to with­
draw from the sales room which immediately led to its closure, 
was part of a tactical plan to squeeze out the smaller 
importers, because they felt that they were not obtaining a 
sufficiently large enough ’share of the business.
With this process of horizontal integration whereby 
a wide range of commercial activities became concentrated in 
the hands of some nine or ten major commercial houses (See 
Appendix VII),we begin to see a parallel process of power 
consolidation at work, in which all the strategic posts in 
the commercial and financial institutions of the island 
become concentrated in the hands of leading members of the 
mercantile elite. For example, it is relevant to note that 
leading merchants and traders like J. Gardiner Austin,
James A. Lynch, J.R. Bancroft, Rupert G. Cave and A.S. Bryden 
were all chairmen of the BMLA in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century. Some of the aforementioned together with 
other notables in the commercial world also occupied important 
offices in Commercial Hall:
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CHAIRMEN AND VICE-CHAIRMEN OF COMMERCIAL HALL: 
' • ' 1885-1920
Chairmen
1885/87 W.H. Jones
(Senior partner of 
Jones and Swan: 
Commission and Steam­
ship agents)
1887/88 J.A. Lynch
1888
1889 W.P. Leacock
(Senior partner of 
Leacock and Co: 
Commission and 
Shipping agents)
1890/92 R. Arthur
(Founder of Alleyne, 
Arthur and Co: 
Commission agents and 
General merchants)
1892/97 J.G. Austin
1897/1902 J.G. Austin
1902/05 J.C. Lynch
1908/20 V. Hansche11
Vice-Chairmen
J.A. Lynch
(Founder of J.A. Lynch and Co:
Commission agents and
Wholesalers)
S.N. Collymore
(Senior partner of Collymore 
and Wright: Commission 
agents and General Merchants)
J.G. Austin
(Sole, proprietor of Michael 
Cavan and Co: Commission 
agents and Wholesalers)
J.G. Austin
J.G. Austin
A. Laurie
(Founder of Laurie and Co: 
General merchants and 
Steamship agents)
J.C. Lynch
(Director of J.A. Lynch and'
Co).
V. Hanschell
(Commission and Steamship 
agent and ship chandlery 
business. Also consul for a 
number of European and Latin 
American states)
E.I. Baeza ■
(Director of J.A. Lynch and Co. 
Also in partnership with his 
brother J. Baeza: Commission 
agents and General merchants. 
Owners of a Department Store 
on Broad Street)
I l l
No analysis of the rise to power of the Bridgetown 
commercial class can ignore the vitally important role 
played by the Chancery Court system in the late nineteenth 
century, and for this reason I have dealt with it below 
•under a separate heading. The refusal of the Barbadian 
legislature to accept the Encumbered Estates Act and their 
decision to invest the local Chancery Court with the task of 
disposing of indebted sugar estates, was a mechanism central 
to the plantocracy's strategy of maintaining local landed 
interests. It is also relevant to note that such a policy 
was just as strategically important to local commercial 
interests, since it effectively enabled them to play a central 
role as consignee merchants in the second half of the nine­
teenth century, which would have been conceivably denied to 
them had proprietorship passed into metropolitan hands.
The Chancery Court System
Unlike.the English system mortgagees did’ not have
the power to bring an encumbered estate to sale in the open
market. Property under Barbadian law could only be disposed
of by the Chancery Court. An encumbered sugar estate had to
be given the chance to work off its debts before disposal
was reverted to, the sale of any estate in Chancery being
regarded as a final measure. Theoretically an estate which
paid off all its outstanding debts whilst being worked in
Chancery during a twelve month period reverted back to its
original owner. The following description of his duties by
the Master-in-Chancery to the West India Royal Commission 
14-in 1897, gives an accurate picture of the way in which 
the system operated:
"When the owner of a plantation is unable to carry 
on its cultivation to the satisfaction of the 
mortgagees or to pay them their interest, a fore- 
- closure bill in Chancery is filed. Unlike the 
filing of a. bill in England the, mortgagee does not 
take possession of the plantation, but a receiver
is appointed by the Court --- and for this reason.
The carrying on of the cultivation of a plantation 
necessitates the advancing of large sums of money, 
and the mortgagee, if he entered into possession, 
would have to find this money and it might prove a 
very hard thing for him to be able to do. A
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receiver when appointed, takes possession of the 
plantation, and raises money either under the 
Agricultural Aids Act, or by some other means, 
that money being a first lien against the 
plantation. As soon as an estate has been in 
Chancery twelve months, I call on the receiver 
to bring in his accounts and he produces all 
his vouchers and receipts which are then carefully 
checked by me, after which I report thereon to the 
Court of Chancery'1.
In the above extract it is evident that the system as locally
practised acted as a kind of 'holding operation' to keep
estate ownership in local hands, and in conjunction with the
Agricultural Aids Act of 1887, to artifically prop up an
ailing sugar industry. In their evidence to the Royal
15Commission of 1897, a group of prominent planters 
indicated the extent to which the sugar industry was being 
supported by loans granted under this Act, emphasizing in 
no uncertain terms that continuing cultivation depended 
solely on these advances:
"Many plantations are now carried on by loans under 
the Agricultural Aids Act, which make money advanced 
for working a plantation a first charge on the 
growing crop; but if from any cause such advances 
should be no longer obtainable, then there would be 
no alternative but to cease cultivating the 
plantations so dependent. The number and total 
acreage of the plantations which have, up to the 
present time, obtained such loans against the crop 
to be reaped this year, and the total amount of 
money borrowed are:-
1. 44 plantations of a total acreage of 10,824 that 
are being worked in Chancery, have borrowed 
£32,141.
2. 94 plantations of a total acreage of 20,674, in 
the hands of their owners,•have borrowed 
£64,727."
Thus roughly one-third of the island's sugar estates were 
supported in this way in the closing years of the nineteenth 
century. Many others which had been previously supported in 
a similar fashion had ceased cultivation altogether.
From the onset of the crisis in the 1880s and 
throughout the 1890s, a drop in the average price of sugar 
on the world market from £20 a ton in 1883 to £9 a ton in 
1897 was matched by a drop in land values. In his evidence
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to the Commission the Master-In-Chancery estimated that the 
value of an estate in 1897 was only 30-35 per cent of its 
value in the early 1880s: "Plantations appraised to
£15,000 in 1883 would now be appraised to about £5,500".
A more comprehensive view of declining land values during 
this period was given by the same group of "prominent 
planters" mentioned above:
"In 1881 the usual selling price of estates 
(including buildings and stocks) were at rates 
of from £55-£85 per arable acre ... The approximate 
value of all the plantations calculated on this 
basis was £5,558,680. At the present time the 
selling prices are at rates varying from £15 to £35 
per arable acre; and on this basis the value of all 
plantations is £1,973,025 - showing a shrinkage in 
value of over three and a half million sterling*.
These judgements of land values quoted above were based upon
the appraisal of estates' values which were sold through the
Chancery Court. Those responsible for making this appraisal
were, according to the Master-In-Chancery, "agriculturists
of repute". It is noteworthy to add, however, that a number
17of these appraisers were in fact Bridgetown merchants. In 
order to describe the process of fixing land values for 
estate sales, I can do no better than to refer back to the 
Master-In-Chancery's evidence to the Commission:
"If an application is made for an order directing 
the sale of a plantation, the decree is brought 
to me and I summon seven appraisers ... and I 
attend with them at the plantation. They inspect 
the canes, buildings, carts, waggons and stock, 
and they put an upset value on them. Then I set 
up the whole property with crops, stock and utensils 
for sale."^g
Estates not immediately sold on the first appointed day were 
re-advertised for sale in the Official Gazette, and set up 
for sale on each succeeding Friday until sold. As the 
records of the Chancery Court clearly indicate, it became 
increasingly difficult to find purchasers for sugar estates 
in the 1890s and- many had to be re-appraised at a lower 
price. The process was a lengthy one and the procedure for 
re-appraisement meant that a plantation could stay in 
Chancery for several years before a sale was effected:
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"If not sold at the expiration of twelve months, any 
.mortgagee or creditor who has filed his claim in 
Chancery can apply for its re-appraisement between 
the 15th December and the 1st March of the next year, 
and a second appraisement is made and the plantation 
again set up for sale at the last appraised value".
During the 1880s and 1890s some plantations were 
appraised as much as eight times without a sale being 
effected. Given that the legal machinery for debt recovery 
through the subsequent sale of indebted estates was con­
trolled by the Barbadian planter elite (the Master-In-Chanoery 
W.K. Chandler was himself an estate owner), one is tempted to 
think that land was appraised unrealistically high by 
Chandler's "agriculturists of repute" in order to prevent the 
bottom falling out of the market. However, the evidence of 
both 'prominent planters' and the Master-In-Chancery tends 
to suggest that land appraisals varied directly in relation 
to prevailing sugar prices. Further evidence taken from the 
personal journal of a Barbadian planter of the period, in 
which the average prices of sugar estates sold in Barbados 
between 1875 and 1896 were recorded, suggests that this was 
so (See Appendix VIII).
Due to the precarious financial situation of most 
estates of the period, the question as to whether estates 
were appraised unrealistically high appears to be irrelevant, 
since most of them were operating at a loss during the 1890s 
and new purchasers would have been unable to run estates 
without recourse to loans under the Agricultural Aids Act. 
Moreover, during this period it became increasingly difficult 
to pay back the interest on these loans. The following 
Table showing the financial situation of a number of estates 
which had been in Chancery for two years or more, clearly 
indicates why it was so difficult to find purchasers. It 
should be noted that the financial situation of these 
estates is actually worse than is first apparent, since annual 
average expenditure does not include one vital factor, and 
that is the cost of raising money to produce the crop of the 
ensuing year. It is also evident that in most cases these 
estates were unable to pay back any interest on loans already 
contracted.
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A move of prime importance leading to the release 
of many estates out of Chancery came in 1898, when the 
Attorney General ordered that these estates were to be put 
up for sale to the highest bidder. As a result of this 
decision a number of estates were sold at prices far below 
their appraised value as the following sample indicates:
TABLE XI : SELECTED SAMPLE OF ESTATES IN CHANCERY SOLD TO
THE HIGHEST BIDDER AFTER UNSUCCESSFULLY ATTAINING
THEIR APPRAISED VALUE
Estate Size
(acres
Appraised Value
)
Starting Bid
Parks 262 £6,716 £500
(St. Joseph) (February 1886) (September 1901)
Eastpoint 90 £933. 7. 6. £300(St. Philip) (February 1900) (September 1901)
Eastbourne 88 £1,908 £500
(St. Philip) (October 1895) (April 1900)
Walkers 708 £7,998 £250
(St. Andrew) (January 1895) (June 1899)
Haggatts 549 £7,251 £200(St. Andrew) (April 1889) (June 1899)
Swans 152 £2,103.4. 0. £400
(St. Andrew) (February 1901) (February 1903)
(Source: Barbados Archives, Chancery Sales Ledgers,
1894--1901, 1901-1904)
Sold 
£1,040 
£ 860
£ 750 
£1,270 
£ 655 
£ 875
A number of estates sold in this way had been appraised 
several times before being put up for sale to the highest 
bidder. Eastpoint, for example, had been originally 
appraised at £1,823 in October 1896. Many of the estates 
sold by this method were later on sold at enormous profit, 
which indicates the degree of speculation that went on in 
the aftermath of the crisis in the 1890s. Walkers, which 
fetched as little as £1,270 in 1899, was sold for £8,000 in 
1916 and again in the following year for £11,000. Although 
this represented a recovery in value it was only partial. 
According to the Master-in-Chanceryrs calculations in 1897, 
such an estate of over 700 acres would have been worth over 
£24,000 before 1886.20
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In retrospect, the last two decades of the 
nineteenth century can be regarded as a crucial period in 
which the white oligarchy maintained its economic power 
through the Chancery Court system, which enabled it to 
develop independently a local trading sector, and to ensure 
that Barbadian estates remained in hands that were both 
local and white. However, it is also a period in which the 
membership of the oligarchy was transformed. From the onset 
of the crisis something like two-thirds of the island's 
sugar estates went into receivership, and most of the 
casualties were old-established resident and absentee 
proprietors. As a result, in the words of one surviving 
representative of the older planter c l a s s t h e  plant­
ocracy was no more; shop-keepers from the nineties were 
henceforth the new masters of the island". The first two 
decades of the twentieth century were a formative period for 
the new white elite, just as the last two decades of the 
nineteenth century were a period of decline for the plant­
ocracy, since it was early in the twentieth century that the 
Bridgetown merchants consolidated the gains of the previous 
two decades by moving into the production sector, and fully 
emerged as an agri-business bourgeoisie.
5.3. The Martiniquan Variant: The Ascendance of the 
Grands Bekes
Like Barbados one can isolate two main factors which 
contributed to the maintenance of local interests after 
Abolition in 1848. Firstly, the continuing stability of an 
indigenous plantocracy untouched by the political con­
sequences of the French Revolution which effectively des-
21troyed the economic power of the Grands Blancs of Guadeloupe. 
Secondly, the existence of readily available local sources of 
capital to finance the sugar industry. Like the situation in Barbados, 
Martiniquan planters were traditionally used to obtaining 
credit locally, and were not dependent upon advances from 
merchant houses in Bordeaux, Nantes and Le Havre, as were 
many of the planters of Sainte-Dominque and Guadeloupe. In 
this respect the planters of Martinique were dependent for
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their sources of credit not so much upon other planters, hut 
upon the commissionnaires of Saint-Pierre, who from the early 
eighteenth century had operated as factors, handling sugar, 
slaves and plantation supplies for the planters of Martinique 
as well as the other French islands. Although members of 
this commercial class continued to be referred to as 
commissionnaires well into the nineteenth century, many in 
fact also operated as merchants on their own account.
According to Richard Pares (I960: 30/31), Saint- 
Pierre's development as a trading and commercial centre was 
due to the fact that it was the terminus of all shipping con­
voys between metropolitan France and the Antilles. This 
meant that very early on the commission earnt on sugar and 
slaves throughout the French Caribbean made for rapid capital 
accumulation, which in turn was invested as loans to sugar 
planters. Thus it can be argued as CrusoXdoes (1973 : 9), 
that the pierrotine commissionnaires played an active role 
in preventing the transfer of estates into the hands of 
metropolitan mercantile interests. It has also been argued 
by Deerr (1949: 1,235) that the commissionnaires played a 
vital role in the earlier development of sugar production in 
Martinique, compared with the rest of the French Antilles, 
since the existence of a powerful mercantile class in Saint- 
Pierre permitted a rapid accumulation of capital to the 
detriment of planters in the other islands. As a source of 
credit to the sugar proprietors of Martinique, it is evident 
that the commissionnaires from De La Cornillbre's account 
(1842: 102) acted as intermediaries within a similar kind of 
consignee system to that which was operated by the Bridgetown 
merchants: •
"The planters usually send their sugar to a 
commissionnaire at Saint-Fierre or Fort Royal 
(Fort-de-France), who supplies them with ood, wine, 
flour and all the other necessary items for cultivation. 
Advances of. credit increase the debt of the habitant.
The commissionnaire earns 2J- per cent on items he 
supplies and sugar he receives, and if the balance is 
favourable ... the commissionnaire in France gives him 
back 1 per cent of the 3 per cent commission he earns".
As factors with little or no overheads their earnings were
substantial, and those who operated as wholesalers and
retailers fixed a high mark-up on the sale of imported goods,
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which was usually as much as 40 per cent.
Who were the commissionnaires of Saint-Pierre? Did 
commissionnaire and planter belong to two distinctly 
different social strata in white creole society? Moreover, 
did the nucleus of the agri-business bourgeoisie which 
emerged in the twentieth century develop out of this local 
trading sector, in the same way that it did in Barbados out 
of the Bridgetown mercantile class? The evidence suggests 
that on the whole they did belong to different social strata. 
Based upon some of Pere LabatTs observations on the 
pierrotine commercial class of the early eighteenth century 
(1722: 1/4,70), I formulated the hypothesis that a sub­
stantial proportion of today's landed families were 
originally commissionnaires. and that the progression from 
merchant to planter represented an improved social status. 
However, from the evidence available no such regular pattern 
of upward social mobility is discernible. Only two Grands 
Bekes families appear to have been engaged in commerce 
during the eighteenth century and up to 1902. A number of 
pierrotine commission agencies were the local branches of 
merchant houses located in such ports as Nantes, Bordeaux 
and Le Havre (See Appendix I X) . Employees of these 
commercial houses and their families would have been class­
ified as metropolitains and not Bekes, since their stay in 
the colony was not permanent. A very high proportion of the 
white pierrotine population was in constant flux as a result 
of the close commercial and trading ties with metropolitan 
France. Of Saint-Pierre's white population of 4,000 prior to 
1902, one contemporary observer (De Croze, 1903: 190) 
remarked that:
"Among the white population many were from Bordeaux, 
this port being the one which maintained the most 
important commercial links with Martinique ... The 
ports of Marseilles, Nantes and Brest were also in 
constant communication with the town, and numerous 
families living in these towns had some of their 
members in our colony..."
By the 1890s a number of immigrants who had arrived earlier
in the century, had permanently settled down in Martinique
as pierrotine commission agents, wholesalers, produce dealers
and distillers. Among these new arrivals who entered commerce
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and became incorporated into Bek£ society, were the Bordaz, 
the Berte, the Lasserre brothers, the MacHugh and one notable 
individual who was to play a central role in the trans­
formation of the sugar industry in the second half of the 
nineteenth century, Eugene Eustache. More will be said about 
him later. Several other notable commercial families like the 
Cottrell, the Borde family and the Duplan, had become 
established as merchants much earlier in the eighteenth century 
Branches of two Grands Bekes families - de Reynal and Assier 
de Pompignan - had also been established at this earlier 
period.
With the notable exception of Eugene Eustaohe, the 
commissionnaires did not come to form the core of a new 
economic elite in the same way that the merchants of Bridge­
town did at the same period. The eruption of Mont Pelee on 
May 8th 1902 resulted in the complete destruction of Saint- 
Pierre and the annihilation of its entire population. When 
commercial life was re-established in Fort-de-France, 
traditionally the seat of administration and government, it 
was the newly created class of usiniers who founded the new 
commercial houses and replaced the now extinct commissionnaires
The specificity of the Martiniquan situation is 
exemplified by the active role of the French state in the 
economic transformation of the colony, and the alliance bet­
ween metropolitan and local capital with the foundation of 
the Credit Colonial. In 1861 the passing of legislation to 
found the Credit Colonial was of momentous importance to the 
future of the sugar industry in the French Antilles. The 
prime objective of this government initiative was
"... to lend ... either to sugar proprietors 
individually or to syndicates of proprietors, 
the necessary sums to construct sugar factories 
in the French colonies or to renew and to improve 
the equipment of factories in existence at the 
present time".22
Another government initiative taken a decade earlier had 
ensured that a portion of the compensation received by 
planters and merchants after Abolition was put to good use, 
with the setting up of colonial banks capitalized by one- 
eighth of the total compensation accorded by the French
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Government. However, the banques coloniales like the 
pierrotine commissionnaires gave only short-term credit 
of nine months on average. The importance of the 1861 
legislation lay in its provisions for long-term credit 
(between five and thirty years) which made the undertaking 
of capital projects possible, resulting in the construction 
of a central factory system in the French Antilles nearly 
half-a-century before its introduction in Barbados.
23An examination of documentary sources reveals 
that the prime movers to set up the Credit Colonial rep­
resented an alliance of Beke planter(together with planters 
from Guadeloupe and Reunion) apd French commercial and 
industrial interests. Prominent names which figure in 
official sources are those of the pierrotine commissionnaire 
Eugene Eustache; the Baron de Lareinty, an absentee proprietor 
and former senator of Martinique; the wealthy industrialist 
Jean Francois Cail, whose iron foundry at Lille specialized 
in the manufacture of equipment for the sugar industry in 
the Antilles and the beet sugar industry in northern France, 
and several prominent French food wholesalers and import/ 
export houses. The initial capital of 3,000,000 francs was 
divided into 6,000 shares valued at 500 francs apiece, and 
shareholdings were distributed in the following manner:
SHAREHOLDERS OF THE CREDIT COLONIAL (1861)
Shares Value (;
Planters
Group from Guadeloupe 800 400,000
Group from Martinique 800 400,000
Group from Reunion 600 300,000
Eugdne Eustache (Martinique) 200 100,000
Baron de Lareinty (Martinique) 200 100,000
Food Wholesalers and Import/Export Houses
Malavois and Company 200 100,000
M. Malavois 50 25,000
M. Jarry Bourgoin and Company 300 150,000
M. Boissaye 200 100,000
M. Cottin 200 100,000
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SHAREHOLDERS OF THE CREDIT COLONIAL (186D contd.
Shares Value (in francs)
Food Wholesalers and Import/
Export Houses contd....
M. le Chambrelente 400 200,000
M. Alfred Picard 400 200,000
M. Levy Crennieu 300 150,000
M. Louis Roemgrossarter 200 100,000
Industrialist
M. Cail 200 100,000
Government Officials
M. Louis Pinard 280 140,000
(Director of the Discount Bank,
Paris, and member of the 
Conseil Superieur for Algeria 
and the Colonies)
M. le Vicomte de Fougainville 50 25,000
(Conseil Generale, Martinique)
M. le Comte de Bouille 50 25,000
(Conseil General©, Guadeloupe)
M. Imhaus  ^  ^ 50 25,000
(Conseil Generale, Reunion)
M. Pelletier de Saint-Remy 50 25,000
(Administrator of the Colonial.
Bank, Paris)
M. Husson 20 10,000
(Director of the Interior,
Martinique)
Plus the holdings of several unidentifiable individuals
650 325,000
(Source: Archives d !Outre-Mer, General. Carton 32 
Dossier 265) — ....
The benefits accruing to the Bekes as a result of 
this alliance with the industrial and commercial bourgeoisie 
of metropolitan France were enormous. With the introduction 
of central factories in the 1860s, production figures for 
sugar make a distinction between sucre d'usine and sucre brut 
or sucre d Thabitant, the former being a •'clayed" semi-refined 
sugar, and the latter a moist muscovado produced by utilizing 
the same time-honoured methods advocated by Pere Labat a 
century and a half earlier. In 1883 22,800 metric tons of
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sucre d'usine valued at 12,300,000 francs were exported to 
France, and 19,200 tons of sucre d'habitant valued at
p L8,000,000 francs were exported to the United States.
Translated into current values sugar exports in 1883 would
have been worth over 220,000,000 NF. During the boom years
of the 1870s earnings on capital invested in the new factories
25were unusually high. An official source ^ in the early 
1880s quotes rates of between 15 and 30 per cent being earnt 
on investments by shareholders. Documentary analysis carried 
out on account books and private papers of several factories 
in the north-east and south of the island for the 1870s and 
early 1880s, indicated that net profits were as high as
o  CLtwenty-five per cent in most years.
In reviewing the period from the year the Credit
Colonial started operating in 1861 to the onset of the
crisis in 1884, what is striking is the speed with which
the new factory system was inaugurated. As early as 1872 a
total of 11 factories had been erected at a cost of 14,000,000
francs; 80 per cent of this sum having been advanced by the
Credit Foncier Colonial. By 1884 17 usines centrales had
been erected at a total cost of 28,000,000 francs.28 Prior
to 1884 the sugar industry had been profitable for both
usinier and ordinary habitant suorier. Unlike the situation
in Guadeloupe and Reunion, no factories or estates had been
expropriated by the Credit Fonder Colonial for bad debts.20
After 1884 this situation changed rapidly, and this is
reflected in the numerous sales and expropriations of
properties which were announced in the colony's official
gazette, Le Moniteur. The speed and efficiency with which a
revolution had occurred in the sugar industry, and the
astonishingly high rewards reaped by some Bekes during the
boom of the 1870s, makes the tone of righteous indignation
underlying the following statement made by the President of
the Chamber of Commerce in Saint-Pierre in response to an
official enquiry into the causes of the crisis in the sugar
industry understandable, even though the independent role
accredited to local capital is quite erroneous:
"All our large centres agricoles are endowed with 
.modernized factories, our agriculture has got 
itself known for its unremitting progress ...
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And this great industrial revolution so quickly and 
so peacefully accomplished, is we proudly proclaim, 
our own work. It is we, we alone who have accom­
plished this with our own hands and our own money .. .
The 28,000,000 that our factories cost have been 
borrowed from our savings and the savings of our 
families...
Some idea of the internal re-structuring of Beke 
society that occurred after the introduction of a centralized 
factory system, and the loss of land and productive capacity 
by many Bekes between 1884 and 1905, can be seen by comparing 
the structure of land ownership in the early nineteenth 
century with the situation later on. Appendix X which 
indicates the names of sugar proprietors in 1820, in spite 
of the absence of data on size of holdings, gives some idea 
of the individual and familial nature of proprietorship 
before the installation of central factories. A comparison 
of this data with that reproduced in Appendix XI which gives 
details of proprietorship and production for the year 1882, 
indicates the beginning of a process of land resource con­
centration in the hands of a small group of usiniers, which 
continued throughout the 1890s and into the twentieth 
century. As I have already indicated in Chapter 4, this 
process was particularly marked in the following communes: 
Lamentin (acquisitions by de Lareinty and Quennesson for 
Lareinty), Trinite and Robert (acquisitions by Eustache for 
Gallon) and Trois Ilets, Anse d'Arlets and Ducos (acquis­
itions by Hayot and Quennesson for Petit Bourg and Riviere- 
Salee).
It is evident that the new economic elite were them­
selves formerly ordinary habitants sucriers, with the 
exception of the pierrotine commission agent Eugene Eustache, 
the head of a metropolitan merchant house Benjamin Gradis, 
and three further individuals of particular interest, Braud, 
Bougenot and Quennesson, who came from metropolitan France 
in I860 as engineers of Call and Company. During the 
depression, however, the factories and shares held by this
i tgroup with one exception passed into local Beke hands. 
Probably the most notable among this group were Eugene 
Eustache and Emile Bougenot. Eustache came to Martinique
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as an employee of a metropolitan merchant house in the 1820s. 
In the early 1830s he acquired his own commission house which 
he operated until 1853. The returns he accumulated from 
commerce in the 1830s and 184Os provided the capital for 
purchasing a number of sugar estates in the next two 
decades, and for building one of the largest and most 
profitable of the central factories built in the second half 
of the nineteenth century, Le Galion. Upon the completion 
of Le Galion in 1865, the conscious policy adopted by 
Eustache of ensuring consistent and dependable supplies of 
cane through the acquisition of sugar estates, provides a 
very good example of the process of estate amalgamation that 
went on during these years. In the early 1860s Eustache was 
already the owner of four plantations: Galion and Grands-Fonds 
acquired between 1849 and 1853, comprising areas of 278 and 
146 hectares respectively, and Spoutourne and Caravelle 
acquired in 1858, of 412 and 517 hectares. Subsequent 
acquisitions were made over the next forty years:
Habitation Size Date of acquisition
Bord-de-Mer 217 hectares 1863
De smariniere s 184 1865-1872
Morne-Galbas 44 1866
Malgre-Tout 67 1866
Fonds-Galion 197 1869
Petit-Galion 181 1870
Mignot 103 1870
La- Digue 114 1887
Beausejour 193 1890
Gaschette 201 1893
Duferret 210 1904
Diverse parcels of land 168 1890-1910
and concessions in woods
(Source: Christian Schnakenbourg, Note Sur L'Histoire De
L'Usine Du Galion, 1 8 6 5 - 1 9 3 9 Based upon the 
private archives of the Societe Civile de 
1*Exploitation Agricole du Galion, Paris)
By the early twentieth century the acquisition of these 
plantations contributed to the formation of a centre agricole
per excellence, with fifteen habitations sucreries now
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amalgamated into one huge complex of over 3,000 hectares, 
forming the total landed assets of the Usine Centrale du Galion. 
In this early period only one other usinier had achieved any­
thing like this degree of concentration of land resources, 
which was to become a phenomenon of the twentieth rather than 
the nineteenth century. By 1882 the Usine Centrale de 
Lareinty, founded in 1861, had acquired a total of eight sugar 
estates situated on the central plain of Lamentin, making up 
a total of some 2,000 hectares.-^1 In 1886 the Baron de
Lareinty purchased a further three estates whose former
/  52owners had been indebted to the Credit Foncier Colonial.
This increased the usine1s holdings to just under 3,000
hectares.
Emile Bougenotfs ascendance as a usinier was swift 
and meteoric, and was all the more unusual since he was a 
metropolitan. He originally came to Martinique to take 
charge of the installation of Baron de Lareinty!s sugar works 
at Lamentin. He subsequently had the good fortune to be asked 
by Eustaohe to install his works at Le Galion. A short while 
afterwards he married his client's daughter, which gave him 
access to the closed exclusive milieu of the Grands Bekes.
Out of a total of twenty-one usines created in the second 
half of the nineteenth century, Bougenot had administered 
and managed nine of them, had held shares in fifteen, and 
upon the death of his father-in-law in 1883, became the sole 
proprietor of Le Galion. He was undoubtedly the wealthiest 
usinier of the period. One estimate based upon his share­
holdings and salaries put his annual average income at
2,000,000 NF between 1875 and 1883. By the early 1890s he 
also owned 50 per cent of the shares of the Credit Foncier 
Colonial
Less seems to be known about Joseph Quennesson and 
J.B. Braud. By the 1880s Braud partly owned and managed the 
Usine Centrale du Marin. Quennesson was the co-founder with 
Emile Bougenot of the Usine de Pointe-Simon in 1867, and 
together with Bougenot and Octave Hayot, a Grand Beke, he 
founded the Usine de Petit B o u t s  two years later. From an 
official source*^ we also learn of the formation of the
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Usine du Francois in 1889, which is indicated as being owned
by Quennesson, Bougenot and Company. By 1882 he was also
quite a substantial landowner as well as a wealthy usinier.
He is accredited with owning sixteen.muscovado estates in
Lamentin, Trois-Ilets, Anse d'Arlets and Ducos, and with
35renting another property. ^ However, from the mid-1890s 
we hear no more of him. By 1890 two of his muscovado
estates belonged to the colony, having been previously
** 3 6expropriated by the Credit Foncier Colonial. Together
with four other estates,the Commission Coloniale recommended 
their fragmentation into small lots. Six years later 
several of his estates in Lamentin had been acquired by the 
Usine de Lareinty, and another estate in Ducos had been 
incorporated into the domaine of the Usine de Pointe- 
Simon.
Within Beke planter society as in the Bridgetown
commercial world of the late nineteenth century, we are
presented with the beginnings of a parallel process of
economic power becoming steadily concentrated in the hands
of a restricted elite, who acceded to a dominant role in
the sugar industry. In this process a sector of Beke society
became relegated to a middle-class of estate and factory
administrators employed by the usiniers, or were reduced
from habitant sucrier to mere planter under contract to the
usine. Alternatively some sought refuge in the cultivation
of crops of secondary importance within the colonial economy,
such as coffee and cocoa. A number of the latter in the
1890s took advantage of a government scheme which provided
subsidies to encourage the revival of coffee and cocoa 
38cultivation. It is interesting to note that whereas in 
the early stages of this scheme nearly all the applications 
for aid came from mulatto planters, owning very small 
estates averaging five to ten hectares and traditionally 
given over to the cultivation of secondary crops, the Bekes 
who formerly produced sucre brut soon began to compete for 
government aid. Very soon,, however, this solution to their 
difficulties was to be superseded by yet another alternative: 
the conversion of their former sugar mills to rum dis­
tilleries .
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Revert (1949: 263) maintains that the Bekes dis­
played a "remarkable cohesion" during the depression, because 
when a property had to be sold in lieu of bad debts the 
resale was always organized within the group, "in order to 
prevent it falling into hands considered impure". Of the 
usiniers who were owed debts by planters, he argues that 
they often did not pursue their debtors since many were 
family, friends and business acquaintances. The evidence 
would appear to contradict this view of the social cohesion 
of the Bekes, and would suggest that this was just as much an 
era of cut-throat competition in white creole society as it 
was in Barbados. It is striking to record the extent to 
which the uainiers consolidated their sugar interests during 
and after the depression, when they increased the size of their 
domaines at the expense of the ordinary planter. A very 
early example of this conscious policy has already been given 
above. Individual habitations sucreries had continued to 
play an important part in sugar production throughout the 
1860s and 1870s, as a result of the abolition of duties by
y ^the Conseil General in 1866, which ended the restrictions
imposed by the 200 year old paote coloniale. The abandonment
of protectionist principles in trade opened up the U.S.A. to
the French islands, which created vitally important markets
for the several hundred owners of small habitations sucreries
which survived for a time alongside the usines centrales.
Those Bekes who continued to produce muscovado on small
family estates after the introduction of central factories,
ceased grinding in the 1880s as the crisis deepened. Other
Bekes who had earlier taken the decision to close their mills
had become totally dependent on the usine as suppliers under
contract. Ultimately the usine came to exert an economic
stranglehold over these smaller planters. All risks were
taken by the planter whereas the usine was relatively
unencumbered, since payment under contract was determined
by a fluctuating market price and the profitability of the
39usine in any given year. One of these planters writing 
to a prominent usinier in 1882 complained bitterly about 
these arrangements:
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"...the extortionate profits of the Usine have 
been garnered from the sweat of the brows of 
others over the last ten years, and I have got 
nothing to show for it but never-ending debts 
and expenses. There must be some means of 
establishing a method of payment which gives 
the planter some measure of security ... one 
which is far different from the present 
iniquitous system.••"40
This relationship of dependency was reinforced by the usine 
extending credit to its suppliers during inter-crop periods. 
An inability to repay these loans in periods of falling 
prices, particularly after 1883/4, resulted in their 
plantations being seized by the usine and incorporated into 
its domaine.
The growth of rum production in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth century provided a viable alternative to 
sugar, which had the effect of preserving the moyenne 
propriete to a degree and providing an independent activity 
for both the Bekes Moyens and the bourgeoisie de couleur. The 
following export statistics for sugar and rum are indicative 
of this shift in economic activity which took place in the 
last two decades of the century:
TABLE XII : TOTAL SUGAR (in kilograms) AND RUM (in litres) 
EXPORTS FROM MARTINIQUE. 1880-1900.
1880 1881 1899
Sucre d'Usine 19,822,219 24,782,883 31,548,356
Sucre Brut 18,770,002 17,307,338 90,257
Rum 8,605,871 8,633,128 14,880,358
(Source: Annuaire de la Martinique. 1882, 1901,
"Etat Des Denrees Du Cru").
This trend towards an increase in ■'clayed''- factory sugar and
rum production at the expense of muscovado produced by the
habitation, was evident as early as 1887 when the production
of sucre d'usine had increased to 34,000,000 kilograms and
that of sucre brut had decreased to 5,000,000 kilograms.
During this period the annual export value of rum had
4 lincreased, from 2,750,000 francs to 5,000,000 francs. By 
the end of the nineteenth century, to quote Ferre (1976: xv),
1900
33,687,016
79,698
15,566,057
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"it was a far cry from the day when rum was considered a by­
product". In 1840 only 500,000 litres were produced and 
only a fraction of this quantity was exported. It should be 
noted, however, that the situation recorded in 1900 does 
not fully reflect the extent to which the Bekes Moyens had 
made the switch from sugar to rum. In actual fact prior to 
1902 80 per cent of Martinique' s rum was manufactured by 
distilleries industrielles at Saint-Pierre, from molasses 
bought from the island's usines. Twenty of these distilleries 
in the town of Saint-Pierre itself were owned by prominent 
white creole and mulatto commissionnaires. such as Borde, 
Berte, Dupouy, Meyer, Lalung Saint-Leger and Knight. With 
an annual production of 12,000,000 litres, one observer des­
cribed Saint-Pierre in 1900 as the "premier centre rhummier 
du monde". The information contained in Appendix XII is an 
interesting document, since it indicates the extent to which 
commercial interests wielded a monopoly over rum production 
at this period. Many of the 132 distilleries listed for 1896 
must have been very small indeed. What is also indicated 
very clearly is that the production of rhum agricole, a less 
remunerative product than rhum industrielle manufactured for 
home consumption rather than export, was shared between 
Beke Moyen and mulatto proprietors.
The introduction of a central factory system resulted
in the creation of a new social class of usiniers, in whose
hands were concentrated both land and productive processes.
The combination of large modern factories and adjacently
owned estates formed the nucleus of the new units of
production: the centres agricoles. This concentration of
land resources in favour of the usine continued into the
twentieth century, and by the mid-1930s the eighteen usines
of the period supplied 60 per cent of their grinding require-
43ments from their own plantations. The emergence of a tiny 
minority id white creole society monopolizing both land 
resources and production, is linked with the creation of these 
usines centrales and the social ascension of a small res­
tricted group of Grands Bekes who owned them. The most 
prominent names among this group are those of Hayot, 
Despointes, de Reynal, Laguarigue de Survilliers, Clerc,
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Asselin, de Gentile and Assier de Pompignan. By the turn 
of the century this powerful group of families, said to have 
both "name and fortune", owned sugar estates and factories 
throughout the major sugar growing areas of Martinique.
5.4. Factors of Class Consolidation: The Forging; of an 
Agri-Business Bourgeoisie.
In analysing the strategies by which both merchants 
and usiniers consolidated their newly-won position of power, 
it is possible to isolate three main factors of class con­
solidation: (a) economic and financial coercive power,
(b) degree and nature of status boundary maintenance, and
(c) control of central political mechanisms. In this chapter 
I will be restricting my analysis to a consideration of
(a); factors (b) and (c) will be dealt with later in their 
proper context in Chapters 8  and 9 .
In charting the new elite's consolidation of its 
economic power in the early years of the twentieth century, 
we are witness first and foremost to a process in which mer­
chants became planters in one island and planters became 
merchants in the other. In the case of Barbados the records 
of the Chancery Court are•a rich mine of information 
attesting to a swift and dramatic shift in estate ownership. 
They clearly indicate that the Bridgetown merchants in a 
great number of cases had liens on sugar estates, and that 
many of the plaintiffs who filed bills of complaint against 
proprietors were merchants. The BMLA for its part was
plaintiff in a total of thirty-three cases in the late
44nineteenth century. Even more pertinent is the fact that 
many of the purchases of estates out of Chancery were made by 
merchants, who in the early years of the twentieth century 
acquired groups of contiguous estates which formed the 
holdings of the first central sugar factories, aided in 
this process by the Plantations-In-Aid Acts which granted 
Barbados £80,000 for modernizing•the sugar industry. This 
sum was subsequently put to good use by the merchants who 
used it to capitalize the Sugar Industry Agricultural Bank 
in 1907, from which loans were made to planters and merchants 
at an interest. The structural transformation of estate
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ownership .became particularly rapid after 1902, when the 
merchants decided to suspend loans to planters in view of 
the latter's inability to extricate themselves from the 
quagmire of increasing debt.^
When commercial life was re-established in 
Martinique after 1902, it was the returns from sugar realized 
by the usiniers in the last quarter of the nineteenth century 
which capitalized the new commercial houses in Fort-de-France, 
giving the Grands Bekes a virtual monopoly in the tertiary 
sector as commission agents, wholesalers and produce 
exporters. Like their counterparts in Barbados, a restricted 
group of about ten families owning land, factories and 
commercial houses came to exert a tight control over every 
aspect of the colonial economy. By the early 1920s the 
Grands Bekes had established an 85 per cent share of the 
export trade and held a similar percentage of all shareholdings 
in the town's business houses. Through a process of 
'secondary colonization1 the Grands Bekes also gained a foot­
hold in Guadeloupe, where they became the owners of between 
one-fift& and one-quarter of the island's land resources, as 
well as setting up commission houses, sugar factories and 
distilleries.
Of paramount importance in this process was the 
degree of financial coercive power exerted by the agri­
business bourgeoisie, particularly where control over access 
to credit was concerned. In Barbados this control was main­
tained through such financial institutions as the Colonial 
Bank, the local branches of several Canadian banks, the BMLA, 
the Barbados Savings Bank and the Sugar Industry Agricultural 
Bank. In Martinique control was maintained through the 
Banque Goloniale de la Martinique, the Banque de France and 
the Credit Fonoier Colonial. Since the agri-business 
bourgeoisie in both islands controlled the access to finance 
capital through their extensive shareholdings and director­
ships in these institutions, it had the power to decide who 
could raise the necessary capital to purchase estates, set 
up central factories and open commercial houses. In Barbados 
where a system of patronage and sponsorship existed, the 
agri-business bourgeoisie was able to control the entry of
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personnel into its ranks. In Martinique where the ranks of 
the Grands Bekes were closed to outsiders, credit was usually 
only granted to other Grands Bekes. In the case of Barbados 
professional and trading associations also played a 'watch­
dog' role. For example, the all powerful Commission Merchants 
Association dominated by the 'Big Six', operated a credit 
system which controlled the necessary supplies of credit to 
the Bridgetown traders for purchasing goods wholesale. Thus 
a combine of the major commercial houses was able to decide 
who they would advance credit to at their own discretion.
This inevitably meant that no businesses owned by black 
Barbadians grew to any appreciable size in the twentieth 
century, whereas a number owned by urbanized -'redlegs ' in 
the first decade or two of the century prospered considerably.
In Barbados an interesting facet of this process 
of economic power consolidation was the existence of a system 
of sponsored social mobility for poor whites, which progres­
sively squeezed out both black and Jewish businessmen from 
the Bridgetown commercial world. In the period just prior to 
Emancipation, at a time when the condition of Barbados's
6,500 free coloureds was improving quite considerably, 
according to contemporary evidence there appears to have 
been quite a large number of substantial coloured merchants 
in Bridgetown who had disappeared by the 1880s. According to 
Thome and Kimball (1858: 236): "A large proportion, if not 
the majority of the merchants of Bridgetown are coloured..." 
Even if these two American churchmen exaggerated the role 
played by non-whites in the mercantile community of the 
period, and have overlooked the fact highlighted by Handler 
(1974: 130/31) that most of these coloured merchants only 
operated as wholesalers and did not import goods on their 
own account, there does appear to have been a nucleus of 
coloured merchants which no longer existed at the end of 
the nineteenth century. Prominent among them was Thomas 
Cummins, who acted as an agent for Edgecumbe plantation,
Thomas Harris an ex-slave, Samuel Francis Collymore who 
owned several trading vessels, and London Bourne who owned 
Friendship plantation in St. Michael. The wealthiest of this 
group was London Bourne, who according to Thome and Kimball 
(1838: 236) had:
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"...his mercantile agents in England, English 
clerks under his employ, (and) a branch in the 
City..."
London Bourne was a slave until the age of twenty-three, whose 
freedom was purchased by his father a free negro. His 
meteoric rise to fame in the commercial world of early nine­
teenth century Bridgetown was no less dramatic than some of 
the -'redleg' businessmen in the next century:
"Since Mr. Bourne obtained his freedom, he has been 
striving to make himself and his family respectable 
...By industry, honesty, and a close attention to 
business, he has now become a wealthy merchant. He 
owns three stores in Bridgetown, lives in a very 
genteel style in his own house, and is worth from 
twenty to thirty thousand dollars. One of his 
stores is on the wharf in a public business part 
of the city, amid the stores of the white merchants.
He is highly respected by the merchants of Bridge­
town for his integrity..." (Thome and Kimball,
1838: 237).
In spite of this respect for his -'integrity*, it is signif­
icant to note that Bourne and all the other coloured merchants 
of this period were excluded from Commercial Hall, whose 
meetings in the 1830s were held in premises over his main 
store which he rented to the white merchants of the City.
Another sector of this business community which
disappeared completely during the nineteenth century was
the Jewish one. Atkins's Census lists as many as forty-six
Jewish patronyms,^ the majority of which were Portuguese
originating from Brazil, who operated in Bridgetown and
Speightstown as merchants. An examination of the electoral
roll for Bridgetown in 1848 reveals a total of eighteen
Jewish names of Portuguese, Eastern European and English 
47origin. From Schomburgk's account (1848: 87) we learn
that the Jewish mercantile community at this period was
already in decline:
"At one period the congregation consisted of a 
_very large number, but from deaths and many of 
the European families returning to England, the 
number has been reduced..."
The author goes on to note that:
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"The circumstances of their having so many as five 
burial grounds, three of which are completely 
filled, and a synagogue which is considered to be 
one of the handsomest and most substantial buildings 
of its kind in the West Indies, proves that the con­
gregation must have been considerable".
By the early twentieth century this Jewish sector of the mer­
cantile community no longer existed. As early as 1881 a 
total of only twenty-one Jews were enumerated in the popu­
lation. As to whether anti-semitism was operative in 
commercial circles I have been unable to assemble any firm 
evidence. However, the following extract from a later con­
temporary source (Stark, 1893: 112/13) strongly suggests 
that the new mercantile elite were instrumental in excluding 
Jews from their business circles, which forced them to 
emigrate:
"The Barbadians are the Yankees of the West Indies; 
they boast that there is no place there for Jews 
or Portuguese, who are found on the other islands 
and on the mainland, occupying prominent positions 
in trade circles. This is literally correct, for 
the Jews who are here formerly in great numbers, 
are now almost unknown".
In the light of current research knowledge it is 
difficult to plot with any accuracy the factors accounting 
for the demise of the coloured and Jewish mercantile classes, 
except to state that the growth of monopoly capitalism with 
a power base which was local, effectively rationalized the 
systems of power maintenance operated by the white oligarchy. 
One thing is certain, by the early twentieth century no 
coloured merchants of the standing of Bourne, Cummins,
Harris or Collymore were to be found in Bridgetown, nor 
were there any of the older Portuguese Jewish names featured 
among those of the elite, like the Novarro, the De Mercado 
or the Diaz. Of the few coloured merchants operating in the 
main commercial area around Roebuck Street in the 1920s, 
their enterprises were very small compared with the white 
businesses of the period, and did not grow in size or 
prominence over the next half-century. On the other hand 
there were many "redleg1* merchants who prospered considerably, 
surviving the depression years of the twenties and thirties 
and gaining admission to the ranks of the agri-business 
bourgeoisie.
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One vitally important move by the agri-business 
bourgeoisie in Barbados to consolidate its commercial and 
trading interests even further, came with the formation of 
Barbados Shipping and Trading in 1920. This came as a 
logical conclusion to the process of horizontal integration 
in the tertiary sector of the preceding century, which saw 
the full-flowering of local monopoly capitalism. Barbados 
Shipping and Trading was formed with the express purpose of 
bringing together the various interests of the six largest 
commercial houses in Bridgetown: Manning's, Gardiner Austin, 
Da Costa's, Musson's, Challenor's and Wilkinson and Haynes. 
From its inception the heads of the subsidiaries which formed 
the 'Big Six* have been majority shareholders, and throughout 
its sixty years of history have provided its board of manage­
ment with directors. This move on the part of the merchants 
was taken in response to the formation of Plantations Limited 
by a group of planters three years earlier, whose primary 
object was to conduct an estates' supply organization and to 
export sugar and molasses on a co-operative basis, thus 
eliminating the commission agent in the buying of stores and
LlQexporting of sugar.
The destruction of Saint-Pierre provided the 
Martiniquan elite with an opportunity to put an end to the 
250 year old institutionalized economic hierarchy between 
planter and metropolitan commissionnaire. By re-investing 
the returns from sugar in commerce, the usiniers gained 
greater control over the prices paid for their exports and 
imported plantation supplies.. In taking over the role of 
the pierrotine commissionnaires the Grands Bekes in the 
twentieth century came to control the entire spectrum of 
economic activity in Martinique. Together with their sugar 
and rum interests their entry into commerce gave them greater 
control over the means of production: landed property, fixed 
capital assets and liquid assets. Unlike the Barbadian 
situation where merchants and planters pooled their resources 
to form two public trading companies, the businesses of the 
Grands Bekes were strictly private concerns, with the result 
that the degree of economic power remained concentrated in 
fewer hands (See Appendix XX.V) . This has had repercussions
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upon the social structure:.in the twentieth century, and will 
he dealt with below in Chapter 8.
Given that a continuing access to land was a 
common and indeed a vital feature of the agri-business 
bourgeoisie1s consolidation of economic power in each island, 
it remains to be seen to what extent control and’disposal of 
land varied in each case. Central to the differences arising 
out of these variant situations were the respective roles 
played by the Chancery Court system and the Credit Foncier 
Colonial. As I have already demonstrated, the Chancery 
Court, backed up by the Agricultural Aids Act, performed a 
kind of 'holding operation’ in difficult times, giving the 
white elite virtually total control over land disposal. In 
this respect it is particularly significant that unlike the 
English system land could not be expropriated outright. In 
Martinique no such system existed for debt recovery, and out­
right expropriations were made by the Credit Foncier Colonial. 
Under its articles it was not allowed to own property, and 
expropriated estates had to be put up immediately for sale in 
the local market. In those cases where a purchaser could not
be found the Colony was duty bound to purchase such property 
49itself, which became incorporated into its habitations 
domaniales.
It is difficult to ascertain precisely the degree 
to which the Barbadian elite had complete control over the 
disposal of land, in so far as they were able to keep the 
sales of estates in Chancery within a tight, inner circle.
None of the records of the Chancery Court nor any of my 
discussions with older informants has produced any evidence 
to conclusively prove a 'conspiracy theory. However, from 
the documentary evidence available there appears to be a 
remarkably large number of sales in which only single 
individuals made successful bids. This would possibly 
suggest that there existed tacit, agreements within the 
planter/mercantile community that certain estates should go 
to certain individuals, indicating the possibility of 
'ringing'’. As well as the fact that there was no competition 
in such sales, the bids in all these cases were invariably
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equal to the appraised value, which would also seem to 
indicate that the elite conspired to keep prices as low 
as possible.
Given the extremely low prices paid for many of 
these estates during the depression and in the early years 
of the twentieth century, and the very high prices they 
fetched when broken up into small lots, sub-division at this 
period was characteristically land speculation and not land 
reform. The sub-division of whole estates into tenantries 
and lots and the partial fragmentation of others, may at 
first sight be regarded as evidence pointing to a relative 
decline in the economic power of the elite, in the face of 
pressures exerted by a land-hungry peasantry. I would argue 
that the reverse in fact was true, and that the alienation 
of estate land from the plantation sector at this time 
actually strengthened the economic power of the new elite, 
since land deals made capital available to modernize and 
rationalize an antiquated sugar industry. Moreover, as it 
will become apparent, the gains from sub-division were sub­
stantial to the elite, and the black Barbadian paid a very 
50high prine to become a landowner on what was often very 
poor, marginal, infertile land. Since the capital realized 
on these sales was used to finance the new central factories 
and to invest in commerce, the sale of land during the period 
1900-1920 can be regarded as a strategy for economic survival.
According to the Blue Book for 1909/10 a total of 
forty-nine sugar estates had been recently sold out in small 
lots and let out in tenantry. In 1912 the Blue Book recorded 
a total of only 320 estates still in cultivation and offered 
the following explanation:
"During recent years a number of sugar estates have 
been incorporated with adjoining estates and a 
number have been sold in small areas to the peasants. 
From a return prepared last year by the Parochial 
Treasurers there were at that time 13,152 persons 
owning under 5 acres of land..."
Sinckler is far more detailed than the Blue Book in offering 
information as to which estates were being sub-divided at 
the period. According to the handbook a total of 4,800 acres 
of estate land was being cut up in 1912. Of this total
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4,000 acres was being sold off in lots of less than five 
acres. The remaining 800 acres is indicated as being rented 
off in tenantry. Thus between 1900 and 1920 black small­
holders were able to increase the land that they had at
5 1their disposal in 1897 by one-third. In the early 
twentieth century most of the land released by the elite 
was sold rather than rented, which indicates that the 
situation of a number of black Barbadians had altered 
radically since 1897, when the Master-In-Chancery testified 
to the Commission that it was difficult to find purchasers 
for parts of Boscobelle and Baxters plantation due to lack 
of capital. A chance to accumulate capital by a large number 
of black Barbadians after 1897 was due to one principal 
factor: the influx of 'Panama Money* (See Appendix XIV).
Throughout the last, two decades of the nineteenth 
century, the extension of small proprietorship had been the 
stated intention of successive Conseil Generaux in 
Martinique:
"What we want is sub-division in reasonable moderation 
...We will be very happy to have the small lots of 
the poor alongside the large estates of the rich".^
Unlike the Barbadian situation where such a measure was
regarded as impractical in the nineteenth century, and where
emigration was considered the only solution to the pressure
on land resources, the Colony itself gained access to land
during the depression for re-distribution. On the 9th
December 1890, the Commission Coloniale recommended that
1,120 hectares of estate land purchased from the Credit
Foncier Colonial, be parcelled off and sold to agricultural
53labourers in the south of the island. In its submission
to the Conseil General it recommended that land in Anse
d'Arlets, Irois. Ilets and Sainte-Anne be divided up into 866
lots and put up for auction at a starting price of 125 francs.
As at the 31st December 1900, a further thirty-one estates
had been acquired by the Colony, most of them located in the
5 4northern communes of the island. Two years later the 
Conseil General officially announced that sixteen of these 
estates were to be sub-divided into 692 lots of between one 
and five hectares each, representing a total of 1,427
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hectares. Interestingly enough the sub-division of failed 
habitations by the Colony which took place at the beginning 
of the twentieth century, actually underwent a reversal 
later on in the 1920s and 1930s. In comparing the data con­
tained in the Agricultural Census for 1911 and 1936, Revert 
(1949: 268-270) shows that the areas covered by the larger 
estates increased by one-third between these two dates.
This was accounted for primarily by an increase in the size 
of the domaines owned by the usiniers. Examples of this 
restitution of estates formerly sub-divided are easily dis­
cernible, if the data contained in Desruisseaux's map (1973) 
are compared with the names of estates sub-divided early on 
in the century.^
The actual process of restitution is not entirely 
clear. This is because the absence of any land survey between 
1671 and 1973, means that there is no accurate guide to 
changes in individual plantation size at this or any other 
period. For fiscal and political reasons this is a partic­
ularly sensitive area on which to obtain information. Another 
reason why this process is impossible to document with any 
accuracy is because the Bekes used third parties to buy land 
for them, such as mulatto notaries and small farmers. The 
use of ’-'men of straw1 and prete-noms to recover land formerly 
re-distributed by the Conseil General in the 1900s, gave the 
Bekes an anonymity in these dealings. One thing is certain, 
however, this dual process of fragmentation and restitution 
of land has been a continual theme in the twentieth century. 
Following the decline of sugar in the 1960s and a programme 
of modest land reform (See Appendix XXIII), it became apparent 
during field work that some Bekes have re-purchased or rented 
this land to grow other export crops.
From the data contained in the tables below, it is 
evident that the process of land speculation in Barbados and 
that of land reform in Martinique, only slightly modified the 
distribution of land resources between peasant and planter in 
the twentieth century. In essence the basic pattern of land 
resource distribution had not radically altered since the 
years following Abolition. It might therefore be concluded 
that the white elite in each island were successful in
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controlling the sale and disposal of land during and immedi­
ately after the depression. Moreover, in Martinique where 
the disposal of indebted estates was taken out of the hands 
of the Bekes by the Colony, they were able to regain a large • 
portion of this land when sugar recovered, and the demand for 
rhum industrielle in the metropolitan market made it an in­
creasingly valuable export. The following data indicates 
the extent to which the elites continued to wield a monopoly 
over land resources, just prior to a more recent series of 
successive crises in the sugar industry which in turn evoked 
fresh attempts to control the disposal of land:
TABLE XIII DISTRIBUTION OF AGRICULTURAL LAND BETWEEN PEASANT 
SMALLHOLDERS, MEDIUM AND LARGE PLANTATIONS IN 
BARBADOS, 1961.
Plantations
Smallholdings 
(under 10 acres)
18517No. of owners 
.% o f total 
Landowners 98.5
Total acreage 12548
%of total area
appropriated 14.85
Average acreage
per type of holding O .67
Medium 
(10-99 acres)
93
0.5
2907
3.45
31.25
Large 
(100 acres 
and over)
193 *
1 . 0
69003
81.7
357.5
(Source: Agricultural Census of Barbados, 1961).
TABLE XIV: DISTRIBUTION OF AGRICULTURAL LAND BETWEEN PEASANT 
SMALLHOLDERS, MEDIUM AND LARGE' PLANTATIONS IN 
MARTINIQUE, 1967.
Smallholdings 
(under 10 hectares)
Plantations
Medium . Large 
(10-40 hectares)(over 40
hectares)
No. of owners 6489 446 349
% of total 
landowners 89.1 6.1 4.8
Total area in 
hectares 14386 8752 57216
% of total area 
appropriated 17.9 10.9 71.2
Average area per 
type of holding
in hectares 2.2 19*6 
Source: Direction Departementale de 1'Agriculture,
163.9 
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5.5. Comparative Analysis of the Degree of Control
Achieved by the Elites over the Traditional Sector.
It can be argued as I have already done in the case 
of Barbados, that the retention of the sugar industry in 
local hands was vital to the survival of the white oligarchy 
as an economic elite. What is striking in Barbados is the 
extent to which ownership in the sugar industry became more 
local in the early years of the twentieth century. An analysis 
of the records of the Chancery Court for the period 1900-1920, 
clearly indicates that the incursion of the commercial class 
into the production sector was paralleled by the swift and 
dramatic demise of absentee proprietorship. As I have
already shown, prior to the depression about 50 per cent of
5 7the total land resources was absentee owned. ' By the late
5 81880s their share had declined to one-third. By 1921 their- 
share had further declined to one-sixth of the total land
5 Qresources of the period. J In 1929 only 7.4 per cent of 
estate land in Barbados was absentee owned. With respect 
to the structural changes in land ownership at this period, 
it is significant the extent to which the Bridgetown merchants 
benefited from the demise of absentee proprietorship. Of the 
15,300 acres of absentee owned estate land which went into 
Chancery between 1885 and 1920, roughly two-thirds was 
acquired by members of th® Bridgetown commercial class.^
Reference to Appendix X.V in conjunction with the 
data contained in Table XV. below, is indicative of another 
process at work: that of the formation of land and factory 
combines almost a half a century after the construction of 
usines centrales in Martinique. As can be seen from 
Appendix_XV, many of the estates purchased out of Chancery 
by members - of the Bridgetown commercial class formed the 
first holdings of the earliest central factories, which were 
financed by profits made in the commercial and trading sector, 
by loans from the Sugar Industry Agricultural Bank, and in some 
cases by the returns from land speculation. Twenty of these 
central factories had been created by 1921. By 1930 this total 
had increased to thirty-one. It should be noted that the 
largest and most important of the period were built by the 
agri-business' bourgeoisie, and were the first to be con­
structed:
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From the data presented above it is evident that the develop­
ment of a central factory system had not been carried to its 
logical conclusion as late as 1930. It is interesting to 
note that alongside a number of large-scale enterprises with 
extensive landholdings, such as Andrews, Bulkeley, Brucevale, 
Foursquare and Spring Hall, there existed a number of much 
smaller vacuum pan factories, which in terms of scale rep­
resented no more than the modernization of a proprietor's 
former wind powered mill. According to the findings of the 
West India Royal Commission in 1939, in addition to a total 
of thirty-three vacuum pan factories which manufactured 
80'per cent of the island's sugar, there were also thirty- 
five ordinary steam plants and thirty-seven wind mills still 
in existence. The survival of the latter can be accounted 
for by the continuing demand for molasses and lower grade 
sugars on the Canadian market. The great variability in size 
of the central factories in the 1930s is indicated by the 
following distribution table of their manufacturing capacity:
TABLE XVI : MANUFACTURING CAPACITY OF THE THIRTY-THREE 
VACUUM PAN FACTORIES IN BARBADOS IN 1939.
Number Average Capacity 
(tons of sugar)
Total Capacity 
(tons of sugar)
1 8,000 8,000
1 7,000 7,000
4 6,000 24,000
4 5,000 20,000
5 4,000 20,000
5 3,000 15,000
5 2,500 12,500
4 2,000 8,000
4 1,500 6,000
33 120,500
(Source: Public Records' Office, West India Royal Commission,
1958-1959. C.O. 950/958)
The restrictions imposed upon the development of a 
fully centralized factory system was the outcome of the 
home government's refusal to make adequate loans available 
for such a project, and the failure of the Colonial Office
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•under Joseph Chamberlain to attract overseas investment.
The first public debate on the erection of central factories
65was held by the Agricultural Society in 1885. In 1895 the
case for central factories was debated once more, and a plan
was put forward to organize factory co-operatives among 
6 4local planters. Such a strategy would, in the words of 
the Committee which was composed of planters and merchants, 
"...avoid capitalist exploitation and keep economic power at 
home..." Formulated in this way the worst fears of the 
Barbadian planters were allayed, in the light of attempts 
being made at this time by the Colonial Office to attract 
English capital to the depressed sugar colonies. Clearly the 
white oligarchy did not want the kind of solution sought by 
the home government to the prevailing economic crisis, which 
would threaten their very existence. Following on from the 
conclusions of the Royal Commission of 1897, that the cause 
of the depression in the sugar industry was "primarily 
technological", negotiations were re-opened by Joseph 
Chamberlain with a number of British financiers to build 
central factories in Barbados. In a memo submitted by the 
Foreign and Colonial Investment Trust in 1898, three central 
factories strategically located in St. Lucy, Bridgetown and 
St. Philip were projected, together with a network of forty- 
seven and a half miles of railway for transportation 
(See Appendix XVI). Under this scheme planters were to lose 
their manufacturing function, and to become contracted 
suppliers of cane to factories owned by the Colony. At a 
planned cost of £500,000 per factory the subvention of 
£120,000 recommended in the Royal Commission’s Report of 
1897, of which £80,000 was granted under Imperial Aid in 
1902, was grossly inadequate. Dependent therefore upon over­
seas investment, the scheme collapsed when Chamberlain’s 
negotiations failed in 1900.
Because of this failure on the part of the home 
government to attract overseas private investment, or 
alternatively to make available sufficient capital from 
official sources to develop a truly centralized system of 
production, cultivation and manufacturing remained widely 
dispersed in a large number of hands. It should also be
6?
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noted that although the largest land and factory combines of 
the period belonged to members of the commercial class, they 
continued to be privately owned. The absorbtion of several 
of these combines into Barbados Shipping and Trading in the 
1940s and 1950s represents a response to special circumstances,^ 
private corporate ownership in the sugar industry being the 
more common pattern to date. As far as estate ownership it­
self is concerned, the merchants did not succeed entirely in 
controlling production. Of the arable acreage under cane in 
the 1930s quite an extensive area by Barbadian standards,
22,000 acres, was owned by peasant smallholders and smaller 
white planters. The fact that some ten factories and sixty-
three estates were owned by shareholders of Plantations Ltd.
66in 1930, also indicates that ownership remained fairly 
diverse.
The diversity of landownership and the essentially 
private as opposed to public corporate nature of estate 
holdings is still a feature of the Barbadian sugar industry.
This is demonstrated in Appendix XVII'which indicates that 
three-quarters of the arable acres in estates is privately 
owned. This situation, together with the relatively large 
number of factories, has best been described by an agri­
cultural adviser to the now defunct Federal Government of 
the West Indies. Although the number of factories has 
halved since his report was published twenty years ago, his 
description still fits the pattern found today:
"The industry of the island does not follow the 
.pattern found in the other sugar producing 
territories of the West. Indies or British Guiana.
It is probably -unique in that no large companies, 
financed from outside the island, tend to dominate 
the industry. It is built up on a large number of 
small estates owned in the main by residents of 
Barbados, and managed by owners or local agents who 
themselves are Barbadians. The processing side of 
the industry is carried out by a number of small 
factories developed by resident owners and share­
holders from the old system of very small estate 
factories of the previous century".
Considering the wide variation that exists in estate profit­
ability in the island, it is questionable whether the agri­
business bourgeoisie ever considered it in their best;
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interests to acquire more land than they did. It was 
certainly never its policy to control production entirely, 
as my interviews with heads of prominent Bridgetown firms 
revealed. Although the agri-business bourgeoisie never 
controlled the entire spectrum of cultivation and manu­
facturing, it more importantly succeeded in exerting a 
tight control over marketing and transportation. -In the 
1930s sugar was still transported to Speightstown and 
Bridgetown by mule drawn carts. Sugar and molasses were 
transported directly to both these shipping centres, where­
upon the merchants undertook both storage and shipping.
Whereas planters’ costs included all costs of delivery to 
the warehouse, the merchant bore the cost of turning the 
sugar into his warehouse, insuring and storing it. On the 
arrival of the ship he also bore the cost of turning out
the sugar, cartage to the lighter and lighterage to trans-
68port the sugar alongside the ship. Through its sub­
sidiaries Barbados Shipping and Trading also owned several 
fleets of steamships for exporting sugar. This control over 
marketing put the merchants in a particularly advantageous 
situation, since they determined the price paid to the 
factory, based upon their costs plus interest and profit.
From the Minute Books of the Agricultural Society of the 
early 1930s, it is evident that the planters felt that the
commercial middlemen were making too much profit at their
69expense out of this system of marketing.
By comparison with the greater diversity in estate 
ownership and manufacturing in Barbados, the Grands Bekes 
succeeded in wielding a far greater monopoly over the 
production sector than the Bridgetown mercantile class. By 
the early twentieth century the basic structure of the 
central factory system had been laid down, and the small 
habitations sucreries owned by coloured proprietors and 
Bekes Moyens no longer produced sugar. During the first 
four decades of the twentieth century the usine incorporated 
more land into its domaine than it had done in the previous 
century. Unlike the Barbadian elite the Grands Bekes were 
particularly constrained to control production. Legislation
passed by the French Government in 1935 fixed quotes on sugar. 70
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Under this quota system quotas were accorded to each usinier 
on the basis of productive capacity. This effectively 
strengthened the monopolistic power of the Grands Bekes, and 
since the enjoyment of this privilege was dependent upon the 
supply of a consistent quota, ensuring access to an 
unvarying quantity of cane was imperative. Up until the 
mid-1960s therefore, control of production via the incor­
poration of land into the usine1s domaine has been a 
specifically conscious strategy on the part of the 
Martiniquan elite. The following table indicating the 
sources of cane ground by the eighteen usines centrales in 
the mid-1950s, shows that the usine supplied at least 60 per 
cent of its grinding requirements from its own plantations:
TABLE XVII : SOURCES OF CANE SUPPLIES IN MARTINIQUE IN 1935.
Usines Internal External
(Usine plantations) (Other plantations and
smallholders)
Kilograms Kilograms
Basse-Pointe 13,284,530 15,759,930
Bassignac Nil 20,497,970
Dillon 7,226,158 1,510
Francois Nil 40,781,240
Galion 37,595,500 197,700
La Favorite 3,541,680 1,910,545
Lareinty 65,561,920 3,576,790
Lorrain 19,814,290 500,000
Marin 18,226,190 3,779,380
Maynard 1,529,650 Nil
Petit-Bourg Nil 102,341,823
Riviere-Salee Nil 44,650,180
Robert 37,151,240 4,406,390
Sainte-Marie 7,462,980 41,637,870
Simon 12,445,350 539,970
Soudon 20,284,990 38,176,645
Vauclin 13,772,120 5,010,240
Vive 25,168,230 2,030,660
Totals 462,239,800 (kgs) 325,798,850 (]
(Source: Service de 1 'Agriculture, Rapport sur1 1 ’Industrie <
la Canne a la Martinique (Kervegant), 1935: 70).
Having achieved this degree of monopoly over land 
resources in the twentieth century, and having effectively 
restricted the Bekes Moyens to economic activities of 
secondary importance, the new elite also curtailed the
aspirations of the island’s bourgeoisie de couleur. Census1reports of the 1840s indicate that the most significant 
development of the period was the rapid growth of a new 
coloured urban middle-class, employed in both the professions 
and trade. The following comments made by the Beke pro­
prietor of the newspaper Le Propagateur in the early 1880s 
are interesting, for they reveal the extent to which this 
new class had been denied any directive role in the economy:
"Sugar production in Martinique today (1882) has 
reached on average 90,000 hogsheads of 500 kilo­
grams each. 319 sucreries belonging to Europeans, 
primarily white creoles, account for 78,300 hogs­
heads; the 105 black or mixed blood proprietors 
only contribute 11,000 hogsheads. Alcohol, a by­
product of sugar, gives similar proportions.
Sugar factories with shareholders represent a 
total of 36,580 shares of 500 francs each divided 
up as follows: 34,460 to whites; 2,120 to blacks 
and men of mixed race. The Bank itself (Banque de 
la Martinique) is in the hands of the whites, with 
5,468 shares out of 6,000..." (Souquet-Basiege,
1882: 674).
Statistical data reproduced in Le Propagateur gave a more 
detailed picture of this distribution of usine shares by 
ethnicity: ■ (See Table XVIII overleaf).
In response to a claim made by this coloured middle-class
that they paid twenty times more tax than the white sector
72of the population, Le Propagateur set out to demonstrate 
that it was the Bekes who bore the brunt of taxation. By 
indicating that their contribution to the total paid on 
droits de sortie was far greater than that of the 
bourgeoisie de couleur. the Bekes unwittingly gave some 
idea of their wealth in absolute terms, and the extent to 
which the new coloured middle-class had been excluded from 
sharing in the wealth generated in the boom years between 
1860 and 1884: (See Table XIX overleaf).
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TABLE XVIII : DISTRIBUTION OF USINE SHARES BY ETHNICITY IN
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MARTINIQUE IN 1882;
Usine Totai shares of White share Coloured shar<
Soudon
500 francs each 
4,000 3,633 377
Francois> 2,400 2,329 71
Simon 1,500 1,429 71
Petit-Bourg 2,400 2,237 163
Riviere Salee 2,322 2,138 184
Dillon 3,000 2,790 210
Vauclin 1,600 1,367 233
Robert 2,144 1,986 158
Sainte-Marie 2,114 1,915 199
Trois-Rivieres 1,600 1,489 111
Trinite 1,500 1,147 353
Galion
Riviere Blanche
)
)) 12,000 12,000 NilLareinty-
Pointe-Simon
Totals
)
36,580 34,460 2,120
(Source: Le Propagateur, May 17th. 24th, 27th, 31st 1882)
TABLE XIX : DROITS DE SORTIE ON SUGAR, RUM AND COCOA IN 1882.
Product Quantity Value in 
francs
Rate Total Droit 
de Sortie
Sucre brut 35,000 hogs­
heads
. 7,000,000 210,000 francs
Sucre d fusine 50,000 hogs­
heads
14,000,000 2|% 420,000
Rum 8 million hec­
tolitres
3,600,000 3% 108,000
Cocoa 577,586 kilo- 18,000 3% 540grams
Total Droit de Sortie =
Paid by Bekes 
Paid by Mulattos
(Source: Le Propagateur, May 17th 1882],
758,540 francs
654,270
85,270
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Controlling cane production in the twentieth century 
was important to the elite for another reason: the production 
of rhum industrielle. After 1902 the usines centrales took 
over the production of rhum industrielle from the now 
extinct pierrotine rhummeries, which they had formerly 
supplied with molasses. In the years leading up to the First 
World War the usiniers began making rhum industrielle on their 
own account, for what became an increasingly valuable export 
market. The usiniers particularly benefited from the 
additional demands of the war years between 1914 and 1918, 
when rum production in Martinique increased from 19,000,000 
to 33,000,000 litres. The way in which the usiniers took 
over production from the pierrotine rhummeries. is a further 
indication of the way in which they sought to consolidate 
their class position. Legislation passed in December 1917 
in favour of the usiniers prohibited the importation of 
foreign molasses. During their heyday the rhummeries of 
Saint-Pierre had imported molasses in large quantities from 
Demerara and Trinidad, in addition to supplies obtained 
locally. This move effectively curtailed the growth of 
independent distilleries industrielles, since it made the 
distilleries producing rum for the metropolitan market 
dependent upon the usine for its raw materials. By the mid- 
1930s there were only two independent distilleries 
industrielles producing a small fraction of that produced 
by the usine (See Appendix XVIII).
Quotas fixed on rum exports from French colonies in 
1922 accorded Martinique 43.5 per cent of the total quota.^
In response to this quota system five usines nouvelles came 
into existence. Since rum quotes were accorded on a pro-rata 
basis according to annual average sugar production, the shares 
accorded to these usines nouvelles were small compared with 
that of the usines anciennes, since they operated with much 
smaller, less powerful mills. By 1935 a total of 212 
establishments producing rum were in existence. Of these ■ 
fourteen were usines anciennes, five were usines nouvelles, 
three were independent distilleries \industrielles„and the 
remainder were distilleries agricoles. The data contained 
in- Appendix XVIII. indicates, that not all these establish­
ments were actually producing in the 1930s. Only
156
two out of the island’s three distilleries industrielles were 
operating at this period, and only 160 out of a total of 184 
distilleries agricoles were manufacturing rum. The period 
between the wars was a golden age for rum production in 
Martinique. Some of those who applied for quotas were 
unable to maintain output and an even larger number were 
unable to maintain output at full capacity. The chief con­
straint on output was the monopoly exerted by the usine over 
land, and its exigent demands to fulfil its own sugar and 
rum quotas. The practice of some distilleries agricoles 
sending their cane to neighbouring distilleries, led to a 
distinction being made between distilleries which were 
’fumante’ (operating) and those which were ’non-fumante*' (not 
in operation). In his report Kervegant (1935) states that a 
number of these distilleries had not functioned for a number 
of years. This is a process which has continued after 1935 as 
the number of distilleries in operation decreased:
1940: 112; 1949: 95; 1952: 62; I960: 27.
An analysis of the list of distilleries agricoles in 
Appendix XVIII,indicates that there was a relationship between 
their geographical distribution and the areas monopolized by 
the usine in the 1930s. Between 60 and 70 per cent- of these 
distilleries were located in the north and centre-north of 
the island. On the north-eastern coastal plain, the central 
plain of Lamentin and in the south, where the usines were 
located, there were few distilleries. It was in these 
latter areas that the production of rhum industrielie took 
place, since both rum and sugar were produced by the usines 
centrales under the same roof. There is a sense in which the 
distilleries agricoles managed to survive in an ecological 
niche which the usine was unable to reach. It is generally 
true to say that these distilleries agricoles were the 
adaptations of nineteenth century habitations sucreries. 
situated for the main part in the interior or in the fonds 
near the coast. A tour undertaken in the centre-north of 
the island in 1977 to visit a number of these distilleries 
and the sites of distilleries now defunct, indicates that 
•their extreme isolation and small size mitigated against the 
installation of modern factories. Another point which emerges
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from an analysis of this list is connected with ownership.
With the destruction of the pierrotine rhummeries the
Grands Bekes very quickly monopolized the export market
for rum through the quota^system. Though rhum agricole to
the Antillean palate was clearly a superior product, within
the economic organization of the plantation economy it was
of secondary importance to sugar and rhum industrielle.
Having failed to maintain their position as sugar producers
in the twentieth century, both Bekes Moyens and mulatres
during the boom period of the inter-war years succeeded in
surviving economically as distillers. However, only seven
of the largest distillers of this period have survived
7 4today as producers of rhum agricole. 1
5.6. The Maintenance and Consolidation of Economic Power :
A Comparative Assessment.
In both islands it is evident that the conditions 
conducive to the survival of local white elites were similar 
in two respects: namely the presence of stable, indigenous 
plantocracies and the existence of plentiful sources of 
capital for cultivation and production. However, in the 
modern world the paths by which forms of monopoly capitalism 
were forged from within colonial society were different. In 
Barbados whereas a relatively independent role was played by 
the Bridgetown merchants in this process, in Martinique the 
same outcome was predicated upon an alliance of local planter 
interests with the industrial and commercial bourgeoisie of 
metropolitan France, via the intervention of the French State 
as acting intermediary.
A comparative assessment of these variant cases 
indicates that white creole strategies of economic power 
maintenance can only be understood in the Martiniquan context 
by reference to the central role played by the French state. 
The foundation of the Credit Foncier Colonial during the 
Second Empire, which effectively ensured the maintenance of 
conditions under which the established social relationships 
to the means of production remained unchanged, underlines 
French policy to colonial economic development. This
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interventionist policy was just as much a feature of 
twentieth century colonial relations. The establishment 
of a quota system for colonial products effectively 
strengthened the monopolistic power of the Grande Bekes, 
and in this way the French state was instrumental in per­
petuating and consolidating the power of the elite. Compared 
with the active role played by the French state in modernizing 
the sugar industry, the contribution by the British colonial 
government to the problems besetting the Barbadian sugar 
industry were minimal. It is noteworthy to compare the speed 
with which the French Government acted in I860, to the need 
for some kind of measure to meet the threat of competition 
from beet sugar after the enactment of Free Trade legislation, 
with Chamberlain's attitude to the request in 1896 for a 
loan to construct central factories in Barbados:
"As at present advised...I am opposed to any loan 
of Government money except upon absolute security, 
and do not consider either land, machinery or 
buildings absolute security in a Colony where all 
values depend upon the sugar industry..."^
It is precisely because of the different conditions 
under which divergent forms of monopoly capitalism developed 
in both islands, that the origins and composition of the 
agri-business bourgeoisie are markedly different in each 
case. The survival of the plantocracy in Martinique and the 
ascendance of one section of that class which formed the core 
of the new elite, can be accounted for by the directive role 
played by the French state in colonial economic development.
In Barbados the limited extent to which the home government 
was willing to commit official funds to aid the ailing sugar 
industry, resulted in the demise of the older planter class. 
Under different circumstances the new elite was forged out 
of a dynamic trading sector which accumulated capital during 
the heyday of the Free Trade era, and which it subsequently 
used to modernize the sugar industry and displace the planto­
cracy with its new found financial coercive power.
With varying degrees of success the agri-business 
bourgeoisie in each island succeeded in manning all of the 
strategic posts of the colonial economy, finance and banking.
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However, in having consolidated its newly won position of 
power, the composition of the agri-business bourgeoise has 
not been entirely immutable. This is particularly true of 
the Barbadian case, in which the avenues of social mobility 
for a number of poor white entrepreneurs has resulted in 
the boundaries of what constitutes the agri-business 
bourgeoisie being fairly fluid. Changes in the composition 
of the agri-business bourgeoisie in Martinique, via the 
incorporation of other groups into the ranks of the Grands 
Bekes, has been a more recent phenomenon. A number of 
Bekes Moyens having profited from the commercialization of 
bananas and the growth of the retail distributive trades'1 sector 
during the last two decades, now has wealth and influence 
equal to the usiniers of old.
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'NOTES AND REFERENCES
1. See below ( pages ,111-112) ' for a description of ’the system 
as locally practised.
2. Within the terms of the Act advances were made
"...for the purpose of carrying on the general 
cultivation and management (of an estate), for the 
purchase of stock and manure and other necessaries, 
for paying taxes, and for meeting and paying all other 
usual and necessary outgoings connected with the 
upkeep...including a reasonable salary to the owner 
in any case where he shall be the manager of such land, 
together with interest on such loans..." It is also 
stipulated that loans contracted under the Act
"...shall be paid...in the first place and in 
priority to all other claims or liens affecting the 
(estate's crops...in case proceedings in Chancery shall 
be taken against the land on which the crop is growing 
before the reaping or sale thereof..."
(Source: Laws of Barbados. 1887/88. Part I para, iv)
3. Based upon the verbal evidence of a group of planters to 
the West India Royal Commission of 1897, which is cited 
below (page. p. 112).
4. According to the evidence of one planter before the
Royal Commission of 1848. credit was lacking because
"investors preferred India and Mauritius".
5. Source: Barbados Archives, Index of Estates in Chancery.
6. Between 1845 and 1885 the Society's bonus averaged 2j%.
•In 1896 at the height of the depression the Society's
actuary recommended that 40,000 dollars out of a gross 
surplus of 454,223 dollars be set aside as a reserve 
fund, "to meet the losses expected on certain sugar 
plantations". This measure reduced the bonus in that 
year to 2%. _ In recommending a bonus of only i%  in 1901, 
the actuary noted that
The losses under mortgage of Real Estate, chiefly 
Sugar Plantations, the necessity for adding to the 
Investment “Reserve Fund, and the loss of Interest combined 
to make this the lowest declaration of Bonus ever made to 
the society".
An improved - situation after 1905 allowed the bonus to be 
increased from lf% to 2% in 1910. After a further drop 
to l^ /o during the.period 1920-1922, the annual bonus 
increased again to average 2j$> - 2§% in the late 1920s 
and 1930s.
(Source: BMLA Records)
7. Sources: Barbados Chancery Court, Chancery Sales Ledgers: 
1885-1893. and 1894-1901; Barbados House of Assembly,
Record of Members of the General Assembly (compiled by 
E.W. Shilstone); Commercial Hall (C a m p b e l l 1969); An Old 
Colonial Family: A History of the Austin Family of Barbados 
and British Guiana (Burslem and Manning, undated).
Interview material.
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8. Imports of beet sugar into the U.K. increased at the 
expense of B.W.I. cane sugar in the second half of 
the nineteenth century. Imports of beet sugar into 
the U.K. rose from 80,027 tons in 1865 to 1,362,000 tons 
in 1900. During the same period imports of cane sugar 
from the B.W.I.declined from 176,593 tons to 37,000 tons. 
(Figures quoted from Dookhan, 1975: 18/19).
9. Source: Barbados Blue Books. 1874-1896.
10. Evidence of the extensive role played by these
individual firms as sugar brokers and exporters to the
U.S. can be found in their sugar export ledgers which
are housed in the Barbados Museum and Historical Society. 
The collection is by no means comprehensive and some 
volumes are badly deteriorated.
11. Commercial Hall, which was renamed the Barbados Chamber
of Commerce in 1909, first opened in 1825. The earliest
description of this institution is to be found in 
Schomburgk (1848: 248):
"The Commercial Hall near the Pierhead commands a 
very pretty view of Carlisle Bay and the Shipping...its 
hall may be considered the exchange of Barbados".
12. To protect their monopoly one of the rules of the 
Association stated that "no direct importation of supplies 
shall be made by local dealers from firms which are not 
represented in Barbados".
13. A letter dated March 1896 announcing the intention to 
withdraw from the Sales Room was signed by representatives 
of the following firms:
S.P. Musson Son and Co., Da Costa and Co., W.P. Leacock 
and Co., Clairmonte Man and Co., J.P. Barrow and Co.,
James H. Inniss, J.R. Fields and Co., Richards and Hinds 
and A.A. Cole.
14. Source: West India Royal Commission, 1897 Appendix C . 
Volume II, C.8657. Evidence of the Master-in-Chancery 
given to the Commissioners on Thursday February 18th 1897.
15. Ibid. Evidence of C.P. Clarke, A.J. Pile, George Sealy 
and F.J. Clarke.
16. Ibid.
17. Source: Official Gazette, "List of appraisers
of plantations and places ordered to be sold in the Court 
of Chancery, compiled in pursuance of section 79 of 
The Chancery Act, 1891".
18. Op.cit.
19. Op.cit.
20. Op.cit.
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21. Whereas Martinique was occupied by the English during 
the Revolution, who supported the ancien regime and the 
interests of the plantocracy, the Victor Hughes Con­
vention established in Guadeloupe forced those planters 
who escaped the guillotine into exile. In spite of the 
boom of the restoration period, the returning planters
• • were unable to compete with the well financed corporations 
from metropolitan France, which were already investing in 
the new central factories.
22. Source:: Letter dated September 8th I860, sent by the 
Minister for Colonial Affairs to the Minister of 
Agriculture, Commerce and Public Works, Archives 
D ’Outre-Mer, General C32 D'265.
23. Ibid.
24. Source: Archives D ’Outre-Mer, Chemins de Fer a Voie 
Etroite de la Martinique (Jour,ion). Martinique 020 0180.
25. Ibid.
26. Source: Private Archives of Bernard Petit.iean-Roget.Fort-de-Franc e.   .... ~........... ......... -
27. Source: Bulletin fflfficiel. de la Martinique. 1870-72.
(The Credit Colonial was -renamed the Credit Foncier 
Colonial in 1863, and its capital was increased from
3,000,000 to 12 ,000,000francs;),
28. Ibid. (1884).
29. By the end of 1879 a total of forty-three plantations 
had been expropriated by the Credit Foncier Colonial: 
thirty-five in Reunion and eight in Guadeloupe.
Source: Minutes of the Ordinary General Meeting of the 
Credit Foncier Colonial. 29th May 1880. Reported in 
Le Moniteur: Journal Officiel de la Martinique.
July 6th, 9th and 13th 1880.
30. Source: Article in Le Moniteur. "La Crise Sucriere".
16/3/1885. "
31. Source: "List of habitations sucreries in 1882",
Le Propagateur. March 25th, April 1st, 5th, 12th, 15th, 
19th, 22nd, 26th and 29th 1882.
32. Source: Conservation des Hypotheques (Martinique),
Registers of Property Transactions. 1886.
33. Source: Interview material.
A brief history of Bougenot!s career is also to be found 
in Schnakenbourg (1977).
34. Source: Le Moniteur. 5/7/1889.
35. Op.cit.
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36. Source: Ministere de la Marine et des Colonies, 
Deliberations du Conseil General. Session Ordinaire 
Nov/Dec 1890,' Dec 9th 1890.
37. Source: Annuaire de la Martinique, 1895 ("Etablissements 
Industriels et Agricoles"). —
38. Lists of applications for these subsidies are to be found
published in Le Moniteur. November 1896 - March 1897.
The following information is given in these lists:
(i) Name of proprietor, (ii) Name or description of 
location of plantation, (iii) indication of culture: 
coffee, cocoa or both, (iv) Size, (v) Subsidy granted,
(vi) General observations on the state of each plantation.
39. There were two elements in the payment to planters under
contract: the mercuriale and the ma.joration. Habitations
contracted to the usine were paid the value of 60 kgs of
sugar for every 1000 kgs of c'ane delivered to the factory, 
the price being determined by current market prices for 
sugar at Saint-Pierre. In 1880 this averaged twenty-five 
francs per kg. For planters without contracts the rate 
paid was based upon the value of 50-55 kgs. of sugar, 
which was equivalent to a payment of twenty-one francs.
In addition to this payment by mercuriale or market price, 
which was given on the 15th and 30th of each month during 
harvest, a second element, that of ma.joration, was paid 
after harvest in December. Majorat!on. determined by the 
profitability of the usine after each season, was usually 
only distributed when the usine was considered to have had 
a good year, and was a decision which depended solely on 
the discretion of the usinfer.
40. Source: Unsigned letter from an habitant to the usinier
... Fernand Clerc dated December 12th 1882. Private Archives
of Bernard Petitjean-Roget, Fort-de-France.
41. Source: Archives D'Outre-Mer, Tableaux de population.
de culture, de. commerce et de navigation. 1883-87.
Martinique C5 D59.
42. A basic distinction is made between rhum agricole, which 
is manufactured directly from cane juice, and rhum 
industrielle. made from molasses, a by-product of sugar-.
The latter has a stronger aroma which is considered 
acceptable (sic) to the metropolitan palate. Martiniquans 
prefer the former which has a lighter, more subtle bouquet, 
very little of the industrielle being consumed in 
Martinique. Rhum agricole-forms the principal element
of the traditional Martiniquan punch which is taken as 
an aperitif.
43. Source: Service de L'Agriculture, Rapport Sur l 1Indus­
trie de la Canne a la Martinique (Kervegant, 1935: 70).
44. Source: Barbados Archives, Index of Estates in Chancery.
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45. A short while before the Brussels Convention of March 
1902, the following despatch dated February 28th was 
sent by a Reuter's correspondent in Barbados and 
published in the Times Weekly Edition:
"Owing to the exceedingly low price of sugar which 
is the staple product of Barbados the cost of production 
is not covered by its sale. The merchants who advance 
money for the working of the estates held a meeting on 
the 20th instant at which it was decided to cease all 
advances".
46. Source: P . R . O . ,  C . O .  1/44, 142-379.
47. Source: The Barbados General Almanac for The Year 1848.
48. The importance of this move on the part of the planters is 
illustrated in the following passage:
"The power of the commercial houses was considerable. 
They determined the price to be offered for sugar 
products. This was predicated to a large extent on 
international market prices. Costs for the planter 
included weighing, storage, porterage and lighterage.
In addition, there were transportation costs and the 
balance owed on plantation supplies. As most estates 
were heavily encumbered, rising prices in plantation 
commodities and sugar export costs greatly reduced 
plantation profitability. Plantation owners had no 
control over the prices exporters paid for their imports 
nor the factors of cost and the profit levied by the 
commercial middlemen".
(Sources Extract from an unpublished paper by Celia Karch, 
"Changes in Barbadian Social Structure, 1860-1937").
49. A 2J- per cent guarantee on loans was given to the Credit 
Foncier Colonial by the Colony of Martinique, which 
meant that in effect unsaleable properties had to be 
purchased by the Colony to realize its undertaking.
Where no such guarantee existed in Guadeloupe, the Credit 
Foncier undertook the management of indebted estates in 
order to attempt to retrieve outstanding loans.
50. This is indicated by the fact that the pre-war value of 
estate land in Barbados was roughly £36 per arable acre, 
which broken up into small lots was sold at an average 
of £47 per acre before 1917,.'and £79 between 1917 and 
1940. Comprehensive data is provided in the tables at 
the back of Halcrow and Cave (1947): "Some recorded 
prices paid for peasant lots of less than 10 acres".
51. By 1897 10,000 acres had been acquired by about 8,500 
smallholders, and a further 4,500 acres was being rented 
by the plantation.
(Source: West India Royal Commission, 1897. Appendix C 
Volume II. C 8657)!
52. Source: MinistWe de la Marine et des Colonies, 
Deliberations du Conseil General, Session Ordinaire, 
18/12/18847
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53. Ibid. Session Ordinaire. 9/12/1890.
54.. "...for some time the Colony has been extending its
domaine considerably, by the acquisition of numerous
sugar estates expropriated, and sold at the request of 
the Credit Foncier Colonial. Among these properties 
■some have been rented out or sold. Others have been 
fragmented and sold in lots...As at the 31st December 
1900, the Colony has bought, following expropriations 
made by the Credit. Foncier Colonial...thirty-one 
habitations .. ." : (Source: Annuaire de la Martinique, 1901: 62).
55. Op.cit. Session Ordinaire. 12/12/1902.
56. Examples include parts.of Concorde and Anse Azerot
(Saint-Marie) and Desmarinieres (Trinite).
(Source:Desruisseaux, Carte de la Structure Fonciere de 
la Martinique. 1973 ) .
57. See Chapter 4 Table IX.
58. Calculated from data contained in a list of sugar 
plantations in The Barbados Almanac and Diarv for the 
Year 1888.
59. Calculated from data contained in a list of sugar works 
in Leverick’s Directory of Barbados. 1921.
60. Calculated from "A List of Estates in Barbados, 1929", 
published by The Advocate (1929).
61. Source: Barbados Chancery Court, Chancery Sales Ledgers, 
1885-1893, 1894-1901, 1901-1904. 1900-1956. '
62. Chamberlain’s approach to the problems of economic develop­
ment in the_West Indies at this period, was based upon
the necessity for a partnership between public and 
private enterprise. Having failed to get Cabinet agree­
ment on a policy of countervailing duties on beet sugar 
to aid the West Indian sugar industry, he sought to 
attract "men of large capital and commercial experience" 
to invest in the sugar industry and new industries, with 
infrastructural costs covered by Imperial Aid. One of 
these "men of large capital" that Chamberlain attempted 
to interest in financing the construction of central 
factories in Barbados, Antiqua and St. Kitts, was the 
grocery magnate, Sir Thomas Lipton. Chamberlain's role 
in developing policy with respect to British West Indian 
economic development in the late nineteenth century, has 
been dealt with in outline by H.A. Will (1970).
63. Source: Barbados Agricultural Society, Minutes of the 
Barbados Agricultural Society, 1842-1929.
64. Source: Barbados Archives, Report of the Committee on 
Central Factories (February 1895).
65. See Chapter 6.
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66. Source: Barbados Companies Registry, File on Plantations 
Limited._
67. Source: Government of Barbados, Report of An Inquiry into 
the Sugar Industry of Barbados, compiled by R.F. McKenzie 
(0 ctober 1958: 1).
68. Source: P.R.O., West India Royal Commission, 1938-1939.
C.O. 950/938/
69. An interesting item on the agenda of a meeting of the 
Agricultural Society on May 29th 1931, was the complaint 
by Mr. H.A. Arthur, a merchant, that the planters had 
done nothing about openly airing their grievances before 
Lord Olivier's Sugar Commission of 1930:
"We are given an opportunity of having an investigation 
into.the Planters' grievances...against the Merchants, and 
everyone sits back and does nothing about it. If it had 
not been for statements made by the Planters creating the 
general impression that the Merchants were getting too 
much profit, in my opinion this Sugar Commission would 
never have been appointed..."
(Source: Barbados Agricultural Society, Minutes of the 
Barbados Agricultural Society, 1930-1956. Ordinary 
General Meeting, Friday May 29th 1931).
70. Loi du Contingentement des Sucres Coloniaux, October 30th 
1935. Under this law an export quota was accorded to 
Martinique of 402,257 quintals (about 180 long tone).
This was re-adjusted on the 7th March 1938 to 532,190 
quintals (about 238 long tons).
71. In the Census for 1846 it was noted that the free 
population had grown considerably over the past five years. 
The following figures for the free population broken down 
by urban and rural areas gives some idea of this growth, 
which was essentially non-white:
Urban Rural
1842. 18,913 22,490
1843- 21,843 22,7501844' 22,549 23,216
1845 22,597 23,8751846' 23,312 24,040
Source*: Archives D ’Outre-Mer, Martinique: Etats de 
Population, 1831 a 1847, Generalitds 232.
72. Source: Les Colonies, 15/3/1882.
73. Loi du Contingentement des Rhums Coloniaux, December 31st 
1922. An export quota of 47,195 hectolitres accorded for 
rhum industrielle, and 41,000 hectolitres for rhum 
agricole.
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74. Ownership today is associated with the names of five 
Beke Moyen families - Courville, Simonnet,^Crassous de 
Medeuil, Domergue and Dormoy - one Grand Beke - Bally - 
and one Grand Mulatre - Bellonnie.
75. Source: Official Gazette, 18/2/1897. Extract of a 
despatch from the Secretary of State to the Governor 
of Barbados, dated 29/12/1896.
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CHAPTER 6: SUGAR AND SURVIVAL
6.1 The Sugar Industry in Barbados and Martinique, 
1960-1977
6.2 Sugar and Survival: The Retention of Economic 
Power in Barbados
6.3 Sugar and Survival: The Retention of Economic 
Power in Martinique
6.4 The Response to Economic Crisis: A Comparative 
Assessment
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More recently from about I960 up to the present, 
strategies of economic power maintenance have been directed 
towards an attempt by the elites in both islands to respond 
to successive crises in the sugar industry. In both cases 
the solutions sought were (a), rationalization of the 
industry through mechanization and the disposal of unproductive 
land, as well as the closure of certain factories, and (b), 
diversification out of sugar into other crops and into other 
sectors of the economy, such as tourism, commerce and agri­
business .
Barbados
In Barbados production figures for sugar in the 1960s 
showed a marked fluctuation, from an average of 165,000 tons 
per year at the beginning of the decade to an increase bet­
ween 1963 and 1967 of approximately 184,000 tons per year.
From 1970 onwards there has been a progressive decline in 
production, though not without relatively minor fluctuations.
In 1975 production dropped below the 100,000 tons level; by 
1977 it had risen again to 118,000 tons.1
Production figures from as far back as 1920 of the 
six sugar exporting countries who are members of the Sugar 
Association of the Caribbean (formerly the British West 
Indies Sugar Association), are to be found in Table I of 
Appendix XIX. As well as indicating a dramatic increase in 
production during the years up to the late 1950s, more recent 
production figures indicate a continuing (though slower) 
overall upward trend which reached a peak during the period 
1963/1967, with the exception of St. Kitts and Antigua. 
Thereafter production in each territory has steadily declined. 
From the evidence presented in Table II of Appendix XIX, a 
parallel decline is also to be observed in field efficiency. 
This is indicated by a decline in tons of cane and tons of 
sugar per acre reaped. In the case of Barbados the decrease 
in acreage reaped is partly a function of the decline in 
field efficiency, which naturally has consequences for the 
tonnages of cane milled.
6.1. The Sugar Industry in Barbados and Martinique: 1960-1977.
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The main factors which affect production are as
follows:
(a) Climate,
(b) Acreage under cane cultivation,
(c) Varieties of cane,
(d) Labour,
(e) Field efficiency (cultivation, harvesting, 
delivery of cane to the factories and control 
of cane fires), and
(f) Factory efficiency (TC/TS ratios and methods 
of sugar extraction).
At any given time all of these factors play a role in deter­
mining output. Having said this it is more difficult to make 
an exact assessment of the relative weight to be given to 
each factor. Rather than attempt to undertake such a 
difficult task, what I will do here is to isolate those 
factors which have played a major role over the last two 
decades.
A major environmental factor, rainfall, can be con­
sidered a constant over any period. A plentiful supply of 
rain, particularly during the growing season between the 
months of July and November, is of prime importance since 
there is no surface water in Barbados; the greater part of 
the island being covered by a mantle of porous coral lime­
stone some 200 feet thick. Holding all other factors con­
stant, some positive correlation is provided by the example 
of 1948's disastrously low output of 78,000 tons, which was 
the result of the lowest rainfall recorded for twenty-five 
years. By contrast during the 'good years' of the 1950s 
and early 1960s average rainfall was high. More important 
than total precipitation is seasonal distribution. To be 
of any benefit a greater proportion of annual rainfall should 
fall during the growing season. During a cycle of drought 
which Barbados has been experiencing over the past decade, 
the drier parts of the island, such as the parishes of 
Christ Church and St. Philip, suffer most from rainfall 
deficits. In 1972 the island average was 50.69 inches, but 
only 36.67 inches was recorded in the drier areas. In 1973
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an island average of 47.81 inches was recorded, whereas only238.53 inches was recorded for the dry areas. It is true to 
say that low rainfall has played a part in declining 
production, and it is significant that the greatest 
proportion of estate land which has gone out of cane production 
in the last decade is in the drier parishes of Christ Church 
and St. Philip. The evidence also suggests that drought may 
be a contributory•factor accounting for the high incidence 
of cane fires in recent years.
Technological advances have played a more central 
role in the past than over the last two decades. The 
introduction of steam plants in the nineteenth century and 
vacuum pan technology in the new central factories in the 
twentieth century, played a vital role in increasing output 
six-fold between Abolition and the outbreak of the Second 
World War. Paralleled by these improvements in factory 
efficiency, of equal importance were the gains made by 
greater field efficiency in controlling pests and diseases 
and improving soil conditions, and the introduction of better, 
disease resistant cane varieties. More recent technological 
advances at the factory level have sought to utilize the by­
products of sugar cane, producing Comfith as a cattle feed 
and Comrind in the production of laminated timber, hard- 
board and paper. A new factory at Uplands in St. George 
financed by the Canadian Government, utilizes a 'separation 
process' to manufacture these by-products as well as sugar.
To date it has not been a commercial success, and is regarded 
by many in the industry as still being at an experimental 
stage. Attempts to fully mechanize field operations through 
the introduction of loading and cutting machinery has only 
been partially successful, estates having been subject to 
demands from the labour market to provide work during a 
period of increasing unemployment.
In 1966 the planter elite had to cope with the 
unique experience of independence. The polemic engaged by 
the Democratic Labour Party under the leadership of Errol 
Barrow against the iniquities of the plantocracy, culminating 
in the now famous 'blade of cane' speech at a Labour Day 
meeting,^ heightened the political atmosphere of the period,
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and was responsible for a spate of cane fires. The causes 
of these fires have been fiercely debated in public over 
the last decade, and there has been much controversy as to 
whether they have been malicious or accidental. I have 
managed to gather cane fire statistics for the period 1967- 
1977 (See Appendix X), and there would appear to be a very 
strong correlation between the incidence of fires and 
attacks on the sugar industry by the Democratic Labour Party.
As can be seen from the data abstracted from cane fire records,
43.000 acres were burnt in ’uncontrolled’ fires between 1968 
and 1970. At this point the Sugar Producers* Association 
decided to go in for ’controlled* burning as a means of 
preventing further losses. ’Controlled’ burning was 
abandoned in 1975, since it had the effect of reducing the 
fertility of the fields. It also presented an additional 
problem: the sucrose content of burnt cane diminished 
progressively after twenty-four hours, thus making immediate 
transportation and grinding an.imperative. Cane fire 
incidences were minimal in 1976, but rose again in 1977.
During the period under review the sugar industry 
in Barbados managed to weather the economic and political 
crises of the 1960s and 1970s. However, in spite of the 
continuing predominance of sugar in the primary sector, its 
role in the overall economy of the island in terms of its 
export earnings, as well as its relative importance to the 
economic interests of the elite, has greatly diminished.
In I960 sugar and molasses accounted for roughly two-thirds 
of Barbados’s export earnings® By the early 1970s sugar’s 
contribution to export earnings had dropped to 8 per cent,^ 
its traditional pre-eminence having been superseded by 
tourism. Annual reports of Barbados Shipping and Trading 
indicate this decline in the- relative importance of sugar in 
a parallel fashion. In 1964 sugar products .accounted for
35.3 per cent of company profits. This had dropped to
21.1 per cent by 1969 and had dropped even further in 1970
7to 7.1 per cent. In spite of the gloomy picture revealed 
by this situation of both relative and absolute decline, it 
will become apparent when discussing crop diversification 
below that the elite’s agricultural interests are still tied
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to sugar. Indicative of the crisis in the sugar industry is 
the extent to which loans from the Sugar Industry Agricultural 
Bank have increased in the 1970s: from 3,400,000 dollars in
o1970 to 46,000,000 dollars in 1977. Increasing overheads and 
decreasing revenues from sugar have resulted in financial 
loss for many estate owners, with the result that loans con­
tracted in one year are not paid off the next, hut are added 
on to the debt incurred in the following year. Also 
indicative of the crisis has been the action of Barbados 
Shipping and Trading to sell off 1,700 arable acres of estate 
land in recent years*
Martinique
Between 1967 and 1974 the French Government pumped 
a total of 104,000,000 francs into the Martiniquan sugar 
industry in the form of aid and cheap loans, with the aim of 
increasing and stabilizing its declining production at around
70.000 tons a year. By 1969 production was a half of what 
it had been a decade earlier, and the total area under cane 
had declined from 13,000 to 7,000 hectares. After a seven 
year period of a massive programme of aid to revive the 
flagging sugar industry, production was further reduced to
14.000 tons in 1974.^ Today the surviving area under cane 
is utilized primarily in the rum industry, and Martinique
has become an importer of refined beet sugar from metropolitan 
France. Galion, one of the two surviving usines centrales 
which is controlled by metropolitan interests, has recently 
been responsible for a further decline in production by 
transferring 60 per cent of its cane quota in Martinique to 
its beet operations in France.10
As early as I960 the fact that Martinique was no 
longer a monocultural export economy, was highlighted by the 
way in which pineapple and banana production was competing 
with sugar for resources of land, capital, labour and 
management. Between 1950 and I960 sugar's share of total 
exports declined from 37 per cent to 30 per cent. During 
the same period the share accredited to bananas increased 
from 26 per cent to 40 per cent and that of pineapples from 
7 per cent to 11 per cent. Including the value of rum
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exports, the percentage of sugar and rum together declined 
from 55 per cent to 44 per cent (Ferre", 1976: 36). Unlike 
the Barbadian elite, it is apparent from these figures that 
the Bekes no longer depend on sugar as a major source of 
earnings on export commodities. The continuing decline of 
sugar in relative terms has continued throughout the 1960s 
and into the 1970s as the following table indicates:
TABLE XX : PERCENTAGE BREAKDOWN OF MAJOR EXPORTS IN TERMS 
OF THEIR EXPORT VALUES. 1961-1975.
1961 ? 62 170 *71 *72 *22. *74 !Z5
Bananas 44 44 50 49 53 44 42.6 47.8
Sugar and Rum 42 44 24 24 17 20 11.0 14.2
Pineapples 11 8 13 10 6 7 5.0 6.4
Petrol (refined) - - - 7 12 17 28.0 20.2
Miscellaneous 3 4 13 10 12 12 13.4 11.4
Totals 100 100 100 100 100 100 100.0 100.0
(Source: Prefecture de la Martinique, Direction Generale
des Douanes, Le Commerce Exterieur de la 
Martinique. 1975)
In a report11 compiled in I960 by the cane growers1 
association, the authors highlighted a number of structural 
weaknesses in the sugar industry which underlined a serious 
imbalance in the agricultural sector. In terms of land, 
capital and labour sugar in I960 was still more important 
than bananas and pineapples. Cane occupied 6l per cent of 
the total area given over to these three crops. Of total 
wages and salaries the sugar industry distributed 66 per cent. 
A structural imbalance in the resources allocated to these 
crops is indicated by the fact that the sugar industry only 
accounted for 44 per cent of export earnings, whereas land 
and labour accounted for roughly two-thirds of the resources 
allocated. Cane occupied twice the area given over to 
banana cultivation and the sugar industry distributed more 
than twice the percentage of salaries and wages: 66 per 
cent against 30 per cent. Additionally, since sugar involves 
an industrial process as well as an agricultural one, the
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amount of capital tied up in sugar is considerably greater 
than that employed in banana cultivation. It is evident 
that these structural weaknesses in the sugar industry, as 
exemplified by the relatively low returns set against 
increasing overheads and high capital costs, has resulted 
in a progressive diversification by a number of Bekes out 
of sugar into more valuable export crops. In analysing 
the crisis in the sugar industry in the 1960s, these 
structural aspects of the problem must be considered as 
being prior to other factors responsible for sugar’s decline, 
which were operative in Barbados, namely declining field 
efficiency and adverse weather conditions. In addition to 
drought the Martiniquan sugar industry has had to contend 
with a series of destructive cyclones and tropical storms 
which culminated in heavy losses in September 1963 (Edith), 
September 1967 (Beulah) and August 1970 (Dorothy).
A progressively declining production,throughout the 
period inevitably resulted in the closure of certain factories. 
Unlike the case of Barbados where closure took place on the 
grounds of rationalization, closure in Martinique was the 
outcome of increasing indebtedness among factory owners.
The financial situation of the six remaining usines in the 
mid-1960s indicates that all the survivors except Petit 
Bourg were operating at a loss:
TABLE XXI : FINANCIAL SITUATION OF THE SIX USINES
Usines
CENTRALES, 1965/1966.
Debt/Liquidity 
. at end of 1965 
(francs)
Losses estim­
ated for 1966 
(francs)
Forecast of 
financial sit­
uation un to 
the end of 
ISEE
Galion-Bassignac
Lareinty-Lamentin
Marin
- 1,502,787
- 5 ,116,050 
- 865,705
+ 1,385,906
- 1,382,874
- 2,430,636 
-9,912,147
(Source: Syndicat General des Planteurs et Manipulateurs 
de Canne).
Petit Bourg 
Riviere Salee 
Sainte-Marie 
Total debt
-755,900
-2,483,061
-514,568
- 721,216
-957,106
-1,410,421
-6,842,272
(francs) 
- 2 ,258,688
- 7,599,111
- 1,380,273 
+ 664,691
- 2,359,981
- 3,841,057 
-16,754.419
176
In spite of the relatively healthy financial state of Petit 
Bourg in 1966, its situation by 1970 had appreciably worsened 
and the administrator of the factory was constrained to make 
the following announcement to the shareholders:
"In order to prevent ourselves from getting deeper 
in debt I ask you all to accept the closure of 
the factory, and the re-investment of part of our 
assets from the sale of capital equipment in 
France..."
It is evident that the financial situation of the factories 
deteriorated progressively as the total area under cane 
declined, since they were operating far below their capacity. 
The following table indicates the degree to which factories 
were operating under capacity in the early 1970s:
TABLE XXII : OPTIMUM VERSUS ACTUAL SUGAR PRODUCTION IN
MARTINIQUE. 1972-1974.
Usines
Sainte-
Marie
Galion
Lareinty
Riviere
Salee
All Mart­
inique
Optimum
Production
Actual Production (i) in tons and (ii) 
as a percentage of the optimum
(in tons) 1972 1973 1974
16,800 668 3.9% ceased production
12,600 7,328 58.1% 9,358 74.2% 4,895 38%
16,800 6,422 38.2% 8,128 48.3% 9,512 56%
12,600 7,372 58.5% 5,457 43.3% ceased
• production
58.800 21,790 37.0% 22.940 39.0% 14.407 24%
Direction Departementale de 1'Agriculture,
Service Departemental de Statistique Agricole)
'  /In one respect the inability of the Bekes to revive 
the sugar industry after 1967 was the result of a conscious 
policy of contraction. Arising out of the failure of the aid 
programme to increase and stabilize sugar production, an 
official commission was ordered to look into the adminis­
tration of the loans and subsidies advanced by the French 
Government. An official report was never published. However, 
it was revealed by a leak in official sources that factories, 
distilleries and planters in reception of aids had been 
involved in a gross misuse of public funds, utilizing cheap
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loans to finance their commercial interests. In some cases 
planters who had received aid for irrigation and land re­
modelling in preparation for mechanical harvesting, had 
later used the land for banana cultivation and other fruit 
and vegetable crops. One planter who had received extensive 
aid for draining mangrove swamps on his property in the south 
of the island, now uses the land for cattle rearing. From 
the evidence it would appear that the Bekes systematically 
ran down the sugar industry in order to invest in other 
agricultural activities, and in other sectors of the economy 
where returns on capital were greater.
6.2. Sugar and Survival : The Retention of Economic Power 
in Barbados
I now want to examine in detail the variant responses 
to this crisis by the elite in each island. I intend 
firstly to examine the responses of the Barbadian elite in 
terms of three main strategies: divestment of estate land
and real estate speculation; crop diversification; and 
diversification of economic interests into other sectors of 
the economy: tourism, commerce and agri-business.
Divestment of estate land and real estate speculation:
During the period under review 30,000 arable acres 
went out of cane cultivation. This loss can be attributed 
to four factors: straight forward crop diversification by 
estates themselves, purchases by the Government of Barbados 
for a variety of purposes, the sale of unproductive land 
for explicitly non-agricultural purposes, and the whole or 
partial sub-division of estates, ostensibly in a programme 
of greater land re-distribution but amounting in reality to 
little more than real estate speculation. The extent to 
which the plantation sector was able to divest itself of 
unprofitable sugar estates and to transform agricultural 
land into valuable real estate, replicated the process which 
took place in the early years of the twentieth century. As 
before, the returns from these saies made capital available 
to the elite to rationalize the existing sugar industry and
to finance new business ventures. Thus further fragmentation 
of land can be regarded as a strategy for economic survival, 
rather than a symptom of the group's decline.
Since I960 a total of 120 estates went completely 12out of sugar production. This represents an estimated
19,500 acres. Twenty-one of these estates were purchased 
by the Government of Barbados, but only four were specifically 
for agriculture. (See Appendix XXI). More interesting than 
this 'compulsory' relinquishment of land by the plantocratic 
elite-to the state, is the process of voluntary relinquish­
ment which took place during the 1960s and 1970s, whereby 
whole estates were sub-divided up into two, four, six and 
sometimes even eight acre lots, and others were much reduced 
in size by partial fragmentation. As I have already noted, 
this process in itself is not peculiar to the last two 
decades. Fragmentation by indebted estate owners and 
avaricious real estate speculators has been a frequent 
occurrence in Barbados's history. Estate sizes have fluct­
uated considerably as a study of wills and deeds will 
13testify. A common enough phenomenon is the ongoing process 
of estate amalgamation, fragmentation and restitution, 
according to the fortunes of the sugar industry. However, 
in recent years the process has been extensive and partly 
irreversible. Ostensibly it was seen by both planter and 
Government as one of land reform. In actual fact as a re­
distribution of land resources to narrow the gap between 
peasant and planter, it was a failure. With land prices at 
between 5,000 and 8,000 Barbadian dollars per acre, land has 
been far too expensive for the small farmer and credit 
unobtainable for such sums. It was for this reason that the 
DLP Government's rural development scheme to transform 
several plantations in St. Lucy into a series of twenty 
acre farms failed. What happened is that the middle-classes 
purchased these lots for house spots, and much of the land 
remaining after construction went to bush. Large tracts of 
former sugar estate lands are now to be found abandoned, 
particularly in low rainfall areas such as the southern-most 
parts of Christ Church and St. Philip, having so far found 
no purchasers for house-spots from the Canadian, American'
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and local property developers in this once promising tout now
14uncertain market.
The evidence would suggest that the sale of land for 
either smallholdings or house spots can toe regarded partly as 
an attempt to rationalize the sugar industry during a cycle 
of drought, rising production costs and imminent mechan­
ization. In many cases, particularly where mechanization had 
been envisaged, ’rab-land’ and difficult terrain not sus­
ceptible to mechanical cutting had been portioned off into 
house spots. During the period of my fieldwork I found 
numerous examples of estates where owners had portioned off 
twenty to forty acres for this purpose. Some of these 
partial fragmentations, however, were far more extensive.
Some were equivalent to a 50 per cent reduction in size. 
Waterhall' in St. James for example, was an estate of 275 
acres in the mid-1960s. Today it is much reduced in size, 
having had 140 acres parcelled off for housing development 
ten years ago. Friendship in St. Michael had a total area 
of 164 acres up to 1966. Today as a consequence of sub­
division into four-acre lots, its size has been reduced to 
64 acres. The new owner of one of the island’s largest 
properties, the Belle in St. Michael, is currently engaged 
on a scheme to sell off 100 acres, having created a series 
of small farms on land which he himself has improved and 
irrigated for the commercial production of vegetables.
What is evident from this wholesale process of 
sub-division and real estate speculation^is an uncertainty 
about the future of sugar and a perceived need by the elite 
to diversify its interests as quickly as possible. In 
interviews, emphasis was placed on the necessity of 
rationalizing the cultivation of sugar by the alienation 
of unproductive land. In fact the process went beyond this, 
and the extent to which-sales were contracted provided many 
owners with the capital to invest in other business ventures. 
One particular response of the elite during this period, that 
of emigration, can be attributed directly to political change. 
This question is relevant here, since the departure of 
prominent established planter families has had the effect 
of making land available to an upwardly mobile group of white
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plantation supervisory staff, who are less ideologically 
committed to the cultivation of sugar. Their orientation 
is primarily instrumental, and geared to■the attainment 
of one goal: incorporation into the elite structure. As 
business entrepreneurs rather than sugar planters, they 
have built up businesses as plant hire contractors and 
construction companies from the proceeds of land sales.
With regard to political change, three events are
of crucial importance when considering the recent history
of the group: the granting of universal suffrage in 1951,
the abolition of the Vestry System in 1959 and independence
in 1966. It is significant when comparing the list of
plantation owners for 19601^ with that of the present day l6(1977), to note the number of fbig! planter names which 
have disappeared, their bearers emigrating to England, the 
United States, South Africa, Canada, Australia, Rhodesia and 
New Zealand. Prominent names have almost disappeared com­
pletely within the short space of a decade and a half: names 
like the Haynes, the Skeetes, the McKenzies, the Piles, the 
Simpsons and the Clarkes. The Pile family, one of the most 
wealthy and influential to emerge in the twentieth century, 
by the mid-1950s owned fifteen plantations totalling over
4,000 acres, a sugar factory and also leased Drax Hall. Most 
of their estates were in the fertile St. Georgers Valley, 
where they owned three-quarters of the land resources of the 
period. Sir George Laurie Pile and his son George Douglas 
Laurie Pile were prominent political figures of the day, 
represented in both Senate and the House of Assembly. 
Realizing the implications of universal suffrage, which 
would lead t o  the loss of their local power base in island 
politics, the Pi-les were one of the first to divest them­
selves of any direct involvement in plantation ownership, by 
selling their estates to Barbados Shipping and Trading, of 
which Sir Laurie had been- chairman. The comments of one 
informant portray succinctly the dilemma of this particular 
family and their response to the situation:
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"Adult suffrage in 1951 came as a warning light.
_'They (the Piles) would never be voted in the 
Assembly. They knew that certain names would be 
taboo to the electorate. The Piles sold out when 
prices for iand were good, and so made no economic 
losses. However, in so doing they departed as a 
social, economic and political force in island 
affairs.. They had very strong English connections, 
so this was easy for them to do".
It is enlightening to study the names of shareholders 
of many present-day plantation corporations, since many of 
the families who pulled out continue to have extensive 
financial interests in these corporations. The Pile family 
continue to own shares in some former family estates. The 
representative of Edgecumbe Ltd., a former colonial oivil 
servant, continues to represent the interests of some forty- 
five members of the Skeete family who have left Barbados. 
Two-thirds of the shareholders of Vaucluse Ltd. are now 
resident in the United Kingdom. A member of the Clarke 
family responsible for the running of this company and 
Dunscombe Estates, represents the interests of some forty 
odd Clarke shareholders, the majority of which are resident 
abroad. The grandson of W.K. Chandler, Barbados's Master- 
In-Chancery for over thirty years, is the local representative 
and attorney for Portland and Alleynedale Estates; the 
majority of shareholders today living in Canada, South Africa, 
Rhodesia and England. It would be no exaggeration to state 
that those corporations•operated by established planter 
families in the mid-1950s and still intact, are today 
financially controlled by shareholders resident outside of 
Barbados
Crop Diversification
It has always been the practice for the plantation
to cultivate ground provisions such as yams, sweet potatoes
and eddoes, to supply its own internal needs. During the
last war, in order to make Barbados self-sufficient in food,
legislation was enacted making it compulsory for the
plantation to devote 12.5 per cent of its arable area to the
18cultivation of food crops. This legislation was never 
removed from the statute books and sugar estates continued 
to grow food crops for internal consumption and local markets.
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It has only been over the last decade that any serious 
attempt has been made at agricultural diversification, with 
a view to commercializing vegetable production and creating 
alongside sugar a crop of high export value.
According to an official survey published in 1969,10 
an estimated total of about 1,800 acres were under green 
vegetables: smallholdings accounted for 1,500 acres and the
balance on estates. Land utilization of the total arable 
area of forty-two estates in the sample survey was broken 
down as follows.!
Sugar Cane 81.0%
Ground Provisions 12.2%
Green Vegetables 2.0%
Other Crops 0.1%
95.3% *
(* Remainder lying fallow)
In terms of gross receipts, on average 90 per cent was 
accounted for by sugar cane. The value of vegetables was 
therefore minimal. There were only two exceptions where 
vegetable production was commercialized to such an extent 
that it accounted for over 30 per cent of gross receipts.
A survey carried out by the Barbados Sugar
20Producers* Association in November 1973, indicated an
arable area under food crops of 2,900.25 acres out of a
total arable area of 33,222 acres, on a sample of ninety-
three estates. 450 acres of the area under food crops was
devoted to green vegetables and the remainder to traditional
ground provisions and maize. In addition to food crops a
further 571.50 acres had also been planted under sea-island
cotton. By 1975 the area under cotton had been increased 
21to 1,100 acres. In the report published by the Sugar 
Producers, it was claimed that the move towards greater 
diversification was signal proof that estate owners had 
responded positively to the- Government’s demand for increased 
food production, beyond the statutory requirements laid down 
in 1942. The need to diversify had been expressed by two
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governments from the mid-1960s onwards in terms of national 
interest, to support a policy of import substitution. From 
interviews with leading figures in the Sugar Producers1 
Association, it became apparent that the move towards 
greater crop diversification by the elite can only be 
regarded in part as a response to the Government*s clarion 
call. Given the difficult political climate of the first ten
years of independence that the group has had to weather, any
relationship between governmental demands for greater divers­
ification and the responses of the elite, must also be seen 
as one of political expediency. In fact when analysing the 
elite*s motives for diversification, a combination of factors 
must be taken into consideration: attacks on the sugar
industry by the former Government in the late 1960s and the 
spate of ’malicious* cane fires which paralleled the 
political climate of the period; the decreasing revenues from 
sugar; and the great potential offered by the rapid expansion 
of the tourist industry from the late 1960s.
In retrospect, attempts by the elite to diversity 
their investments in the agricultural sector, have not 
provided the group with a viable alternative to sugar or
even a second best. Overall, in the plantation sector
roughly 90 per cent of gross receipts are still accounted 
for by sugar. From a series of interviews conducted with 
owners, attorneys and estate managers, I have succeeded in 
obtaining factual information on nearly all of the estates 
in Barbados.. From my data it would appear that only ten 
estates on the island are seriously geared to the commercial 
production of green vegetables under irrigation, on an area 
of about 200 acres. Climatic and geophysical conditions 
make irrigation a necessity for green vegetable production 
in Barbados. This means that wells must be drilled which is 
an expensive operation that can only be carried out in areas 
where there is sheet water.
On the majority of estates in Barbados, therefore, 
cultivation is still primarily geared to sugar production. 
With the exception of those ten estates already mentioned, 
the common pattern is for estates to plant ground provisions 
as ’catch crops’ on land under preparation for cane, plus a
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very small quantity of green vegetables on estates in the 
wetter parts of the island. Other exceptions, apart from 
the schemes of irrigation already mentioned, are few and 
far between. Two estates have been transformed into dairy 
farms. Another practises a mixed activity of cane, 
vegetables, sea-island cotton and sheep farming. Another 
has been partially transformed into a dairy farm with some 
cane and vegetable production. A small estate of 64.arable 
acres now devotes ten to fifteen acres to onions grown in 
rotation with cane. One estate owner plans to transform his 
estate by substituting nutmegs for sugar on half of the 
arable area, and another is currently experimenting with 
hydroponics on an area of 25,000 square feet. Several are 
planning the' commercial production of aubergines, but have 
so far encountered difficulties in establishing markets in 
Europe and North America.
"...farming is a business. I ’d call this a farm 
and I ’m rather tired of the expression plantation 
because it is a farm even if it is slightly old- 
fashioned. We’re turning over half a million 
dollars a year-. It’s a business you have to think 
about and my main function is thinking about that' 
end of it..."
Despite the insistence of many estate owners (like the one . 
quoted above) that they have become ’farmers’ operating a 
business solely on the basis of rational cost accounting, 
the very persistence of the sugar plantation, still incor^ 
porating many of its traditional organizational features 
(see Chapter 7), means that the elite is unable to alter or 
modify a role it would dearly like to discard. This became 
apparent during interviews, particularly in those areas 
designed to tap attitudes on changing social relationships 
within the plantation. It indicates that the crisis as 
perceived by the elite has dimensions which go far beyond 
the purely economic. The polemics employed by the DLP in 
the late 1960s made the group acutely aware of this fact. 
There is therefore a good case for arguing that the elite 
would have liked to decrease its dependence on sugar, if 
only as a means of discarding the unpopular label of 
’plantocracy1.
> iwasiSkd" - - •'ukf'c-
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Climatic and geophysical factors apart, another 
reason why the 'plantocracy' failed to diversify and become 
'farmers', is due to problems of marketing. Firstly, the 
local market is a limited one, though the growth of tourism 
in recent years has virtually doubled the potential domestic 
market. Up until April of 1976 Barbados traded its onions 
with its Carioom partners, Jamaica and Trinidad. Since those 
islands did not take up their quotas in-1977, the Caricom 
outlet has temporarily dried up. Domestic marketing arrange­
ments are inadequate. Disenchantment with the disorganized 
state of the Government-run Barbados Marketing Corporation, 
has led estate owners to sell directly to supermarkets and 
to fall back on a more traditional outlet, that of hucksters 
who harvest and transport the crops themselves to market. 
These individual responses to the poor organization of the 
Barbados Marketing Corporation mean that there is no adequate 
centralized control over supply to the local market, and as 
a consequence the market for food crops is characterized by 
alternating periods of glut and severe shortage. The 
financial returns from food crops are therefore uncertain, 
and many planters have had to destroy whole fields of crops 
during a period of glut. The marketing of onions is com­
pulsory through the Corporation,but repeated marketing 
failures over the last few years resulting in the loss of 
thousands of dollars for growers,in 1977 led to a drastic 
reduction in the area under onions. One example of this 
recorded during my field trip is that of the case of Bulkeley 
Estates, a subsidiary of Barbados Shipping and Trading, whose 
onion crop for April 1977- was left to rot in the fields by 
Corporation officials, resulting in a 90 per cent loss of 
the total crop, worth an estimated market value of 40,000 
Barbadian dollars. Many other planters who had commer­
cialized onion production suffered similar losses during 
the same period.
Diversification into other sectors of the economy
The structure of plantation ownership and corporate 
development which I have already described in Chapter 5, 
indicates the firm links which were forged between the
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commercial bourgeoisie and the planter class as early as 
1920. Foursquare Estates Ltd. (1,545 acres) founded by 
Dr. J.W.- Hawkins in 1916 as a private company, became a 
subsidiary wholly owned by Plantations Ltd. in 1941. 
Applewhaites Ltd. (1,168 acres) founded by a group of 
planter families in 1918, the Hawkins, the Simpsons and 
the Hinksons, had 85 per cent of its shares acquired by 
Manco Investments in the 1950s, a subsidiary of Barbados 
Shipping and Trading. Bulkeley Estates Ltd. (2,201 acres) 
and Da Costa and Musson Estates Ltd. (1,215 acres) are 
today wholly owned subsidiaries of Barbados Shipping and 
Trading. In 1977 6,129 arable acres were wholly owned and 
controlled through subsidiaries by these two public cor­
porations .
The acquisition of Bulkeley Estates by Barbados 
Shipping and Trading affords- an example of the process of 
agri-business consolidation which has gone on in the 
twentieth century- Six estates in the parish of St. George, 
Bulkeley, Jordans, Boarded Hall, Stepney, Buttals and Windsor 
originally belonged to Sir George Laurie Pile. In the early 
1950s both Bookers and Tate and Lyle offered to buy these 
estates, but according to one prominent figure in the sugar 
industry: "Sir Laurie preferred to sell them to Barbados 
Shipping and Trading and keep ownership local". The estates 
were ultimately sold to Barbados Shipping and Trading for
2,000,000 -dollars less than that offered by Bookers and 
Tate and Lyle. Castle and Lamberts in St. Peter originally 
formed part of a private company, Springhall Ltd., which was 
established in 1934 by Samuel Manning. In 1958 during a 
period of great financial difficulty, Springhall Ltd. was 
purchased from the Manning family by Barbados Shipping and 
Trading and became part of Bulkeley Estates.
However, of far greater significance than direct 
ownership- and control by the two agri-business conglomerates, 
is the phenomenon of inter-locking directorships and owner­
ship of shares by plantation corporations in the two 'giants* 
This diversification of financial interests is a process 
which has continued into the 1960s and 1970s, in what is 
considered by the elite to be a 1 safe investment *', generating
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an income to offset any losses that may occur in agriculture. 
What is most striking about attempts to channel investments 
out of the plantation sector, is the way in which the largest 
plantation owners have continued to invest heavily in the two 
conglomerates. The general pattern is for plantations owned 
by relatively long-established sugar planting families, 
engaged primarily in agriculture with little or no commercial 
connections, to have investments in Plantations Ltd. and for 
majority shareholders to sit upon the board. Today roughly 
three-quarters of the estate owners in Barbados are rep­
resented in Plantations Ltd. through shareholdings. In terms 
of their personal assets, influence in the sugar industry 
and powers of decision-making, the board members of 
Plantations Ltd. are an extremely influential group. Cor­
porate holdings owned by families who are representatives of 
the commercial bourgeoisie, such as the Mannings, the 
Wilkinsons and the Challenors, have extensive investments in 
Barbados Shipping and Trading. (See Appendix XXII).
It has already been demonstrated that investment in 
the commercial sector is not a recent phenomenon. Because 
of its origins the white elite in the twentieth century has 
all the characteristic features of an agri-business bour­
geoisie rather than a traditional plantocracy. The 
substantial diversification of Barbados Shipping and Trading’s 
holdings during the 1960s and 1970s, which was facilitated by 
the sale of its sugar interests, has given the elite the 
opportunity to diversify its assets to an even greater extent 
than ever before. During the period Barbados Shipping and 
Trading acquired interests in the retail grocery trade, 
clothing manufacturing, automobile sales, property investment, 
agricultural machinery and the recording industry. With the 
expansion of the airport, it also acquired considerable
investments in an air freight company, Seawell Air Services 22Ltd. As a measure of its growth during the period of our 
study, a reflection of the economic growth and diversification 
of Barbados itself away from a 'pure plantation economy', the 
authorized share capital of the - corporation has increased 
fourfold: from •' 3,000,000 Barbadian dollars in I960 to
12,000,000 dollars in the mid-1970s.^
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Two-thirds of my sample^ had investments or had 
caused their companies to have investments in the two con­
glomerates. Since many of them had recently acquired 
additional shareholdings, particularly in Barbados Shipping 
and Trading, this can be regarded as a positive response to 
the opportunities afforded by a developing and more highly 
developed economy. Barbados Shipping and Trading's entry 
into the retail trade and property investment sector sig­
nificantly coincides with the rapid growth of the tourist 
industry. Both these sectors can be considered tourist- 
related, since their largest investments are to be found in. 
major areas of tourist development in Christ Church and St. 
James: in the two complexes of Southern Plaza and. Sunset 
Crest incorporating holiday villas, apartments and shopping 
precincts. Now with an annual average tourist intake equal 
to the population size itself, tourism has superseded sugar 
as the island's major source of export earnings. A statis­
tical analysis reveals a strong correlation between the 
decline of the sugar industry in the 1960s and the rapid 
growth of the tourist industry in the latter half of the 
decade. Although "still king" in agriculture, sugar had 
unequivocally given way to tourism by the late 1960s as the 
following newspaper editorial indicates:
"Last year according to the Manager of the Tourist 
.Board, the hot shirted and short-panted successors 
of the former Yacht Club establishment - some 
115,600 of them, mostly North Americans, though 
quite a few British too - spent 54,000,000 Eastern 
Caribbean dollars in Barbados compared with the 
income derived from ex-King sugar of 28,600,000 
dollars.
Sugar production, once almost the sole prop of the 
Barbados economy, declined last year by 18.5 per 
cent compared with 1967: the tourist industry on 
the other hand, showed a growth of some 17 per cent 
during the same period - compared, so they say here 
with a world average of about 11 per cent...
A dozen members of my sample neither belonged to 
established planter families nor to the great commercial 
families of Bridgetown. This group could be typified as 
having originated from a poor yeomanry stock, who had 
worked their-way up in the white social hierarchy as 
overseers and estate managers. The ownership of an estate
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for members of this group signified that they had arrived 
at the apex of Bajan society. It became apparent in inter­
views that the social status conferred by the ownership of 
an estate, was far more important than purely economic con­
siderations. What was particularly noticeable about this 
group was a lack of commitment to the sugar industry and a 
greater flexibility and entrepreneurship for new enterprises.
It was also noticeable that the majority of the group had 
been extensively involved in real estate speculation, pur­
chasing and selling estate land primarily for building 
development. Two members of this group had functioned in a 
systematic way, each purchasing a series of estates over a 
ten-year period and partially fragmenting each one. In this 
way capital was accumulated from these sales and used to 
finance other operations.
Three cases will indicate the extensive business 
interests of this group:
Case I
Owner of four separate companies in the construction 
industry: electrical installation; structural systems;
fabrication; and building.
Owner of several land development companies.
Part-owner of Ready Mix Cement (Barbados) Ltd.
Part-owner of a paint manufacturing company.
Part-owner and founder of an agro-chemical and 
fertilizer company.
Case II
Majority shareholder in two property development companies. 
Owner of an apartment hotel and tourist complex in Christ 
Church.
Part-owner of a garage with spare-parts depot and 
salesrooms.
Shareholder of Plantations Ltd., the government-run 
Barbados Light and Power Company Ltd., and a printing company.
Case III
Owner of two land development companies.
Part-owner of a paint manufacturing company.
Part-owner of a plant hire company.
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Owner of a company to import and assemble irrigation 
e quipment.
Owner of several villas in a condominium in a St. James 
tourist resort.
Shareholder of Plantations Ltd.
6.3. Sugar and Survival : The Retention of Economic Power 
in Martinique.
In analysing the responses of the Bekes in Martinique 
to the crisis in the sugar industry, one thing is readily 
apparent. Unlike the elite in Barbados the Bekes have been 
successful in promoting a crop of high export value com­
parable to that of sugar. The financial returns from the *>
cultivation of bananas may be one factor in the 1960s which 
prevented a widespread fragmentation and sub-division to 
occur, as happened in Barbados. When making a comparison 
with Barbados this is a useful preliminary observation, since 
the same process has taken place in Martinique in the past 
when returns from agriculture were low. Due to the important 
role played by bananas as a substitute for sugar, I intend 
to devote a separate section to banana cultivation and then 
go on to consider other forms of response: other crop 
diversification, diversification into other sectors of the 
economy, and the investment of capital overseas.
Banana Cultivation
The cultivation of bananas for export goes back as 
far as 1907 when small quantities were exported to France:
20 tons in 1907 rising to 200 tons in 1910. However, 
it was not until a shipping service was specially inaug­
urated for the transportation of bananas by the Compagnie 
Generale Transat1antique in 1929, that banana production was 
commercialized to any extent and formed a substantial 
proportion of exports. Exports rose rapidly from 4,700 tons 
in 1932 to 40,000 tons in 1938, and continued their rapid 
ascent after the interruption of wartime: 42,000 tons in 1949;
105,000 tons in 1957, reaching 147,000 tons in 1959. Today 
average annual exports to metropolitan France and other 
countries exceed the 200,000 ton mark, and they account for
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two-thirds of total export receipts.  ^ In the late 1950s 
the competition from French African territories, notably the 
Ivory Coast, threatened to ruin the Antillean banana 
industry. In response to this threat an important measure 
of protection was given to banana exporters in Martinique 
and Guadeloupe by a departmental decree in January 1962; 
two-thirds of the French market were reserved for Antillean 
departments and the other third for associated African 
states in the EEC.
With the exception of two bad years in 1963 and 1964, 
the result of extensive damage caused by cyclone Edith, 
production continued to rise until it reached a peak of
235,000 tons in 1966. At this point the market was saturated 
and further expansion within the EEC, as envisaged in the 
Fifth Plan for Economic Development, was not realized since 
member states continued to depend on their traditional sources 
of supply. In July 1967 SICABAM accepted a series of measures 
suggested by an official commission to limit and stabilize 
production at 200,000 tons per annum. This was achieved by 
the imposition of quotas on exporters, and was based on 
tonnages exported by individual exporters during the previousp LTtwo years.
What is striking during the 1960s is the rapidity 
with which the Bekes responded to the opportunities offered 
by banana cultivation. In the north of the island (which 
today accounts for 75 per cent of Martinique’s banana 
production) from the inland communes of Saint-Joseph and 
Gros-Morne, to the communes on the Atlantic coast of Marigot, 
Lorrain, Sainte-Marie, Trinite and Robert, a process took 
place whereby 1,000 hectares between I960 and 1970 were con­
verted from sugar cane to bananas. One of the largest 
domaines in this area (1,300 hectares) made up of eight 
former sugar estates, belonging to the Despointes family and 
formerly supplying the factory of Sainte-Marie, now has a 
larger area devoted to banana cultivation than sugar cane 
(Burac, 1975: 63-72). Further north in the commune of 
Lorrain, another large domaine of 627 hectares formerly 
owned by the Clerc family and made up of nine estates, was 
geared primarily to sugar production ten years ago. It is
25
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now broken up among several separate owners and exclusively
27devoted to bananas. In the coastal communes, traditionally 
the catchment area for Galion and Sainte-Marie, the area 
under cane halved from 3,309 hectares in 1963 to 1,858 
hectares in 1971, about 700 hectares being converted during 
this period into banana estates (Burac, 1975: 63-72).
What is also striking when viewing in retrospect
the success with which the Bekes mobilized their resources
to develop an alternative crop of high export value,is the
maintenance of a system of land resource distribution between
planter and peasant smallholder, indicating that 75 per cent
of the area under bananas is monopolized by the plantation
sector, representing 12.3 per cent of the total number of 
28growers.
TABLE XXIII : LAND RESOURCE DISTRIBUTION BETWEEN PEASANT 
SMALLHOLDINGS. MEDIUM AND LARGE BANANA 
PLANTATIONS IN 1976
Size (hectares) Number of Owners Area (hectares)
0-5 1,930 2,500
5-25 150 1,300
Over 20 120 6,200
(Source: SICABAM) 2*200 Ip-tOpP
This unequal distribution of land resources skewed in favour 
of the plantation sector, is one of many disadvantages which 
act against the small producer, and can be illustrated by 
reference to the history of the SICAS or collectives of small 
planters over the last decade. These co-operatives which 
were set up with government aid between 1958 and 1966, have 
progressively failed to hold their own. By 1968 fifteen 
banana SICAS were in existence, bringing together 1,591 
peasant smallholders. By 1973 the number of these co­
operatives had declined- to eleven and the total number of 
adherents to 964. The decline of the SICAS during this period 
is also indicated by a progressive drop-in production:
1966 23,000 tons; 1970 11,000 tons; 1971 8,500 tons.^° As 
an example of what happened, the president of one SICA 
in the north of the island described the background to a
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process whereby the number of active adherents of his SICA
declined from 343 in 1963 to 162 in 1968, and finally to
56 in 1977. Difficulties encountered by the small farmer
were typically those of marketing problems, an inability
to cope with increasing costs of production, and difficulties
30in obtaining long-term loans. In addition SICAS do not own 
their own mechanical equipment; governmental aid being limited 
to the provision of packing stations and infrastructure.
SICAS are therefore dependent upon Beke proprietors for the 
hiring of tractors, which are loaned when the plantation has 
finished its ploughing. As a result the bulk of the co­
operatives' crops enter the metropolitan market at a later 
period (September to November) than the plantation's (March
to July), when the market is saturated and prices are 
31lower. Unable to take advantage of economies of scale
and having less resources than the plantation sector, SICA
members are having to abandon a crop of potentially high
export value for the cultivation of food crops for domestic
consumption. The peasant smallholder has therefore been
contained once more in his traditional sphere of activity.
/  /On the other hand the Bekes have managed to mobilize their 
far greater resources and to maintain their position in the 
market for a variety of reasons. Firstly, they have an 
assured market in the EEC through access to quotas laid down 
over a decade ago. Furthermore, the Grands Bekes are the 
owners of export houses in Fort-de-France, and they therefore 
control the marketing of their own produce as well as that 
of the Bekes Moyens and small producers.
Size is another factor which acts in favour of the 
Bekes, and allows for greater rationalization. In some 
cases banana cultivation is carried out on large domaines of 
400 to 500 hectares termed exploitations agricoles. These 
units are organized into family corporations often owned 
by several Beke families, their existence bearing witness 
to the amalgamation and purchase of individual estates by 
central sugar factories in the late nineteenth century.
Another strategy by which the Bekes have rationalized 
cultivation is by the formation of their own co-operatives.
A group of thirteen planters in the north of the island,
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responsible for one-quarter of the island’s production, 
several years ago formed their own organization for the 
bulk-buying of fertilizers, packaging materials and for 
the communal use of mechanical equipment. Unlike the 
exploitation agricole the members of GIAM (Groupement 
Industrial et Agricole de la Martinique) do- not represent 
a physical unity, their estates being scattered over five 
of the northern communes on the Atlantic coast. Lastly, 
the Bekes have far better access to credit facilities than 
the members of the SICAS, since they continue to control the 
financial institutions of the island, through the ownership 
of shares and directorships in local banks.
Other Crop Diversification
At a conference in December 1976, organized by 
various interested parties in agriculture, banking and 
trade unionism, to review the performance of agriculture 
between I960 and 1976 and its future role in the economy, 
the following conclusions were reached:
"The Martiniquan economy has been subjected throughout 
the period studied, to a continual and sustained 
process of de-stabilization occasioned by:
A decline of traditional activities, the disappearance 
of traditional forms of employment and an absence of 
any clear-cut policy and common will to revive 
agriculture. A misuse of public funds in certain 
cases, and a lack of a concerted effort in putting 
them to proper use. A complete deterioration in 
agriculture, affecting both proprietor and wage 
labourer"
In commenting upon some of the points raised above, I have 
already shed some light on this "process of de-stabilization’1 
by reference to the decline of the SICAS and the Bekes misuse 
of sugar funds. In spite of this de-stabilization which has 
resulted in an increasing dependence upon massive injections 
of State funds by a number of agencies, the Bekes have shown 
a remarkable ability in responding to crisis in the agricul­
tural sector. Given the recurrent difficulties encountered 
in the export of fruit and vegetables to the EEC, they have 
shown great flexibility in crop diversification by switching 
rapidly from one crop to another as market conditions change. 
As a result of this practice the food crops’ export market is 
highly unstable as the following table indicates:
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The success of the Bekes in being able to re-direct 
•their resources in this fashion, can be accounted for by the 
part they play in the commissions set up for deciding economic 
policy in the Five Year Development Plans for overseas depart­
ments. As members of the Commission for Agriculture, Forestry 
and Fisheries, they are responsible in effect for deciding 
their own agricultural policies. This is particularly 
important when State subsidies are involved, since the Bekes 
are always aware of schemes at the planning stage' two or three 
years in advance,, and can therefore re-organize their 
activities accordingly by re-allocating land use. As an 
example of this, when subsidies were made available in 1975 
for aubergines and citrus cultivation, many Bekes had already 
ploughed up cane land and abandoned pineapple cultivation in 
response to the opportunities offered by different crops.
Although essentially a mono-cultural export economy
like Barbados, the potential for agricultural diversification
has always been greater in Martinique. Whereas in the former
the total land area devoted to sugar has been roughly 80-85
per cent in the recent past, the total area given over to the
cultivation of sugar has never been much more than one-third
in the latter. This may be partly explained by climatic and
geophysical differences which make certain areas of the island,
particularly the mornes in the north, unsuitable for sugar
cultivation, but which have proved eminently suitable for
pineapples in recent years,, and which since 1848 have become
a hays vivrier: a zone of small black proprietors on the margins
of the large exploitations agricoles growing food crops for
domestic consumption and local markets. Since 1724 the French
Government has sought to enforce the cultivation of maraicheres _ ■
anci vivrieres. A statute of 1724 stipulated, that planters had 
to plant "500 fosses de manioc par domestique". Another statute 
of 1736 stipulated that planters had to grow "25 pieds de banane 
par tete de negre". Numerous statutes with the aim of promoting 
the island's self-sufficiency in food were enacted during the 
eighteenth - century. A decade before Abolition over 13,000 
hectares were devoted to the cultivation of food c r o p s . I n  
1900 the area under food crops was 15,000 hectares.-^ With 
their progressive decline prior to and during the First World
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War, the French Government attempted to encourage their 
revival by extending subsidies to growers. This had little 
effect for the Census of 1935 revealed that the area under 
food crops had further declined to 6,200 hectares. In a 
short monograph Eugene Revert (1946) has shown the way in 
which food crop production increased in Martinique between 
1940 and 1944, consequent upon the exigencies of wartime and 
the imposition of legislation which stipulated that 5 per cent 
of sugar lands should be converted to vegetable production.
With the cessation of hostilities the situation was reversed, 
and Martinique once more became dependent upon imported food 
stuffs.
Quite briefly I have sought to show the way in which 
the Bekes have been partly instrumental in the "sustained 
process of de-stabilization” referred to above. The short 
history of the banana SICAS illustrates a number of structural 
weaknesses in the economy, which mitigates against the main­
tenance of a stable small proprietorship on the one hand, and 
the development of a diversified agriculture on the other. It 
is apparent from Table .XXIV that the Bekes*response to crop diver­
sification is essentially short-term and opportunistic, being 
limited to seeking quick returns in a fluctuating market. In 
dealing below with the commercial sector, it will become 
apparent that the structural weaknesses already referred to 
extend beyond agriculture due to the control which the 
Bekes exert over exports, and the vested interests which they 
have in maintaining the importation of foodstuffs.
Diversification Into Other Sectors of the Economy
In the 1940s Eugene Revert (1949) estimated that the 
Bekes share of the export trade was 85 per cent of the total 
value. At that time this was accounted for primarily by sugar 
and rum. The success attained by the Bekes during the 1960s 
in substituting bananas for sugar as a major export crop* and 
achieving a near monopoly over its cultivation, means that 
their share of the export trade has changed very little over 
the past thirty years. Leiris’s portrayal in 1955 of an 
economy which continued to rigidly define the social structure
of the French Antilles, is still apt in a number of respects 
25 years later.
The Grands Bekes, as represented by families like the 
Hayot, the Despointes, the Aubery and the de Reynal, are very 
much an agri-business bourgeoisie like their counterparts in 
Barbados, the Mannings, the Wilkinsons and the Challenors.
The accession of a small group of Bekes to a directive role in 
the economy in the twentieth century, as a result of fortunes 
accrued in the sugar industry as uainiers, has given them a 
virtual monopoly over the commercial sector as commission agents, 
wholesalers and exporters. Today out of a total of forty 
commission agents and manufacturers1 representatives, only three 
businesses of any substantial size are owned by non-Bekes. Out 
of twenty-five export houses two are metropolitan-owned and 
only one belongs to one of the few prominent mulatto commercial 
families. Importers of agricultural machinery, building 
materials and automobiles are all predominantly Beke, with only 
one notable exception. Commercial activity among non-Bekes is 
principally confined to entertainment, publishing and the book­
store and stationery retail trade. From my data on the dis­
tribution of shareholdings across the commercial sector, it 
would appear that Beke commercial interests are roughly 
equivalent to their share of the export trade (See Appendix XXV 
for a more precise appraisal of Beke commercial interests).
Given the long established monopolization of 
commercial interests, it remains to be seen in what way the 
pattern of Beke investments has changed in recent years. In 
a recent publication^8 issued by the Prefecture to celebrate 
twenty-five years of departmentalization, the Prefect boasted 
that Martinique was now a consumer society. Indicative of 
this fact is the extent to which imports have progressively 
increased in recent years:
TABLE XXV : VALUE OF IMPORTS TO MARTINIQUE (in thousands of
francs)
1971 1972 1975 1974 • 1975 1976
860,881 891,755 1,083,344 1,405,111 1,453,468 1,965,139
(Source: Institut D fEmission des Departements D'Outre-Mer, 
Rapports d^activites, 1971-6).
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Related to this progressive and dramatic increase in imports 
during the 1970s, are the effect of the French Governmentfs 
delayed policy in putting into effect the full measures of 
equality of Martinique with the Metropolis, as laid down by 
the law of Assimilation of 1948. Forms of economic dis­
crimination which persisted for a long time after 1948, such 
as the guaranteeing of minimum salaries and wages and the 
granting of full welfare rights, have only been recently 
removed (c/f Darsieres, 1974: 149-233). The progressive 
increase of public funds from the Metropolis to Martinique 
during the 1970s has shown a movement somewhat parallel to 
that of imports:
TABLE XXVI : TRANSFER OF PUBLIC FUNDS FROM THE METROPOLIS 
(in thousands of francs).
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976
721,300 954,900 1,056,800 1,334,600 1,404,800
(Source: Institut D ’Emission des Departements D ’Outre-Mer.
Rapports d ’activites, 1971-6).
The extent to which the Bekes have responded to this process 
is quite significant. It is reflected in their increased 
interest in the, retail distributive trade sector. Two notable 
examples are afforded by the establishment of Monoprix and 
Prisunic in 1971, with a total initial capital of 6,200,000 
francs. Both are ’giant* supermarkets dealing in foodstuffs, 
dry goods, wines and spirits. Monoprix, of which the Dorn 
family are majority shareholders, forms part of a new commercial 
complex in the cite" of Dillon. Prisunic,^0 with two outlets, 
one in the central shopping area of Fort-de-Franoe and the 
other in Cluny, an upper-middle class residential area 
adjacent to Didier, is a metropolitan-based company. The name 
is held ■under licence in Martinique, Guadeloupe and French 
Guiana by the de Reynal family.
Overall, about 80 per cent of total imports 
originate from metropolitan France, and four companies monop­
olize the bulk of food imports. Local Beke interests are 
closely allied with those of metropolitan export houses in 
Bordeaux and Marseilles, and ties are increasingly being made 
by the Bekes with some of the most important commercial and 
industrial families of France. One of the chief mechanisms
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is through the contraction of marital alliances. During the 
period of my fieldwork the daughter of one Grand Beke had 
recently married the son of one of France's largest food 
importers. Another, the son of a prominent commission agent, 
had married the daughter of a French textile industrialist.
With regard to the role that the Bekes have played 
in the development of a tourist industry in Martinique, it is 
not easy to draw conclusions. So far the Bekes have failed 
to commercialize tourism in Martinique, primarily due to the 
high cost of local labour, building materials and the 
dependence on expensive imported foodstuffs. High costs are 
a major factor which have so far restricted the tourist 
industry to a luxury market, and because of this the 'holiday 
package' for the average tourist is highly uncompetitive com­
pared with that offered by many other Caribbean islands.
During the 1960s the Bekes sunk a total of 30,000,000 francs
41into the tourist industry, and many of the owners of hotels 
and holiday apartments have been consistently recording heavy
losses. At the moment the situation with regard to the Bekes'
42investments in tourism seems uncertain. A number of large 
and medium-sized hotels have closed down several times and 
seem incapable of making a profit.
Investment of Capital Overseas
This is one area in which it is difficult to obtain 
any comprehensive data. Since Martinique is an administrative 
part of France there are few restrictions on capital outflows 
to the Metropolis. The only quantitative data I have been able 
to obtain on the 'flight' of capital are the following statistics, 
based upon banking operations recording the transfer of funds 
from Martinique to the Metropolis. The following private 
transfers were made between 1972 and 1976 (these figures 
represent 'miscellaneous operations' and do not include balance 
of trade factors):
TABLE XXVII : TRANSFER OF PRIVATE FUNDS FROM MARTINIQUE TO 
THE METROPOLIS. (in thousands of francs)
1972 1973 • 1974 1975 1976
708,000 859,000 209,000 1,658,000 1,116,000
(Source: Institut D'Emission des Departments D'Outre-Mer,
Rapports d'activites, 1971-6).
These figures do not tell the whole story, since there are 
also large flows of capital entering Latin America and other 
European countries. In the former case capital is being 
invested in the manufacturing sector, primarily in Venezuela 
and Colombia. In the case of the latter most of the investment 
is being made in property. In Geneva for example, a complete 
residential area now belongs to several Beke families. In 
addition to these investments, reliable contacts in commerce 
and banking have indicated that some seven or eight families 
have large cash deposits banked in other Caribbean islands, such 
as Puerto Rico, Bermuda and the Bahamas. This is an area which 
requires further research, although I doubt whether any res­
earcher could accurately assess the true extent of these out­
flows, especially since one of the commonest methods of 
exporting funds is in the form of banknotes carried as luggage.
6.4. The Response to Economic Crisis : A Comparative Assessment
In analysing the elites' responses to the recent 
crisis in the sugar industry as a set of strategies to maintain 
their economic power, it is evident that both groups adopted 
different solutions. The nature of these solutions were in turn 
governed by a set of constraints, the dimensions of which went 
beyond the purely economic. Any attempt to assess the com­
parative effectiveness of the strategies employed by the two 
groups in the maintenance of their interests, must therefore 
take into account the nature of these constraints.
In addition to the absolute and relative decline of 
the sugar industry in Barbados, the elite now has less assurance 
of receiving an economic price for the greater part of its 
product. Prior to the Lome Convention of 1975, Barbados had a 
negotiated price quota of 133,800 tons of sugar per annum under 
the old Commonwealth Sugar Agreement. The Lome agreement 
reduced the negotiated price quota substantially to 49,300 tons. 
Negotiations between the EEC and African/Caribbean/Pacific 
countries were conducted at a time of escalating world prices, 
for sugar. Based upon the forecast that demand would remain 
tight for some time and that high prices would therefore hold
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during that period, the Sugar Association of the Caribbean, of
which Barbados is a member, decided to maximize earnings by-
selling a greater proportion of sugar on the world market.
Hence much smaller quotas were negotiated by Caribbean states
under the new agreement. In spite of the fact that
Barbados’s sugar production in 1975 was the lowest it had been
since 1948, the gross revenue was almost double that of the
previous year. The gross revenue for the following year was
halved, thus returning to the level recorded in 1974.^ Now
having to sell more than half their sugar on the world market
at prices far below that obtained through the EEC, plus the
intrusion of a new competitor in addition to that of beet -
45high fructose corn syrup - the elite’s continuing dependence 
upon sugar does not appear to be a particularly good strategy 
for economic survival.
According to a very well informed local source, the 
governments of the various member states of the Sugar 
Association played an important role in deciding that more 
sugar should be sold on the world market. In the case of 
Barbados the Sugar Producers’ Association was of the same 
opinion, and it actively sought to take advantage of the in­
flated world prices of 1975. It is apparent that the DLP 
Government also sought to benefit from this strategy when it 
introduced the Sugar Export Levy Act of 1975, which imposed on
every ton of sugar exported from Barbados a levy of an amount
46prescribed by the Minister of Finance. It should be noted 
that the imposition of sugar levies was yet another curb upon 
the way in which the elite disposed of its sugar revenues.
There were already in existence several different types of 
levies imposed by legislation for different purposes. A 
Capital Rehabilitation Fund operated to finance the depreciation 
of capital equipment. The Price Stabilization Fund was 
instituted as a safeguard against the ’bad years’ when returns 
were low. A third levy had been imposed for the purposes of 
funding the Sugar Workers’ Provident Fund. In 1975 out of a 
gross income of 110,700,000 dollars received for sugar,
68,400,000 dollars was directed towards these funds . ^
In judging the effectiveness of the elites in both 
islands to surmount the crisis in the sugar industry, it is
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evident that the Bek.es have been more successful than their 
white Bajan counterparts. Despite the loss of local autonomy 
occasioned by departmentalization in 1948, the Bekes have 
managed to retain powers of decision-making in the field of 
agricultural policy, through their role in the Development 
Plan Commissions. This has been particularly advantageous 
where fore-knowledge of government subsidies was concerned, 
since it has allowed a great deal of flexibility in coping 
with difficult markets for food crops. Their success may be 
contrasted with the failure of the elite in Barbados to achieve 
any degree of real influence in official bodies in a newly 
independent state. When the Barbados Marketing Corporation 
was first founded prominent planters were appointed by the 
Government to positions on its board. However, lacking political 
power they played no effective part in decision-making, since the 
locus of power lay with the politically appointed.
Because Martinique continues to be an administrative 
part of France, the Bekes enjoy a far greater mobility of 
capital than their Barbadian counterparts. The evidence gleaned 
from official statistics and informants indicates a progressive 
outflow of their capital in recent years, which became 
particularly marked after the closure of the sugar factories 
and the subsequent sale of capital equipment. In Barbados 
restrictions on the export of capital have made it difficult 
to invest abroad and diversify out of sugar and a tourist 
industry which now has little potential for further expansion.
The 'new elite' composed of that upwardly mobile group of over­
seers and estate managers are no longer able, like many planters 
before them, to consolidate their interests through returns on 
capital overseas. Prior to independence this was a common 
enough practice among many families as my interviews revealed.
The fortunes of the Pile family, for example, were built upon 
investments made in Canada in the early years of the twentieth 
century.
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ammonia and nitrate of soda in the 1880s. In the late 
1920s Sir John Saint successfully carried out mulch and 
fertilizer trials, in an attempt to find an alternative 
to pen manure which had become scarce. Allied to these 
advances was the important contribution made by the intro­
duction of disease-resistant varieties of cane in the 1920s, 
1930s and 1940s, by such pioneers as Bovell, McIntosh and 
Harrison.
4. Barrow's statement in essence was that he looked forward 
to the day when not a blade of cane would be seen in 
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11. Source: Syndicat General des Planteurs et Manipulateurs de la
canne de la Martinique, Note Suocinte Sur L'Eoonomie 
Sucriere et Rhumiere de la Martinique en I960.
12. Calculated by reference to a wide variety of sources, both 
printed and verbal.
13. With respect to information on estate size and ownership 
prior to the period of my study, I am greatly indebted to the 
local historian Ronnie Hughes, in directing my attention to
contd..
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14. "Uncertain" primarily due to the fact that local demand 
for land at highly inflated prices has become saturated.
15. Source: List of sugar plantations in The West Indies and 
Caribbean Year Book (Barbados Entry), I960.
16. Source: Barbados Sugar Producers’ Association,
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17. Source: Barbados Registry Office, Company files.
18. Source: Acts of Barbados. "Local Food Production (Defence) 
Control Order 19^2, No.2".
19. Source: Ministry of Agriculture, "Vegetable Production in 
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22. The following list of Barbados Shipping and Trading 
companies will indicate the extensive nature of the cor­
poration’s interests in 1977:
General Trading
De Costa and Musson Ltd., Gardiner Austin and Co.Ltd., 
Manning, Wilkinson and Challenor Ltd., De Costa and Musson 
(Dominica) Ltd., Da Costa and Musson (Guyana) Ltd.,
Perkins and Co.Ltd.
Specialists
Louis L. Bayley and Son Ltd., Elite Shirt Co.Ltd., Fort 
Royal Garage Ltd., Seawell Air Services Ltd., Tractors and 
Equipment Ltd., West Indies Records (Barbados) Ltd.,
Cargo Handlers Ltd.
Property Investment
Ince and Co. Ltd., Manco Investments Ltd.
Sugar Industry
Bulkeley Estates Ltd., Applewhaites Ltd.
23'. Source: Barbados Shipping and Trading Co.Ltd.,
Reports and Accounts: 1960-1977.
24. Source: Barbados Advocate. "Sugar Gives^Way to Tourism 
in Barbados", 26/11/69.
25. Background information provided by the president of SICABAM 
(Societe d ’Interet Collectif Agricole Bananiere de la 
Martinique), the association of banana growers in 
Martinique.
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No.9« Disposition a Appliquer en vue D'Eviter la 
Surproduction Banani&re en 1966 et 1967.
27. Source: Interview material.
28. The polarization of land resources between plantation and 
peasant smallholding has not altered greatly over the last 
forty years. According to Revert (1949:- 268) the plant­
ation sector in 1935 (which represented 12.6 per cent of 
the total landowners) monopolized 85.3 per cent of the 
total land resources of the period. Smallholders, rep­
resenting 87.4 per cent of landowners, owned 14.7 per cent 
of the total land resources. Desruisseaux (1975: 37) 
noted that the plantation sector in 1967 (which represented 
10.9 per cent of the total landowners) monopolized 82.1 per 
cent of the total land resources. Smallholders, rep­
resenting 98.1 per cent of landowners, owned 10.9 per cent 
of the total land resources.
29. Source: Direction Departementale de 1 'Agriculture.
Records of agricultural production, 1952-1972.
30. Loans obtained from the Credit Agricole are of nine months 
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31. The following wholesale prices paid for bananas in 1969 
illustrates this point:
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(Source: Bulletin du March£ Europeen des Fruits 
et Ldgumes) ~ ’ ~ “
32. Their influence in banking and finance is steadily being 
eroded,, as their positions on the boards of banks are now 
being taken over by metropolitans.
33. Three organizations sponsored this conference: the Chambre 
Departementale d'Agriculture, the Credit Agricole and the 
Federation des Syndicats d'Exploitants Agricoles.
34. Source: Livre Vert de L 1 Agriculture Martiniquaise. 1977: 24.
35. With respect to food crops a classic distinction in the 
French Antilles is made between cultures maralcheres (root 
crops such as yams and sweet potatoes) and cultures 
vivrieres (European type vegetables such as tomatoes, 
aubergines and sweet peppers).
36. Source: Archives D'Outre-Mer, Bulletins de Cultures, 1831- 
1850. Martinique, Carton 231.
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37. Source: Archives D'Outre-Mer,Bulletin de Cultures, 
1894-1900. Martinique, Carton' 34".
38. Source: Prefecture de la Martiniquea Martinique: 25 annees de 
departementalisation (1946-1973).
39. The Law of Assimilation (Loi No.46/451) was actually- 
promulgated on March 19th 1946, and the former colonies 
of Martinique, Guadeloupe, French Guiana and Reunion were 
accorded the new status of 'departements1. It was not 
until the 1st January 1948 that all laws and decrees 
operative in metropolitan France were applied to these 
departements.
40. The historical background of this company is interesting 
from a comparative point of view. It grew out of a very 
old French West Indian merchant house, Etablissements 
Reynoird, and like Maxwell and Lascelles in Barbados, 
became established in Martinique during the eighteenth 
century. It ceased trading in the colony at the end of 
the nineteenth century and became metropolitan based once 
more. Its reappearance as Prisunic is somewhat akin to 
the re-establishment of Maxwells in the early years of the 
twentieth century, as Wilkinson and Gaviller. This example 
suggests that the distinction between a metropolitan mer­
chant class and a local one is not always clear cut, and 
that there has always existed a complex web of inter­
related interests.
41. Source: Chambre de Commerce, Dossiers on Corporations in
Martinique. " ’ ~ ^ ^  “ ~  ^
42. It must be noted that the Bekes gain substantially from one 
particular type of tourist, the cruise ship passenger. On 
average one cruise ship per day arrives in the bay of 
Fort-de-France, and these visitors patronize the duty free 
shops owned by the Bekes which are strategically situated 
near the seafront.
43. The distribution of quotas among member states was broken 
down in the following way (for comparison figures are also 
given for the former CSA negotiated quotas):
Lome Negotiated CSA Negotiated
Price Quotas (long tons) Price Quotas' (long
tons)
Antigue (export production ceased) 10,000
Barbados 49,300 133,800
Guyana 157,700 189,500
Jamaica 118,300 223,300
St.Kitts 14,800 33,800
Trinidad 69,000 134,600
Total SAC
Quotas 409,100 725,000
(Source: Sugar Association of the Caribbean, Chairman's
Annual Report for 1975.presented at the 35th 
Ordinary General Meeting on 1/12/75).
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44. The gross revenues from sugar for these years were as 
follows:
45. The manufacture of an additional half a million tons is
planned over the next five years, from new plants in
Belgium, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, West Germany 
and the Republic of Ireland
46. By an Order published in the Official Gazette on November 
13th 1975, the rates of the levy were fixed as follows:
"10 per cent of every dollar or part thereof of the price 
where the price is 720 dollars per ton or over but does 
not exceed 960 dollars. 30 per cent of every dollar or
part thereof of the price where the price exceeds 960 
dollars per ton but does not exceed 1,680 dollars per 
ton, and 50 per cent of every dollar or part thereof 
where the price exceeds 1,680 dollars per ton".
47. The allocation of this sum in 1975 was as follows:
Sugar Export Levy - 28.4 (million dollars)
Capital Rehabilitation
1974 : 64.2 million Barbadian dollars.
1975 : 114.91976 : 61.0
(Source: Central Bank of Barbados, Annual Reports for
1975 and 1976)
Reserve Fund 
Price Stabilization
12.0
Reserve Fund 
Sugar Workers Provident
2.6
Fund
Total
25.4
68.4
(Source: Barbados Sugar Producers1 Association, 
Annual Report. 1975).
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CHAPTER 7: THE MAINTENANCE OF SOCIAL CONTROL
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7.2 An Analytical Framework for Understanding 
Power Relations Within the Plantation
7.3 The Survival of the Plantation as a 
'Total Institution’ after Emancipation
7.4 The Transition from 'Total' to 'Greedy 
Institution1
7.5 Observing the 'Deferential Dialectic'
7.6. Elements of Change: The Erosion of
Traditional Authority 
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7.1. -Introduction
In the next two chapters which deal with the social 
power of the elites I have sought to examine the problem at 
both the micro and the macro level. At the macro level the 
unit of analysis is the total society, and particular 
attention is paid in Chapter 8 to situating the elites in 
local systems of social stratification, the mechanisms of 
social reproduction and status boundary maintenance, and the 
role of ideology in maintaining social cohesion. At the micro 
level the unit of analysis is the plantation itself, and the 
focus here is upon the role of ’traditional authority’ as a 
strategy of power maintenance within this setting.'
The economic organization of West Indian plantation 
societies has had important repercussions upon social organ­
ization, making the problems of social control in an insular 
context relatively simple. However, the facility with which 
the plantocracy was able to maintain social control during 
and after slavery, devolved not merely upon geographical size, 
but upon the boundedness and relative isolation of the 
individual units comprising each plantation system. Socio­
logically speaking, plantation society in the recent past, and 
even today in a much attenuated form, had the appearance of 
being composed of a linear series of self-contained, segregated 
communities, each marked by a hierarchical authority structure 
and a highly inegalitarian distribution of rewards between 
white planter and black labour. It is to these features of 
plantation society that I wish to address myself, and to 
attempt to explain why a certain continuity of form in the 
plantation system has persisted from the post-Emancipation 
period well into the twentieth century.
7.2. An Analytical 'Framework for Understanding Power Relations 
Within the Plantation
The encompassing nature of the plantation as a 
social entity is highly suggestive of Erving Goffman’s model 
of a ’total institution’, the total character of which
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"...is symbolized by the barrier to social intercourse 
with the outside and to departure that is often built 
right into the physical plant, such as locked doors, 
high walls, barbed wire, cliffs, water, forests or 
moors..." (Goffman, 19 6l: 4).
A central feature of total institutions is the way in which 
they break down the barriers between 'sleep*, 'play', and 
'work', activities which are normally - situated - in different 
locations and subject to different authorities. Thus an 
institution has a total or encompassing character when
"...all aspects of life are conducted in the same 
place and under the same single authority".
when
"...each phase of the member's daily activity is 
carried on in the immediate company of a large 
batch of others..."
when
"...all phases of the day's activities are tightly 
scheduled..."
and finally, when
"...the various enforced activities are brought 
together into a single rational plan purportedly 
designed to fulfil the official aims of the 
institution". (Goffman, 1961 : 5/6).
Goffman breaks down this model by classifying total instit­
utions into five groups as follows: (Goffman, 1961 : 12).
establishments (l) for the incapable and harmless, such as
old people's homes and homes for the 
disabled;
(2) for the incapable who pose an unintended 
threat, such as psychiatric hospitals,
T.B. sanitaria and leprosaria;
(3) for the avowed protection of the community 
whose inmates are regarded as posing an 
intended threat, such as prisons, P.O.W. 
camps and concentration camps;
(4) for a retreat from the world, such as 
monastries and convents; and
(5) for the attainment of instrumental ends, 
such as army barracks, ships, work camps, 
kibbutzim, boarding schools and colonial 
compounds.
In the first three types of total institution inmates are 
removed from the world, because with varying degrees of 
culpability they are defined as deviant. In the case of 
the fourth type inmates have voluntarily removed themselves 
from the world in order to retreat from society. Thus the 
structure of the institution in these cases is deliberately 
organized to regulate the inmate's interaction with the out­
side world. The fifth type seems to be based upon a 
different criterion, since the primary goal is a utilitarian 
one and the physical totality is not a means or an end towards 
achieving its goal. The total nature of their environment is 
contingent rather than necessary to their main utilitarian 
goal, whereas in the others totality is a means and an end 
which is specifically sought.
It is difficult to locate the plantation and to 
achieve a perfect fit within one of these five categories 
alone. However, Goffman admits that his classification is 
"not neat, exhaustive, nor of immediate analytical use".
They should therefore be regarded as a series of ideal types 
from which it is possible to abstract a number of features 
which adequately captures the structural totality of the 
plantation. In attempting to formalize Goffman*s schema, it 
is possible to condense his five classes of total Instit­
utions into three main categories: negative-custodial (group 3 
and definitely the more custodial types of institutions in 
groups 1 and 2), positive-custodial (group 4) and utili­
tarian (group 5). It would appear that the plantation during 
slavery, and in the years following Abolition, exhibited both 
utilitarian and negative-custodial features. As an economic 
organization it was primarily geared to the attainment of 
purely instrumental ends, i.e. the production of colonial 
produce in which the profit motive was paramount. As a 
social organization, however, the use of unfree labour made 
a high degree of institutional control necessary, thus 
imposing upon its slave-inmates a structured totality.
Given that the slave population in mature plantation society 
outnumbered the Europeans' 9:1, it may be wondered by what 
means the plantation was able to impose a structured totality 
upon a vastly numerically superior body of slaves. Goffman's
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use of the custodial type of mental hospital as a paradigm 
of a total institution, in which he illustrates how the 
structure of the self can be undermined and invalidated by 
a process of desocialization or ’disculturation1, uncovers 
a number of processes which can be equally applied to the 
plantation during slavery:
"The recruit comes into the establishment with a 
conception of himself made possible by certain
stable social arrangements in his home world.
Upon entrance, he is immediately stripped of the 
support provided by these arrangements...(then) he 
begins a series of abasements, degradations, 
humiliations, and profanations of self".
(Goffman, 19ol : 22).
Following this process of ’mortification’ in which an attempt 
is made to effect a clean break with the past, a new identity
can be imposed by a superordinate authority. In the Americas
the process of ’mortification’ described by Goffman found its 
equivalent in the ’seasoning’ process of African slaves.
After the traumatic experience of the Middle Passage which 
effected a radical break with all former tribal, communal 
and familial ties, the new slave now stripped of his former 
identity was re-socialized into a different set of social 
arrangements on the plantation:
"Finally came the long period of seasoning. The 
slave was taken to the estate, branded with a 
silver brand heated in spirits, and given a 
name...On most estates the official period of 
seasoning was three years but in actual practice 
the period was usually restricted to a year". 
(Patterson, 1967: 152).
During the period of seasoning a slave was under the close 
supervision of an already seasoned slave or his master, and having 
served this ’apprenticeship’ he was ready to adopt a new 
role in the social hierarchy of the plantation. Although 
differing in legal status, the indentured labourer of the 
post-Emancipation period experienced a similar process:
"...indentured immigrants went through an induction 
centre and a sea voyage during the course of which 
he was stripped of his old caste and village 
identity, docketed and numbered, given standard 
issue clothes, and in effect reborn into a new 
social system..." (Smith, 1967: 230/1).
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A further analogy can be drawn between Goffman's
model of a total institution and the plantation as a social
organization, which devolves upon the psychological effects
of the seasoning process. A number of writers on slavery
have pointed to its effects upon the individual personality
of the slave, which produced a subservient 'Quashee* or
1'Sambo* character. In a number of ways points of com­
parison can be made with the infantile contraction complexes 
developed by the inmates of Goffman's asylum. Further com­
parative material has been made available by Bettelheim (i960) 
on the effects of this debasement upon the personality of 
concentration camp inmates. There are, however, limitations 
to which these comparisons can be made, since the high 
incidence of uprisings and rebellions during slavery throws 
some doubt upon the effectiveness of the plantation in 
achieving a perfect structural totality.
In some respects Goffman's model does not provide 
a completely satisfactory framework for understanding the 
true nature of power relations in the plantation today. The 
model he presents does not provide us with a systematic 
sociological framework capable of encompassing all types of 
total institution along a negative-custodial/utilitarian/ 
positive-custodial continuum. The paradigm he employs tends 
to emphasize the physical mechanisms of control which 
separate an inmate from the outside world. I would argue 
that there has been a marked transformation in the plant­
ation system, from being a Goffmanesque type of total 
institution during slavery and in the post-Emancipation 
period, to becoming in the twentieth century what Coser (1974) 
has termed a 'greedy institution', relying primarily on 
voluntary compliance to gain commitment, and dependent for 
its survival upon the erection of symbolic boundaries rather 
than physical ones. Although one can easily point to the 
existence of symbolic boundaries in Goffman's asylum, such 
as the status distance between inmates and staff, the over­
whelming impression is one of the organization's physical 
arrangements.
According to Georg Simmel (1955) the number of
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commitments exerted upon the individual to form group 
affiliations was small in the ancient world and in primitive 
or 'simple' societies. These were primarily limited in 
scope to totemic associations, age sets and kinship and 
tribal loyalties. In more highly differentiated 'modern' 
societies, with the breakdown of tightly-knit primary 
groups, the individual has become "enmeshed in a web of 
group affiliations", having become subject to a wide variety 
of claims by competing groups. This competition for commit­
ment and loyalty by a multiplicity of groups is seen by 
Coser as being problematic in modern society, because commit­
ment is a scarce resource:
"As a consequence, various groups having a claim on 
individuals' energies and time compete with one 
another in the effort to draw as much as they can 
...from the available pool of resources. The 
struggle over their allocation is as much a root 
fact of social life as is the competition among 
users of scarce resources in economic affairs".
(Coser, 1974: 1).
In competition with other groups in society, the real source 
of power of greedy institutions lies in the way in which they
"...seek exclusive and undivided loyalty and... 
attempt to reduce the claims of competing roles 
and status positions on those they wish to 
encompass..." (Coser, 1974: 4).
In present-day capitalist society (Coser employs the 
designation 'non-totalitarian' societies), Coser examines 
a number of examples which make totalistic claims on the 
individual in the struggle for scarce social resources.
These examples include situations of domestic service (encom­
passing the housewife role as well as that of the paid 
domestic servant) and a number of collectivist organizations: 
religious sects, utopian communities, the Jesuits, the 
Bolshevik Party and the Catholic Church, specifically with 
respect to the role of the priesthood.
A serious problme inherent in Coser's model when 
applied to the case of the plantation, is that most of the 
examples he selects involve positive commitment and an 
element of freedom of choice among participants. On the 
other hand the social dimensions of plantation society have
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a recent history in which both these aspects have been 
singularly absent, and in which black labour and white 
capital have existed side-by-side in an uneasy state of 
mutual dependency, governed by a set of economic relation­
ships which are undeniably assymetrical. Bearing this in 
mind it needs to be shown in what way and to what extent 
the plantation after Emancipation and into the twentieth 
century retained the characteristics of a total institution, 
before considering the more recent transition to that of 
greedy institution.
7.3. The Survival of the Plantation as a Total Institution 
after Emancipation
In attempting to plot the qualitative changes 
which came about in the plantation system after Emancipation 
it is a reasonable hypothesis that the plantation lost its 
negative-custodial character, surviving primarily as a 
utilitarian organization concerned with the attainment of 
instrumental ends. This presupposes that the degree of 
totality exerted by the plantation over the ex-slaves was 
greatly diminished, since the physical mechanisms of con­
trol were no longer necessary to the plantation’s con­
tinuing existence. The evidence indicates that this was 
not so, particularly in the case of Barbados, since in spite 
of their new legal status the structural situation of the 
majority' of ex-slaves remained unchanged for another 100 
years. I will now examine the way in which the plantation 
maintained a structural totality after Abolition, con­
tinuing to depend for its survival upon physical mechanisms 
of control. This will be done with reference to two factors 
the role of located labour systems and the enactment of law 
and order legislation.
In Barbados at the end of the Apprenticeship 
period in 1838, planters were faced with the problem of an 
unstable labour market, as some labourers moved from estate 
to estate seeking higher wages and better conditions, and 
others emigrated to Trinidad and British Guiana. The 
passing of the Masters and Servants Act in 1840 put an end
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to this free mobility of labour, and henceforth under a 
located labour system labourers remained tied to the 
plantations they had worked during slavery and under 
apprenticeship. In return for the houses and allotments 
they continued to occupy, they were required by law to 
provide the plantation with five days' work per week. The 
success of this system which lasted for nearly 100 years 
was due to a closed land resource situation, coupled with 
the fact that there were no Crown lands available for settle­
ment. For the vast majority of the black population there 
was therefore little or no alternative to plantation labour, 
and this is indicated by an extremely slow growth of an 
independent peasantry in the post-Emancipation period. 
According to one source (Schomburgk, 1848: 153) there were 
only 934 small landowners possessing small plots of less 
than ten acres in 1840. Another source (Davy, 1854: 109) 
reports a higher figure of 1,367 for the same date. It is 
most likely that the majority of these holdings were owned 
by 'redlegs* and free coloureds whose titles ante-dated 
Abolition. By 1875 the number of small landowners had 
increased to 2,278, which accounted for 5,457 acres out of pa total of 101,290 acres utilized for agricultural, purposes. 
During the same period as Woodville Marshall has recently 
documented (1977), several 'free villages' were established 
in the Parish of St. Thomas, a factor which has not hitherto 
been taken into account in studies of the development of the3Barbadian peasantry. Consequent upon this scarcity of land 
and located labour legislation, the planter elite was not 
faced with a labour shortage after 1840, and was therefore 
able to carry on sugar cultivation profitably without 
recourse to indentured labour. In the mid-nineteenth 
century Barbados was therefore in the advantageous position 
of not being dependent upon East Indian migrant labour, which 
according to one estimate cost the sugar colonies £20,000,000 
(Deerr, 1950: II, 394).
The extent to which the planter class monopolized 
land resources was inextricably tied up with the extent to 
which it also monopolized the labour market, since an 
independent peasantry could develop only to the extent that
218
the plantation relaxed its control over the land available. 
This was evident as the following statement made by the 
Police Magistrate of St. Michael in 1842 revealed:
"Little progress has been made by the labourers in 
establishing themselves as freeholders, not from 
any disinclination on their part to become so, but, 
circumstanced as our island is, there is little 
probability of any great number being able to 
obtain freeholds. The reason is obvious; there 
is not in the whole island a spot of waste land 
fit for cultivation; and as the land is principally 
divided up into plantations, the proprietors are 
not likely to sell off small plots for that purpose; 
and there being no public lands available; it is 
plain that freeholds to any extent cannot be 
established in this country".^
Consequent upon the scarcity of land and the enactment of 
legislation to tie the labourer to the plantation, unlike 
a number of other British West Indian territories what 
emerged for the most part at this period was an agro- 
proletarist, working as wage labourers and living on plots 
of land governed by what was essentially leasehold tenure. 
This was the 'tenantry system' which both Davy (1854) and 
Sewell (1861) characterized as a labour system rather than 
a land settlement scheme.
Woodville Marshall's own description of the 
tenantry system (1975: 86) portrays it as one under which
"...the ex-slaves were permitted to occupy a house 
on the estate and a small plot of land for regular, 
exclusive labour at stipulated wages on the 
particular estate to which they had been attached 
as slaves and apprentices".
The r.aison d'etre of the system in accordance with the labour 
requirements of the plantation, ensured the location of ex­
slaves upon the plantations of their former masters in a 
state of continuing servitude:
"During the first years of the system, the new 
tenants were not charged a money rent; rather they 
were charged a labour rent, and were forced to 
accept a wage rate which was about 25 per cent below 
the rate offered to non-located labourers. Later... 
a stipulated money rent was charged for the occupancy 
of the house and allotment; but the requirements on 
the tenants to perform regular estate labour was 
retained". (My emphasis).
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According to the evidence presented to the Select Committee 
on West India Colonies in 1842, the penalties for not con­
forming to the ’articles1 of this quasi-contract were severe. 
Absenteeism was-fined at-the rate of 5d to lOd per working 
day. The insecurity of the labourers'tenure is highlighted 
by the fact that habitual absentees were evicted at a month’s 
notice®
In the French Antilles the planter class after 1848 
inaugurated its own version of the tenantry system, which 
like Barbados was essentially a labour system rather than a 
land settlement scheme. Under the system of colonage 
partiaire former slaves continued to live on the plantation 
after Abolition, operating as sharecroppers in addition to 
providing located labour. They were allowed to keep their 
case (hut) and .iardin (vegetable patch), and were given a • 
parcel of land of one to two hectares on which to grow cane 
en metayage. Under this sharecropping system the colon 
partiaire was obliged to deliver his cane to his former 
master’s mill, and he received from one-third to one-half 
of the value of his produce. He did not receive a share in 
the revenues obtained from rum and molasses. Other sources 
of livelihood enjoyed by the colon partiaire included free 
pasturing and the production of food crops for domestic con­
sumption, and in return he was obliged to provide the 
plantation with full-time labour.^ However, by virtue of 
the fact that sugar never monopolized more than one-third of 
Martinique’s total land surface, physical escape from the 
plantation was possible, and because of this the growth of 
an independent peasantry in the nineteenth century was more 
rapid than in Barbados.
With the introduction of indentured East Indian and 
African labour in 1854, many creoles abandoned estates as 
colon partiaires to take up subsistence farming and cash 
cropping on appropriated, marginal land. Many of these 
appropriations were illegal, their owners having no title 
or rights in law. By the late 1850s the black agro-proletarist 
was faced .with two options: either to remain as colon
partiaires tied to the plantation, or to seek independence 
in a geographical zone known as pays vivrier. -However,
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unlike Guadeloupe where the process of establishing small 
proprietorship was virtually completed by 1880, it was not 
until the twentieth century that it gained any impetus.
With respect to land resource utilization, one 
major difference between Barbados and Martinique was that 
the latter had a tradition of cultures secondaires. whereas 
the former was almost exclusively devoted to growing cane. 
The following breakdown of agricultural land use in 1835 is 
interesting, since it reveals that 45 per cent of the total 
cultivated area was devoted to these cultures secondaires:
TABLE XXVIII : AGRICULTURAL LAND USE IN MARTINIQUE IN 1835.
17,141 hectares
Food crops 15,389
Coffee 3,082
Cocoa 492
Cotton 178
Cane 21,2:79
Total 38,320
.(Source: Archives d'Outre-Mer, Correspondence Generate
(Martinique). Carton 231. Bulletin de Cultures. 
1831-1850 )
In highlighting the relative importance of this small-holding 
sector, it is noteworthy to point out that whereas less than 
one-twentieth of the land in Barbados was owned by small­
holders in 1847, over one-fifth of the area of Martinique
was devoted to smallholdings before Abolition. Data on land
7utilization for 1870' suggests a pattern that had not changed 
on its essentials since 1835. The evidence also suggests 
that the structure of land-ownership had not altered radically 
in the intervening years, since it would appear that these 
smallholdings were still in the hands of those poor whites 
and free men of colour who had owned land before 1848. No 
data is available on the total area of pays vivriers 
appropriated by ex-slaves. Unlike the Barbadian case, there­
fore, it is difficult to say to what extent former colons 
partiaires were able to escape the regime of the plantation 
during these years..
22.1
In both these islands after Abolition the labour 
systems which were introduced to maintain a black labour 
force in situ, were complemented by repressive legal measures 
to maintain the status quo. To execute these laws the island 
assemblies transferred the traditional police functions of 
the plantation to the state, which undertook the formation of 
regular police forces and the establishment of -local magis­
tracies. With the loosening of social controls exerted by 
the plantation system, the chief concern of the authorities 
was to maintain order and social stability, which meant the 
uninterrupted production of colonial commodities by a 
willing and co-operative labour force. ' To this end a whole 
series of laws were passed pertaining to vagrancy, tresspass, 
riotous assemblage, itinerant trading, emigration and theglocation of labour.
Under the vagrancy laws in Barbados the definition 
of 'idleness' was very broad. Included were persons "not 
having any means of subsistence", unlicenced itinerant 
traders and persons who "refused to support their 
families". Legislation relating to bastardy and the settle­
ment of the poor was an active discouragement to internal 
migration, and gave further substance to the Masters and 
Servants Act, since poor relief was refused to those out­
side the boundaries of the parish in which they were born. 
Infringement of these laws in both islands invariably 
invoked harsh measures, such as forced labour:
"In the colonies where slavery is abolished...begging 
and vagrancy are punished by law as follows:
All beggars...or vagrants, will be handed over to 
the authorities for a fixed time from between three
to six months...During that time they will be em­
ployed on behalf of the state in public works, in 
chain gangs...
In Martinique the imposition of a pass book system upon all
day-labourers controlled the free movement of plantation
workers. One of the articles of the decree which instituted 
it stipulated that
"No day-labourer can move from commune to commune 
_without obtaining a visa from the superintendent 
of police or the commanding officer of the 
military..."10
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The payment of a fee to obtain a pass book constituted a 
form of taxation, and this had to be paid annually and a 
visa obtained to prove payment. Failure to comply with these 
regulations was penalized by a fine of twenty francs, and 
defaulters could also be dealt with under the legislation 
relating to vagrancy, which usually resulted in forced 
labour.
A good objective measure which demonstrates the
extent to which the planter class sought to maintain its
former authority, is reflected in the discriminatory use of
public expenditure. In Barbados between 1838 and 1849, 50
per cent of the total budget was spent on the maintenance
of law and order, compared with only 3.5 per cent on social
services, education and health, and 12 per cent on public 
11works. In Martinique roughly one-half of the colony’s 
budget during the 1850s was similarly allocated to law and 
order.12
From the foregoing, it can be seen that the cen­
tral mechanisms for maintaining a structural totality over 
the lives of the newly emancipated slaves were similar in 
both islands. Both law and order legislation and systems 
of located labour complemented one another, since they formed 
the underpinnings of an economic system in post-Emancipation 
society which could only survive if the elite had continued 
access to large quantities of cheap, malleable labour. The 
retention of certain negative-custodial features within the 
’reformed’ plantation system, indicates that the structural 
totality imposed by the plantation over black labour was 
merely a difference of degree and not of kind. The way in 
which the elite transferred the traditional functions of 
social control to the colonial state,, also indicates a very 
important strategy of power maintenance at this period which 
was vital to the survival of the plantation as a total 
institution.
7.4. The Transition from ’Total’ to ’Greedy Institution’ .
Whilst retaining certain features characteristic 
of a total institution, I would argue that the surviving
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vestiges of a social system which had existed under slvaery, 
gave the planter elite a basis upon which to transform the 
plantation into a greedy institution. That the planter 
elite should see fit to attempt this kind of institutional 
change, is based upon the premiss that social control is 
more effectively realized if an appeal can be made to commit­
ment and loyalty when the degree of physical constraint in a 
power situation is lessened. In the cases of Barbados and 
Martinique a number of conditions made this transformation 
particularly effective. The survival of an indigenous 
plantocracy and the retention of an organizational structure 
based upon individual ownership, provided the conditions 
under which a paternalistic rule could be substituted for an 
authoritarian one. Added to this, the maintenance of the 
plantation's structural totality which enforced an extreme 
form of localism, meant that the plantocracy could impose 
an ideological hegemony over its labour force which was 
supreme. The development and growth of monopoly capitalism 
in Barbados and Martinique, which resulted in a rational­
ization of the means of production on the plantation, did not 
change the form of social relationships, since individual 
plantations continued to be managed as separate units deriving 
their labour supply from located sources.
Given these conditions under which it may be said 
institutional change was effected, it remains to be seen 
within what parameters paternalism actually operated. The 
concept of 'deference' in the sociology of power has been 
a preoccupation of sociologists and political scientists 
alike ever since the earliest formulations of Marx, Weber 
and Durkheim. In spite of their differences of approach it 
can be said that their main concern was with the legitimacy 
of social hierarchy, and in particular the traditionalism 
of this legitimacy and the strategies by which traditional 
elites legitimate their power. According to the Weberian 
typology the outstanding feature of 'traditional authority* 
is its stability, hierarchical relationships legitimated by 
tradition being upheld by the sanctity of the moral order 
and the attendant powers of control as they have been 
handed down from the past. Domination of this kind which
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rests upon a "piety for what actually, allegedly, or
presumably has always existed" (Gerth and Mills: 1970,
296), is expressed through the ideology and practice of
'paternalism', a term which encompasses the several types
of traditional authority noted by Weber: 'patriarchalism*,
13'patrimonialism', and 'gerontocracy*. By those who 
operate it paternalism is defined in a number of ways: quite 
simplistically as 'kindness' or 'benevolence1', or with over­
tones of greater complexity - as an attitude of 'provident 
fostering care'. As a form of domination it can be regarded 
as a means by which superordinate groups transform 
coercive power relations into normative ones, in such a way 
that the fact of domination is translated into a right.
For the rule of paternalism to be effective there is a 
sense in which it should be only partly authoritative, 
reciprocity being the key to its success, with "affectionate 
tutelage on the one side" and "respectful and grateful 
deference on the other" (Mill, 1848: 319). Its effectiveness 
increases if an elite can make it appear to be a form of 
simple exchange relationship, in which the extraction of 
services by a superordinate group on the one.hand is com­
plemented by the fulfilment of a subordinate group's material
needs on the other.- However, since this exchange is in fact 
14unequal, equilibrium has to be maintained by something 
external to the relationship: the imposition of an
ideological hegemony which suffuses every aspect of a sub­
ordinate 's daily life. It is in the process of. social inter­
action that this occurs, and in borrowing the term 
'deferential dialectic' coined by Newby (1975) for this kind 
of interaction, I will be offering a number of examples 
below in Section 5.
The fact that ownership remained local in Bar­
bados and Martinique in the second half of the nineteenth 
century, unlike the situation elsewhere in the British and 
French Caribbean, meant that plantations as a type remained 
family plantations. This was a factor of momentous 
importance for the development of social relations of a 
highly personalized nature, since the organizational 
structure of the family plantation is a relatively simple
one. Owner contact with the workforce is more or less 
direct, production decisions are taken by the owner himself, 
and the execution of his orders are personally supervised 
by him with the assistance of overseers. The degree of con­
tact and control engendered by this kind of organizational 
structure makes for pervasive, highly personalized relations, 
in which the owner is in a position to arbitrate on all 
matters affecting his workers’ lives, which goes beyond the 
purely utilitarian concerns of plantation production.
Planters themselves stress this vital aspect of their trad­
itional role, of which a good illustration is quoted on 
p .227. In some cases managers and estate attorneys act 
as intermediaries and the line of direct contact is broken. 
However, this does not necessarily imply a diminuation of 
personal owner/worker contact, since as I had the chance of 
observing in the field, many planters on non-owner managed 
estates spent an inordinate amount of time driving round 
their estates, inspecting work in progress, talking to 
overseers and workers and participating in supervision. On 
some of the larger, more prosperous banana and sugar estates 
where a managerial structure had developed, an interesting 
observation was made by a number of planters to the effect 
that the hiring of staff to deal with the "day to day 
running of the estate”, gave them more time to deal with 
’’the financial end of-things”, and to deal with "personnel 
relations” more effectively*-• By combining these two roles 
this group of planters felt that the latter complemented 
the former, since a greater specialization of the pater­
nalist role helped to mitigate against the impersonal 
effects of a stricter, more business-like management.
The kinds of corporate structures which have 
developed in the twentieth century must be sharply distin­
guished from those described by Beckford (1972: 252-286) as 
'company plantations * in his four-fold typology of Third 
World plantations. With the exception of the holdings 
owned by the state in Barbados, and the limited role played 
by metropolitan capital in Martinique, the shares of these 
companies are limited to local white families or groups of 
families allied by marriage. By international standards
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the scale of these enterprises is quite small, compared with 
some of the plantation holdings held by Booker McConnel and 
Tate and Lyle in other parts of the Caribbean, which in some 
cases run to 8-10,000 acres. Further afield in the Asian 
tea and rubber industries corporate plantation enterprises 
operate on even a vaster scale, with plantations running 
into hundreds of thousands of acres. Plantation companies 
in Barbados and Martinique are for the most part private as 
opposed to public, and from a social and cultural per­
spective their authority structure and style of operation 
differs in few respects from that of the simple family type 
of plantation. In a number of cases in Barbados there are 
company holdings which operate exactly like family units, 
since they are no more than incorporated partnerships bet­
ween husbands and wives. It may be argued that social 
relations tend towards impersonality on public corporate 
holdings in Barbados, and on those administered by Bekes 
Moyens for Grands Bekes or metropolitan interests in 
Martinique, due to the absence of any clearly marked owner­
ship vested in one person or family. In testing this 
hypothesis the results proved negative, since their authority 
structures were no less personal than those of private under­
takings. In Weberian terms patrimonial rule in these cases 
was substituted for patriarchal rule, since salaried managers 
and administrators took over not only an executive function, 
but also assumed the mantle of traditional authority. It 
should be noted that patrimonial rule has an established 
precedent in the case of Barbados through the attorneys who 
ran the estates of absentees. In Martinique patrimonial 
rule was established with the development of usines centrales 
in the 1860s, as salaried Bekes Moyens took over the manage­
ment of plantations and factories.
On those questions relating to the- maintenance of 
traditional authority within the setting of the plantation 
(See Appendix I Questions 22 and 23), planters, in both islands 
made a clear distinction between human relations which they 
considered to have remained basically unchanged, and the day to 
day running of the estate which had changed quite significantly.
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The most succint illustration of this common view was given 
by one Barbadian planter in the following way:
"As far as the day to day relations are concerned 
theylre much the same, because we're working 
with_relatively small numbers of people fifty- 
two weeks of the year and its inevitable that 
you get to know each other rather well. One 
knows the details of more or less everybody; 
and its reasonable if your employees have a 
problem they feel you could help them with they 
come to you with it. As far as the day to day 
running of the estate is concerned...its very 
much different".
In Martinique the interviews carried out among planters who 
had made the switch from sugar to banana cultivation, also 
indicated that plantation owners didn't feel that human 
relations between employer and employee had greatly changed. 
To quote one instance, one planter noted that the hierarchy 
today on his banana plantation was very similar to what it 
had been some fifteen years earlier when he had cultivated 
sugar, which comprised as it had done in the past of two 
managers, five overseers and a permanent work force of 
eighty men and women. Through this chain of command he 
argued, he was still able to maintain good working relations 
with everybody. He even went so far as to state that in some 
respects the problems of direction and control were easier, 
since the total work force was split up into six or seven 
teams working separately. Moreover, and this was a point 
substantiated by a number of other banana growers, since the 
very nature of the crop's cultivation requires a steady per­
manent work force all the year round, and no large 
additional seasonal labour inputs as in the case of sugar, 
there is a greater continuity of personnel which simplifies 
the maintenance of good work relations.
However, for that sector of the labour force in 
Barbados which continues to be tied to the sugar plantation, 
what are the factors involved in the maintenance of 
traditional authority, or what the planters themselves 
define as "good human relations"? For a start it is evident 
that the work situation of those employed in the sugar 
industry has changed very little, which points to a degree
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of continuity of form in the island’s plantation system.
This is particularly striking when certain aspects of this 
continuity, such as the organization and nature of the work 
performed, are compared with a number of changes which have 
taken place in the twentieth century, with respect to owner­
ship, scale of enterprise and technology, as well as changes 
in the institutional arrangements binding labour to the 
plantation and the political ties linking the former colony 
with Britain. Sidney Mintz (1974: 52.) has highlighted a 
number of features of present-day plantation organization 
and life which have changed very little, and which are still 
characteristic of the Barbadian sugar plantation:
’’Close ties still exist between field and factory, 
as in the case of sugarcane, which must be cut when 
ripe and ground as soon as it is cut. The regimen 
of daily plantation labour still requires some over­
arching authority to make all production decisions 
...there are still sharp social distinctions between 
those who labour in the sun and those who direct 
their labour, distinctions expressed in such matters 
as income, prestige and living standards. There is 
still the factory-like organization of agricultural 
labour into large-scale, highly co-ordinated enter­
prises. Moreover, in most cases there is still the 
rather rigid social order of the plantation hierarchy, 
and the sharply limited opportunities it offers those 
at the bottom to change their relative position in the 
social system”..
Mintz*s description of a sugar plantation indicates that the 
persistence of a number of structural features, which 
devolve upon the exigencies of production and ownership, con' 
tinues to enforce a high degree of totality and pervasive­
ness over the lives of plantation labour, conditions which 
are conducive to the maintenance of traditional authority.
One aspect of this continuity of form in the 
Barbadian plantation system has been the survival of the 
’task system’, which I would argue has played a central role 
in the maintenance of forms of social and economic 
dependency on the part of black labour. This in turn ’has 
the great virtue to the plantations of permitting a flexible 
labour supply which can be dispensed with at times of 
economic downturn without cost” (Cross, 1980: 4), which has 
always meant that in Barbados where little or no alternative
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means of livelihood existed outside the plantation, labour 
has been perenially dependent upon the 'benevolence' of 
the planter in times of economic hardship. However; owing 
to the seasonal variations in labour requirements on the 
sugar plantation, this dependence upon the web of pater­
nalism for survival has been a constant in both the 'good 
years' and the 'bad*.
A study of the accounts' and records' books of a number of
1 5plantations for the 1880s and 1930s in both islands 
indicates that the practice of payment by piecework was 
prevalent at these periods. Agricultural labourers were 
paid by the task and some twenty to twenty-five different 
operations were performed in this fashion, each having its 
own rate of pay. Examples of these operations included 
such tasks as digging cane holes, ditching, drainage, 
forking and weeding. Among estate labourers in Barbados 
an important distinction was made (and still is) between 'A 
class' men and 'B class' men. Women were similarly divided up 
into these two classes. Among the ordinary labouring popu­
lation this invidious distinction signified wage differen­
tials commensurate with the type of task performed. 'A 
class' men, composed of the youngest and strongest, per­
formed the most arduous tasks such as cane cutting, drainage 
and ditching. fB class' men, composed of teenage boys and 
older men no longer capable of strenuous work, performed 
lighter tasks such as planting food crops and tending cattle. 
The distribution of tasks performed by women were allotted in 
the same way, such that *A class' women usually cleaned the 
cut cane and piled the trash during reaping, and 'B class* 
women, usually girls and older women, performed such tasks 
as hoeing and weeding.
In Martinique a basic distinction was made between 
'Grand Atelier* and 'Petit Atelier', the terminology itself 
being a survival of the slavery period. The first group 
comprised the male work force occupied in-the most strenuous 
tasks, such as ploughing, oane cutting, loading and trans­
portation. The second group was made up of women and 
children occupied in lighter tasks, such as weeding, manuring
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and planting. The following data based upon the organization 
of the work force on a typical plantation in the mid-1950s, 
gives some idea of the extent to which plantation field work 
was broken down at that period, together with the different 
rates of pay for each task (each task being roughly equiv­
alent to a daily unit of six hours work in most cases):
TABLE XXIX : BREAKDOWN OF FIELD OPERATIONS IN THE
MARTINIQUAN •SUGAR-INDUSTRY IN 1935 •
Nature of Work Task Wage
Hoeing (PA) 400 square metres 4-5
Land Remodelling (GA) 400 square metres 10-12
Forking (GA) 400 square metres 12-15
Digging Cane Holes (GA) 100 holes 13-15
Ploughing (GA) Day 8-10
Cattle Driving (GA) Day 7-8
Cattle Driving (PA) Day 4-5
,Sinking Wells (GA) 2 metres depth 0.40
Drainage (GA) 2 metres length 0.25
Planting (PA) Day 4-5
Manuring (PA) Day 4-5
Weeding (PA) 97.5 square metres 4-6
Cane Cutting (GA) Pile 0.50
Cane Tying (GA) Pile 0.50
Transport
Muleteer (GA) Day 9-10
Truck Driver (GA) Day 10-12
Loader (GA) Day 9-11
Tending of animals
Ox Driver (GA) Day 8-10
Groom (GA) Day 7-8
Cutting Hay (PA) Day 6-8
(Key: GA = Grand Atelier; PA ss Petit Atelier)
(Source: Service de 1 'Agriculture, Rapport Sur L'Industrie
de la Canne a la Martinique (Kervegant) -f 1935: 45).
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The complexity of this method of payment and the 
extreme differentials involved, is further illustrated by 
the following evidence of a coloured Member of the Barbadian 
House of Assembly to the Deane Commission in 1937:
’’The cane-hole digger was paid nine cents per hundred 
holes and as an average day’s work was four-hundred 
holes he earned 1/6 per day.- The forker was paid 
eight to ten cents per hundred holes. A man could 
do about four-hundred per day, so he would earn 
thirty-two cents per day if he forked three-hundred 
and fifty-holes - an average day’s work - at ten 
cents per hundred holes. For planting the canes 
the labourer received 1/- for two thousand holes, 
that was a day’s work. For turning up cane stumps 
he received five cents per hundred holes and for an 
average day’s work of eight-hundred holes he received 
forty cents. Cane-cutters received sixteen cents 
per hundred holes; an average day’s work consisted 
of three-hundred holes so that a cane cutter could 
earn 2/- per day”.
The above tasks were generally performed by able-bodied men. 
Lower down the scale the piece rates paid to boys, women 
and old men were considerably less:
’’For driving carts a driver received 1/- per day 
and the leader boy 6d per day. Farmers were paid 
3d to 4d per acre, the average acreage farmed in a 
day being one and a half acres. The old labourers 
...who were given hedgerow work to do...were paid 
twenty cents per day. The young women and lads 
were paid 4d to 6d per day and the maximum wage of 
a woman was twenty cents per day”.
Depressed wages meant that nearly all of the located 
labourer’s family worked on the plantation in order to con­
tribute to the family’s meagre budget. Combined with this, 
the lack of guaranteed full-time work the whole year round 
added to the economic and social dependency of the estate
worker. One estate labourer in his evidence to the 
17Commission emphasized the extent to which his income 
fluctuated throughout a working year:
”1 work at Mount Wilton plantation, St. Thomas,
,for thirty cents a day when I am doing day work.
When I am doing task work and working by the 
hundred holes I work for thirty-six cents per day 
...during the crop I work for a little more. I 
work for 11/- to 12/- per week during the crop but 
in the hard times I work for 9/- downwards. Some­
times it goes as low as 5/- or 3/-...”
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In Martinique Kervegant estimated that wages on average 
decreased by 40 per cent outside the crop season. Non­
located labourers (gens etrangers) were harder hit by the 
seasonal variability of the work available than located 
labourers (gens oases), since they primarily depended upon
the crop season for earnings, all jobs of a permanent or
18semi-permanent nature being accorded to located labour.
The information contained in Table XXX breaking 
down the various categories of work performed on a Bar­
badian sugar plantation in 1975, indicates that traditional 
patterns of work organization persist to the present day.
This example is not exceptional, and may be regarded as 
being characteristic of the way in which work continues to 
be organized on nearly all sugar plantations up to the 
present. A basic division of the plantation's working year 
is that of the 'in crop' season when cane is harvested 
(January - June), and the "out of crop1 season (July - 
December). Another basic division is to be found within 
the labour force itself, where a distinction is made between 
'registered' (permanent) and 'non-registeredf (seasonal) 
labour:
TABLE XXX : BREAKDOWN OF PLANTATION LABOUR AND STAFF 
ON T0DD8 ESTATE (654 acres). 1975.
(i) Out of crop Regis- +65 Not Regis- Total
tered tered
A class men 9 8 - 17
B class men 17 9 8 34
A class women 16 4 2 22
B class women 9 4 3 16
Farmers 6 3 5 14
Chauffeurs 6 1 - 7
Sup er int end ent s 3 1 - 4
Weekly Staff 1 3 - 4
Totals fiL 33 18 118
Table contd
233
(ii) 'In "crop Regis- +65 Not Regis- Total
tered tered "*
No.of: Cane cutters 14 7 59 60
TABLE XXX contd___
Cane loaders 20 2 19 41
Cane headers - - - -
Cane tyers - - -
McConnel ret­
rievers 2 1 9 12
Lorry or tractor 
drivers 4 4 8
Lorry or trailer 
packers 2 1 9 12
Road.boys - - 3 3
Loaders on 
McConnel 1 MB 1
McConnel
operators 1 1
Men not cane 
reaping 1 8 M 9
Women not cane 
reaping 5 5 1 9
Farmers ' 6 3 3 12
Superintendents 4 1 5
Weekly Staff 2 2 1 5
Others 2 2 2 6
Totals 62 22 20 184
(Source: Estate Records and Accounts of Todds 
Plantation)
The task, system together with payment by the day and piece 
work has also survived in the Mariniquan banana industry as 
the following example indicates. One major difference bet­
ween the nature of work in the Barbadian sugar industry and 
the banana industry in Martinique, lies in the fact that the 
labour force in the latter for the most part is a permanent 
one the whole year round. A task in the banana industry is 
calculated as being roughly equivalent to what an average 
worker can achieve in an eight hour working day.
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TABLE XXXI : BREAKDOWN OF WORK ON L'AVENIR 
• - - - -..• - <165~ hectares!, -1976. - -
Work by the task method
Weeding
Hoeing
Propagating (budding)
Insecticide spraying
Clearing
Manuring
Injecting
Piece Work 
Transport 
Box fabrication 
Packing
Work by the day
Planting
Drainage
Pollinating
Pruning
Covering
Washing
Quantity
350 plants 
350 
1000 
300 
1500
8 bags 
350
per hand 
per box 
per box
Wage
66.36 francs
0.33 francs
0.09
0.36
66.36 francs
(Source: Interview material)
7.5. Observing the 'Deferential Dialectic'
The concept of 'deference' is a particularly 
serviceable one here, since properly operationalized it can 
be employed empirically to observe the actual workings of 
'traditional authority'. Moreover as it will become evident, 
it can indicate ways in which limitations are now placed upon 
the rule of 'paternalism' and the continued existence of the 
plantation as a 'greedy institution'. In utilizing the con­
cept it is firstly necessary to make a distinction between 
deference as (1) a form of behaviour, and (2) a set of 
attitudes. Newby (1975) argues that neither behavioural nor 
attitudinal definitions of deference alone are sufficient,
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and that it should be regarded rather as a form of social 
interaction in the Simmelian sense. Behavioural definitions 
of deference are inadequate, since it is problematic to what 
extent an homology can be drawn between such deferential 
behaviour as bowing, avoidance of eye-contact, forms of 
address and speech and cap doffing, and underlying attitudes. 
It does not necessarily follow that such behaviour reflects 
a positive commitment to, or a positive evaluation of, the 
object of deference. Attitudinal definitions alone also pose 
their own particular problems, since they involve the 
attribution on the basis of certain ’known’ facts (i.e. the 
supposed endorsement of an order in which a deferent accepts 
subordination as ’natural*) of an ideological stance which is 
assumed to inform a consistent behavioural pattern at all 
times and in all circumstances. This suggests that the use 
of an attitudinal definition of deference leads to the 
assumption that the beliefs about society of those at the 
bottom of the social hierarchy are monolithic and unidimen­
sional, and that future behaviour can be extrapolated from 
past performance and inferred from structural situation.
Such an approach, therefore, has the built-in weakness of 
being ahistorical, and ignores what the situation may mean 
for the actor himself vis-a-vis his position in the social 
hierarchy. To illustrate this, there is some justification 
for stating that plantation slavery did produce a subservient 
’Quashes’ or ’Sambo’ like character, but such deferential 
traits alone, however prevalent, did not completely express 
the content of the master/slave relationship. Throughout 
the history of slavery masters discovered to their cost how 
bodies of seemingly docile, well-disposed slaves, could rise 
up and attempt time and time again to overthrow the world 
of the slaveholders.
Since both these approaches taken separately pose 
problems of meaning, I have adopted the approach taken by 
Newby (1977, 1978) which treats deference as a form of 
social interaction, and which focusses upon the dyadic 
relationship between deferent and the object of deference. 
Following Simmel (1955), like all other forms of social 
interaction the deferential variety is dialectical and
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dualistic in nature; conflict, competition and hierarchy 
complementing rather than negating its positive aspects.
Thus the deferential dialectic is a composite of two 
opposing elements: differentiation and identification.
Tension management involves maintaining a balance between 
these opposites. Newby notes that occasions may arise when 
the ability of an elite to manage the tensions inherent in 
it will be vitiated by forces over which it has no control. 
This is a theme which will be taken up later on, in an 
examination of the way in which traditional authority has 
been eroded by forces external to the plantation.
Despite the fact that there is a certain continuity 
of form in the plantation system of both islands, moreso in 
Barbados where the sugar industry has survived, it is prob­
lematic to what extent the elite really has retained its 
traditional authority in the face of a number of changes 
whioh have taken place in the domain of personal relations. 
Doubts as to their success in maintaining the deferential 
dialectic surfaced in a number of situations, which served 
to highlight the precariousness of their true position. In 
Barbados I was confronted with this fact in a most dramatic 
way, when several of my interviews were interrupted by the 
outbreak of cane fires, which occasioned long discussions 
and soul searching on the part of the planter as to the real 
causes of these fires and those responsible. In Martinique 
occasions for similar discussions were prompted by a number 
of strikes in the north-east of the island, with pressure 
being put upon planters for increased piecework rates for 
packing shed labour. Given the expression of these doubts 
as to their ability to maintain good 'human relations', and 
hence the continuity of traditional authority, to what 
extent can it be said that planters are successful in main­
taining the deferential dialectic? The following observations 
are intended to provide an answer to•this question, and to 
highlight the limitations which are now imposed upon its 
operation.
A common feature of the fieldwork situation in both 
islands was the extent to which plantation owners actively
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sought (without being prompted) to exhibit forms of patern­
alistic -behaviour, and to attempt to elicit examples of 
deferential behaviour from labour in a number of different 
contexts. In Barbados for example, in a number of cases 
owners themselves voluntarily undertook to take me on tours 
of their tenantries, in an explicit attempt to assure me 
that "social relations in the plantation hadn't really 
changed much in thirty years and were still on the whole 
good". Such displays whilst hardly corresponding to extreme 
forms of deferential behaviour, such as cap-doffing and 
noblesse oblige, did nevertheless indicate that vestiges of 
their former authority persisted. What appeared to be 
universally gratifying to them in this context, was the fact 
that they were 'known', recognized as the owner of the land 
on which the tenantry stood, and even more importantly, 
referred to respectfully as 'Mr1, in spite of the undigr' 
nified way in which groups of small boys and teenagers 
called out, surrounded the jeep, and clambered over 
its bonnet.
In Martinique all of the classical marks of defer­
ential behaviour, incorporating gestures, demeanor and forms 
of speech, were more readily observable as the following 
example indicates. After a two-hour drive around a banana 
plantation in the central-northern zone of the island, the 
owner and I were returning to the plantation house along the 
main drive. On our journey we came across an old overseer 
who had worked on the plantation for forty years. He was 
riding a mule towards us, and when the jeep stopped he 
sidled up and turned around, facing the same direction as the 
jeep and parallel to it. He took off his hat and said 
"Bonjour messieurs", and sat there silently looking down, eyes 
lowered with his hat held respectfully in both hands pressed 
against his left side. The owner then began kindly and 
patiently without a trace of irritation in his voice, to 
explain that some of the cutting operations in the field were 
not being carried out correctly. Workers were not cutting 
off leaves and stalks from banana plants after the fruit had 
been removed. During the whole period of this encounter 
which was more of a monologue than an exchange, the overseer
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kept his head bowed and never once looked his master in the 
eye or fully in the face. After a period of ten minutes 
the jeep was forced to reverse, and the overseer had to 
move to make way for an oncoming truck. Once the truck 
had passed the overseer rode around to the other side of the 
jeep and took up the same stance again, and this mode of 
deferential behaviour lasted a further five minutes. During 
the owner’s monologue the overseer said nothing, merely 
nodding in assent at appropriate moments during his master’s 
delivery.
On another occasion in the northern-most part of 
the island, I was treated to a performance in which all the 
niceties of noblesse oblige and appropriate deferential 
behaviour were observed by both parties. The owner of a 
plantation took me on a round of his workers’ ’cottages’ 
which were located on the plantation around the Big House 
itself. As an observer I had the opportunity of noting at 
first hand a type of interaction between proprietor and 
worker which was intimate, but at the same time carefully 
ritualized and formalized according to a set of rules which 
were implicitly understood by both parties. An essential 
ingredient of this intimacy was language: the use of Creole
as opposed to standard French in all conversation, which 
automatically ensured identification and made possible nuances 
of meaning which went beyond the purely linguistic. In each 
case after dispensing with a few social niceties, the owner 
went on to enquire after the health of the children, their 
progress at school, and a number of other questions were fired 
in quick succession concerning the welfare of the family as a 
whole. The time allotted.to answering these questions was 
minimal, thus ensuring brief responses which were as ritual­
istic as the questions themselves. I duly surmised that such 
exchanges had been rehearsed over and over again and in their 
usage hallowed by time and repetition. In several cases the 
proprietor played a variety of teasing games with the children 
of these families, and in one case made a boy recite a poem 
off by heart and promised him some small gift later on for 
learning it. As the proprietor casually passed the time of 
day in this fashion, he also took the opportunity to ask
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serious questions about work rotas for wives and older 
children.
Although the several examples quoted above indicate 
an element of stability and continuity in the operation of 
traditional authority, the actual situation is far more 
fragile and unstable than these few examples suggest. In 
the field it was only by employing several research methods 
and comparing structured interview material with that gained 
from participant observation, and in some cases incorporating 
depth techniques in interviewing, that a true picture emerged. 
In response to the probe: "So relations between owners and 
labour continue to be good?", which followed on from the 
question on changing social relations in the plantation 
community (See Appendix I: Question22)5 one Barbadian 
planter had this to say:
"...I think our relations are good. Mainly because our 
management is strict and straight...and I've always 
felt on really good terms with everyone myself. I go 
round on foot and talk to the people at work and so 
on. And we have a long history of not' having malicious 
fires here which is a good indication..."
On a second visit to the same plantation to wat@h cane cutting 
in operation,, it was evident that owner/worker relations did 
not live up to the professed spirit of co-operation previously 
portrayed. The attitude of cane cutters to the owner was one 
of subdued hostility, and this atmosphere precluded any 
ritualistic exchange of pleasantries. In the process of 
cutting trash was not being piled in the right place, and as 
a result it was getting mixed up with canes loaded for the 
factory. Both owner and estate manager grumbled but no 
action was taken to remedy the matter. It was apparent that 
both men treated the workers warily and did not feel inclined 
to point out their shortcomings. In recent years the amount 
of extraneous matter going to the factories has increased con­
siderably, which indicates that management on this estate and 
many others in the island are incapable of enforcing good 
work practices and gaining the co-operation of the work force. 
Also on this estate as the manager revealed to the embarrass­
ment of the owner, praedial larceny was currently rife, with 
blame being attached to estate tenantry dwellers.
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The fragility of traditional authority is further 
exemplified by a quite conscious policy pursued by the elite 
in the country, which can best be expressed as 'confron­
tation avoidance'. The most comprehensive account of this 
avoidance principle was given to me by one plantation owner 
in Martinique, when talking about his relationship with the 
people of the nearby town of Grande Riviere, some of whom 
worked on his land:
"My relationship with the townsfolk is still quite 
good...but it used to be better...before politics 
came to Grande Riviere...I used to go down there 
quite regularly...almost every day. I often went 
into a bar for a drink to talk with the people.
Everybody knew my face...I don't go down to Grande 
Riviere very much now though. One always risks 
being called names. That's very dangerous. Once 
it happens you are finished. It always pays to 
be mysterious, in a way. You can be friendly and 
well-known. But you musn't go too far. You can 
only go so far and stop".
When I asked him what he meant by being called names he 
readily replied: "Sale Beke!" Subsequent enquiries revealed
that he had been involved in an incident two years before, 
in which he had been heckled and verbally abused from the 
terrace of a cafe in town.
A similar phenomenon was also to be found operating 
in Barbados. In the operation of the deferential dialectic 
it was evident that Barbadian planters like their Martiniquan 
counterparts, took great pains to avoid situations of 
potential conflict, which threatened to undermine identifi­
cation and break down the barrier of social distance. This 
was apparent in the example already quoted, where planter 
and manager dared not risk the possible consequences of losing 
face, if having tried they failed to enforce good work 
practice. In a number of cases it was also evident that the 
relations between planters and their domestic servants were 
strained. Unlike the days of old the Great House no longer 
functions as a greedy institution, 'devouring* every minute 
of the servant's day. Domestic servants no longer live in 
as a matter of principle, and cannot be called upon to sub­
ordinate their whole personality to the 'omnivorous' 
demands of the household. This is a fact that some older
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planters have not been able to accept, and as a result the 
'servant problem* is a perennial one for them, as servants 
come and go and they find it increasingly difficult to 
attract anyone to domestic service. Confrontation avoidance 
in the domestic setting was not so much motivated by the fear 
of losing face, but by the fear of getting a bad name as a 
hard task master or 'slave-driver*. Planters who had acquired 
such a reputation henceforth found themselves permanently 
servant-less. Competition for domestic labour from the 
tourist industry which is free from the negative associations 
of service in the Great House, means that planters have to be 
quite circumspect in their dealings with servants, and often 
have to accept inefficiency, absenteeism and bad time-keeping 
without protest.
Confrontation avoidance found its most overt 
expression in cases where some planters adopted a policy of 
not going through certain tenantries, which were known to 
house 'bad characters' or 'trouble-makers', or where at some 
time in the past they had experienced insults or rebuffs.
On this question of relations with tenantry dwellers other 
planters adopted a show of bravura, indicating in no uncer­
tain terms that "no one keeps me off my land". In some of 
these cases as I later found out from other sources, this 
defiant attitude was bogus, and the individuals in question 
were just as equally concerned about avoiding open conflict 
as most other planters.
From the foregoing it is evident that the power of 
the plantation as a greedy institution, based upon the dual 
mechanism of traditional authority and deference, has 
recently been eroded. The actual instability and fragility 
of traditional authority today is indicated by the way in 
which severe limitations are often placed upon its operation.
In an attempt not to lose face, or in the words of one 
planter, to retain the essential element of 'mystery* which 
may be regarded as a component of social distance, it is 
necessary to avoid situations which are potentially conflictual. 
This conscious policy of confrontation avoidance in a number 
of cases indicates that the elite is often powerless to 
influence the behaviour of subordinates. It is now my
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intentiontto explore the factors responsible for this erosion 
of traditional authority by dealing with each island 
separately.
7.6. Elements of Change : the Erosion of Traditional 
Authority.
In practical terms the ending of located labour in 
1937 with the repeal of the Masters and Servants Act did 
nothing to change the structural situation of estate 
labourers in Barbados, since alternative employment opport­
unities outside the plantation were limited. The 'house spot' 
on plantation rab-land which under the tenantry system was 
akin to the institution of the farm worker's 'tied cottage* 
in rural England, continued to operate in the same way and - 
for the same reasons: ensuring a oaptive labour force, 
justifying depressed wages and reinforcing the social and 
economic dependence of the estate labourer. However, the
situation described in the Moyne Commission's Report forty 
19years ago, as one in which
"...the mass of the population stand in similar 
relations to the owners and managers as did the 
wage labourers of the nineteenth century..."
is no longer apposite in the 1970s. In 1937 the sugar
industry in Barbados employed a total of 34,000 full-time
2.0workers. By 1969 the total labour force had shrunk to
2110,300. The Labour Department's annual survey of regis­
tered full-time sugar workers for 1975 indicated a further 
drop to just over 4,500. The distribution of the labour 
force in the sugar industry in 1975 (broken down by parish, 
age and sex) is given in Table XXXII. The statistics 
indicate that the workforce in the sugar industry is an 
ageing one: 60 per cent of the total is over fifty years of 
age, and only 17.25 per cent is under 40. This is a fact
which worries the industry, since all other things being22equal must result in a continuing decline.
As a consequence of this trend, the significance 
of the tenantry system as a means of ensuring the social and 
economic dependence of the 'mass of the population^ has greatly
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diminished. Whereas in the recent past ail the families 
living in the tenantries were dependent upon the plantation 
as a source of livelihood, only a small percentage are today. 
In a study carried out in 1971 hy the Barbados Sugar 
Producers'Association, it was shown that 4,000 acres in 
tenantry provided housing spots for approximately 6,000 
families. Within these families the proportion of agri­
cultural workers was less than one in ten of the occupiers of 
the land. Comparing today with a few generations ago, the 
President of the Sugar Producers'Association commented:
"...thirty years ago or more every house in the 
tenantry had someone who was employed on the estate. 
Today I would say that of every ten houses in the 
tenantry not more than two would have anyone working 
on the estate in question, because employment 
opportunities have broadened".
This dramatic decline in the tenantry dweller's involvement 
and incorporation into the regimen of daily plantation life, 
was further substantiated by another planter in a similar 
vein:
"The fact is we don't employ so many (tenants) now.
Thirty years ago pretty well everyone in the adjacent 
villages were our own tenants paying peppercorn rents 
for house spots, and pretty well all were employed on 
the plantation. Now many of them are still enjoying 
peppercorn rents and have nothing to do with the 
plantation at all. The villages have expanded con­
siderably and a great many of them are commuting to 
Bridgetown or local light industry, and are not so 
deeply involved in the plantation".
The situation described above is of portentous consequence for 
the concept of the plantation as a greedy institution today, 
since the majority of tenantry dwellers who continue to live 
on estate land rubbing shoulders with neighbours, families 
and friends who are still agricultural workers, are them­
selves working outside of the plantation, in light industry, 
tourism, government service and commerce. Having wider 
social contacts and different work experiences, they bring 
with them into the tenantry alternative values and life 
styles, and different definitions of status and hierarchy.
One particularly worrying aspect of these alternative 
definitions of the situation brought about by tenantry 
dwellers working away, is what planters believe to be the
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intrusion of politics into the plantation, by virtue of the 
fact that some of them are government officials:
"On estates we don't generally find any resentment.
If it's there it's below the surface. But wherever 
it's introduced it's introduced from the political 
level. Probably with maybe a very good reason 
because they want to see an upliftment and a change, 
because we have got here and on most estates now 
youngsters who are working in the civil service 
living in the tenantries with mothers who are
labourers. I know when I lived at------, in the
tenantry there was a boy who works in the Prime 
Minister's office, and his mother is still doing an 
agricultural worker's job".
A comparison of the data presented for plantation 
labour employed 'in crop1 and 'out of crop* in Table-XXX, 
indicates the extent to which the plantation now depends 
heavily on additional supplies of 'imported* labour during 
the reaping season, over and above its normal requirements 
throughout the rest of the year. The case of Todds is 
fairly typical in this respect, and of all the estates in 
Barbados still primarily geared to sugar production, each 
hires a supplementary work-force for almost half the working 
year which commonly varies from 50-100 per cent of the 
numbers registered as permanent sugar workers. The seasonal 
work-force is invariably drawn from the ranks of the under­
employed: many being labourers from a depressed construction 
industry; self-employed artisans such as masons, carpenters 
and decorators, for whom it is more lucrative to switch to 
cane cutting for part of the year; peasant smallholders who 
likewise take the opportunity to increase their small incomes 
and cantoneers, permitted by government to switch to 
agricultural work during the reaping season. In this way the 
registered permanent labour force of just over 4,500 working 
in the sugar industry in 1975, has actually swelled to
6-8,000 'in crop* during the last few years. This heavy 
dependence on outside labour is yet another factor which 
impedes the successful operation of the deferential dialectic 
Just as four-fifths of the tenants living on his land are now 
strangers to him, the planter also has to cope with the fact 
that for almost six months of the year about half of his 
labour force are equally strangers. Under these conditions
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it is problematic to what extent it can be argued that the 
operation of traditional authority continues to be a strategy 
of power maintenance of the elite in the country, since the 
conditions for its operation have been undermined. With 
respect to the problems created for the planter in having to 
employ seasonal labour from the outside, one planter artic­
ulated this dilemma in the following way:
"The most taxing part of the year is of course the 
reaping season. But in addition to the sheer 
logistic problems of getting the canes to the 
factory on time...and of course the constant 
threat of cane fires we have been experiencing in 
recent years...we have to work with labour...brought 
in from outside...which we don't know and which in 
some ways we feel we can't control...it's particularly 
worrying when they are working in larger than usual 
gangs. They get together... start talking to our own 
workers and fill their heads,with communistic ideas 
from the other islands. What's really worrying is 
the possibility of any untoward influence they might 
have on our own men..."
Conditions conducive to the maintenance of tradit­
ional authority have been undermined in other ways. Most 
important has been the way in which the provisions of wel­
fare have become specialized and transferred to the state, 
which has resulted in the loss of a vital aspect of the 
planter's paternalistic role of 'provident fostering care*. 
Prior to the guaranteeing of full-time employment by the 
establishment of a register for permanent sugar workers, the 
labourers' wages fluctuated considerably throughout the 
working year. It was only during the. crop season that a 
labourer might be working a full five day week. For six 
months of the year he would be lucky to find gainful employ­
ment on the estate for three or three and a half days a 
week. In the absence of any regular economic wage he 
depended on a number of fringe benefits, which included 
grazing rights, free supplies of molasses and syrup, and 
interest-free loans for purchasing lumber and other expensive 
items. Forty years ago one planter in his evidence to the 
Deane Commission stated that:
"...at Blackman's we carry over 1,085 dollars for loans, 
lumber, doctor's fees, pots, pans - all kinds of utensils".2^
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"We have‘3,000 dollars loaned out on houses for 
24our people;.." Yard staff might also enjoy such additional 
fringe benefits as free milk and chickens and eggs. From the 
evidence of the planters themselves it would appear that none 
of these practices were standardized, since it was very much 
up to the arbitrary decision of the owner or manager to 
decide what privileges he would accord to his workers. Thus 
the extent to which an estate labourer was able to supplement 
his low standard of living was very much dependent upon the 
personal relations he had with proprietor and manager.
However, as early as 1937 this system of discretionary 
privileges which contributed to the social and economic 
dependence of the estate labourer, was already being steadily 
eroded by technological change. A process of rationalization 
involved the maximization of the area under cane, which resulted 
in the amount of food crops available to the labourer at 
preferential rates becoming scarce. The use of grass for 
mulching resulted in the progressive disappearance of the cow. 
Technological change at the factory level also resulted in the 
loss of another privilege: the free provision of sweet liquor, 
syrup and molasses. An important symbol of the planter's 
'benevolence', the crop-over festival, has disappeared even 
more recently during the last ten years. At the end of 
harvest time not so long ago each plantation provided its. 
workers with free entertainment, food and drink as a sign of 
gratitude for their efforts during the past year. Most 
plantation owners also gave each worker a small monetary gift 
of ten dollars. The crop-over festival is now no more than a 
piece of entertainment put on for the benefit of tourists and 
has completely lost its original function and meaning.
Within the Martiniquan plantation system today, the 
role played by located systems of labour has long since 
disappeared. With the development of central factories the 
system of colonage partiaire introduced after 1848 was 
replaced by a more direct form of labour exploitation, in 
which landless labourers and former colons became gens cases, 
living on plantation land in the vicinity of the Great House
Another noted that:
248
itself (as opposed to separate 'villages' as in the Barbadian 
tenantry system) as located labourers. Although.the system of 
colonage partiaire continued to exist in isolated pockets of 
the island, supplying rum distilleries rather than sugar 
factories, by the early twentieth century agricultural workers 
were mostly either gene cases or gens etrangers. The first 
category
"...lived with their family in huts or houses that 
were rented on the plantation itself, usually around 
the manager's house. At the same time they had the 
use of a small plot of land where they cultivated 
food crops...In case of illness they received free of 
charge medical care for themselves and their families.
In return they were obliged to provide the plantation 
with their labour and not to work elsewhere..."
The second- category of worker
"...were colons and peasant proprietors whose inoome 
was insufficient to maintain subsistence the whole 
year round. They were free to seek work wherever 
wages were highest and work plentiful, often 
travelling as far as ten or twelve kilometres. . . xx ^
With the exception of a few plantations in the north-east of 
the island, where labour has been scarce in recent years and 
planters have had to import labour from St. Lucia, no estate 
workers and their families are now to be found living on the 
plantation as gens cases. Visits to a number of sugar and 
banana plantations in the south indicate that the institution 
of located labour has been similarly revived from time to time, 
when labour has been imported for the crop season. This was 
the case particularly in the late 1960s and early 1970s- before 
the decline of sugar.
Unlike the Barbadian case where statistical data on 
tenantries and their occupants is plentiful, very little 
information of a comprehensive nature exists on the role of 
located labour in Martinique, which makes it impossible to 
quantify its prevalence at any given period and its decline. 
This in turn makes it difficult to employ its decline as an 
indicator of social change, in which the conditions under 
which paternalism flourished were progressively undermined.
In 1935 Kervegent was unable to give a statistical breakdown
for the two categories.of estate worker, which at that time 
comprised a total work force of about 30,000 in the sugar 
industry. He does, however, suggest that-the phenomenon 
of located labour had become less important than it had 
been in the past, and that the numbers of gens etrangers 
had become more numerous than gens oases. Thus unlike Bar­
bados where the tenantry has remained an enduring 
feature of the rural scene, its equivalent in Martinique 
has virtually disappeared. According to the majority of 
planters interviewed the institution of located labour had 
disappeared entirely on their plantations by the mid-1950s. 
From the information submitted by informants, forms of labour 
exploitation based on the sharecropping principle seem also 
to have disappeared, but according to one official source in 
1974, 3,758 hectares continued to be exploited under
colonage oartiare.
Although quantitative data on the actual numbers
drawn into the totalistic structure of the plantation via
located schemes of labour exploitation is lacking, it can be
said that such schemes were never developed to the same degree
as they were in Barbados, due primarily to a more open land
resource situation. Again no precise data is available, but
from very early on in the post-Emancipati.on period, an
alternative to the regime of plantation life was developed
by those creole colons partiaires who abandoned estates to
set themselves up as squatters on unappropriated land.
However, one thing is certain, the agricultural workforce
has declined as dramatically as it has done in Barbados over
the last twenty-five years. In 1954 the sugar industry
employed about 30,000. In addition another 7-8,000 were
27employed on hanana and pineapple estates. By 1974 the
permanent work force overall was sharply reduced to 6,700.
Like Barbados Martinique's agricultural work force is also
an ageing one. At present more than 80 per cent of the work
force is forty and over and more'than 45 per cent is fifty-
five and over. Only 15.7 per cent account for the up to
28thirty-nine age group.
Those factors which have recently contributed to 
the erosion of traditional authority within the setting of
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the Martiniquan plantation system, are less empirically self 
evident than in the Barbadian case. It is therefore not so 
easy to abstract from the data a clearly definable relation­
ship between the decline of traditional authority and factors 
which have contributed to its demise. However, it is 
possible to generalize and to place the weight of explanation 
upon the former colony's changing relationship with the 
metropolitan power after 1948. As I have already indicated 
in Chapter,6,forms of inequality have until quite recently 
delayed the transition from colonial to full departmental 
status. Following the political unrest o.f the 1960s in 
which a demand for autonomy grew out of the failure of the 
French state to accord complete social, economic and political, 
equality with the Metropolis, the Government has attempted to 
redress the balance by a rapid process of administrative 
assimilation.
As a consequence of this process it is possible to 
highlight two main factors which have played a central role 
in the erosion of traditional authority. Firstly, the pro­
nounced bureaucratization at every level of departmental life 
in which wage levels, working conditions, welfare benefits 
and pension rights have come increasingly under official 
jurisdiction, and have been standardized in line with metro­
politan practices. One example of this has been the 
initiative of the French government in 1971 to fix a minimum 
wage level, which was devised to increase in line with the 
cost of living (SMIC: Salaire Minimum Interprofessionnel de 
C r o i s s a n c e ) A l t h o u g h  it is possible to document a number
of cases of abuse of this attempt to achieve economic and
30social parity with the Metropolis, it is true to say that 
there has been quite a dramatic shift in the power of the 
planter elite to arbitrate on all matters affecting workers 
lives in favour of state intervention. It. may be argued that 
the growth of state intervention in a post-colonial setting 
is a common factor in both islands which has played a role 
in the erosion of traditional authority. However, what is 
particularly significant in the Martiniquan case is the 
extent to which this has occurred. With the introduction of 
administrative and fiscal measures to achieve greater
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assimilation, there has been a massive injection of public 
funds (See Chapter 6: Table XXVI). The impact of these 
economic measures has produced,-• and is in the process of 
producing, a number of social effects which transcend even 
the degree of assimilation and acculturation produced by 
colonialism in the past, as analysed by Fanon (1952) over a 
quarter of a century ago. Forms of psychological and 
cultural dependency have now been superseded by economic 
dependency, as an increasing balance of trade deficit 
indicates (See Appendix XXVI : Table 1). A second factor 
responsible for the erosion of traditional authority follows 
from the social implications of this economic disequilibrium. 
The rapid implantation of a consumer society over the past 
decade, has produced a situation in which expectations extend 
far beyond those which the economic system was realistically 
able to satisfy in the past. The growth of the public 
sector through which these expectations can be realized as 
employees, in what a number of commentators have termed the 
' fonctionarisati'on' of Martiniquan society (See Appendix XXVI: 
Tables 2 and 3), the impact of an increasing influx of metro­
politans entering Martinique as businessmen and public sector 
employees, and the free flow of migrants to the Metropolis in 
search of work, whose outward passage and return is assisted by 
public funds, (See Appendix XXVI .i Table 5) has resulted in 
the penetration of the local status system by the metropolitan 
one. This has inevitably influenced concepts of status within 
the setting of the plantation, highlighting the structural . 
position of agricultural labour to the detriment of person­
alized relationships.
The evolution of the status quo resulting from these 
changes has produced one further response from the elite in 
the country. This has taken the form of setting themselves 
up as mediators between labour and the welfare state, and the 
various credit agencies through which the worker obtains loans 
for mortgages, home improvements, smallholding, cars and a 
wide variety of consumer durables. According to a majority of 
planters in each island, the intricacies involved in dealing 
with such problems as national insurance, taxation and welfare 
rights have proved too difficult for the averate estate worker
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to cope with alone. Equally, they argued, the documentation 
involved and the knowledge required to apply for bank loans 
and hire purchase facilities are also too complex to handle 
without the aid of the planter. For the time being at 
least, state bureaucracy and the growth of conspicuous con­
sumption have indirectly established the planter as a source 
of dependence in the guise of 'counsellor1, involving not 
only advice but the necessary spadework. It is also in 
applying for bank loans and hire purchase facilities that 
labour invariably turns to the planter for a credit reference.
Most of'the sample interviewed who had responded to 
change in this way.stressed this vitally important aspect of 
their new role, which they took very seriously, and made a 
point of setting aside half a day each week specifically for 
the purpose of dealing with their workers' problems. In 
Barbados where these 'counselling services* existed surgeries 
were held on the plantation itself, and access was limited to 
plantation labour. In Martinique a somewhat different 
situation pertained, in so far as the retention of a local 
government structure through which the Bekes continue to enjoy 
a certain degree of influence, meant that the role of coun­
sellor extended beyond the plantation itself into the bourg.
7.7. Conclusion
The transition from authoritarian rule to a patern­
alistic one in the post-Emancipation period based upon 
pervasive, face-to-face, reciprocal deference-respect 
relations between planter and located labourer, proves to 
have been a successful strategy of power maintenance, since 
the plantation system survived intact for over a century.
Faced with the task of having to find solutions to common 
structural problems, the plantocracy in both islands appears 
to have adopted similar methods of maintaining social control. 
However, the transition from one type of rule based upon force 
to another based upon consent was not as clear cut as this 
simplistic dichotomy implies, since the rule of 'paternalism* 
was underlain by coercive legal measures to maintain the 
status quo. Thus the plantation in some respects continued
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to function as a negative-custodial type of ’total instit­
ution’ well into the twentieth century, at the same time 
that the planter elite sought to transform it into a 
’greedy1 one, dependent for its survival upon voluntary 
compliance through the ideology and practice of paternalism.
The hybrid nature of the ’reformed’ plantation 
system, part total institution and part greedy institution, 
and the double-edged nature of paternalistic rule itself, 
throws some light upon the real meaning and content of the 
’deferential dialectic’ as a form of social interaction 
within the plantation setting. As in the case of agricultural 
workers in Britain (Newby, 1977), it would also appear that 
the source of deferential behaviour and attitudes for 
plantation workers was located not in the immediate process 
of pervasive, face-to-face interaction with estate proprietors, 
but elsewhere: deeply embedded within the total power of
structure of plantation society. Thus it may be argued that 
the types of interaction witnessed and noted above, reflect 
forms of physical subordination by individuals who occupy 
the lowest rungs of a rigidly hierarchical social structure, 
and do not necessarily imply a positive commitment to any 
superior moral order.
As a consequence of the limitations now placed upon 
the operation of the deferential dialectic, examples of this 
kind of interaction are becoming increasingly more difficult 
to observe. It is pertinent to note that all of the state­
ments made by planters in both islands to the effect that 
"human relations on the whole continued to be quite good and 
hadn’t really changed", were followed up by reservations 
being made about their younger workers. Having once 
committed themselves to an optimistic view of labour relations, 
it was apparent from the probes which sought to compare per­
ceptions of working relations with older and younger 
labourers, that these discussions provoked acute embarrass­
ment and a sense of profound unease. It was evident from 
interviews that planters no longer felt that they could rely 
on paternalistic modes of interaction to oil the wheels of 
social intercourse when dealing with workers under thirty.
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This became patently obvious in the field when employing 
observational techniques. It was evident that planters care­
fully and consciously chose■situations and individuals when 
they wished to display the deferential dialectic in action. 
From my observations the role of deferent was invariably 
performed by middle-aged and elderly workers. Given the 
fact that the conditions conducive to the rule of 'traditional 
authority' have been recently undermined, it is problematic 
as to why this older group of workers should continue to 
defer. It is a reasonable hypothesis to regard their con­
tinuing deference as a consequence of their socialization 
into a value system in the past, which although now threatened 
by the existence of an alternative system of rewards and 
values, precludes any reference to them, since they have 
already accepted the legitimacy of the former hierarchical 
arrangements.
During the period of this study the formation of 
land and factory combines into corporate holdings did not 
result in impersonal relations being substituted for personal 
ones, and what has been termed the 'size effect' does not 
appear to have played any part in reducing the effectiveness 
of paternalism. Thus until quite recently these modern 
capitalist enterprises have continued to be cloaked in 
archaic social forms redolent of manorial tradition, and 
relatively isolated from the outside world. Similar 
observations have been made by Hutchinson (1957) and Wagley 
(1965) in north-eastern Brazil, where modernization of the 
plantation sector in the late nineteenth century was also 
effected by traditional elites rather than international 
joint stock companies. From the evidence it is apparent 
that the conditions conducive to the maintenance of the defer­
ential dialectic have been undermined by an increased 
dependence upon forces external to the plantation itself, 
which has resulted in a decline of interactional status and 
a sharpening of class consciousness.
It is evident that there has been a movement away 
on these family plantations from highly personalized social 
relations towards more impersonal ones, characteristic of
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those to be found on plantations belonging to public joint 
stock companies, such as those described by Mintz in the 
case of Canamelar in Puerto Rico (1974: 95-130), and 
Dagenais in the case of Blanchet in Guadeloupe (1969). The 
undermining of the deferential dialectic is the outcome 
of a whole series of changes - economic, social and 
political - over which the elite of both islands have had no 
control. In many ways their attitude towards these changes 
and the effects they have had on the paternalist role are 
ambiguous. This is understandable since they have both lost 
and gained in this process. On the one hand they have 
bene fitted financially from a more highly developed and more 
highly diversified economy. On the other hand the erosion 
of traditional authority produced by economic change has 
resulted in the loss of an important source of power. In 
actual fact the picture is far more complex than these few 
comments would suggest, since the ideology of paternalism is 
far from monolithic. For example, very little value was 
placed upon the practice of paternalism by members of the 
elite employed in commerce in Bridgetown and Fort-de-France, 
living in Christ Church and Didier far from the relatively 
isolated world of rural life. Many in this category 
expressed an extreme distaste when talking about 'squire- 
archical* or 'seigneurial' modes of social interaction on 
the plantation, believing them to be backward, old- 
fashioned and redolent of an era which had long disappeared. 
Even among the elite in the country no consensus existed 
on beliefs in its value and continuation. Attitudes varied 
widely along a continuum: at one extreme were to be found 
planters of the archetypal 'patron1 kind, for whom the 
ownership of land signified a whole way of life and autom­
atically conferred status; at the other extreme there were 
planters who embodied a form of 'legal-rational authority', 
spurning what many regarded as the 'pretensions' of the 
former, and primarily as businessmen rather than planters 
purely motivated by profit and loss. Some of the most 
notable examples of these extreme types were to be found on 
the one hand among the older Grands Bekes whose working life 
had been principally devoted to sugar, and on the other among
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a nouveau riche bourgeoisie recently incorporated into the 
ranks of the Grands Bekes as successful banana producers. 
Equally representative of the latter group in Barbados, 
were those upwardly mobile entrepreneurs of poor yeomanry 
and ’redleg’ stock engaged in variety of business interests. 
From the data there would appear to be very strong evidence 
to suggest that continuing paternalism, or paternalistic 
attitudes at least, are very much the result of socialization 
into a former value system, in the same way that continuing 
deference was for older workers.
It would appear that the abandonment of the 
trappings of traditional authority, was not simply an uncon­
scious drift on the part of the planter towards modes of 
interaction more consonant with changing circumstances.
Rather it would appear to have been something of a firm 
decision, in spite of the fact that some of the older 
planters socialized into the deferential dialectic- found it 
very difficult to adjust. Statements made by the planters 
themselves suggest that on the basis of a cost-benefit 
analysis, they carefully calculated the costs of paternalism 
in terms of time, material resources and energy, and set 
them against such returns as loyalty, commitment and 
stability. The extent to which their abandonment of pater­
nalism was calculative was evident in a number of examples.
In Barbados the decision to discontinue crop-over festivals 
was undertaken since their material value to the estate 
worker had become negligible, now that labour enjoyed a much 
higher standard of living. Several planters in both islands 
noted that they had discontinued the practice of leaving 
fertilizer in their fields days before spreading it, since 
it was too expensive to allow workers to help themselves at 
will (in the past it had been one of the ’perks’ of field 
labourers to which the planter had turned a blind eye).
In conclusion it may be said that the extent to 
which the deferential dialectic has been able to operate 
successfully, has always been subject to certain constraints 
in plantation society for two reasons. Firstly, the very 
nature of sugar cultivation, a "curious cloaking of industry 
in agriculture" (Mintz, 1974: 54), indicates that the sugar
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plantation worker in one respect does not conform exactly 
to Newby's model of the deferential agricultural labourer. 
From the-beginning, numbers of plantation workers were and 
still are very large compared with the numbers to be found 
on English farms. Plantations continue to be highly labour 
intensive, more so in the case of sugar than banana cultiv­
ation. Up until fairly recently sugar plantations on 
average employed one labourer for every two acres. By con­
trast the average number of full-time workers employed on 
East Anglian farms in Newby's sample, was 3.5 rising to
20.3 on highly capitalized farms of over 1,000 acres 
(1978: Ch.IV). The degree of labour intensiveness in the 
sugar industry, means that the effects of pervasive inter­
action between owner and worker was mitigated by the 
presence of large numbers of like-situated individuals 
forming isolated, one-class communities. This is most 
evident in the case of Barbados, where the tenantry system 
comprised a series of self-contained, one-class villages, 
totally unlike the English agricultural labourer living in 
relative isolation in his tied cottage. The second reason 
is to be found in the perennial problem of maintaining a 
balance between identification and social distance, in a 
context in which the status boundaries of race and ethnicity 
have always been rigidly defined, which has resulted in undue 
emphasis being given to the latter to the detriment of the 
former. Thus the same degree of intimacy between owner and 
labourer has never been as effectively realized as in the 
setting of the English farm.
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NOTES AND REFERENCES
1. Such an analysis has been made by both present-day his­
torians, notably Elkins (1963), and a number of contem­
porary observers such as Edward Long (1774) and Bryan 
Edwards (1807). Patterson’s analysis of ’Quashee1'
(1967: 173-181) is a particularly interesting one, since 
it indicates that the institution of slavery which 
produced a subservient personality pattern, also produced 
its converse, the rebel. A similar view is shared by 
Genovese (1971: 74) who argues that slavery produced 
more than one basic personality pattern: under certain 
conditions the ’’personality pattern could be inverted 
and a seemingly docile slave could suddenly turn fierce”.
2. Source: Barbados Blue Book, 1875.
3. Representative of the view that the development of a 
peasantry in Barbados did not occur until the turn of the 
century, is the following comment by Halcrow and Cave 
(1947: iv/v):
’’There was practically no development of Africans as
peasant holders until about the year 1895. Thereafter
Barbadians of African origin who had made some money by 
emigrating to work in Panama and elsewhere began to 
return or to remit money to relatives in Barbados. As 
a result of their improved purchasing power, many of the 
coloured people were able to offer good prices for land 
and some estates were sold in small plots...”
4. Source: Select Committee on West India Colonies, 1842
(Appendix VI). ~ ~ ” '.
5. Ibid.
6. Source: Article in Journal Officiel de la Martinique,
"De 1 ’Industrie Sucriere h. la Martinique, et ses Divers
Modes D * Exploitation", 4/8/1855.
7. The breakdown for 1870 was as follows: Food crops:
12,745 hectares; Cocoa: 628; Coffee: 495; Cotton: 366; 
Tobacco: 18. Sub-total = 14,252 hectares. Cane: 18,832 
hectares. Total = 33,084 hectares.
Source: Archives D ’Outre-Mer, Statistiques des Cultures 
pour l ’annee 1870. Carton 597).
8. Sources: Acts of Barbados, 1830-1837. 1837-1841, 1841-1845. 
Archives D ’Outre-Mer,.Abolition de l ’Esclavage, 
Correspondence Politique' (1848/9.), Martinique, Carton 56, Dossier 464. - -- - -
9. Ibid (Article l:''Decret relatif a la repression de la 
mendicite et du vagabondage aux colonies du 27 avril 
1848").
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10. Source: Archives D'Outre-Mer, Extrait des Proces- 
Verbaux Des Deliberations du Conseil General 
1*21/12/1871). Martinique. Carton 91. Dossier 767.
11. Source: Barbados Blue Books. 1858-1849.
12. Source: Ministere de la Marine et des Colonies,
Budgets. 1850-1860.
13. For Weber patrimonialism represents a variety of pat­
riarchal rule, which is acquired by conferment or 
inheritance. Whereas 'pure' patriarchalism represents 
"the rule of the master and patron over bondsmen" or 
"of the lord over the domestic servants and household 
officials", patrimonialism derives its power from 
appropriation, infeudation, conferment and appointment 
(Gerth and Mills, 1970: 297).
14. A prime example of this unequal exchange can be found 
' in the labour systems instituted after Emancipation,
which were fictively regarded by the plantocracy as 
schemes of land settlement. Planters then and even now 
in Barbados, have likened the granting of tenantry land 
in return for the rendering of labour services to the 
estate and peppercorn rents as a simple exchange 
relationship, in the same way that money is exchanged 
for goods in the market place. However, this analogy 
does not hold, since the tenant enjoyed no security of 
tenure over the land on which his house stood and the 
adjoining garden. He had no legal rights and could be 
evicted at any time.
15. For this study of plantation records thanks must be 
extended to the owners of Newton Ltd. and Searles 
Plantation, and the manager of Applewhaites Ltd. in 
Barbados. In Martinique my thanks goes to Bernard 
Petitjean-Roget for allowing me to consult the records 
of the plantations belonging to the Usine Centrale of 
Sainte-Marie.
16. Source:- The Advocate Press, The Barbados Disturbances 
(1937). Review of the Situation. Reproduction of the 
Evidence and Report of the Commission.-- ' E v i d e n c e  of
• Theodore Brancker.: 14-16.
17. Ibid, Evidence of Gordon Drake: 108/109.
18-. Source: Service de 1'Agriculture, Rapport sur 1'Industrie 
de la Canne a la Martinique (Kervegant, 1935: 45).
19. Source: P.R.O., West India Royal . Commission,
1938-39, Oral Evidence (Barbados) » ' Vol .' I C.O. 950/919^ ~
20. Ibid, Memorandum of Evidence: The Sugar Producers' 
Association, C.O. 950/586.
21. Source: Barbados Labour Department, Annual Survey of 
Registered Workers in the Sugar Industry, 1969.
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23.
24.
25.
26. 
27.
30
Commenting upon the results of an official survey on 
the distribution of the 18-30 age group in the sugar 
industry, the Barbados Sugar Industry Review (June 
1976: 5) stated:
"Recruitment of young workers is likely to be a 
problem in future years. Seventy-two of the 140 
plantations listed in the report have no employees 
between the ages of 18 and 30 years. The proverbial 
longevity of farm workers who continue to work after ■ 
attaining the age of seventy may prevent the problem 
from becoming acute in the immediate future, but a 
critical shortage of plantation workers will inevitably 
occur unless new inducements are provided".
Op cit., Evidence of Robert Challenor: 216-219.
Op cit., Evidence of Colin King: 219-221.
Source: Service de 1*Agriculture, Rapport Sur 1 !Industrie 
de la Canne a la Martinique (Kervegant, 1935: 56).
Source: Service Centraltoes Enquetes et Etudes Statis- 
tiques. Recensement Generale de 1* Agriculture, 1974.
Source: Direction Departementale du Travail et de la 
Main-DfOeuvre, Note Sur l 1Utilisation de la Main- 
D fOeuvre Agricole en 1954 (11/2/55).
28. Op cit.
29. Rises in annual wage levels have been as follows:
1971 ... +10.7%1972 ... +12.3%
1973 ... +19.3%1974 ... +24.5%
1975 ... +14•2%1976 ... +12.0%
Source: Institut D'Emission des Departements D'Outre-Mer 
Rapports D fAotivitls, 1971-1976).
All of the examples of abuse quoted to me by both 
Bekes and coloured Martiniquans concern metropolitans, 
in the hiring of cheap local domestic labour at wages 
below the level guaranteed by SMIC.
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Whilst the agri-business bourgeoisie has con­
tinued to maintain the status boundary of ethnicity in the 
twentieth century, the mechanisms of social reproduction 
have differed considerably in each island. In Barbados the 
ascendant commercial class very early on forged financial 
and familial links with the surviving remnants of the plant­
ocracy, linking the names of established planter families 
like Haynes, Sealy, Pile and Chandler to those of Manning, 
Bryden, Wilkinson and Da Costa. Several examples are 
illustrated in Appendix XXVII, which gives some idea of the 
cross-fertilization which took place between members of mer­
chant and planter families in the early years of the 
twentieth century. The extent to which inter-marriage took 
place between members of the indigenous plantocracy and the 
Bridgetown merchant class points to an incorporative strategy 
of power maintenance. At the same time it is also quite 
striking the extent to which the status boundary of ethnicity 
has been given primacy over that of class, which is indicated 
by an ongoing process of upward social mobility for poor 
whites and plantation supervisory staff throughout the 
twentieth century, via a system of patronage and sponsorship. 
Thus in order to maintain its economic supremacy as a local 
status group, the white elite has sought to control the 
traditional avenues of social mobility by sponsoring the 
efforts of certain ’worthy1 poor white individuals, whilst at 
the same time excluding non-whites from the most lucrative 
sectors of the colonial economy.
One particularly striking phenomenon in the early 
years of the twentieth century was that of the rise of the 
self-made ’redleg* businessman, who having migrated from the 
Scotland district,- the traditional preserve of marginality 
for the poorer white populace subsisting outside the 
plantation system, in Sheppard’s words (1977: 109) "led 
his one cow into Bridgetown" and within a generation became 
the owner of a business empire, a sugar planter and a member 
of the most prestigious white social and sporting clubs of 
the island. This pattern of upward social mobility has been •
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repeated many times over during the twentieth century, as 
families of 'redleg' origin like the Goddards, the Dowdings, 
the McConneys, the Emtages, the McKenzies and the Seales 
rose rapidly in the social hierarchy and became incorporated 
into the ranks of the agri-business bourgeoisie.
Conversely, in Martinique the extent to which the 
Grand Bekes not only upheld the solidarity of 'caste', but 
also maintained a rigid internal hierarchy in white creole 
society, is indicative of a .strategy of exclusivity. The 
stratification of Beke society into three main sectors or 
classes - Grands Bekes, Bekes Moyens and Petits Blancs - 
produced a segmentation of white creole society into 
patronymic groups which have tended to remain distinct and 
separate through the practice of intra-group endogamy 
(Kovats, 1969). By the early twentieth century the socio­
economic differences between the Grands Bekes and the Bekes 
Moyens had already become institutionalized. Many of the 
Bekes Moyens having lost their estates during the depression, 
had become a middle-class administrative and supervisory 
cadre employed in the commercial houses, sugar factories and 
on the plantations owned by the Grands Bekes. Others who had 
continued to operate as owner/managers on their habitations 
had been forced to abandon sugar production and to transform 
their ancient mills into distilleries, producing rhum 
agricole for local consumption. Unlike their poor white 
counterparts in Barbados, the situation of the Petits Blancs 
in the social hierarchy changed very little in the twen­
tieth century. Those 'Bekes Goyaves' who Abandoned small­
holding and came to Fort-de-France found clerical posts and 
unskilled manual work in the businesses owned by other white 
creoles, and some managed to establish themselves as small 
shopkeepers. However, unlike the successful 'redleg' 
businessman in Barbados, no such phenomenon had its equivalent 
in Martiniquan white creole society.
8.2. White Creole Social Structure in Barbados
With the re-organization of the white social 
structure and the emergence of a new elite in the early years
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of the twentieth century, the representatives of the new
order sought to consolidate their interests as the colony's
ruling class. Theoretically it could be broken down into
four separate sections: the merchants, the planters, a
service class of professionals, such as bankers, accountants,
solicitors, lawyers and doctors, and the various appendages
of the colonial state, represented by the Church of England
and the civil service. As occupational groups the total
1could not have exceeded 700. In actual fact this division 
was not always clear-cut, due to the complexity of cross­
cutting financial interests and familial ties. Both 
English churchmen and colonial civil servants had in the 
past married into the plantocracy, and many members of the 
professional service class were themselves planters or members 
of planter families. Solicitors in particular were and still 
are an occupational group closely allied to the planter class. 
Having a solicitor in the family was vitally important when 
it came to conveyancing and raising the necessary cash to 
buy land. Up to the 1940s there were no coloured solicitors 
at all, and it was a strategic policy on the part of the
white firms in Bridgetown to discriminate against any non-2white practising in the City. A common enough phenomenon 
in the twentieth century is the way in which merchants have 
diversified their interests in seeking to control production 
by becoming planters themselves. Given the complexity of the 
social fabric which bound these apparently diverse groups 
together, it is possible to typify them as constituting a 
solidary ruling class united by economic interests and con­
siderations of status.
The social structure of present day Barbados is best
characterized as a 'combination* class/status system, in which
the status boundaries of race and ethnicity are intersected 
by those of class. Structurally speaking it is not the case 
that there is a direct homology between class and ethnicity. 
The continuing salience of ethnicity is.not reflected in the 
overall social structure in such a simplistic fashion:
rather it is the case that it is reflected in a dual
occupational structure, with avenues of social mobility in 
the white sector still being confined to landownership and 
business, and in the non-white sector to politics and the
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professions. The ’combination’ class/status system as the 
following diagram illustrates,-is made up of a series of 
fairly discrete clusters which are quite clearly defined.
In assigning individuals to clusters of class/status 
groupings, ethnicity continues to be a vitally important 
ascriptive variable acting in association with class. In 
the diagram the horizontal axes WXY and Z represent class 
boundaries which are intersected by the vertical status 
boundary of ethnicity at 0. An additional status boundary 
is represented by the horizontal axis P, which makes a dis­
tinction in ethnic terms between creole and metropolitan 
sectors of the white population. Class/status groupings 
which do not fit into this overall schema are considered mar­
ginal and are delineated by rectangles with broken lines:
(See Diagram II overleaf).
Core members of the agri-business bourgeoisie are 
the major shareholders of Barbados Shipping and Trading’s 
’Big Six’, Plantations Ltd. and Barbados Sugar Factories.
Up until quite recently they also controlled the distribution 
of two-thirds of the island’s arable acreage."^ Strictly 
speaking membership is composed of the decendants of that 
cross-fertilization between the older planter class and the 
nouveau riche mercantile class which took place in the first 
decade or two of this century. Allowing for greater 
elasticity of definition which takes into account the more 
recently acquired wealth and prestige of other groups, we 
can point to the partial incorporation of several coloured 
families and a number of ’redleg’ families who have risen in 
the social hierarchy since the 1930s. The partial incor­
poration of two coloured families, the Wards and the Deanes, 
into the ranks of the agri-business bourgeoisie is an 
interesting phenomenon where occupational categories are so 
closely associated with ethnic background. What is 
exceptional in the Barbadian context, is that the incor­
poration of these two families into the planter/mercantile 
elite is the consequence of ’outside’ children of prominent 
white planters in the early twentieth century inheriting 
property. It was evident in the field that the degree to 
which ’redleg’ businessmen are incorporated into the ranks of
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the agri-business bourgeoisie is only partial, and that 
their absorption is based more on toleration than a social 
acceptance commensurate with their socio-economic position.
In spite of wealth, prestigious offices in commerce and the 
sugar industry, and their membership of the elite social and 
sporting clubs of the island, it became apparent in inter­
views that among members of the core group vestiges of the 
stigma and moral opprobrium attached to 'redlegs' persisted. 
This was particularly marked in a number-of stereotypes which 
recurred in interviews, such as "cattle rustler", "horse 
thief", "speculator" (a term invariably used with overtones 
of dishonest and crooked dealing), "white trash", "baccra 
Johnny" etc. Although not explored in depth, the attitudes 
implied by these connotations which are essentially cultural, 
seem to indicate that the established ethnic boundaries 
segregating the 'redleg* community have not been completely 
lifted for this urbanized, upwardly mobile group. It is 
significant that members of the 'redleg' business community 
have not inter-married into the agri-business bourgeoisie 
proper, nor have their financial interests been interwoven 
with those of the 'Big Six'.
Compared with the situation eighty years ago
absentee proprietorship plays a minor role today, being
made up of a restrioted group of some half-dozen members,
whose social ties are limited to selected members of the agri­
-­business bourgeoisie with strong English connections.
Prominent members of this group have always included rep­
resentatives of the English aristocracy and landed gentry, 
such as the Earls of Harewood, the Giffard family and the 
Drax family. As very high status groups their, interaction 
with all classes of white creole society is minimal, and from 
the few interviews with absentees conducted in Barbados and 
England, it is evident that they have a profound mistrust of 
local society, which goes back to the period when they lost 
most of their estates through the Chancery Court to local 
planters and merchants. Their social orientation is primarily 
centripetal, which is not•surprising since they spend on 
average no more than two months a year 'wintering* and tying 
up estate business in Barbados. Having a cultural background
268
which is metropolitan rather than creole, which sets them 
apart from the native islanders in a number of ways, means 
that they can be said to form a different ethnic group from 
all other sectors of the white population. The boundaries 
delineating what constitutes an absentee, however, have 
become somewhat blurred ever since the emigration of a number 
of families to England and the white Commonwealth during the 
last few decades. Many continue to have financial interests 
in estates and local trading companies, and continue to main­
tain strong familial ties with local families, and because of
this they can be regarded in a sense as absentees.
Members of the loosely designated ’middle-class1 
tend to be ’practical planters', living on and managing 
their own estates and having for the most part few commer­
cial interests; estate attorneys for absentees and merchants
who may themselves be estate owners; and members of planter 
families engaged full-time in a profession as opposed to 
agriculture. The boundaries of what constitutes the middle- 
class tend to be somewhat fluid, since it has traditionally 
provided an avenue of social mobility for estate supervisory 
and managerial staff, who have spent most of their working 
life as wage earners before saving the cash or raising the 
loan to buy an estate. The extent to which this process of 
upward social mobility has been prevalent throughout the 
twentieth century, is highlighted by the fact that just under 
a half of the sample interviewed had made this kind of 
transition in their lifetime. The working career of this 
group of planters followed a typical pattern: two to three
years spent as a junior overseer on ’X ’ plantation after 
leaving school; moved to ’Y ’ plantation at twenty-one as a 
senior overseer; moved to ’Z ’ plantation as an estate manager 
at the age of twenty-five;-worked in the capacity of estate 
manager on three to six estates for the next fifteen to twenty 
years; sometime between the age of forty-five and fifty 
became an owner.
The individual histories of many of the families 
situated within this planter middle-class and in the lower 
middle-class of supervisory estate personnel are fascinating. 
When studied over a long time span it is evident that both
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upward and downward inter-generational social mobility has 
been an ubiquitous feature of Barbadian plantation society. 
Relying initially on the often- imperfect knowledge of res­
pondents, whose own family histories were later on more 
accurately researched from archival sources,^ it became 
apparent that the fortunes of many families in plantation 
society fluctuated considerably. Some members of the lower 
middle-class came from families which had once owned estates. 
Several planters who had recently acquired estates and had 
previously worked as overseers and managers, recounted how 
they had re-gained a social position lost by their grand­
father or great-grandfather two or three generations ago. A 
section of the Armstrong family tree contained in 
Appendix XXIX,. dissected into four separate phases of socio­
economic mobility, provides a very good illustration of the 
extent to which the social position of one particular family 
altered over time. From further genealogical data collected 
in the field, of which the abridged version of the McConney 
family tree in Appendix XXVIII is an example, it is true to 
say that this is a pattern which has been repeated in a great 
number of cases.
Occupying the lowest rank of the white creole social 
structure are to be found a rapidly declining number of poor 
whites and.'redlegs', traditionally engaged as smallholders 
on the poorest, rockiest soils of the Scotland district, and 
employed as overseers and book-keepers and in a variety of 
trades such as blacksmiths, masons, plumbers and 'horse- 
doctors' on plantations. "Whereas Sheppard (1977: 50) 
estimates that there must have been some 10,000 poor whites 
and 'redlegs* in Barbados in the mid-nineteenth century, 
there are probably no more than 2-300 whites today living 
at near subsistence level in the parishes of St. John,
St. Joseph and St. Andrew. A number of factors have 
accounted for the disappearance of the 'redleg' phenomenon: 
mass emigration during the second half of the nineteenth 
century and in the early years of this century; a series of 
reforms in education, public health and poor relief which 
have improved the living conditions of this sector of the
7white population; 1 the new opportunities offered by the
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growth of the commercial sector which enabled many to rise 
as high as the ranks of the planter/mercantile elite; and 
the absorption through inter-marriage of those unable to 
rise as high as the white middle-class into the ranks of 
the black urban working-class. Miscegenation by this once 
racially arrogant sub-stratum of white Bajan society,
"whose notable badge . was a white skin..." (Thome and 
Kimball, 1838: 230), is probably the last stage in the final 
disappearance of the poor white. One writer in a series of 
newspaper articles in the early 1960s, predicted that by the 
year 2000 there would no longer be a separate poor white 
sector in the community, since inter-marriage between poor 
white migrants from the east coast and urban working-class oblacks had become such a common occurrence in the capital. 
Admittedly impressionistic though proving an invaluable 
source of evidence, participant observation carried out in 
the crowded, noisy rum shops of Tudor Street revealed a num­
ber of these mixed marriages. Further evidence of this process 
is to be found in a recent novel written by a black Barbadian 
(Hutchinson, 1972), in which the central character, a poor 
white ’clerkess’ in one of Broad Street’s department stores, 
trades colour for class in marrying a black civil servant.
It is an interesting problem and one which has not 
been examined in any great depth even by- Sheppard, and that 
is the extent to which all the contemporary eyewitness accounts 
of ’redlegs’ are to be regarded as typical portraits of the 
group. I would also question the assumption that this community 
of transportees remained "dependents, loafers, doers of odd 
jobs and...mere squatters of the most dejected type" (Treves, 
1908: 41) for two and a half centuries on the east coast, 
trapped like moths in amber until the twentieth century. Con­
sider the following eyewitness accounts, exactly seventy years 
apart, in which the typical stereotype of the ’redleg’ is a 
recurring theme:
"Mr. C. pointed out the residences of a number of poor 
white families, whom he described as the most degraded, 
vicious, and abandoned people in the island...They 
live promiscuously, are drunken, licentious, and poverty- 
stricken: a body of most squalid and miserable human 
beings". (Thome and Kimball, 1838: 228/9).
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"Long intermarriage, long living in the tropics,
©Long centuries of purposeless existence have 
left them utterly degenerate, anaemic in mind 
and bo$y, sapless and nerveless, mere shadows 
of once sturdy men". (Treves, 1908: 41)
If the 'redleg* community was as universally demoralized 
and as 'utterly degenerate' as these accounts (and many 
others for that matter) suggest, then it is to be wondered 
how families like the Goddards, the Dowdings and the Seales 
managed to rise to such pre-eminence within a few decades 
and become incorporated into the highest echelons of the 
elite. From the literature the judgement upon them seems to 
be basically a moral one. That is to say that they have been 
castigated and denigrated for the anomaly of having been white 
men who happened to be poor. I would argue that if we looked 
more closely at some of these families and regarded their 
poverty and low status as just one phase in a complete cycle, 
in some respects they share a history in common with groups 
which floated successively between the planter middle-class 
and the lower middle-class. In other words their position in 
the social hierarchy has never been as fixed as popular pre­
judice would claim.
The case of the McConney family provides a good 
illustration of this thesis. Nat McConney, the famous 'redleg* 
land speculator of the 1900s whose entrepreneurial skills 
helped to found the business empire of the Dowdings, was the 
'outside* child of one William Boxill McConney of St. Joseph. 
William Boxill was a butcher by trade, and was the heir to a 
long line of small planters who originally formed part of 
what might be termed a poor yeomanry class. The Barbadian 
McConney family were of Scottish descent, and it is believed 
that they were descended from two brothers, John and Neil 
McConnachy, who were Covenanters exiled as indentured 
servants sometime between 1660 and 1685. By the mid-eighteenth 
century their descendants had become yeoman farmers, cul­
tivating small parcels of land of six to eight acres. At the 
end of the century and into the nineteenth century some 
members of the family owned small estates of ten, twenty and 
thirty-six acres. In the years immediately preceding 
Abolition'small proprietors were undergoing a decline, as
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they were progressively being squeezed out by the big 
planters. The slave revolt of 1816 also had the effect of 
causing large numbers of small planters to abandon agri­
culture. Between 1816 and 1833 these small land owners 
were faced with three choices: to move eastwards onto mar­
ginal land in the Scotland district, to take up some trade 
with the aid of a slave or to emigrate. It seems that some 
members of the MoConney family chose the last option.
William Boxill, however, moved to the Scotland district and 
became a butcher, a trade which he passed on to his son Nat 
MoConney, and one which was also pursued by his brother-in-
Qlaw, Charles Dowding. An abridged version of the MoConney 
family tree indicating the main male lines of descent appears 
in Appendix XXVIII. As an example of the process already 
described in Section 5 of Chapter 3, it is relevant to note 
that the surviving members of the MoConney family still 
resident in Barbados today are all descended from Edward 
Quarless, the descendants of William James having all 
emigrated to Canada in the mass exodus which took place in 
the early years of this century.
8.3. White Creole Social Structure in Martinique.
In comparing the Martiniquan usinier class which 
emerged in the late nineteenth century with the Barbadian 
planter/mercantile elite, one thing is immediately striking, 
and that is its greater homogeneity and ability to resist the 
incorporation of less wealthy Bekes into its ranks. The 
economic factors responsible for this rigidity in the social 
structure which enabled the Grands Bekes to maintain the 
status quo until quite recently, have already been analysed 
in Chapter 5. What is unique about the Martiniquan situation 
is the degree of ascriptiveness which has existed between the 
different strata of the white population, each major sector 
of Beke society representing not only a social class, but a 
closed status group. The importance attached to name which 
identifies an individual as belonging to one of the three 
main sectors of Beke society, and the attendant restrictions 
in intra-group relations in such matters as social mixing and
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choice of marriage partner, when taken to such logical con­
clusions gives these closed status groups the appearance of 
•castes*. Having said this it will become apparent from 
Diagram-III (overleaf) that the model proposed does not 
fully describe the actual social reality, due to the 
existence of several marginal cases which deviate from the 
given norm.
When presented schematically, the Martiniquan 
social structure appears to be superficially similar to the 
Barbadian one. Like Barbados it can be characterized as a 
* combination* class/status system, composed of status 
groupings defined by ethnicity acting in association with 
class. In the following diagram the horizontal axes X, Y 
and Z represent class boundaries which are intersected by 
the vertical status boundary of ethnicity at 0. Within the 
white sector they may also be regarded broadly as status 
boundaries, which are determined patronymically. The 
metropolitan presence in the island is indicated by an 
additional status boundary at P, which distinguishes it 
from the creole sector of the white population. Incon­
gruities in the model which give rise to groups considered 
marginal, are again delineated by rectangles with broken 
lines: (See Diagram III overleaf).
What is once again most immediately striking about
this model is the presence of a dual occupational structure,
in which the determinants of socio-economic ranking are
different for the white and non-white sectors of the
population. Like Barbados the institutionalized economic
dominance of the white elite has persisted up to the present
day. However, alongside a white agri-business bourgeoisie
there exists its mulatto counterpart, a highly restricted
group of Grands Mulatres owning commission agencies, import/
export houses and some of the larger retail outlets, as well
as having interests in property, entertainment, publishing,
agriculture and distilling. Compared with the Grands Bekes
their share of the import/export and commission business is10quite small, being probably less than 10 per cent. The 
existence of a much larger coloured middle-class is primarily
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due to the fact that Martinique has always enjoyed a more 
open land resource situation than Barbados, which has meant 
that the mono-cultural production of sugar has never been 
total, and consequently there has always been a tradition 
of cultures secondaires. Moreover, as I have already 
emphasized in Chapter 5, the topography of the island made 
the complete domination of the usine in the nineteenth 
century impractical, which accounts for the survival of some 
traditional habitations sucreries which were transformed into 
rum distilleries by mulatto planters. This has meant that 
conditions were favourable for the development of a 
bourgeoisie de couleur. whose ascendance was based upon the 
cultivation of coffee and cocoa, and the production of lower- 
grade sugars and the less remunerative rhum agricole. Thus 
the existence of spheres of production of secondary importance 
in the colonial economy provided a means of capital accumu­
lation for a coloured middle-class, which was later invested 
in commerce. It should be noted that the Grands Mulatres of 
the twentieth century were not the first of their kind, since 
there had already existed an established coloured mercantile 
elite in Saint-Pierre before 1902.
According to Kovats (1969: 77), the Grands Bekes 
who form the upper echelons of white creole society as a rule 
possess both wealth and name, and are for the most part the 
descendants of old established families who have not only 
maintained their wealth up to the present day, but have also 
managed to increase it. For the sake of precision it should 
also be noted that the core of this elite are the heirs of 
the usiniers of the nineteenth century, whose wealth is based 
upon the exploitation and ownership of the first central sugar 
factories. Strict application of Kovats!s criteria of wealth 
and name, together with the third criterion advanced above, 
restricts this upper class to no more than ten families, which 
constitutes an agri-business bourgeoisie whose share of the 
total capital invested in the island!s economy is roughly 
50 per cent.11 Although this definition of the Grands Bdk£s 
is accurate for the period prior to I960, it is somewhat 
inadequate today. Arising out of the decline of sugar in the 
1960s which was replaced by bananas as the most valuable
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source of export earnings, plus the new opportunities offered
by the retail distributive trade sector, a nouveau riche
bourgeoisie comprised of a further five families has been
fully incorporated into the ranks of the Grands Bekes during
the past twenty years. If the wealth of this newly arrived
group of Bekes is combined with that of the original core
elite, their share of capital investment increases to 80 per 
12cent. With one exception, unlike the descendants of the 
usiniers members of this new elite do not bear illustrious 
•old* names, their ancestors having arrived in Martinique 
relatively recently after 1789. Nevertheless, to emphasize 
a point made by Kovats (1969: 81), their ascendance in the 
socio-economic hierarchy has automatically conferred 1 lustre*1 
to their name, and consequently they now satisfy the criteria 
for social acceptability within the core elite.
It is possible to identify two further groups which 
qualify for admission into the upper echelons of the elite. 
These may be regarded as marginal cases, since neither group 
meets all of the criteria discussed above. One group of 
families whose fortune has declined and are now living in a 
precarious state of * genteel poverty*, have maintained status 
and respect and hence admission into the social circles of the 
Grands Bekes, due principally to anciennete of name which 
overrides the fact that their wealth has diminished. During 
the period of my fieldwork a branch of one of these families 
was undergoing a process of transition, in retrieving the 
wealth it had lost during the depression of the 1880s through 
the commercialization of banana production. The branch of 
another family which had succumbed to the crisis in the sugar 
industry in the 1960s, and which was currently incurring even 
more financial losses in commerce, was quite rapidly joining 
the ranks of the * genteel poor*. The fact that economic 
decline for this family did not entail loss of status, was 
underlined by one member in the following words:
’•The family has lost a lot of money over the past 
ten years. My husband had to sell off quite a lot 
of land to pay off debts...the business in town has 
run into all kinds of difficulties due to mis­
management, or so I’ve heard...in spite of all this 
the family will always be received in the best 
circles...to think otherwise would be inconceivable”.
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The second marginal group which has only been partially 
incorporated into the ranks of the Grands Bekes is desig­
nated as ’not quite white1. Economically they have been 
integrated into the top strata of the socio-economic 
hierarchy, because their wealth and diversity of interests 
gives them membership of the agri-business bourgeoisie. 
However, since they are regarded by other Bekes as having 
breached the status boundary of ethnicity, they are merely 
tolerated because of their economic standing;©’ It can be 
generally said that families belonging to this group satisfy 
the dual criteria of wealth and name, but not the criterion 
of ’racial purity*, and it is this which restricts them to 
the margins of the social circle of the elite. The 
boundaries segregating this marginal group are somewhat hazy, 
since no complete concensus exists among white creoles as to 
its membership. In the view of the researcher it was 
apparent that a few of the Beke families interviewed who 
were considered to be ’racially pure*, had at least one 
ancestor who was coloured. However, it is through a knowledge 
of genealogies that a family is known or even merely suspected 
of having miscegenated at some time in the past, and not 
through physical appearance, since phenotypically the fact 
of miscegenation (mesalliance) may not be apparent on sight.
The monopoly that the Grands Bekes have wielded
across all three sectors of the economy in the twentieth
century distinguishes them from the Bekes Moyens, who
basically form a middle-class of owner/manager planters and
distillers, and a supervisory and administrative cadre in the
businesses, sugar factories and on the plantations of the
Grands Bekes. It is not the case as in Barbados that this
position in the hierarchy has always provided an avenue of
social mobility, due to the practice of systems of equal 
13inheritance. ^ Within the middle-class there is also to 
be found a group of families bearing the same patronyms as 
the Grands Bekes. These families constitute the lesser 
branches of Grand Beke families who enjoy the prestige of 
name but not status. Thus the bearer of the illustrious name 
*X* does not automatically enjoy the status of Grand Beke.
This point was put to me rather forcibly by the administrator
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of an import/export house in Lametin, who said "I am an 
Hayot, hut I-belong to the Saint-Michel branch of the 
family". Inequalities of wealth within these families is 
what relegates certain branches to a lower rank in the 
socio-economic hierarchy, and it is generally true to say 
that members of the lesser branches are employed as senior 
administrators in the businesses and on the estates owned 
by the major branches of their families. This ensures a 
reasonable standard of living and helps to maintain an 
acceptable degree of status commensurate with their name.
Situated at the bottom of the social hierarchy are 
to be found the Petits Blancs, who can be roughly said to 
form an urban working class and a declining number of 
smallholders or 'Bekes Goyaves* in the countryside. Whilst 
not exhibiting the same degree of geographical segregation 
and cultural separateness as some of the poor white 
communities in Guadeloupe and its dependencies, nor the 
'redlegs' in Barbados, they can nevertheless be sharply dis­
tinguished from the above mentioned sub-groups. Excluded 
from and ignored by Beke society, it is nowhere more apparent 
than here that the different strata of Beke society behave 
more like closed status groups than classes in the orthodox 
sense. What is particularly significant in the case of 
this group is the absence of any avenues of social mobility 
in the twentieth century, which has enabled them to improve 
their social position like the 'redlegs' in Barbados.
Metropolitans are separated from the white creole 
population by the ethnic status boundary at P, and may be 
found scattered at different strata within the socio-economic 
hierarchy. The Prefect and his Chefs de Service, as well as 
high ranking officers in the armed forces, businessmen and 
directors of banks and other financial institutions, occupy 
the upper ranks. Other civil servants and professionals 
(primarily teachers) are situated within a middle-class, and 
servicemen and various grades of skilled and semi-skilled 
government employees (the largest single occupational group 
being the police force) are situated lower down in the 
hierarchy. It is very difficult to say to what extent these 
metropolitans are actually incorporated into local systems of
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social stratification, since they are ’birds of passage’ for 
the most part whose stay in the department is only temporary. 
Nevertheless their impact on Martiniquan society is not to be 
underestimated, since their presence has grown significantly 
over the past twenty-five years, from 7,500 in 1952 to 
50,000 in 1977.14
8.4. Modes of Social Interaction and Cohesion: Patterns
of Associational Life.
In the sphere of associational life we are 
presented with contrasting sets of data which do not neatly 
conform to the social evolutionary models proposed in the 
literature, as developed by such theorists as Maine (1897), 
Morgan (1877), Tonnies (1915) and Durkheim (I893), who s:ee 
voluntary associations taking precedence over involuntary 
ones as societies advance in technology, complexity and 
scale. It is evident from the data already presented in 
Chapters 5 and 6 that both islands share a common economic 
base, and that the emergent modernizing elites have a 
relationship to that base which is similar in many respects.
A major point of difference, however, is to be found in the 
superstructural elements making up each society which reflect 
wide variations. These variations which have already been 
highlighted in the analyses of social structure and mechanisms 
of social reproduction, are suggestive of a characteristic 
though imperfect Gemeinschaft/Gesellsahaft polarity. In a 
comparative analysis variant patterns of associational life 
conform to these ideal types. In Barbados the focus of 
social interaction in white creole society is within a number 
of voluntary associations, whose membership is based upon 
external factors such as occupation and socio-economic 
position. In Martinique this focus is to be found within the 
nuclear family and extended kinship network, which is 
instrumental in organizing individuals into groups based 
upon factors of a more mechanical, natural and emotional kind. 
A detailed analysis of the ideological superstructure upon 
which, these variant modes of social interaction and cohesion 
are founded, will be considered below in Section 5. A
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consideration of the variant patterns of associational life 
will now he analysed in terms of their role as strategies 
of status boundary maintenance.
The extent to which status boundaries have been 
maintained in Barbados is nowhere more immediately apparent 
than in the domain of associational life, where membership 
of social and recreational clubs, cricket clubs and Masonic 
Lodges all mirror the social and cultural commonalities of 
the society's various status groups. The Royal Barbados 
Yacht Club with a membership currently limited to 800, is the 
oldest and most elitist of these associations, being 
traditionally the preserve of upper class whites from the 
planter class, high-ranking colonial civil servants and 
selected English expatriates. In the early years of the 
twentieth century the most prominent members of the Bridgetown 
commercial class who had formed links with the plantocracy 
were also admitted. Those merchants who were excluded from 
the Yacht Club, and this applies without exception to the 
'redleg1 businessmen in the early years of their ascendance, 
formed their own associations: the Rockley Golf and- Country 
Club, the Savannah Club and the Barbados Aquatic Club. At 
this period the Bridgetown Club was also formed to cater for 
commercial interests, and it became the chief venue for the 
white merchants of the City, with its premises located on the 
second floor of the BMLA building in Beckwith Place.
An analysis of club membership among the sample 
interviewed indicates that it continues to be correlated with 
hierarchies of class and status. All members of the agri­
business bourgeoisie belong to the Yacht Club and the Bridge­
town Club, as do absentee proprietors who are "invited to 
join". The fact that some merchants also belong to Rockley, 
Savannah and Barbados Aquatic is an indication that they had 
joined these clubs in the past when they had been unable to 
gain admittance to the Yacht Club. The membership of middle- 
class estate owner/managers in the Yacht Club seems to be 
very much dependent upon a family's standing in the community, 
and the length of time a family had owned property. First 
generation estate owners risen from the ranks of employee and 
some of the new generation of 'redleg' entrepreneurs were not
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generally admitted, though in some cases a few from ’good 
families’ were (i.e. the descendants of the nineteenth 
century plantocracy).
Nowhere is this close association between club 
membership and class and status more apparent than in the 
island’s cricket clubs. From its inception in 1877 the 
Wanderers Cricket Club has been the preserve of prominent 
white planters and merchants, though it is true to say that 
its former exclusivity is now being somewhat eroded. Among 
some of its earliest supporters were the Master-in-Chancery,
Sir William Kellman Chandler, the Piles, John Gardiner Austin 
and the Challenor brothers. Some of Wanderers’ early 
cricketers gained a reputation outside of Barbados itself, 
playing Test cricket for the West Indies and taking part in 
English County matches. Pickwick was formed in 1882 to 
cater for the middle-class whites of the island. In-response 
to the formation of these two white clubs which served the 
agri-business bourgeoisie and the planters, the coloured 
middle,-class formed its own club in 1893, Spartan Cricket 
Club. Three clubs with a lower middle-class and working-class 
membership were the last to be formed. Two clubs which were 
patronized by estate overseers and managers, the Leeward and 
Windward Cricket Clubs, were formed at the end of 1893. These 
were subsequently followed up by their black counterpart, the 
Empire Cricket Club. In this way all of these clubs which 
were formed in the last quarter of the nineteenth century 
provided all sectors of the population with the chance to 
play cricket; those sportsmen dedicated to the game being 
rigidly segregated along lines of ethnicity and class. Although 
in some respects membership is not as rigidly segregated as 
it was a decade ago, from the interviews conducted it is true 
to say that membership of these clubs in the - 1970s generally 
continues to reflect quite accurately status and class 
affiliations.
In matters of associational life the white elite 
displays a remarkable degree of closure, locked in as it is 
into the Anglo-Saxon ’club system’ which ensures the maintenance 
of status boundaries within segregated communities of like 
interests and backgrounds. However, membership of
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associations like Wanderers and the Yacht Club are no longer 
as exclusive in the terms I have described-above. The 
admission of first-class black and coloured cricketers into 
Wanderers, and the extension of membership in the Yacht Club 
to prominent 'redleg* businessmen and members of the new 
political elite, is an indication that the status boundaries 
are no longer as rigidly defined as in the recent past. In 
spite of this apparent 'liberalism' on the part of these 
clubs, membership is still not open in practice to all 
comers. The recent decision of the Yacht Club to maintain a 
restriction on membership to 800 is one means of ensuring 
that this does not happen. Among some older members of the 
white elite there is a common feeling that changes in member­
ship of these two clubs have been too drastic, and as a 
result they have adopted a privatized form of social life, 
preferring to socialize in* the privacy of their own homes 
with their acknowledged peers. One theme which emerged in 
discussions of club membership was the way in which certain 
white associations had been criticized in the press for 
operating a colour bar. Choosing his words very carefully 
one older respondent defended the right of associations to 
be selective in their choice of membership:
"The organization of a club is not apparently fully 
understood by a certain section of the community.
They think that it's not right that a certain 
collection of people should form a club and that 
other people may not be allowed in as members. Well 
that of course is ridiculous. A club is not an 
organization that's got anything to do with the 
general public. It's only something concerning the 
collection of people that have come together, and 
we have had cases in recent years in which clubs 
have been attacked for not admitting X, Y and Z, 
when there's no reason at all why they should. And 
so it has soured the atmosphere to some extent, 
because some people seem to be rather jealous of 
the existence of clubs and certain facilities that 
they have. But they don't seem to realize that 
it's entirely up to the members of the club. They're 
not a public organization and not supported by public 
funds either".
Notwithstanding this perceived threat to privilege and the 
actual erosion which has taken place, the impact of upper- 
class English cultural life is encapsulated in no better 
form than in the clubs of Barbados, reflecting the survival
of some of the most archaic aspects of the English class 
system. As in England considerations of ’caste’ often 
override those of class when determining suitability for 
club membership. Throughout the period of my fieldwork 
numerous instances were related of whites being refused 
admission to some of these clubs, on the basis of family 
background, reputation or behaviour. And as one informant 
related, once turned down by a club committee the decision 
was final:
”If you do something dishonourable and you come up 
for membership at the club, certain people will 
blackball you. And once you get those black balls 
there1s no way of getting in”.
As a result of this high premium which continues 
to be placed on maintaining status boundaries, the white 
elite is successful in maintaining an anonymity in social 
life. Unless he or she has prior connections the chances of 
a casual visitor either seeing or meeting planters- and mer­
chants in public may be limited to race meetings of the 
Barbados Turf Club, the to-ings and fro-ings of Bridgetown 
Club members outside the BMLA building at lunchtime, or to 
planters’ day in Broad Street when planters and estate 
managers converge on the City each Friday to discuss business 
with their attorneys and representatives. The growth of 
tourism in recent years does not appear to have lessened the 
elite’s degree of closure; in fact it seems to have had the 
opposite effect. Respondents and informants alike were 
nostalgic about the days when tourists were mostly English 
and upper-class, and they tended to look down upon the new 
breed of tourist: a product of the highly commercialized 
package holiday which "all classes of Europeans and North 
Americans could afford”. Many of the sentiments held by a 
cross-section of the elite with respect to this new 
phenomenon were echoed time and time again in the words of 
one planter:
’’I ’ve got nothing in common with a car worker from
_Detroit or Luton, so why should I want to have a 
drink with him in a hotel bar?”
It became evident in interviews that the elite regarded
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tourism as a mixed blessing. On the one hand it provided 
remunerative avenues for investment, but on the other hand 
the influx of large numbers of European and North American 
whites with different values and life-styles, racial 
attitudes and sexual mores, was perceived as threatening to 
their status as whites and their authority as employers, 
which they felt would be undermined if others identified 
them with these visitors from metropolitan societies. As 
well as such general factors as deportment and dress, modes 
of social interaction and sexual relations with local black 
Barbadians were felt to be the most unacceptable forms of 
behaviour. What was most singled out for criticism were 
the homosexual 'communities' on the West Coast and the 'beach 
bum' phenomenon, the latter being far more potentially 
threatening since it involved on occasions the pursuit of 
local white girls mistaken for tourists by black Barbadians.1^
Unlike the Anglo-Saxon setting social life in 
Martinique is primarily located within the intimate atmos­
phere of extended kinship networks. Voluntary associations 
tend to be of a functional and highly specialized nature, and 
for the most part limited to specific interests which cut 
across the boundaries of class and ethnicity. In the main 
they are made up of professional and trade associations, 
associations of ex-servicemen and cultural and sporting 
associations (See Appendix XXX ). However, two associations 
in Fort-de-France serving the interests of the City's mer­
cantile community accurately reflect ethnic background in 
their membership. One of these, Le Cercle de Fort-de-France, 
is primarily an institution catering for the Bekes, whilst 
the other, Le Cercle Martiniquaise, has a mulatto membership. 
Whereas the boundary of ethnicity which determines member­
ship in both cases is only customary, the forerunner of the 
Bekes cercle , Le Club de 1'Hermine, which existed in Saint- 
Pierre -before 1902, made a point of systematically excluding 
the City's gens de couleur. A branch of the Rotary Club in 
Fort-de-France has a mixed membership of white creoles and 
mulattos, as well as a large number of metropolitan business­
men, bankers and financiers. Because of the nature of its 
membership which is widely drawn from many sectors of the
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population, it is not regarded by the Bekes themselves as a 
significant focal point for social interaction.
Kovats’ statement (1969: 102) that "the extended 
family coincides with the circle of principal social 
contacts", highlights the central role played by involuntary 
association in all social interaction in Martinique. This 
view of the centrality of family life as a focal point for 
social interaction as opposed to voluntary association among 
the Beke, was reinforced in one of my interviews in the 
following way:
"There is no club life here as in Barbados or any of 
the other English speaking islands for that matter 
...There is no club life in the sense that our 
social life revolves around a ’club house’ which 
people frequent in order to meet their friends. 
Martiniquan life is very intimate. We prefer to 
spend all our free time with our families and 
relatives...entertaining in our own homes”.
Within the Martiniquan context as most respondents were 
quick to point out, "friends were family". This was made 
apparent in a number of examples when discussing the social 
activities of the various sub-groups of Beke society, which 
revolve almost exclusively around a wide range of different 
family gatherings: weddings, christenings, funerals, dinners, 
outings, feast day celebrations and shared holidays. In 
spite of the generous hospitality extended to me in other 
circumstances, it was significant that I received no 
invitations to such gatherings. The extent of this clannish­
ness is exemplified by an example drawn from Kovats* work, 
of one group of families allied by marriage who jointly own 
a small island off the Martiniquan coast where they spend 
holidays together, the island being dotted with small 
holiday homes belonging to the various nuclear families. On 
two occasions whilst spending week-ends on the coast, the 
researcher had the experience of meeting Bekes whom he had 
previously interviewed, staying nearby accompanied by 
members not only of his nuclear family but also his extended 
family. The weekend house parties are very much family 
affairs in which all activities are shared by the extended 
family to the exclusion of outsiders.
The importance attached to familial participation 
in all forms of social interaction was further exemplified by
285
286
the conditions under which discussions with informants and 
interviews were conducted. Whereas in Barbados interviews 
were conducted strictly on a business-like one to one basis 
in the privacy of an office, in Martinique the possibility 
of establishing a working relationship with a respondent was 
vitiated by the fact that such visits were regarded as social 
events in themselves, involving the participation of other 
members of both nuclear and extended family. A common 
feature of all these interviews was a preoccupation with 
genealogy, and an inordinate amount of time was spent by the 
individuals present in untangling family interconnections and 
deciding who was whose cousin. This presented some difficulty 
in the field, since such conditions necessitated the sub­
stitution of a structured interview for less directive tech­
niques in gathering data. This situation peculiar to the 
Martiniquan setting was not without significance, since it 
demonstrated the solidarity of kinship and underlined the 
communal nature of all interaction. It became apparent in 
these interviews that the prolonged discussions which revolved 
around family trees were carefully manipulated performances, 
in which the kinds of information imparted were carefully-j *
controlled. In this way the potential threat offered by the 
intrusion of an outsider asking potentially sensitive 
questions was dealt with by the concerted effort of the 'clan*.
Since all social interaction is located within the 
intimate sphere of family life, it is probably true to say 
that the Bekes are even a more invisible minority than their 
Barbadian counterparts. It can be said with greater certainty 
that the group displays an even greater degree of closure, 
segmented as it is into a series of extended kinship net­
works organized on the basis of wealth, name, 'racial purity1 
and reputation. I n  making a comparative analysis it is 
important to stress that the maintenance of status boundaries 
takes place not only at the level of ethnicity and class, but 
most importantly at the level of familial identification.
It is in the process of primary socialization that an 
individual's position in Beke society is indelibly fixed:
"The child is raised firstly in the cult of his
„family name, then afterwards in that of the social 
group to which he belongs" (Kovats, 1969: 102).
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The importance of familial identification oame across in 
several ways in interviews. Firstly, individuals exhibited 
a heightened consciousness of -their patronym when dis­
cussing landownership, which was invariably prefaced by the 
statement "I am an Hayot...£ and a long discourse on the 
history of the family. Secondly, an intricate knowledge of 
genealogies and ego’s relationship with members of other 
Beke families was startlingly articulated in a way that the 
Barbadian elite were incapable of doing. Thirdly, the way 
in which families were the repositories of recognizable sub­
cultures, each with their own private language, customs, 
ancestral myths and attributes. What was most striking was 
the extent to which individual families were identified by 
idiosyncratic characteristics: one family was credited with 
"great intelligence”, another with ttwittt, another with "daring 
and individuality”. Each of these attributes took the form 
of ascribed qualities, and were thus considered to be 
inherited by each successive generation.
It may also be noted that the influx of large 
numbers^ of metropolitan whites during the last twenty-five 
years has done nothing (as in the case of the tourist industry 
in Barbados) to lessen the closure of white creole society.
In taking a generalized stance against this ’invasion*Bekes 
expressed an identity of nationalist interest with Martiniquans 
as a whole,, which took precedence over all other factors, such 
as class, ethnicity and race. Contrary to the Barbadian 
elite’s distaste of metropolitan sexual mores and modes of 
interaction with black islanders, what the Bekes criticized 
was the arrogance of the ’zoreilles’ who came to Martinique 
”as agents of a new form of colonialism, quick to exploit and 
mistreat the common man and to despise local custom". A 
second source of conflict originated in the manner in which 
many metropolitans offended the Bekes'rigid moral code, and 
what most respondents selected here for criticism was personal 
dishonesty and dishonesty in business. Given the strictness 
of the extent to which the Bekes themselves maintain the 
status boundary of ethnicity, it was surprising to discover 
that inter-racial marriage between metropolitans and coloured 
Martiniquans went uncriticized by the Bekes. This may be seen
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as yet another indication that the metropolitan sector of 
the population has not been incorporated into the local 
system of hierarchy and values.
8.5. Ideology and Social Action.
Based upon the premiss that it is a solidarity of 
purpose and group consciousness which gives an elite a high 
degree of unity and cohesiveness in terms of social and moral 
integration, from the analysis of the social structure of 
both societies it is evident that the nature of this unity 
and cohesion is qualitatively different. Some of the points 
already raised concerning differences in social structure, 
social reproduction and modes of interaction, highlight 
significant differences in the relationship between individual 
and society, which is highly suggestive of the distinction 
Durkheim made (1893) between solidarity of a 'mechanical' 
nature and that of an 'organic' kind. In the case of 
'mechanical solidarity* which is based upon a totality of 
beliefs and sentiments collectively held by all members of 
a group, the individual's focus of identification is familial 
and tribal. The basis of this type of social cohesion is a 
collective consciousness which is predicated upon a supposed 
identity between individuals. By contrast 'organic solidarity* 
presupposes the absence of communal beliefs and actions, and 
hence a difference between individuals. In this case the 
individual's identification is with a series of functional 
groups, which may or may not be coterminous. The importance 
attached to family, name and genealogical descent among the 
Bekes, and the primacy of involuntary association in all 
social interaction, suggests that cohesion is based upon a 
'mechanical' form of solidarity. In Barbados where group 
identity is-more clearly related to class position, and the 
focus of social interaction is within a number of functional 
associations whose membership is determined by socio-economic 
factors as opposed to those of lineage and 'clan1, solidarity 
is of an 'organic' nature. Given these contrasting social 
realities-which have so far been expressed in the sphere of 
action, in order to fully understand them as organic unities
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our analysis must be extended to a consideration of the role 
of values, and the way in which they influence action. To 
this end I have chosen to begin by examining the different 
criteria employed in making status judgements within Beke and 
white Bajan society.
The responses to the question: "What is it that 
decides someone's social importance in Barbados/Martinique?" 
were very interesting, since they clearly revealed wide 
variations in the criteria used in judging status. In 
Barbados wealth was almost unanimously singled out as the 
one major factor which determined an individual's standing
in society. Little significance, if any, was attached to the
importance of name and family. A typical response given by 
some dozen respondents in roughly the same form, was prag­
matically that of "money: what a fella earns". This view was 
modified by a few respondents who noted that wealth in itself 
had become the criterion of status, but that a certain social 
cachet was still attached to a few 'old' names. One 
expression of this view took the following form:
"I think there's a tendency to swing towards the 
American idea of importance by income ranking...
No opinion on that can ever be completely true,
but I think that people are getting more conscious 
of what a chap's earning...with still overtones of 
the people who_(embarrassed laugh)...er...matter... 
you know - respect for the old established whites...”
This kind of view was voiced by members of older, established 
plantocratic families and may be regarded as a subjective 
notion of their own worth. In a minority of cases idiosyn­
cratic notions of "what a man is”, usually defined by 
reference to general behaviour, honesty, reputation etc., 
were also quoted as criteria for judging status, often with 
the aim of denying the importance attached to wealth in a 
highly materialistic society.
Within Beke society the dual criteria of wealth and 
name proved to be- of primary importance in placing someone 
socially. However, they are not the only ones, since there 
are a number of other less tangible criteria upon which con­
siderable emphasis is placed. These include such notions as 
education (breeding), bonnes manieres (good manners),
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reputation (reputation), instruction (knowledge and learning) 
and frequentation (the company one keeps), all of which are 
enshrined in the ideal of the honnete homme. Although these 
are of secondary importance at first sight, in reality they 
are interwoven with the dual criteria of wealth and name.
Their importance lies in the way in which they form the basis 
of a traditional morality, which informs appropriate and 
acceptable codes of conduct and controls the modes of inter­
action with other groups in society. Their role in the order 
of things is not to be underestimated, since sanctions which 
can be imposed against transgressors can be, and often are, 
severe, and can effect a whole family’s good name and fortune. 
Miscegenation, dishonesty in business, bankruptcy, keeping 
bad company, various pathological and deviant forms of 
behaviour and certain ’indelicate’ situations in marital 
relations, will all result in the social exclusion of the 
individual concerned. With respect to the role of wealth 
and the application of less instrumental criteria, one Grand 
Beke had this to say:
’’I’ll tell you right away that it is not strictly a 
question of money which determines someone’s 
importance, because there are many people who are 
highly considered but who are not so well off. Let 
me explain if I can ... Martinique is a small 
country where everyone knows each other ... if some­
one commits a gaffe - some foolish unseemly act - 
the consequences of this will haunt him and his 
family for a very long time”.
It is important to stress that in Beke society the adage 
"no man is an island” applies with full force. Severe trans­
gressions usually Involve the physical removal of the male­
factor in order that the nuclear and extended family do not 
lose face completely. During the period of my fieldwork I 
came across several families who had members forced to leave 
the island for various reasons, who were now living in other 
overseas departments or territories, or in metropolitan 
France. For the individual concerned departure from the 
island is often imperative, since Beke society is so closely 
knit and Bekes depend on each other in a multitude of ways, 
for jobs, homes, credit facilities etc., which means that he 
or she can no longer survive in society as a Beke. One of my
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informants, a young homme de couleur from Didier, intro­
duced me to his maternal grandfather, a Beke who had married 
a coloured Martiniquan woman and in consequence for this 
mesalliance was no longer recognized by his family. Rejected 
by Beke society he was forced to renounce his inheritance 
as a young man, and left to carve out his own living without 
the kind of support that Bekes expect from their peers.
Beke society is therefore very much a 'moral community* par 
excellence, in which an individual's actions are subject to 
constant scrutiny and the imposition of social controls to 
maintain conformity.
In Barbados the situation is far more ambiguous and 
less clearly defined. The evidence suggests that less instru­
mental criteria do play a role in status judgements, but they 
are often idiosyncratic and highly individualistic. This 
makes it difficult to say to what extent they can be said to 
constitute a coherent body of traditional morality, in the 
same way that similar judgements in Martinique clearly do. 
Like Martinique Barbados is a small society in which it is 
difficult for an individual's actions to go unnoticed and 
pass without comment. This was a point emphasized frequently 
in interviews in both islands. However, consequent upon the 
fragmentation and greater heterogeneity.of white creole 
society in Barbados,' there is a marked absence of any 
communally held beliefs concerning an individual's worth or 
esteem. As a generalization it is probably true to say that
dishonesty in business or marrying across the colour line,
17may not be entirely approved of, but they do not result in 
the complete expulsion of an offender from society. On the 
issue of miscegenation one planter characterized the outcome 
as a kind of unwilling acceptance:
"It's happened so frequently. It might not be approved 
.of by the immediate family and their circle of 
acquaintances but they just have to put up with it.
It's rather like a girl in England marrying a mechanic 
from Huddersfield. You've just got to lump it".
The same planter then went on to describe the reaction of his 
family when an aunt married a coloured Barbadian fifty years 
ago:
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"It's not quite the social disaster when my aunt,
_who was living here in the 1920s after my father 
died, married the manager who was partly coloured.
She was ostracized by pretty nearly everyone in her 
social circle for twenty-five years. Partly because 
she married down and because he was coloured. It 
was considered a perfectly disgraceful thing to do 
... I gather it caused an absolute furore. Now that 
wouldn't take place for good or bad".
It is apparent that the sanctions enforced against the 
offender for this kind of non-conformity whilst resulting in 
social ostracization, were not nearly as severe as they would 
have been in Martinique for a similar offence. Moreover, the 
frankness with which the respondent concerned related this 
incident would have been completely unthinkable in the 
Martiniquan context.
The ideological underpinnings of the elite's con­
ception of its role in creole society can be broken down into 
two separate components: ideologies concerning functional
role and those concerning symbolic role. The historical 
basis of these ideologies is rooted in the structural dis­
tribution of wealth, esteem and power which was established 
very early on in plantation society. As I have already 
indicated in Chapter 3, the different social strata in 
slave society were distinguished on the basis of the following 
qualitative criteria: modes of entry, legal and historical
origins, and the differential access to scarce resources and 
power. Added to this, the enactment of legislation by the 
colonial powers imposed an ideological rationale for a form 
of status honour based upon phenotype and ethnicity. In 
this process between the foundation of both colonies and the 
onset of the 'sugar revolution', the upper echelons of the 
European minority acquired a functional role which was con­
sequent upon their seizure of economic mastery and access to 
political power. The acquisition of a symbolic role was 
theoretically acquired by the propertied and non-propertied 
alike, since it signified a form of status honour based upon 
the expression of racial and ethnic superiority, which 
manifested itself in an extreme ethnocentrism.
It can be argued that the structural distribution 
of wealth, power and esteem is no longer as rigid as it once
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was, owing to the existence of alternative avenues of social 
mobility for the majority population. One by-product of this 
has been the formation of political 'counter elites', who have 
taken away some of the former functions of the white planter/ 
mercantile elite and modified others. At the macro-level 
hierarchies of socio-economic class clearly play a predominant 
role over ethnic status in the social structure. However, the 
absence of an integrated class structure, and its corollary, 
a dual occupational structure, does point to the maintenance 
of a certain rigidity in the distribution of scarce economic 
and social resources, since the traditional economic supremacy 
of the white elite has remained unaltered in its essentials. 
Given this, and the fact that there has been a marked decline 
in interactional status based upon- ethnicity and the rule of 
traditional authority within the plantation, it is not sur­
prising that ideologies pertaining to role should be primarily 
functional in nature.
What was most striking in the field was the way in 
which ideologies concerning symbolic role were very weakly 
articulated (particularly in Barbados), whereas those relating 
to functional role were articulated with a coherence which 
was lacking in the case of the former. In response to the 
question "What contribution (apart from the economic) do you 
think the planter class has made to island society?", what 
was interesting was that in both islands the majority of the 
sample stressed political and social stability as a major 
contribution. In Barbados a substantial number of res­
pondents also emphasized this point in relation to the time 
and energies devoted to the political and administrative 
life of the colony in the past, indicating their active role 
in central government and the Vestry system, and the part 
played as members of the various departmental Boards. All 
these without exception advanced the view that they were 
responsible for developing a democratic system of government 
which Barbados enjoyed today, and which contrasted starkly 
with the political anarchy and instability of Jamaica and 
Guyana. A typical comment was the following:
"My forebears left a substantial legacy for everybody 
to work on today, and it is because of this base, 
which was available to the people of the island when
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politics became freer and everybody had an 
opportunity to vote, that Barbados has been 
able to go forward the way. it has like no other 
island in the West Indies11.
Another maintained that:
11 We have a stable government compared with Jamaica 
....and its through the inspiration of the white 
community and the teaching of past generations 
that this has come about”.
In Martinique a recurring theme in most interviews was that 
of Haiti. Respondents who stressed the contribution of the 
planter class to the political and social stability of 
Martiniquan society, obsessively used this as a point of 
comparison in the same way that Jamaica and Guyana were used 
by the Barbadian elite. Over and over again respondents 
emphasized that if they had been overthrown like the planters 
of Saint-Dominque in a ’black revolution’, or if they were to 
be overthrown in the future (the possibility of ’another 
Haiti* being a continual preoccupation of the elite up to the 
present), Martiniquans would no longer enjoy a democratic 
system of government and such a high standard of living. One 
point of difference did emerge here and this is related to 
the fact that the Bekes lost their direct political power 
over a hundred years ago during the Third Republic. Unlike 
the Barbadian elite who stressed their contribution to 
stability in terms of their participation in political office, 
the Bekes stressed their contribution to stability through 
the exercise of a more diffuse source of power: that of 
traditional authority through the plantation system.
It is significant from the above findings that when 
the sample was asked to pinpoint their contribution to 
society in non-instrumental terms, they chose to talk about 
their access to and exercise of political and social power. 
However, the most cogent expression of the elites’ belief in 
its functional role surfaced in the consistently held view 
that only the Europeans were suitably adapted to agriculture 
and business. Only a small proportion of the sample in both 
islands argued their case in terms of ethnic factors, 
indicating that such qualities as ’thrift”, "steadfastness”, 
’’patience”, ”endurance” and the "ability to look ahead” had
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made the European an ideal planter in a difficult tropical 
climate. -On the other hand "people of African stock", they 
argued, usually only sought short-term gains in every ven­
ture they undertook, were unwilling to make sacrifices, 
lacked the necessary dedication and preferred an easy trouble- 
free life in place of hard work. In both islands planters 
related a number of anecdotes which they freely employed to 
substantiate the prevailing stereotypes. Most of these 
centred around similar categories of ideas already described 
by Kovats (1969: 154/155): an incapacity to work methodically;
the need for constant supervision (preferably by a white man); 
in dealing with mechanical equipment the tendency to be some--1 othing of a bricoleur rather than a technician, illustrating 
as in Kovat&'s study "a lack of assimilation into industrial 
civilization”; and an inability to cope with personal finances. 
Cultural stereotypes of the coloured middle-classes presented 
them as being functionally better adapted to expressive and 
intellectual activities: they made good lawyers because of 
their oratorial skills, and were gifted writers, musicians 
and artists due to innate creative capacities. Echoing the 
aphorism once current fifteen or twenty years ago in the 
French Antilles:
Blancs: "riche et sans culture" ^
Mulatres: "instruite et peu fortunee",
one Beke informant noted that the gens de couleur had made 
outstanding contributions to the cultural and intellectual 
life of Martinique, as brilliant poets and writers, but it 
was the Bekes who had developed the material resources of 
the island and therefore deserved the material benefits.
The majority view, however, was based upon the 
proposition that what made them better agriculturists, and 
to a lesser degree better businessmen, was simply the result 
of historical accident. Since they had always been an economic 
elite and had always been planters, they had the background 
and know-how which others lacked. In Martinique one planter 
expressed this in the following way:
"Because of a peculiar set of historical circumstances 
.the Bekes became the economic masters of the island, 
and I don't think that they can be criticized for this.
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They have proved that they deserve this role, which 
justifies their continuing existence".
A comparable quote was supplied by the wife of one Barbadian 
planter, who sought to explain in similar terms why the white 
creole community was peculiarly suited to plantership:
"Look, we've been here for over 300 years and it's 
.just a quirk of history that put us here. And 
it's this same quirk of history that equally made 
us an economically dominant group. And it's through 
this set of circumstances that we have developed an 
expertise in planting and trading. Just to draw an 
analogy... it's rather like the Jews in Europe who 
became money lenders and pawnbrokers. They acquired 
a specialized occupation which over time became... 
er ... traditional".
Inherent in these views is what might best be described as 
an ideology of 'traditionalism'. In this context it can be 
regarded as a view to the effect that the white creole 
sector of the population has inherited certain aptitudes, 
skills and abilities which are transmitted from generation to 
generation, by dint of historical precedent rather than 
certain innate biological characteristics, which has given 
them the necessary basis for performing the role of economic 
elite best. At first sight the elites in both islands 
appear to share this common ideology of traditionalism, but 
one significant difference lay in the way in which the Bekes 
invariably appended an 'ought statement' to the fact of 
economic supremacy, to the effect that proven ability in 
past performance gave them a moral right to maintain their 
position in the future. It is the rightness of "what has 
been and always will be" as expressed by the Bekes, which 
subjects the more narrowly defined ideology of traditionalism 
in Barbados to a number of nuances, suffusing mere ideology 
of function with a world of symbolic meaning.
In the Martiniquan case a most interesting precedent 
for this view was established by the proprietor of Le Prop- 
agateur nearly a century ago. In his book (Souquet-Basiege, 
1882) which was written against•a background of political 
ferment, in which the introduction of republican institutions 
led to the displacement of the Bekes as the governing elite 
by a new coloured political elite, the author presents a 
case for the maintenance of Beke political power. To this end
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Souquet-Basiege rejects the crude notion of superiority- 
based on- race and ethnicity, and replaces it with one based 
on class. He advances the view that the established racial 
divisions of ’Beke1, ’Mulatre’ and ’Noir’ in themselves were 
of little importance in the colonial hierarchy. Employing 
a biblical imagery he argued that:
1 ...we are all derived from the same racial stock,
^because we are of the same nature...The Almighty 
gave life to the same piece of matter and created 
us with one breath...(making of us all) the children 
of God”. (Souquet-Basiege, 1882: 656).
Having established this point the author goes on to justify 
the superiority of the Bekes, by adopting a number of ideas 
borrowed from the writings of Burke and De Tocqueville on the 
French and American revolutions. What interests us here most 
is Burke’s contribution to Souquet-Basiege*s thesis, which 
rests upon the assertion that social hierarchy is natural, 
and that society operates in a way which history merely reveals 
unconditioned by laws or its own internal dynamic. In Burke’s 
view inequality was rooted in the very nature of society 
itself, and hereditary power was transmitted from generation 
to generation, rightfully so, because the distinctions of rank 
implied by this power were based upon talent, merit and ability 
In borrowing this idea of Burke which viewed the traditional 
inheritance of power as natural, Souquet-Basiege was able 
to argue that the Bekes occupied a rightfully dominant 
position in the social hierarchy because of their inherited 
aptitudes and talents which were fixed by birth, wealth and 
education. Their superiority and right to rule was determined 
therefore not by their racial origins, but by their social 
origins.
In trying to tap beliefs on the elites’ concept of 
its symbolic role, and the relevance that such a concept 
might have for status honour, group closure and status 
boundary maintenance, one gross fact emerged. Ethnicity in 
itself was not a factor governing the structuring of social 
relationships and patterns of social interaction. Ethnicity 
per se was not a determinant factor in the establishment and 
maintenance of status boundaries. The evidence presented
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below indicates that ideologies within the sphere of the 
symbolic are not related directly to ethnocentrism, but to 
the fact of institutionalized power. I would argue, there­
fore, that the closure of both groups is based more upon the 
historical fact of the white creole elites’ superordinate 
position in the structural distribution of wealth, power and 
esteem, which has attained a rigidity over time which has 
nothing directly to do with notions of cultural and biological 
superiority. I have sought to provide evidence for this 
hypothesis with reference to the practice of endogamy and 
inter-ethnic group relations.
The Practice of Endogamy.
The practice and underlying ideology of endogamy 
among the Bekes has already been treated in passing by 
Leiris (1955), and forms a central theme in the work of 
Kovats (1969). Leiris depicts endogamy as operating at the 
level of ethnic identity, with factors of inclusion/exclusion 
based upon the role sign of phenotype. According to him an 
unacceptable marriage takes place
"When a white creole marries a coloured woman or 
(more exceptionally) when a coloured man marries a 
local white woman..." (Leiris, 1955: 127).
In either case a mesalliance is considered to have taken 
place. However, from the evidence presented by Kovats 
(1969: 116-156) it is apparent that the operation of endogamy 
is far more complex than that suggested by Leiris. In actual 
fact the choice of a marital partner and the making of a 
'beau marriage* is governed by both ethnicity and socio­
economic position. Both these factors taken together are 
considered by the Bekes to play a primary role. It is 
significant that although the term mesalliance is generally 
applied to inter-racial marriages in Martinique, it cannot 
be precisely translated, as 'miscegenation', since its use 
is equally applied to marital unions with-persons of an 
inferior socio-economic position. This extension of the 
principle of endogamy to considerations of class is not 
prescribed by convention in the same way that it is by race. 
However, statistically speaking it is a highly significant
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factor in determining the choice of a marital partner, as 
Kovats1 data indicates:
TABLE XXXIII : INTRA-GROUP MARITAL ALLIANCES AMONG THE 
BEKES - -
Grands Bekes Bekes Moyens Petits Blancs
Grands Bekes:
Male 56.7% 38.3% 7.4%
Female 65.6% 43.0% 15.0%
Bekes Moyens:
Male 35.1% 48.2% 24.2%
Female 32.1% 45.1% 22.4%
Petits Blancs:
Male 8.2% 13.5% 68.4%
Female 2.3% 11.9% 62.6%
(Source: Kovats, 1969: 125 bis).
The marked tendency for intra-group endogamy within Beke 
society, and in particular unions of a consanguinal kind, was 
highlighted in the field in discussions centred around 
genealogy. Respondents and their families talked about 
genealogy in terms of webs of familial affiliations, and 
characterized their family trees as blocks of alliances in 
which their nuclear family was united consanguinally with 
several other families of a similar socio-economic background. 
Internally, therefore, Beke society is segmented through the 
practice of intra-group endogamy, and from this perspective 
forms of social cohesion and solidarity are based primarily 
upon shared economic interests.
The principle of endogamy among the Bekes operates 
at yet another level, in which the metropolitan outsider is 
excluded. Thus it may be argued as Kovats does (1969: 123):
"...in conformity with traditional norms, all elements 
^from outside the group, even white, are excluded a 
priori".
Certainly it is true to say that the maintenance of this 
principle of exclusion extended to the metropolitan, outsider
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has been instrumental in preventing the transfer of economic 
interests abroad, in the same way that its extension to 
coloured Martiniquans has prevented the transfer of interests 
into non-Beke hands. It is significant to note, however, that 
when this- norm is waived it invariably involves the marriage 
of partners of similar socio-economic standing. I would not 
agree with Kovats that the practice is a recent phenomenon, 
but would argue that it has been an enduring feature over the 
last 300 years. In the early colonial period, family trees 
and contemporary writers bear witness to a number of alliances 
made by the Martiniquan plantocracy with influential members 
of the French court and colonial administration.10 In the 
second half of the nineteenth century a number of alliances 
were made between the new usinier class and the representat­
ives of metropolitan capital, of which the marriage of 
Bougenot to the daughter of the proprietor of Le Galion has 
already been quoted as an example. More recently the Bekes 
have married into metropolitan commercial and industrial 
families, and the daughters of several Grands Bekes have 
married senior civil servants from metropolitan France.
Whilst it is certainly true that the principle of endogamy 
at this level is not an inflexible one, it is also true to 
say that the Bekes in practice don’t just marry anyone from 
overseas with a white skin. It can be said that the principles 
governing selection are similar to those governing the 
selection of marriage partners within white creole society, 
which again re-inforces the primacy of class and economic 
interest over all other factors.
Whilst it is not so difficult to draw conclusions 
about the functions of endogamy for the Barbadian elite, it is 
not so easy to isolate the principles upon which it is founded 
with any degree of precision. According to Kovats (1969: 116) 
for the Bekes the institution of marriage has served as the 
’•backbone” of the group; the selection of partners being 
"vital operations fraught with consequences for the future of 
the collectivity'’. That this is so is highlighted by the 
consciousness displayed by respondents and their families of 
the importance played by marriage in maintaining social 
cohesion, and the avoidance of mesalliance at all costs,
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whether across the colour line or down the social scale. In 
this respect it was quite striking the extent to which the 
Bekes were able to articulate the informal codes governing 
all matters concerning marriage, and the existence of cate­
gories to verbalize these codes to a complex degree. It 
would be an exaggeration to state that marriage in itself was 
perceived in such a deterministic light in Barbados. Whilst 
the group may be said to be endogamous at the level of 
ethnicity and race, the practice is not subject to the same 
degree of internal segmentation and selectivity.
At the level of white creole society itself, there 
is no evidence of the kind of generalized ruling that all 
elements external to the group are a -priori excluded from 
marriage with white creoles. That this kind of ruling doesn't 
pertain is most clearly seen in the fusion which took place 
between the new mercantile class and the plantocracy in the 
early years of the twentieth century. Among the sample inter­
viewed in 1977 roughly one-quarter had taken wives from over­
seas: from the U.K., Canada and the United States. On the 
whole there is no clear cut evidence of intra-group endogamy 
within the Bajan elite, which means that one doesn't find 
the same kinds of blocks of alliances among families that is 
so characteristic of the Martiniquan case. Among the higher 
echelons of the elite with their wider social contacts and 
greater geographical mobility, one finds just as many marriages 
with overseas whites as with white creoles. According to 
several informants there is now a tendency for members of the 
agri-business bourgeoisie to increasingly marry more over­
seas whites than creoles. The fact that these marital 
alliances are invariably always made with families from a 
similar socio-economic background, highlights one gross fact 
which was substantiated by the upper echelons of the elite: 
the limited size of the pool from which desirable marital 
partners can be drawn in local society. During the period 
of the rise of the Bridgetown mercantile class a number of 
these alliances were made with North American commercial and 
trading families, a fact which serves to re-inforce the over­
riding primacy of class and economic interests, in the same 
way that the alliances of the Bekes with the commercial and
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industrial bourgeoisie of France has done over the last two 
decades.
For the present adult generation of white Barbadians 
(that is to say the offsprings of the majority of the sample 
interviewed), the breakdown of endogamy cannot be viewed as a 
strategic measure to secure economic alliances abroad as it 
once was in the past.. In the wake of independence and the 
difficult political climate which stimulated a sense of 
insecurity for the future, numbers of young white Barbadians 
increasingly sought higher education and vocational training 
abroad, with the intention of building a foundation for a
career in some profession. Among the sample interviewed\between one-quarter and one-third of the total number of their 
offsprings were either in higher education or employed, mainly 
in Canada, the U.K. and the U.S.A. All of this.group were 
either training for or qualified in a wide variety of 
professions: medicine, dentistry, management, teaching, law 
and engineering. The majority of those already qualified and 
working were married with English, Canadian and American 
spouses. Of those still in education or still receiving 
vocational training, respondents voiced the opinion that their 
children would ultimately marry and settle down abroad.
Inter-Ethnic Group Relations.
The maintenance of the status boundaries of eth­
nicity indicates that ethnicity still plays an important role 
in the white elite's perception of status hierarchy, which 
governs modes of s.ocial interaction. However, although 
historically the conditions were laid down in early 
plantation society for the emergence and development of ethnic 
stratification, ethnicity alone can no longer be regarded as 
a determining factor in inter-ethnic group relations.
Important intervening variables in both islands are those of 
class and social context. Their relevance and comparative 
importance will be discussed below.
In setting out to analyse inter-ethnic group 
relations in Barbados and Martinique, I start off from the 
premiss suggested by Barth (1974: 15) that the critical focus
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of investigation is "the ethnic boundary that defines the 
group, not the cultural stuff that it encloses". What will 
therefore be central to my analysis are socially relevant 
factors rather than objective cultural differences. Bearing 
this in mind I can find no better starting point than that 
suggested by Leiris’s seminal distinction in the French 
Antillean context between ’relations prives’ and ’relations 
publiques’ (1955: 129). In making this distinction recog­
nition is-accorded to the fact that social context is 
probably one of the most crucial determinants of white creole 
relations with other groups in society. Quite broadly it may 
be stated that in both islands a dividing line is drawn 
between spheres of intimacy, such as family life, marriage 
and all matters pertaining to procreation and the position of 
women, and the more public sphere, such as political life, 
work and education in which social relations between equals 
in a variety of contexts are considered the norm.
Roughly the same kinds of social contexts des­
cribed by Leiris (1955: 129/130) in which men of similar 
social backgrounds meet on equal terms, such as chance 
encounters in public places and places of entertainment, 
official functions, meetings of professional and business 
organizations and charity functions, were recorded by res­
pondents in Barbados. Also in Barbados I have already noted 
the extent to which selected members of the coloured middle- 
class and political elite have recently been accepted into 
’white clubs’. In other cases such as the Barbados Marketing 
Corporation,-the - Sugar Producers’ Association, the Agricultural 
Society and a number of organizations which regulate the 
export of sugar and molasses, the opportunities for developing 
social contacts!, in which common educational and cultural 
levels and shared business and professional interests cut 
across the boundaries of ethnicity, are many and varied. 
According to Hugh Springer, before the abolition of local 
government the parish vestries were important focal points of. 
contact "where men of different colour could if not agree, 
could agree to differ on local issues". Whether through 
political alliances or in opposition in the House of Assembly 
in the 1930s and 1940s, shared experiences in the political
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arena provided the white elite and men of colour with a 
basis for sustained contact and mutual respect, and some­
times even admiration.
It must be noted, however, that these inter-ethnic 
relationships built up in the public workaday world and in 
places of entertainment such as bars and rum shops "where 
only men meet", do not as a rule penetrate the intimate 
closed world of the home, through which a non-white 
acquaintance could conceivably extend his network of social 
relationships. Relationships between 'equals1 therefore tend 
to operate on a highly individualistic basis, and be res­
tricted to areas of life outside the home. A few examples 
drawn from interviews and participant observation will serve 
to illustrate ways in which the distinction between 'relations 
prives' and 'relations publiques' are maintained:
(1) Extensive participant observation carried out at 
The Firefly, one of the more respectable rum shops in 
Bridgetown patronized by many white and coloured plantation 
supervisory staff, indicated that the world of work and the 
daily ritual of social drinking with peers before returning 
home, were sharply divorced from the intimate world of family 
life. Lubricated by a steady flow of rum in which each 
individual in turn bought his round, the topics of conver­
sation were characteristically those of sugar, rum, cricket, 
horse racing and island politics. Shared drinking in which 
the refusal of a drink offered was tantamount to an open 
insult, and the choice of topics of conversation which every­
one with shared experiences could follow and express opinions, 
was a great leveller. In the world of the rum shop equality 
was the central value of the regular clientele. Family and 
domestic life very rarely if ever cropped up as general 
topics of conversation. It was significant when visiting 
the homes of a white overseer and a factory manager on a 
number of occasions, that social visiting by acquaintances 
from the rum shop was exclusively by other white Bajans.
When probed on this apparent selectivity one informant replied 
that the pattern was "customary'1. The other gave a fuller 
explanation in the following terms:
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"What goes on outside and what I do with my time
_I only have myself to answer for. Where I have 
niy wife and children to consider that's different 
,.. I cannot allow them to be exposed to outside 
influences... Besides, my wife wouldn't like me 
bringing home coloured fellas".
(2) In Martinique a communist mayor related how he had 
been on very close terms with a prominent Beke commission 
agent for nearly twenty years. Common intellectual pursuits 
had brought them together and their friendship had developed 
as members of the local Historical Society of which they were 
founding members. The Beke was an avid bibliophile, and was 
reputed to have the best private collection of rare books in 
the island. Through their close friendship from time to 
time M. Rousseau entrusted the mayor with the loan of one of 
his precious books. One day M. Rousseau invited the major 
to view his collection at home, and added that he could use 
his library at any time he wished. Arriving at the house 
alone one morning the mayor was shown up to the library by 
the maid. After several hours of study the mayor left the 
library and proceeded to leave the house. Descending the 
stairs to the front door his friend's wife simultaneously 
crossed the hall and mounted the staircase. As they passed 
each other on the stairs Mme. Rousseau stared fixedly ahead 
and refused to recognize the mayor's presence. The mayor 
never went back to his friend's house again.
(5) One young homme de couleur in Fort-de-France related
an incident in which he went to the cinema one evening and saw
a Beke he knew quite well through the Chamber of Commerce./ /In the foyer before the performance the Beke was with his 
family and did not acknowledge his friend's greeting. Later 
on in the interval he met his friend who had left the family 
group to come and have a few words with him privately in the 
foyer.
(4) In Martinique a number of coloured informants noted 
that they had been on friendly terms with Bekes at school, 
but having once left school they passed these former school 
friends in the street without exchanging a word. In the life 
of an individual the transition from the world of school to 
the world of work occasions a re-assessment of inter-ethnic
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relations. This is true in both cases. In Barbados speaking 
about her own children, one planter’s wife said:
’’They were the best of friends with everyone. In 
.school everybody mixed with everybody. But out of 
school, and having left school, everybody went 
their separate ways. That has always been so".
One Barbadian planter noted that the egaliterianism "between 
the races" at school, often later on turned to deferential 
behaviour-on the part of black ex-school friends:
"I went to Lodge School and there were as many 
coloured boys as white ones, and today there are 
a lot more again because the school has developed 
into a fairly big school. At school level you feel 
no difference. But it’s surprising that after 
school you go your way and this chap will go his, 
and you’ll meet him up in town and he’ll call you 
’sir’. I ’ve had this happen to me with a school 
mate of mine. I hadn’t met him for years".
ii
This distinction between the public and the private 
spheres of social life, indicates that the continuing 
’salience’ of ethnicity is a variable rather than a constant 
phenomenon. From the data it is apparent that in the sphere 
of public life class can assume a greater salience than 
ethnicity. This can be seen in those cases where men of 
similar cultural, educational and socio-economic background 
establish and maintain in a variety of fairly closely cir­
cumscribed contexts relationships of equality. The main­
tenance of the status boundaries of ethnicity which can be 
seen in the ethnic ’allegiance’ members of the white creole 
community exhibit in the more intimate sphere of family life, 
of which the practice of endogamy is a consequence, indicates 
that the situation is reversed, with ethnicity assuming a 
dominant role. It is also apparent that the variability of 
ethnic salience, which is indicated by its shifting, fluct­
uating character from one social context to another, is 
equally a feature of inter-ethnic relations over time.1 It 
can be seen that at different periods in this study there have 
been times when ethnicity has assumed a particularly marked 
salience. For example, during the depression at the end of 
the nineteenth century, the elites in both islands closed 
ranks and adopted a conscious policy of preventing bankrupt
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sugar estates from falling into coloured hands. In the 
commercial world of Bridgetown the eradication of-a flour­
ishing coloured and Jewish mercantile class between the 
1830s and 1850s, and the exclusion of non-whites from the 
new opportunities offered , in commerce and trade in the early 
twentieth century, indicates that ethnicity at these periods 
played a central role in the competition for new, scarce 
resources. The extent to which ethnicity can assume a marked 
salience can also be seen in periods of political change. 
Politics after the extension of the franchise in Martinique 
in 1871 took on a decidedly ethnic character, as the white 
creoles and mulattos divided into two mutually antagonistic 
hostile political camps (See Chapter 9 Section 2). The 
period immediately following Independence in Barbados was 
marked by attacks by the DLP against the 'plantocracy1, the 
ethnic character of this conflict being both symbolized and 
actualized in the firing of canes, which represented a 
challenge to their traditional basis of power.
The evidence suggests that the forms taken by inter­
ethnic relations in both islands are related to a number of 
established structural determinants, and that ethnicity may 
be properly regarded as a dependent rather than an independent 
variable. Thus at periods when economic interests or political 
power has been threatened, the salience of ethnic identity 
has increased. Equally in situations where status honour is 
threatened ethnicity assumes a more central importance than 
class. It is not, however, only status honour which is 
threatened if family life is exposed to ethnics outside the 
group, since the breaking down of the private sphere would 
make it difficult to maintain the practice of endogamy and to 
justify its continuance, which would result in the passing of 
economic power out of white hands. The social, role accorded 
to women in this respect is crucial. The extent to which 
they have traditionally been confined to the closed intimate 
sphere of family life, indicates that they have played a 
central role in maintaining the important distinction between 
'relations prives' and 'relations publiques1. Moreover, from 
the Barbadian evidence it is apparent that women in general 
like- their counterparts in Beke society as Kovats has already
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observed (1969: 116), tend to adopt a more intransigent view 
of inter-ethnic relations, taking a much stricter view of 
actions which contravene the moral codes of the group, and 
all forms of interaction which threaten the intimacy of 
family life. Whilst it may be said that inter-ethnic 
relations are governed in both cases by this vitally 
important distinction between 'relations prives' and 'relations 
publiques', one major point of difference lies in the way in 
which this distinction also operates between the several strata 
of Beke society itself. Within white creole society adherence 
to this code has had the function of concentrating economic 
power in the hands of a much smaller minority.
8.6. Conclusion.
In conclusion it may be said that inter-ethnic 
relations in both islands has assumed a symbiotic character, 
in which whites and non-whites co-exist side by side in a 
state of equilibrium, of which a major determinant of social 
interaction in public life is class, whilst in the private 
sphere ethnicity assumes a dominant role. This state of 
equilibrium is maintained by the mechanism of social distance 
through etiquette, in which, according to one Barbadian planter,
"...each side understands the rules of the game, and 
understands what he or she may or may not do in the 
circumstances we find ourselves here in Barbados".
As to whether this symbiotic model of inter-ethnic relations 
can be maintained in an unaltered form, will depend I would 
argue, upon the extent to which strategic elites in both 
societies do not encroach upon each other's economic and 
political interests. It is to be hypothesized,, therefore, 
that attempts by the coloured political elite in both islands 
to compete with white creoles for economic power, will 
produce conflict and disequilibrium in inter-ethnic relations.
It is also hypothesized that attempts by the planter/mercantile 
elite to recapture part of their former political power base 
will be similarly productive of conflict. In the Martiniquan 
case the proposed hypotheses would conceivably be subject to 
an intervening variable: the administrative policies of the 
metropolitan state.
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From the foregoing it is apparent that ideology 
plays a similar role in Beke and white Bajan society, in so 
far as its primary function is to maintain social and economic 
structures intact. At its most basic level it is centrally 
an ideology of ’traditionalism’, through which the elites 
share a belief in their inherited capacity to perform the 
economic role best. The majority view of both samples inter­
viewed was shown to be based upon structural determinants 
rather than concepts of racial or ethnic superiority. The 
extent to which concepts of functional role were strongly 
articulated and symbolic ones weakly articulated, tends to 
validate this conclusion. This would also suggest that con­
cepts of status honour and the operation of group closure 
and status boundary maintenance, are primarily related a 
number of functional pre-requisites, which in the Martiniquan 
case assume a symbolic character.
At a deeper level it is evident that the ideological 
underpinnings of the elite’s conception of itself take 
variant forms. A point of departure can be seen in the way 
in which the Bekes translate their objective power and 
position into a hierarchical system of values. Evidence for 
this is revealed in the importance attached to non-instru­
mental criteria in assigning status, the role played by 
genealogical descent in the stratification system, and the 
classical features of traditional authority exhibited in 
social interaction on the plantation. What is striking when 
comparing the social structure of both groups, is the fact 
that although the agri-business bourgeoisie in both cases 
may be regarded as a modernizing strategic elite, the internal 
structuring of the group and the mechanisms of social 
reproduction indicate that the Grands Bekes continue to 
exhibit some of the vestiges of an hereditary ruling class. 
This I would argue is a function of the way in which the core 
of the agri-business bourgeoisie in Martinique was forged out 
of a traditional planter class, having its origins firmly 
rooted in the social values of pre-Revolutionary France.
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NOTES AND REFERENCES
1. An estimate calculated from the data presented in 
Table XXXII on Occupational Breakdown in the Report on 
the Census for 1911..............................— —
2. Source: Interview with Hugh Springer, 11/7/80.
3. During the 1960s and early 1970s with the decline in the
sugar industry and the emigration of some prominent 
planter families,controlling interests by the agri­
business bourgeoisie declined to about 50 per cent.
4. In actual fact the locus of contact with local society 
appears to be concentrated in one individual, the 
grandson of Sir George Laurie Pile, who is the attorney 
for Bulkeley Estates and all the absentees.
5. This is a term coined by the planters themselves, intended 
to highlight the difference between the full-time
'career1 planter and the businessman in the City, who
merely oversees estate business in a financial capacity.
6. Source: Barbados Archives, Deeds. Wills and Registers
of Births, Deaths and Marriages.
7. The enactment of legislation such as the Education Act of 
1878, the Poor Relief Act of 1880 and the Public Health 
Act of 1908, combined and centralized a number of piece­
meal functions originally performed by the vestries, 
parochial authorities and private charities.
See Sheppard (1977: Chapters 7 and 8).
8. Source: Derek Bickerton, "The Redlegs of Barbados" in 
The Sunday. Advocate (Magazine Section), May 28th - July 
2nd 1961.
9. In sketching this brief outline of the history of the 
MoConney family thanks must be extended to the help given 
by the great great niece of Nat MoConney, Barbara de Vere 
Davis.
10. It is interesting to note that Bekes consistently over­
estimated this share, usually stating that the white/ 
non-white share was roughly 50:50.
11. Source: Chambre de Commerce: Dossiers on Corporations 
in Martinique.
12. Ibid.
13. Stipulated in the Code Civil of 1848. As a consequence 
of equal inheritance land ownership in Martinique is 
quite dissimilar in one'respect from that in Barbados. 
Whereas ownership in Barbados was traditionally vested in 
one person or possibly two acting in partnership, in 
Martinique French rights of succession based upon equal 
inheritance resulted in some estates being owned-by ten 
to twenty heritiers.
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14. Source: Prefecture de la Martinique.
15. As to whether these were always cases of ’mistaken 
identity’ the situation is not quite clear. Conver­
sations with some of these ’beach bums’ lead me to 
believe that in some cases they were acts of deliberate 
provocation, and in others a response to a challenge.
Since achievement among ‘beach bums’ varies directly 
with the difficulty of ’making’ a particular prospect, 
success with a local white girl would be highly rated 
among his peers.
16. The wives of respondents in particular played a major 
role in interviews, deflecting a husband’s responses 
away from sensitive issues whilst adeptly introducing 
new topics of conversation which the interviewer 
invariably found innocuous. A propos the conversational 
abilities of these Beke wives, an indelible memory 
remains of one planter's wife who spent two and a half 
hours talking about the different kinds of beetle that 
can attack furniture in the tropics.
17. Both these were given as illustrations in prompt form 
to the question: "How easy do you think it is for a 
person’s social standing to be improved or worsened?"
18. Exactly the same example quoted by Kovats was reproduced 
on a number of occasions in Barbados: that of a yard 
worker using the spare parts of a wrong model to repair 
a tractor.
19. See quotations from Labat, Chapter 3 Section 3.
An interesting document is the genealogical chart 
produced and printed privately by Jean Laguarigue de 
Survilliers, indicating the lines of descent of a 
number of B£ke families from Jean Assier, who came to 
Martinique in 1688 as a Secretary to the Conseil Souverain. 
The chart indicates that a number of marital alliances 
were made between white creole women and French officers 
and administrators in the eighteenth century. •
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9.1. Political Institutions as a Function of Colonial 
Policy and Practice.
Historically the hierarchical principle in 
plantation society which was evident in the distribution of 
land resources, played a similar role in the distribution of 
elective and appointive political offices. As I have already 
noted in Chapter 3, the members of the Legislative Council 
and the House of Assembly in Barbados and the Conseil 
Souverain in Martinique, were recruited from the upper 
echelons of the planter elite. Thus in plantation society 
from the earliest period economic power was synonymous with 
political power.
In both the British and the French Caribbean it 
can be said that the systems of government established from 
the very beginning were based upon direct rule, in contrast 
to those colonies in other parts of the world where established 
indigenous socio-political organizations made indirect rule by 
tribal authority systems possible. In Barbados there was no 
indigenous population prior to the arrival of the English, 
and in Martinique the native Arawak population was rapidly - 
exterminated at the onset of colonization. Politically 
speaking, since these islands were a tabula rasa like the 
rest of the Caribbean, where whatever fragile authority 
structures in existence were very quickly destroyed, the 
political institutions adopted were modelled upon the res­
pective metropolitan ones. Although it could be said that 
assimilation to the institutional framework of the Metro­
polis was a policy of both imperial powers, the French 
elevated it into an inflexible doctrine by a policy of cen­
tralization in all administrative matters. By contrast 
assimilation in the British case can be more likened to a 
process of osmosis, rather than a consciously pursued policy 
subject at all times to the dictates of the home government.
I will later examine the ways in which these variant inter­
pretations of assimilation have influenced the political power 
bases of the white elites, and compare the extent to which 
this has affected the degree of autonomy of each group from 
the metropolitan power. These differences in turn will be of
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explanatory value in suggesting reasons for the different 
kinds of strategies employed by the elites in each island 
to maintain political power and influence.
The different kinds of assimilationist policies 
pursued by the British and French colonial powers were a 
function of the way in which both powers regarded their 
overseas possessions. In the British case their value was 
based primarily upon their perceived economic utility, a 
view which was clearly evident in the controversy instigated 
by the publication of the diametrically opposed views of 
Edmund Burke and Adam Smith at the height of- 
West Indian sugar prosperity, in which the value of the 
colonies was argued by neo-Burkians and neo-Smithians alike 
in terms of their contribution to the economic growth of 
the mother country. At the same period the anonymous 
author of Candid and Impartial Considerations of the Nature 
of the Sugar Trade (1763), in putting forward the idea that 
the self interest of the planters at "the temple of honour" 
(i.e. sugar) was commensurate with the "common weal", 
similarly propagated the view that the value of the colonies 
was only estimable in narrow economistic terms. How narrowly 
economistic these terms were can be seen in the attitudes of 
the Colonial Office in the late nineteenth century to the 
public financing of central sugar factories in Barbados. By 
contrast French colonial thinking rested on doctrines of 
political philosophy, in which overseas possessions were pregarded as inseparable extensions of the French kingdom.
In the post-Revolutionary period the republican ideals of 
liberty, equality and fraternity, together with a belief in 
the moral rightness of stamping all aspects of colonial life 
with the imprint of French culture and institutions, made 
for a far more comprehensive grasp of the meaning of Empire. 
Seen from this perspective a logical extension of Gallic 
colonial practice and ideology was that of total assimil­
ation, whereby a conscious policy was adopted which made 
provisions for colonial subjects to evolve to the status of 
citizens, through the educational system and the adminis­
tration. In. the case of Caribbean and Pacific possessions, 
it should also be noted that their evolution from colonial
to departmental and territorial status^ rather than 
independent statehood, is in itself a logical culmination 
of the rationale on which the French Empire was built.
In Barbados the Old Representative System granted 
by Royal Charter in 1627 and ratified by the Commonwealth in 
1652, gave the white oligarchy a power of internal control 
far greater than that of the Bekes in Martinique. Under a 
representative system of government which gave way to Crown 
Colony government in all other British West Indian territories 
in the nineteenth and twentieth century (with the exception of 
Bermuda and the Bahamas), the Barbadian planter class unlike 
their Martiniquan counterparts enjoyed the right to vo:te its 
own budget and make its own laws. Bryan Edwards1 description 
of representative government in the West Indies (1807: Vol.II, 
Bk. VI, Ch.I) portrays it in terms of its English equivalent, 
at one point designating the elected assembly as the guardian 
of "the people's rights against the Governor and His 
Executive Council": a reflection of the historical struggle
between the monarchy and parliament. The legislature made 
up of three elements - the Governor, the Legislative Council 
and the House of Assembly - is shown by Edwards to be a mirror 
image of the English system, with a Governor representing the 
Crown, an upper house made up of a maximum of ten members 
appointed by royal mandamus, chosen by the Governor and 
ratified by the Secretary of State, and a lower house of 
elected members (two from each parish in Barbados) chosen on 
a limited franchise of freeholders. Under this system from 
1881 executive functions of government were performed in 
Barbados by an Executive Council and an Executive Committee, 
consisting, of members of the Executive Council, one member of 
the Legislative Council and four members of the House of 
Assembly nominated by the Governor.
The political institutions developed in the French 
Caribbean like those in the English islands, were in many ways 
analogous to their metropolitan counterparts, the French 
•parlements. Unlike the system of government in Barbados which 
enjoyed an unbroken continuity up until the experiment with 
ministerial government introduced in 1946, there were marked
315
316
constitutional changes in the French Antilles over a three- 
hundred year period, which reflected political upheavals in 
the home country. By comparison with Barbados one major 
difference was the delay of representative government in 
the form of elected assemblies up until the second half of 
the nineteenth century. This in itself may have had little 
effect upon the distribution of political power within 
colonial society, but it did mean that a limited degree of 
administrative autonomy was delayed for nearly a century and 
a half, which was again forfeited when Martinique became a 
department in 1948.
Up until 1674 Martinique was administered by the 
Grands Compagnies as intermediaries of the French Crown.
From 1674 up to the Revolution the island was attached 
directly to the Crown. Administration was jointly carried 
out by a Governor responsible for military functions and 
general administration, and an Intendant responsible for 
civil matters such as justice and finance. During this 
period there was no equivalent of a bicameral system of govern 
ment. The Conseil Souverain or King's Council was composed of 
some dozen nominees under the direct control of the Crown and 
under the immediate jurisdiction of the Governor and Intendant 
For a brief period between the onset of the Revolution and 
the first English occupation in 1794, representative govern­
ment was instituted at Saint-Pierre and Fort-la-Republique 
(Fort-de-France). In the country the plantocracy continued 
to recognize the legitimacy of the Royalist Governor Behague 
and hence the political institutions of the ancien regime, 
whilst the merchants in the towns rallied to the Republican 
Governor Rochambeau, and elected a National Assembly which 
accorded Martinique the status of department for the first 
time on October 30th 1793.
During the periods of the first and second English 
occupation between 1794 - 1802 and 1809 - 1814, the political 
institutions of the ancien regime were applied once more 
together with nominative government under English control.
In the years following Waterloo a number of constitutional 
changes were introduced, notably the introduction of a 
bicameral system of government, consisting of a Conseil Prive
representing an upper house and a Conseil General representing 
a lower one. During the same period the dual roles of 
Governor and Intendant were replaced by a Governor Adminis­
trator, upon whom both military and civil functions devolved. 
Through a series of ordonnances which defined the functions 
of colonial Governors, the Governor was also made the rep­
resentative of the Head of State coming under the direct 
authority of a new ministry, the Ministere de la Marine et 
des Colonies. The appointment of a Director of the Interior 
in 1827 (a post which was nominated by the Governor and always 
filled by a metropolitan official), in so far as he was 
accorded similar functions to those performed by a depart­
mental prefect in metropolitan France, such as attending 
meetings of the Conseil General and enjoying financial powers 
which involved the management of all public expenses including 
the Colony's budget, was in administrative matters a prelude 
to departmental government.^ In all matters concerning 
finance, administration and legislation, there was therefore 
a high degree of centralization in French colonial affairs. 
This was particularly so where legislation was concerned, 
since unlike Barbados where the white oligarchy was empowered 
to frame its own laws, colonial legislation in the French 
islands was made in the form of decrees emanating from met­
ropolitan France which were presented to the colonial 
Conseils Generanx for ratification. The tendency towards 
far greater centralization was further emphasized by the 
fact that representatives of the colonies were (and still 
are) returned to the Assemblee Nationale and the Senate to 
represent the interests of their respective territories.
Given that the white elite enjoyed a high degree 
of formal political power during the colonial period, which 
was relatively independent of all outside influence in the 
case of Barbados, and dependent upon the maintenance of 
influence in political circles within France itself in the 
case of Martinique, it is problematic to what extent the 
white elite in each island were able to continue wielding 
political power and influence once the formal basis of their 
power was removed. Strategies of power maintenance in the 
political sphere are therefore concerned primarily with covert
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means of wielding influence, during a period when the formal 
basis of that power was waning. From a comparative per­
spective the differences between the two cases are quite 
striking in their dissimilarity, in terms of the actual 
process whereby political power and authority was eroded, 
the period at which this took place and the responses of 
the elite to this loss of power. As it will become apparent, 
these differences are rooted in the variant colonial 
policies and practices pursued by the two powers, and the 
kinds of political institutions developed in the colonial 
context. The remainder of this chapter will be devoted to
examining the loss of this formal power base in each island,
and the different kinds of responses made by the white 
elites to this erosion of power.
9.2. The Loss of a Formal Power Base in Martinique i
The Imprimateur of Republicanism.
In each case the broadening of the franchise was 
instrumental in radically reducing the white elite's chances 
of election in the island's assembly. The highly centralized 
colonial policies of the French in which constitutional 
changes at home were duplicated in her colonial possessions, 
resulted in the introduction of universal suffrage in the 
Antilles as early as 1871. Following the collapse of the 
Second Empire in the Franco-Prussian War, the Third Republic 
was proclaimed and universal suffrage was granted to the 
colonies. Within less than a decade the ethnic composition 
of the Conseil General was changed dramatically. At the 
beginning of the decade only three mulattos were in the 
island's elected house. By 1880 the situation waa reversed 
and the mulattos were in the majority. The continuing 
success of a few Bekes before the electorate had less to do 
with political ideology, than the fact that they were popular 
figures of the archetypal paternalist kind. The extent to 
which the formal political power of the Bekes was permanently 
eroded is indicated by the composition of the Conseil General 
in 1882 and 1901 (See Appendix XXXI). A French civil servant 
of the period in his memoirs (Garaud, 1895: 295/6) related 
how this re-alignment of political power in the Colony, in
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calling into question the established authority of the 
Bekes, resulted in their withdrawal from active political 
life:
"...the mulattos that are still ephemistically 
referred to as gens de couleur, are today the 
ruling class in Martinique...
However, it is regrettable that the former 
masters, the white creoles who are called Bekes 
in the local patois, have prematurely resolved 
to live apart. This class has shut itself off 
from political life and scornfully left the 
mulattos to argue among themselves at will.
The whites have voluntarily left the public arena 
where their experience of business reserved them 
a rightful place. They have not been able to 
resign themselves to seeing the majority of 
places in the Conseil General pass into the hands 
of the mulattos, and they have protested against 
the holding of general elections, refusing all 
competition in the country and withdrawing in 
rancour..."
The rancour with which the Bekes in the last quarter 
of the nineteenth century responded to this loss of political 
power, can only be understood in the following terms. The 
abolition of slavery in 1848 did not drastically alter the 
socio-economic structure of Martiniquan society, and the 
power base which existed before Emancipation remained intact. 
The way in which the informal political power base of the 
plantocracy was merely transformed by a qualitatively 
different kind of rule underlain by new forms of social 
control, has already been examined in Chapter-'7. In many ways 
post-Emancipation society retained many of the features which 
had previously existed. In Martinique the Bekes remained 
both an economic and political elite, the black agro­
proletariat had no political representation, and the inter­
mediary 'middle-classf gens de couleur had little access in 
the system to avenues of social mobility. The date 1871 was 
a watershed in the social and political history of the 
island, since the continuity of the old order was broken for­
ever. Although the economic power of the Bekes- remained 
unassailable, their hegemony as a ruling class was broken, 
and whatever political influence they could gain had to be 
shared with a competing elite, or obtained through them as 
intermediaries. To emphasize the importance of universal
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suffrage to the exclusion of other factors in this process, 
is insufficient in explaining just how radical this rupture 
was with the past. Over a period of fifteen years between 
1870 and 1885, all of the major democratic institutions of 
the Third Republic were introduced into the Colony. Apart 
from universal suffrage these included provisions for 
education which was both free and secular, parliamentary 
representation in the French Assembles Nationale, rep­
resentative government at both the communal and departmental 
level, and the full application of the principals of political 
liberty contained in the Code Civil.
The application of republican principles and 
institutions after 1870 lay the groundwork for a bitter 
political struggle, in which ethnicity and race were deter­
mining factors in political affiliations. The cleavage in 
public opinion was quite clear-cut. The choice was unam­
biguously between two 'parties' . On the one hand there was 
the 'party* of the white creoles, whose political ideology 
was anti-republican and ultra-conservative; one may even say 
royalist and pre-Revolutionary - embracing all the socio­
political precepts of the ancien regime together with a 
profound respect for the authority of the Catholic Church.
They were totally opposed to the attempts of the Third 
Republic to democratize Martiniquan society, and sought to 
preserve the status quo and defend their privileges. On 
the other hand the 'party' of the hommes de couleur was 
republican and committed to the ideals of liberty, equality 
and fraternity, and actively sought to put an end to the 
supremacy of the Bekes and to bring about the final eman­
cipation of the negres from the tutelage of the plantocracy. 
Between 1848 and 1870 the power and privileges of the Bekes 
had remained uncontested. After 1870 the question of who 
should wield political power in Martinique was central to 
all public debate. In these debates which only gained 
impetus from the late 1870s onwards,8 the Bekes attempted to 
justify their continued hegemony on the grounds of patriotism, 
culture, civilization and wealth. The hommes de couleur on 
the other hand sought to uphold the Republic, since it 
offered them Apolitical power.
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The background to this loss or "substitution* of 
power is important to document, since it helps to explain 
why this period in Martinique's history was marked by such 
violence, in a number of cases involving riots and duels 
which were fought by men of colour against whites to satisfy 
some perceived insult to racial pride. From contemporary 
sources it is evident that the Bekes did not accede easily 
to this loss of power, nor did the ascendant coloured 
political elite fail to seize whatever opportunity 
presented itself to attack their adversaries. It is also 
evident that at this period every issue was politicized: 
the question of taxation; the allocation of the Colony's 
budget; the laicization of the educational system; the 
question of East Indian immigration; the role of the 
Catholic Church in affairs of state; the electoral principle 
itself, and even the famous carnival of Saint-Pierre at 
which songs and sketches were created and performed offering 
commentary on political issues of the hour. Content analysis 
of the newspapers of the period provides a very good insight 
into the issues which were politicized, since the press 
played a central role in the political struggle. At this 
period the pierrotine press was of a very high quality, and 
apart from the official publication Le Moniteur, there were 
three newspapers serving the interests of the white creoles: 
Les Antilles, La Defence Coloniale and Le Propagateur. The 
latter, edited by the Beke Souquet-Basiege, was in particular 
the most virulent mouthpiece of Beke interests in the 1880s. 
Another publication, Le Bien Public, a mouthpiece of clerical 
interests which supported the 'party' of the whites, ceased 
publication in 1878. It was in that year that the only news­
paper supporting mulatto republican interests was founded by 
Marius Hurard, Les Colonies.
In 1882 the political tensions of the previous 
decade culminated in a particularly virulent exchange bet­
ween Le Propagateur and Les Colonies. It is no coincidence 
that Souquet-Basiege's now infamous thesis, containing all 
the arguments- for the maintenance of Beke hegemony, was pub­
lished in that same year. Les Colonies sought to counter the 
Beke argument that political power was their rightful heritage
7
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since they were still the creators of wealth, by insisting 
that the heavy burden of taxation fell upon the shoulders of 
the gens de couleur and black smallholders:
"Our reactionaries have so often repeated that it is 
they who pay the greatest part of taxes and duties, 
they have probably ended up by believing it. It 
only takes a few minutes of thought to ascertain 
that such an affirmation is false and completely 
ridiculous...
But on what grounds do they support their argument 
that they pay more than the rest of the population?
By the land tax? It would be more than absurd to 
uphold the idea that land has stayed entirely in the 
hands of the former privileged class. In the north 
at Basse-Pointe, they possess it is true, a greater 
part of the plantations. But everyone knows that 
these rich plantations are not the only sources of 
our revenues. Everywhere else land and wealth are 
divided up, and the new men, those that they iron­
ically call the new social strata, make up the 
majority of land owners. In the towns the same 
situation pertains ... since the coloured population 
is at least twenty times more numerous ... It is us 
... we who contribute the greatest part of the 
(Colony's) budget. To uphold the contrary is an 
absurdity..."g
Le Propagateur's response to this claim under the title "Un 
Peu de Statistique" appeared ten days later and began:
"Emboldened by the success that they have gained 
through certain organs of public opinion, with 
their lying narrative and calumnious accusations 
against the white class, our adversaries today 
embark on a new campaign, in undertaking to prove 
that 'the reactionaries' of Martinique only 
possess a minimum part of the land and that the 
whites only pay about one-twentieth of our taxes".^
The editor then went on to reproduce the results of a survey 
into landownership and tax contributions broken down by race 
(See Appendix; XI and Table XIX Ch.5). Undeterred by the 
evidence produced by Le Propagateur that the whites were still 
the economic masters of the island and contributed most to the 
colonial exchequer, Les Colonies launched its next attack on 
the Bekes by criticizing the unfair advantages of the system 
of taxation levied on sugar (droits de sortie), compared with 
that levied on secondary crops (impot foncier):
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"The situation with respect to taxation still con­
serves the flaw of the ancien regime. The system 
was established during a period when the proud 
aristocracy alone made the law, and cavalierly 
disposed of public funds as it thought best. Why 
is the land tax not applied to all agricultural 
products, and why doesn't it include sugar and rum 
which are only taxed on leaving the country? Why 
does this exception exist which one can find no 
equivalent in the Metropolis? It has been created 
in favour of the large plantations".-^
The editorial went on to explain how the different systems of 
taxation were calculated and why this dual system was 
iniquitous:
"The tax inspector arrives at the proprietor's 
habitation, where vegetables or other crops are 
grown which are not subject to a droit de sortie.
He estimates the net revenue of the said property 
... and the. small planter is obliged to pay (this 
sum) to the Treasury. Since this sum is payable 
in advance, it doesn't allow for crop failures, 
poor harvests and an over optimistic calculation 
of what the land is capable of producing...
The sugar proprietor on the contrary pays in pro­
portion to his actual yield from canes, and only 
when it has been produced...
We cannot help but see in this unequal division of 
taxes a legacy of slavery which continues to favour 
one group ... "-q
Having been criticized for voting sums of money to build
lay primary schools and a lycee in Saint-Pierre the year
before, the hommes de couleur now took up this challenge on
the way in which the Colony's budget was spent. What they
attacked was the Colony's contribution to the cost of East
12Indian immigration, and the 2.5 per cent guarantee on 
loans from the Credit Foncier Colonial. In replying to the 
taxation issue, Le Propagateur indicated that returns from 
the droit de sortie realized ten times the amount realised 
from the impot foncier, and so defended the costs of 
immigration and the colonial guarantee.
As a consequence of these repeated attacks against 
the Bekes through the pages of Les Colonies, Le Propagateur 
accused the mulattos of racial prejudice and wanting to 
destroy the whites. Under the dramatic headline "Haine de 
Castes" the following editorial appeared in the middle of 
that year:
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"A hatred which instead of gradually diminishing 
jseems on the contrary to grow every day, forming 
an abyss in this country...between the whites on 
one side and the blacks and gens de couleur on 
the other.
Prejudiced men with superficial minds place the 
blame for this deplorable situation on the obstinacy 
of the white creoles. These backward politicians 
seem to have been asleep since 1848; they forget 
that slavery...disappeared forever. Thanks to 
universal suffrage they have been thinking for the 
past twelve years that the blacks and hommes de 
couleur count for everything in this country and 
the whites for nothing. They are not aware that 
the extinction of colour prejudice depends upon 
the attitude of the mulattos. The insults, injuries 
and outrages that their mouthpiece throws at the 
whites everyday indicates even to the less dis­
cerning that they don't want peace and harmony in 
the country: what they want is to crush, to com- 
•pletely obliterate the white class".
The Bekes at this period were particularly concerned with 
the effect that republican politics would have upon their 
relations with the blacks, who formed the great mass of the 
agricultural labour force. They saw the aspirations of the 
mulatto bourgeoisie undermining their own legitimacy, 
creating a wedge between themselves and the blacks with the 
intention of bringing about racial discord and disharmony:
"We ask ourselves in the face of this political 
^programme...before the blindness of the blacks who 
have not yet understood that they are only an 
instrument in the hands of a new privileged caste, 
more imbued with colour prejudice than the white 
creoles ever were...if we can remain impassive...
No...Black race, open your eyes. Understand and 
stop acting as a blind instrument to lying hypo­
crites who use you as a stepping stone to accomplish 
their criminal plans'«<l4
One particular issue over which the hommes de couleur were 
accused of fomenting racial discord by Le Propagateur in 
1882, was that of the celebration of Bastille Day. The 
previous year's celebrations had ended in riots, in which 
a white doctor's house had been sacked by an angry crowd 
of black citizens, following a physical assault by the said 
doctor, Dr. Lota, against Marius Hurard, the editor of 
Les Colonies and President of the- Conseil General. In June 
1882 Les Colonies- printed the following warning a propos the 
coming celebrations:
325
"The campaign that they have started on the eve of 
_the national holiday could perhaps present some 
danger. Let that be understood. However many 
precautions are taken, they are taking care to 
ensure that order does not reign...The national 
holiday, as someone has said, could only present 
problems if one gives birth to them by provocations.
M. Lota is far from our shores. Let us hope that 
he will not find his imitators"
Reflecting on the celebrations and the warnings of Les Colonies, 
the editor of La Propagateur replied:
"We are approaching July 14th. Soon all over France 
people will celebrate the national holiday. We are 
certain that in the mother country the joyful demon­
strations will bring no trouble in their wake...
In our colony the joy must be even deeper, the demon­
strations of the people more expansive, for the con­
sequences of the revolutionary principles of 1789 
have brought about immeasurable benefits to the great 
majority of our population. Slavery has been 
abolished forever. The whites like the blacks bless 
the disappearance of this evil institution...
Everything here then disposes us to rejoice: 
unfortunately it is not so; unfortunately the country 
is troubled...
There are ambitious, wicked men who don't want 
harmony and concord to reign between the different 
classes...(their) only mission is to excite the 
blacks against the whites and the national holiday 
is a day chosen by them to accomplish this detestable 
business"
On July 12th the tone adopted by Les Colonies took on a more 
political note, in which the plots of the whites were equated 
with a desire to spoil the pleasures of the people, which 
indicated a hatred of republicanism:
"July 14th is a national holiday and the streets 
on this day belong to. the xpeople.. .Those .whose ears 
are wounded by the songs and patriotic' cheers only 
have to lock themselves up at home. If they are 
. free not to take part in the celebrations, they 
don't have the right to display their bad temper 
and restlessness in public...
Two further controversial issues at this period 
concerned the laicization of the educational system and the 
decision of the Conseil General to end indentureship. Up 
until the early 1880s primary and secondary education was
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fee-paying and under the control of the Church, with the 
consequence that access to education was restricted in 
favour of the white creoles and lighter-skinned, affluent 
members of the bourgeoisie de couleur . However, the economic 
was not the only factor of exclusion. The Church, always 
allied to the plantocracy1s interests in colonial society, 
was now united even more closely with the interests of 
the white oligarchy in the face of a common enemy - the 
Republic - which sought to separate Church and State. Hence 
it was a defender of Beke ideology, actively upholding the 
racist attitudes and concepts of hierarchy of the group.
Le Bien Public for example, was at the same time a propagator 
of Catholic and ultra-conservative Beke views,which in the 
Martiniquan context were synonymous. The two primary schools 
in Saint-Pierre, the Jesuit Freres de Ploermel for boys and 
the Soeurs de Saint-Joseph de Cluny for girls, as well as the 
Seminary College of Saint-Pierre, practised an overt racial 
discrimination in both the selection and treatment of pupils, 
denying access to children of a "naissance irreguliere". Les 
Colonies in 1878 reported ironically on the "order of the 
bath house" at the girls' primary school:
"In this year of grace 1878, one can see at the 
convent of Saint-Joseph de Cluny in Saint-Pierre, 
institutionalized categories among the pupils, who 
are accompanied to the bath house by groups 
according to the shade of lightness or darkness of 
the eyes. Those with light eyes are called 'young 
ladies', as for the others, they are only 'little 
girls'. The 'young ladies' bathe first, the 'little 
girls' follow" .
Through the pages of Le Propagateur and the
Conseil General the Bekes opposed the foundation of the
lycee at Saint-Pierre, and continued to criticize its
construction after 1883 on the grounds that it was their
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money raised through taxes which the government was wasting. 
However, behind these purely economic arguments it is 
evident that the development of a free, secular education 
system provided an avenue of social mobility through which 
mulattos and blacks could improve their life chances and 
compete more effectively against the Bekes. At the same time 
laicization also meant that an important institution like
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the school, which up to the 1880s was instrumental in 
legitimating the social hierarchy of the colonial ancien 
regime, was henceforth given over to the diffusion of 
republican ideology.
From some of the arguments submitted for and against
indentureship in the Conseil General in 1884,10 it is evident
that for the republicans of the period it was just as much a
political question as an economic one. The minutes of the
period indicate that the ending of indentureship was important
in consolidating the democratic principles of the Republic,
and was regarded as a necessary attack against the re-
introduction of slavery in a new guise, which effectively
curbed the aspirations of the emancipated creoles to acquire
land. Following two petitions made by a group of habitants
to the Governor at the beginning of 1853, and a visiting
commission to look into the operation of indentureship in 
20Trinidad, the principle of immigrant labour was adopted. 
Between 1853 and 1884 25,500 East Indian indentured labourers 
were introduced into the Colony. The case for indentureship 
put by the planters in the Conseil Prive in 1853 ran as 
follows:
"Considering the situation of the country in 1848,
.one would not expect to see the state it is in 
today. The situation is so desperate that 
properties have been abandoned. One fact cannot 
be denied: it is all due to the lack of a regular 
work force. The blacks tend more and more to take 
themselves off to live elsewhere at their own 
caprice: twenty-seven agricultural workers on the 
Percin plantation have bought parcels of land and 
the same has happened elsewhere. What is feared 
is that the agricultural workers one day...will 
completely abandon work on the big plantations.
There would be nothing frightening in the present 
situation if it wasn't getting worse. The 
inclinations of the blacks must naturally inspire 
fears for the future" . ^
In spite of the planters' claims that the introduction of 
free labour had brought about disastrous consequences for 
the future of the sugar industry, evidence-to the contrary 
indicates that sugar exports increased by a third between 
1848 and 1852.22
In the Report of the Finance Commission presented
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to the Conseil General on December 17th 1884, it was 
recommended that the introduction of foreign labour and the 
continuing organization of immigrant labour in Martinique 
should cease. Apart from the economic arguments against the 
system, the main thrust of the attack was against the social 
injustice created by the existence of two categories of 
worker:
"The creole worker whose rights were defined by 
.common law, and the immigrant worker whose
rights were circumscribed by special regu­
lations ".
It was argued that the existence of immigrant 
labour represented a form of slavery under which a worker 
could be imprisoned for leaving his post. The creole worker, 
on the other hand, held a contract subject purely to civil 
law and was subject to freedom of movement. It was argued 
by the Commission that this system presented problems for
the creole worker too, since he was forced to compete with
the immigrant worker whose wage was fixed by law, whereas his 
was subject to the fluctuating law of supply and demand. This 
separation of the agricultural work force acted in favour of 
the planters, since it kept wages down which had the effect 
of limiting the attempts of creole workers to become indep­
endent proprietors. Attempts by one white creole conseiller 
to re-state the case for indentureship based upon the 
original argument in 1853, was criticized by the Commission 
on the grounds that:
"...as one of the oldest representatives of the 
landed aristocracy in the sugar industry...he 
could only have personal interests at heart... 
which were contrary to liberty and the ideals of 
the Republic..."
It is significant to note that a metropolitan official rep­
resenting the Department of the Interior spoke out at this 
meeting in defence of the Commission's Report, castigating 
the institution of indentureship as "a veritable sore on 
our society". His stated intention to support the findings 
of the Commission caused the aforementioned white creole 
member to exclaim:
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"I am astonished to hear a representative of the 
_administration abandon protocol in this way and 
take on the role of conseiller. His position as 
representative of the metropolitan power in this 
assembly obliges neutrality. I have been in 
effect attacked and criticized from all sides".
In spite of the fact that from an economic standpoint the 
need for labour was not a pressing problem at the onset of 
the depression in 1884, the ending of indentureship must be 
regarded as political, and seen as yet one further assault 
on the power of the Bekes.
Although the Bekes with a few exceptions no longer 
filled elective offices, they continued to have access to 
political influence through the Conseil Prive and through 
the monopoly of a number of administrative posts. It is 
significant that the posts they continued to fill were 
related to their economic interests. All financial powers 
involving the management of public funds and taxation were 
retained by the Conseil Prive, in which the Bekes held posts 
which gave them access to the Governor and metropolitan 
officials. A majority of the members of the Commission 
Coloniale., which had the primary function of processing 
requests for loans from the Credit Foncier Colonial, were 
white. Key administrative posts in the Banque Coloniale, 
the local office of the Credit Foncier Colonial, the land 
registry, the taxation office and the customs department con­
tinued to be held by white creoles. These surviving 
vestiges of their political power and influence at the local 
level remained intact, until Martinique became a department 
in the late 1940s. The loss of Martinique's administrative 
autonomy occasioned by this change in status resulted in a 
further waning of their power and influence.
9.3. The Loss of a Formal Power Base in Barbados :
An Osmotic Process.
In the Barbadian case the white oligarchy's loss 
of a formal political power base came three-quarters of a 
century after it had occurred in Martinique. When it came 
it was more of a gradualist process, in the sense that the
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erosion of power was not a direct consequence of an 
inrprimateur by the metropolitan government, but a protracted 
power struggle within a party political arena which culmin­
ated in the Franchise Bills of 1943 and 1951, which 
effectively ousted the white oligarchy from representative 
government (See Appendix XXXII).
Once the principle of universal suffrage had been
laid down, the introduction of a number of constitutional
changes between 1946 and 1967 removed the white oligarchy's
remaining vestiges of political power. The development of
semi-ministerial government from 1946 onwards which led to
2 3full Cabinet government in 1958,  ^resulted in the transfer
of executive power from the white controlled Executive Committee
to the Premier and his ministers. In 1961 the Executive
Committee was finally abolished and all residual powers were
transferred from the Governor to the Cabinet. In the same
year the Legislative Council was re-named the Senate, and a
revised system of nominating members effectively removed the
2 4remaining legislative powers of the white oligarchy. Up
until 1961 the Upper House had been mainly composed of members
of the planter-mercantile elite; the extent of its delaying
powers somewhat akin to that of the House of Lords before 
251911. During this period the re-organization of local 
government which replaced the old parish vestry system with 
three local authorities in 1959, and finally abolished local 
government entirely in 1967, was another decisive factor in 
the erosion of power. When Independence came in 1966 this 
had little more than symbolic significance for the white 
elite, merely legitimating the power of the new order "in 
the eyes of the people", since the actual transfer of power 
had already taken place.
From this brief overview it can be seen that the 
nature of the Barbadian oligarchy's erosion of political 
power was determined by the same osmotic process of colonial 
rule described above, in the sense that constitutional 
practices filtered down gradually from the metropolitan 
centre to be absorbed into the colonial polity. A far 
greater degree of administrative centralization in colonial 
affairs, backed up by doctrines of political philosophy
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rather than those of political convenience, made the Bekes 
loss of power more abrupt. What follows is an attempt to 
look more closely at this loss of power in Barbados, and a
case is made for arguing that the white elite accepted this
assault on its privileges with greater equanimity than the 
Bekes.
Until the 1930s, the seats in the House of Assembly
were filled almost exclusively by white planters and merchants.
Formerly the preserve of the plantocracy as were the Legis­
lative Council and all administrative offices, the rise of 
the Bridgetown mercantile class in the 1880s led to commer­
cial interests taking precedence over planter interests in 
government in the City of Bridgetown and the urban parishes 
of St. Michael and Christ Church. Every major commercial 
house had members who sat on statutory boards, served as 
Vestry members, and were members of the House of Assembly, 
the Legislative Council and the Executive Committee. The mem­
bers of the House of Assembly for the City were regarded by 
Commercial Hall as representatives of business interests, and 
therefore of the Hall itself. The Hall usually 'requisitioned* 
(a term it used itself) a candidate to fill a vacancy in the 
City, and the selected candidate was virtually assured of 
success at the polls. It also had the ear of the Governor 
which gave it a direct line of communication with the Colonial 
Office at home, and it did not hesitate to avail itself of 
this privilege:
"The Hall usually had the Governor and the Government, 
as well as the West India Committee, on its side.
Time and time again memoranda submitted by the Hall 
were forwarded by the Governor to the Colonial Office 
with his blessing and endorsement". (Campbell,
1969: 107)
Up until 1943 the political franchise was still limited to 
those with property and income qualifications, legal and 
medical practitioners and holders of university degrees.
Since the whites monopolized the plantation and trading sectors, 
had unequal access to higher education, and the highest paid 
supervisory posts in agriculture and commerce were still 
reserved for white employees, the electorate was largely 
white. The electoral qualification laid down in The
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Representation of the People's Act of 1891 (See 
Appendix XXX.III), indicates that the white oligarchy quite 
clearly intended the franchise to be limited primarily to 
whites. Qualification 5 in particular which specifies the 
inclusion of agricultural attorneys, managers, book-keepers, 
clerks, agents and upper servants, clearly indicates the 
intention of the oligarchy to retain the franchise for 
itself.
Looking at the size of the electorate in 1883 (see 
Appendix XXXIII), it is evident that franchise qualifications 
had not changed in their essentials since 1680. The increase 
of just over 60 per cent between 1883 and 1895 was a direct 
consequence of the Franchise Act of 1884, which had the main 
effect of enfranchising white employees who earned an income 
of £50 per annum. This somewhat limited extension of the 
franchise, and the introduction of a form of responsible 
government in 1881 with the passing of the Executive 
Committee Act, were the only concessions made by the white 
oligarchy to the home government following the attempt at 
Confederation in 1876, and the threat of Crown Colony Govern­
ment. Between 1895 and 1930 the size of the electorate more 
than doubled, though this was still quite insignificant when 
the total number of registered voters at this later date 
represented no more than 3 per cent of -the population. This 
increase in the size of. the electorate in the first three 
decades of the twentieth century, is accounted for by the 
improved economic circumstances of both black and white 
Barbadians since the property and income qualifications laid 
down in the Franchise Act of 1891. For the black population 
this was the-outcome of the wealth generated by 'Panama 
Money'. The increase in the size of the white electorate 
was accounted for by the avenues of social mobility provided 
by land speculation, commerce and estate ownership in the 
early years of the twentieth century. It was not until the 
Representation of the People's Act of 1943, which halved the 
income and property qualifications and also enfranchised 
women for the first time, that the electoral chances of the 
whites were seriously contested for the first time. That
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this was so can be seen in the distribution of successfully 
contested seats: nine to the Barbados Labour Party of
Grantley Adams,-seven to the radical Congress Party under 
the leadership of W.A. Crawford, and eight to the whites' 
Conservative Electors' Association. In the 1951 election 
support for the whites declined even further. In spite of 
the fact that sixteen out of the forty-three candidates who 
contested the twenty-four seats ran on an Electors' Assoc­
iation ticket, only two whites gained seats (See 
Appendix XXXIV). After 1951 the names of established 
planter/mercantile families were taboo to the electorate. It 
is interesting to note that where the odd one or two whites 
have gained seats at elections between 1951 and the present, 
they have always been of 'redleg' origin or more recently of 
English extraction. It would appear from informant sources 
that being white in itself was not the factor of exclusion, 
but their associations with the past, or as one informant put 
it, their ^ideological unacceptability*.
Behind the progress towards universal suffrage lay 
the forces which brought it about: the development of a
party political arena in which the will of the white oligarchy 
was contested for the first time in 300 years. Political 
opposition was initiated by the Democratic League, founded by 
Charles Duncan O'Neale in 1924, whose ideas were propagated 
through its newspaper The Herald. Although socialist the 
programme of the League in retrospect could not be regarded 
as radical, since it did not seek to transform the ownership 
of the means of production. That the aims of the League were 
relatively modest is indicated by the following extract from 
an article by Erskine Ward in 1925:
"(The Democratic League)... calls for a nutrition and 
sufficient diet, clean and decent clothes and a com­
fortable home for the mass of the Island's population.
It calls for measures which will give some security 
to the worker whose wages are inadequate to provide 
against sickness and old age. It calls for a lowering 
of the franchise, a wider and better education, a 
fairer distribution of wealth, a more equitable 
relation between profit and wages"*26
However, in spite of the moderate tone of this programme 
which rested on the tenets of parliamentary democratic
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socialism, the idea of lowering franchise qualifications was 
anathema to the oligarchy, given the fact that the whites 
represented no more than between 6 and 7 per cent of the 
population. Although the oligarchy did not accept the 
contesting of seats, a few 'progressive* whites like the mer­
chant Dudley Leacock and planters such as E.T. Cox and 
Dr. Eustace Greaves, supported and canvassed on behalf of 
Grantley Adams's election to the Parish of St. Joseph in 
1934. At this-period it would appear that sectors of the 
planter/mercantile community were aware that the white's 
monopoly of the political machinery would come to an end in 
the not too distant future. Contrary to the impression given 
bytHoyos (1974: 44), that the white 'progressives' gave their 
support to a more representative element in politics solely 
by dint of their humanity and concern for social up-liftment,
I would argue another case. The fact that men like these were 
quite different from ultra-conservative planters like 
Dr. Hawkins and S.C. Thorne, only indicates that the political 
ideology of the elite was far from monolithic. From dis­
cussions with several prominent political figures of the 
period, it seems> more likely that they were 'progressive' 
in the sense that they could see further ahead than most of 
their contemporaries, and knew that one day they would have 
to stand down. By canvassing on behalf of Grantley Adams, 
who wrote for the Agricultural Reporter and did well as a
barrister out of work received from the City's white
solicitors who controlled the briefs, I would argue that 
the 'progressive' element saw in Adams someone who could con­
trol the electorate when the franchise was extended.
To what extent the riots of 1937 represented a 
watershed in the history of the elite is debatable. It 
certainly came as a psychological blow to the group, 
especially since they formed part of a mass protest which 
swept through the British Caribbean at the same period, and 
could not be regarded in the words of one planter who found 
himself involved, "as a little spot of local bother". In
fact it seems to have been the more common view that:
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"...communistic influences ’Moscow inspired1 
/were spreading like wild-fire from all of the 
other islands".
From the perspective of the period, it seems to have been
the general view among the older respondents interviewed
that the riots in Barbados were nothing to do with the local
inhabitants, who were on the whole "quite good", but were
essentially a "nasty foreign import" brought into the
country by trouble-makers. However, in spite of the feelings
of the time, compared with what happened elsewhere between
1935 and 1938, the so-called ’riot’ which centred round the
2 7figure of Clement Payne did not pose a long-term threat to
the status quo. I take this view because it was not
instigated by any party political organization or labour
movement, and was swiftly dealt with by the forces of law
and order aided in certain cases by plantation supervisory 
2 8staff. Its real importance, however, lay in the way in 
which it brought sharply into focus to all classes in Bar­
badian society the social and economic ills of the country, 
and the existence of widespread poverty among the rural and 
urban masses and black and white alike. In retrospect many 
members of the elite today insist that the disturbances of 
1937 did not have a political character, but were primarily 
economic and brought about by the need to improve social 
conditions. In so far as the riots were the consequence of 
a spontaneous outburst of pent-up frustration, of which the 
deportation of Clement Payne was merely a catalyst and did 
not involve the participation of political organizations, 
that may be partly true. However, as a result of the riots 
which were clearly a warning to the oligarchy, other forces 
were unleashed which led to social and economic reform and 
brought about political change in their wake. The kind of 
direction taken by these forces after 1937 which were 
decidedlypolitical, under the leadership of Grantley Adams, 
set a seal on the style of Barbadian politics for the next 
forty years. As a consequence of this style which was con­
stitutional rather than radical, plus the fact that the 
assault on the oligarchy’s political power base was 
ultimately in the interests of a coloured political elite 
rather than the Barbadian masses, the fundamental structuring
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In the words of one political figure of the
1930s:
©
"The chief significance of the events of 1937 was 
.that in the questioning of the white oligarchy's 
monopoly of political power, the initiative was 
taken out of the hands of the lawyers with their 
somewhat limited view of how change should be 
brought about" . ^
This oblique reference to "the lawyers" is evidently a 
reference to Grantley Adams, who played a central role in 
destroying Barbadian radicalism whilst upholding the con- 
servative cause of the oligarchy in the early 1930s.
Later on 'in borrowed clothes' he took on the mantle of 
radicalism himself, firstly by supporting the proposed 
Franchise Bill as an independent member of the House of 
Assembly in 1935/36, and secondly by joining the newly formed 
Barbados Progressive League in 1938. Having once seized the 
opportunities presented to him by the disturbances of 1937, 
he acted as a moderating force in the Party, by alienating 
radicals like Brathwaite and Martineau who resigned to form 
the short-lived Congress Party, and finally emerged as its 
unquestioned leader. In spite of the initial impression that 
he had turned against them, it would appear that the 
'progressives' among the planter/mercantile elite 'got it 
right* when they gave their support to Grantley Adams. His 
mixture of Fabian socialism and constitutional liberalism, 
which although contributing to the white elite's erosion of 
political power and privilege, nevertheless left their 
economic power base intact.
9.4. Strategies of Political Power Maintenance in 
Martinique.
Attempts to elicit information from respondents in 
formal interview situations on sources of political power, 
indicating to what extent they were still able to influence 
the decision making process in government, were not productive 
of much 'hard data'. Given that whatever influence they 
continue-to wield is of a covert kind, it must be said
of Barbadian society and economy did not change.
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that by its very nature such things as the funding of 
political parties and the influencing of politicians and 
officials by financial means or otherwise, are impossible 
to quantify or assess the scope of with any degree of 
accuracy.- Moreover, where pressure group politics exists 
it is often hidden and not publicly identifiable. For these 
reasons the method of analysis here is inferential, and most 
of the data has been obtained from informants drawn from out­
side the group, rather than respondents in structured inter­
views .
In the Martiniquan case where the Bekes lost their 
formal political power over 100 years ago, an important 
strategy of power maintenance has been the way in which they 
have consistently sought to form alliances with other groups 
in Martiniquan and metropolitan society. It is possible to 
schematize these alliances in terms of combinations made 
up of the following groups: Bekes, the metropolitan adminis­
tration, the metropolitan industrial and commercial bourg­
eoisie, mulatres and masse noire. At different periods over 
the past 100. years according to the prevailing political 
climate, different combinations of these groups have been 
formed, often as blocks to counter the claims of other groups 
or combinations of other groups. The following cases are 
offered as examples of these blocks of alliances. (See over­
leaf):
338
DIAGRAM IV : MODEL OF BEKE ALLIANCES
GROUP A GROUP B PERIOD COMPONENT
BEKES
METROPOLITANADMINISTRATION MASSENOIRE DEVELOPMENT AND CREATION OF USINES CENTRALES IN THE 1860s
CLASS MEDIATED BY POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS
METROPOLITAN INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL BOURGEOISIE
MULATRES
BEKES
MASSENOIRE
MULATRES
METROPOLITANADMINISTRATION
RISE OF THE THIRD REPUBLIC IN THE 1870s .AND 1880s
POLITICAL: REPUBLICAN VERSUS ULTRA-CONSERVATIVE "TRADITT ONALIS T!* IDEOLOGY
BEKES
• METROPOLITAN ADMINISTRATION
MULATRES
.MASSENOIRE
VICHY PERIOD: 
1940-1943 POLITICAL MEDIATED BY CLASS INTERESTS
BEKES
MULATRES
METROPOLITANADMINISTRATION
MASSENOIRE
EARLY YEARS OF DEPART­MENTALIZATION: LATE 1940s AND 1950s.
CLASS
BEKES
MULATRES METROPOLITANADMINISTRATION PRESENT : 1960s AND 1970s
NATIONALISM
MASSENOIRE
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In Diagram IV Groups A and B represent alliances 
of different groups in creole and metropolitan society.
Group A in every case consists of an alliance of Bekes with 
some of these groups, whereas Group B represents counter 
alliances formed by remaining groups which contest the claims 
of the Bekes at each given period. In each of the five cases 
together with a rough indication of when these alliances were 
formed, is an indication of their chief component. There now 
follows an elaboration upon each case portrayed in the diagram.
Development and Creation of Usines Centrales in the 1860s
The alliance of Beke and metropolitan capital to 
create an institution of finance capital in 1861, represents 
the beginning of a conscious strategy by the Bekes to attract 
overseas investment without losing their own economic base.
As a result of this pooling of resources, a small white creole 
minority assumed a dominant economic role and became the 
local representatives of metropolitan mercantile interests.
From the perspective of the metropolitan power the main com­
ponent of this alliance was political, and this is indicated 
by the intermediary role played by the French State in 
establishing the Credit Foncier. At this period the coloured 
middle-class and the black agro-proletariat can be regarded 
as a block not so much united in active opposition to the 
Bekes and their allies, but united in their mutual exclusion.
On the one hand the coloured planters were excluded from 
playing a role in the new wealth generated by the modern­
ization of the sugar industry. On the other hand the res­
trictions imposed by the plantoeracy upon the ex-slaves to 
acquire good cultivable land (itself wishing to retain land 
in the major sugar growing areas in order to ensure regular 
supplies of cane for the usine), indicates that they too 
were excluded from the wealth created by the boom of the 1860s 
and 1870s.
Rise of the Third Republic in the 1870s and 1880s
With the erosion of their political power th® Bekes 
stood alone in the face of the very strong political links 
forged between the republican mulattos and the Government of
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metropolitan France. The main component of this alliance 
was political.' The alliance between the Bekes and the black 
agro-proletariat•represents not so much a real alliance of 
interests, but an attempt on the part of the Bekes to con­
vince black plantation labour of the legitimacy of the 
traditional colonial order, and the machivellianism of the 
new political elite. The fact that the political struggle 
assumed a racial character does not mean that race in itself 
was a major component of this opposition, but that race was 
harnessed by the mulattos to foment political discord in 
order to further the "substitution" of power.
The Vichy Period: 1940-1945.
It is tempting to regard the support given by the 
Bekes to the proconsulate of Admiral Robert as being neces­
sarily based upon an ideological sympathy with Fascism. Such 
an explanation of the Bekes* support for the Vichy Government 
is superficial, just as the view that this support was 
unanimous is incorrect. I would argue that the support given 
by certain Beke families (who happened to be usiniers for the 
most part), was based upon the perceived importance attached 
to maintaining links with the metropolitan administration to 
protect their sugar and rum quotas. The mulatres and masse 
noire formed a natural alliance against this compact. With 
the development of a syndicalist movement in Martinique in 
the 1920s and 1930s, led by middle-class mulattos in business 
and the professions who were communists and socialists, the 
masse noire became a political class united for the first time 
with the mulatres.
The Early Years of Departmentalization. : the late 1940s 
and early 1950s.
What united the Bekes and the mul&tres against the 
metropolitan administration and the masse noire during the 
late 1940s and the early 1950s, was a common threat to economic 
interests. Article 2 of the Law of Departmentalization 
passed on 1st January 1947 stated:
"The laws and decrees in force at present in metropolitan 
France and which are not yet applied to the colonies,
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will...be made the subject of decrees for application 
to these new departments".
Implicit in the above text was the full equalization of 
social, economic and political rights with the Metropolis, 
including equal levels of pay, equal access to social wel­
fare benefits and family allowances. This in effect meant 
raising wages and salaries, and also meant that the employer 
would have to contribute to national insurance and sick pay. 
The application of this legislation during the post-war years 
represented a direct threat to the profit margins of Beke 
and mulatto planters and merchants alike, in an inflationary 
period of rising costs in conjunction with overproduction in 
agriculture and low export prices. Dut to the influence of 
a powerful pressure group representing Beke and mulatto 
business interests, wages did not achieve parity with the 
Metropolis until I960 (SMIG: Salaire Minimum Garanti).
Other rights, such as full welfare and social benefits and 
index-linked wages and salaries (SMIC: Salaire Minimum 
Interprofessionnel de Croissance) were not accorded until the 
early 1970s.
The Present : the 1960s and 1970s.
The chief component in this last case is probably 
best characterized as one of nationalism. A number of related 
factors have contributed to a perceived alliance of interests 
by Bekes with other groups in Martiniquan society, which cut 
across the boundaries of class and ethnicity. Factors 
producing an opposition to the metropolitan power and a 
strengthening of nationalist sentiment include the following: 
an increased loss of autonomy under departmentalization; 
higher taxation in line with the Metropolis; competition with 
other African/Caribbean/Pacific countries for Martiniquan 
exports within the EEC, and the social effects of a large 
influx of metropolitans who come to live and work in the 
department. Set against these factors, a legacy of rep­
ression by the metropolitan authorities in the late 1950s 
and throughout the 1960s, to stifle protest against the 
failure of departmentalization to bring, about complete 
equality, has produced a strong identification with being
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Martiniquan, and a marked hostility to the metropolitans who 
the Bekes regard as 'the agents of a new colonialism". The 
situation, however, -is not without its contradictions, 
since on the issue of autonomy the B£kes come down on the 
side of the authorities in campaigning against the 
autonomiste platform of radical left-wing parties.
The kinds of pressures and influences that the 
Bekes bring to bear upon the political system are very much 
a reflection of the particularistic nature of Beke society 
itself. This influence is commonly established at the level 
of sets of highly personalized relationships, in which the 
power holders are 'courted1 by gifts, cash payments, 
invitations to family dinners and important social functions, 
and by flattery, at which the Bekes excel. Since Martinique 
became a department the Prefect has become a prime target 
through which pressures can be exerted upon central govern­
ment policy affecting Beke interests, such as taxation and 
the way in which the department's budget is allocated. One 
French civil servant working at the Prefecture offered the 
following explanation for this phenomenon:
"Most prefects who come to Martinique are so green.
They come here with no previous experience of over­
seas departments and their particular problems.
They are quite defenceless against the Bekes. They 
find it very difficult to resist the blandishments 
of the Bek£s, who have this very special aptitude 
for flattery and the developing of relationships of 
a highly personalized nature to gain influence. They 
usually hold office for only two or three years. By 
the time they know the score they are ready to depart 
for another post".
It is ironic that the French government's policy of changing 
prefects regularly and frequently to avoid corruption 
actually works in favour of the Bekes, since as the above 
informant noted, the lack of any continuity means that the 
post is always filled by someone who is not only inexperienced 
in overseas matters, but also inexperienced in dealing with 
the Bekes.
Given the fact that the different strata of Beke" 
society behave like closed status groups and that the intimacy 
of family life is considered sacrosanct, proof of the
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importance of the Prefect as a central figure in the wielding 
of political influence is. revealed in this statement by a 
mulatto mire, indicating that a Prefect a priori is always 
received socially:
"You will never find the Prefect at home on Sunday.
Every Sunday in the year I can guarantee that the 
Prefect will be invited to dine at the home of this 
Beke or that Beke. The influence that the Bekes 
wield over them is enormous. More often than not 
the Prefect comes from a relatively modest social 
background, and he is flattered by the attentions 
of the Bekes. In France he has only one car that 
goes with his job. Here he gets a chauffeur-driven 
Mercedes for official duties, another car for private 
use, a (-vehicle for shopping and servants - all kinds 
of fringe benefits and financial rewards that he 
does not get in the Metropolis. And on top of all 
that he is courted by the Bekes!"
The prefects may come from a "relatively modest social back­
ground" and have nowhere near the same standing as the Grands 
Bekes economically, but because of their position in the 
French administration at the centre of power, their status 
is sufficiently high enough for their sons and daughters to 
be considered acceptable marital partners in Beke society.
In the same way that economic alliances with French'industrial 
and commercial families have been cemented through marriage, 
the forming of alliances with the families of senior French 
administrators is one way in which the Bekes realize 
political influence in central government. A recent example 
in 1977 of this kind of alliance was the marriage of the 
former Prefect Orsetti to the daughter of the Grand Beke,
Jean Bally.
Gaining political influence through the patronage 
of certain mulatto politicians by the same web of person­
alism described above, has been a long-established tactic 
on the part of the Bekes. Not having played a direct role 
in the Conseil General for a long time, the Bekes have 
sought to influence the decision making process indirectly 
by getting members to vote for. policies which favour their 
economic interests. An example of this in the early 1970s 
concerned the Brasserie Lorrain brewery owned by the 
de Jaham family. In this•case by exerting influence upon
one member of the Conseil General in Fort-de-France, who in 
turn was able to sway a majority of the other -conseillers. 
the assembly voted to reduce the commune’s share of the 
octroi de mer which had the effect of reducing overheads 
during a period of rising costs, which protected the profit­
ability of the business. This tactic, however, does not 
always work and may have to be taken to a higher authority 
in the Metropolis itself. For example, one Grand Beke 
decided to construct a petrol station in the commune of 
Lamentin. The plans were presented to the municipal govern­
ment and were refused on the grounds of safety. Having 
approached the maire of Lamentin and mistakenly believed that 
he had gained his support, the plan was submitted again and 
planning permission was refused a second time. The plans 
were next submitted to the Department of Bridges and High­
ways and turned down by the Chief Engineer on two separate 
occasions. With the intervention of the Prefect acting on 
behalf of the Grand Beke, his case was presented to the 
Department of Public Works in Paris who accepted the plans. 
Back in Martinique both the Department of Bridges and High­
ways and the Conseil Municipal refused application a third 
time. Permission was never granted and the plans had to be 
shelved. Although in this example these attempts at 
influencing the decision-making process did not succeed, it 
does indicate that the Bekes in local parlance ’have long 
arms’. This example highlights a common strategy employed 
by the Bekes. Where influence fails at the local level 
they have developed the means to present their case to 
central government through the Prefect, which in some cases 
can bring pressure to bear upon the local authorities to 
produce a successful outcome.
Although the Bekes very rarely if ever nowadays 
wield political power directly, there is one avenue which 
offers a relative chance of success, and that is in local 
government. At the municipal level in the predominantly 
rural communes it has been possible for several Bekes to 
become maires, by building their appeal to the electorate 
in a paternalist mould. Famous examples of Grand Bekes in 
the recent past who won elections in local government and
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also became conseillers in the Conseil General, include 
Gabriel Hayot in the south of the island and Fernand Clerc 
in the north east. In his day the former was reputed to be 
a great benefactor in his community, building schools and 
hospitals in Trois-Ilets. A more recent example is that of 
Jean Bally, who was elected maire of Carbet and conseiller 
in 1971. Another Beke describing Bally's election referred 
to his tactics as "the demogogic practice of the really 
Grand Beke", indicating that Bally courted popularity 
through patronage and paternalism: dispensing largesse in 
the form of gifts and distributing food, champagne, beer and 
lemonade. His case is an interesting one and it is pertinent 
to relate the following facts. Firstly, this is a prime 
example of those paternalistic modes of interaction developed 
within the confines of the 'greedy institution* already 
analysed in Chapter 7, extending outwards into the local 
community. Jean Bally is a very large land owner and a high 
percentage of the population in the area depend on him for 
work. Secondly, the Bally family is considered in Martinique 
to be one of the few Beke families who are instruit. a mark 
of high distinction in the local hierarchy of values.^1 
Jean Bally like his father and uncle before him graduated 
as an officer from the elite Ecole Navale in Paris, and has 
a rank high enough to qualify as an admiral. Thirdly, as 
the Beke informant mentioned above noted, what makes it 
possible for a Beke to succeed to political office is the 
ability to dispense patronage over a large geographical 
area. Speaking of another Beke who informed me that he 
intended running for office as maire, a mulatto politician 
sneered derisively at these intentions: "...he's only a
petit Beke. He wouldn't stand a chance at being elected..." 
However, sheer financial ability to dispense patronage is 
not the only factor of success. It is status as well, which 
indicates that interactional status has not declined com­
pletely in some parts of the island, since the aura of 
power and wealth and the respect for traditional authority 
still continues to invest the "really Grand Beke" with 
almost charismatic qualities. -
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The evidence seems to suggest that the Bekes 
primarily devote themselves to pressure group politics 
rather than party politics, preferring to restrict themselves 
to defending sectoral interests on matters which threaten or 
touch upon their economic power. However, it is apparent 
that in recent years they have entered the party political 
arena and given active support to the Majority Republican 
Party of Giscard D'Estaing. When Jean Bally came up for re- 
election in 1977 he headed the list for maire and was 
elected into office. But Bally did not want to be re­
elected and in his place he nominated a successor, a mulatto 
who supported Giscard D'Estaing's Majority Party. Although 
not originally listed as a candidate, this nominee was sub­
sequently elected as maire and conseiller. In the municipal 
elections of 1977 the Bekes played a central role in cam­
paigning for Majority Party candidates. They played an 
equally active role in the general election of 1978 in 
support of Majority Party candidates. Whilst conducting 
field work in the north-east during a period running up to 
the elections of 1978, it became apparent from my frequent 
meetings in a number of different rural communes with a 
young Beke I had previously interviewed, that he was con­
ducting an electoral campaign on behalf of the Majority . 
Republican Party. Apart from such legal means of gaining 
support, it is apparent from reports received on the conduct 
of the actual election in 1978, that the Bekes continue to 
employ quasi-illegal methods of enforcing their political 
will.. Given the existence of the secret ballot this may 
appear inexplicable to outsiders, but observers reported that 
during the election in the north-east Bekes were seen to be 
strategically positioned outside polling centres to intimidate 
the electorate. This interpretation of findings from obser­
vation studies carried out in five communes, coincides with 
the stated views of coloured informants gathered during 
fieldwork, that this strategy of intimidation has been a con­
sistent one practised by the Bekes ever since their loss of 
a formal power base. Since the evidence for this strategy 
of intimidation is rather tenuous it is difficult to draw 
further conclusions. It may be hypothesized that its
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effectiveness is related to the psychological dimensions 
of the 'deferential dialectic’, where the evidence presented 
in Chapter 7 suggests that forms of social interaction 
deemed deferential relect physical subordination rather than 
a positive commitment to the object of deference. Thus in 
a social context in which the decline of traditional 
authority has occurred relatively recently, it may be 
argued that a heritage of fear enables the Bekes to intimidate 
the rural electorate merely by their presence.
Although the Bekes have given their support to the 
political faction of Giscard D’Estaing, it is questionable 
whether they have really entered the party political arena 
or whether this is just another instance of protecting 
narrow sectoral interests. In interviews it did not appear 
that they had actively subscribed to the right-wing repub­
licanism of Valery Giscard D’Estaing any more than the 
left-wing republicanism of Francois Mitterand. Their support 
instead stemmed mainly from a concern which parochial issues: 
namely the issue of autonomy which became central to the 
local and general elections in Martinique in the period 
1977/78. Set against the threat offered by the mouvement 
autonomiste supported by a wide range of left-wing political 
parties in Martinique, including socialists, communists, 
trotskyists and at one time the Parti Progressiste of Aime 
Cesaire, the Bekes* support for right-wing republicanism can 
be seen as yet another strategy of alliance, to counter the. 
claims of other groups inimical to their economic interests.
9.5. Strategies of Political Power Maintenance in Barbados.
The strategies employed by the Barbadian white 
elite to maintain forms of political power and influence are 
not as clearly defined as in Martinique. It is more difficult 
to isolate any consciously evolved strategies, such as the 
formation of alliances and the attendant forms of person­
alism which are to be found in the dealings that the Bekes 
have with other7groups. Moreover, in making a comparison 
there is the methodological problem of time-scale. In the 
Martiniquan case the fact that the loss of direct political
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power occurred over a century ago, means that it is easier 
in retrospect to identify general patterns of power main­
tenance. In the Barbadian case I would argue that the 
recency of this loss of power makes it more difficult to 
build up a composite picture of the patterns which have 
evolved. I would also argue that the retention of forms 
of covert power and influence is just as much related to 
the composition and nature of the new political elite it­
self, as it is to a conscious strategy on the part of the 
whites. In making my analysis I will therefore begin by
focussing upon the new political elite, which I have termed
32the 'lawyer politicians',-^ and then proceed to an examin­
ation of actual strategies which I have characterized as 
co-option.
From the comparative data presented above on the 
elites' loss of power, it is evident that the rise of 
political opposition in Barbados in the 1920s and 1930s, 
did not represent the same kind of monolithic grouping of 
forces against the white oligarchy that the 'party' of 
coloured republicans did in Martinique. In the Barbadian 
case the new breed of 'lawyer politicians' as represented by 
figures like Grantley Adams, Erskine Ward, H.A. Vaughan, 
Frank Holder and W.W. Reece, were not united by any common 
political ideology, and as a result the forces lined up 
against the oligarchy were fissiparous, and the responses 
of the 'lawyer politicians' to their waning power individ­
ualistic. Significantly enough they were divided in their 
support for the only organized political alternative to the 
power of the oligarchy at this period, with Erskine Ward 
and H.A. Vaughan actively supporting the cause of the 
Democratic League, whilst politicians like Adams opposed its 
radicalism. Just how fissiparous these tendencies were is 
later indicated by the rift in the Barbados Progressive 
League (later re-named the Barbados Labour Party), and the 
formation of the Congress Party out of its more radical 
elements.
Commenting upon Hoyos's view of the rise of 
Barbadian democracy which is to-be found in all of his works 
dealing with the twentieth century, Lewis (1968: 246) states
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that this local historian portrays it in terms of the 
political career of Grantley Adams. Quite rightly Lewis 
concludes that this is a somewhat exaggerated view.- How­
ever, in some respects I would argue that it is a view that 
contains a kernel of truth. Evidence for it can he related 
to the established practice in the Colony of encouraging 
the formation of a tiny educated coloured elite, through a 
murderously competitive system of rewards, via a limited 
number of foundations to top white schools like Lodge and 
Harrison College, and the biggest prize of all which 
ensured an "Oxbridge education, the annual Island Scholar­
ship. Among those who succeeded in jumping all the hurdles 
this inevitably produced a decidely elitist ethos, and a 
highly developed sense of personal and individual achieve­
ment which is reflected in their political careers.
Through the avenue of social mobility provided by 
education, there is in Barbados a tradition of coloured 
'lawyer politicians' going back beyond the 1920s, which in 
the past at any given period never represented more than one 
or two individuals. One such figure was William Conrad 
Reeves, born in 1826 of a slave mother and a white father. 
Reeves studied law at Oxford in the late 1840s and early 
1850s and returned to Barbados to become a highly successful 
attorney-at law. During his career he became Solicitor 
General, was elected to the House of Assembly by the planto­
cracy of St. Joseph, became Attorney General and finally 
ended up as Chief Justice. A later figure who featured in 
the rise of political democracy in the 1920s and 1930s was 
Henry Walter Reece, born in 1868 and educated at University 
College, London. Like Reeves he worked as an attorney-at-law 
on behalf of the island's merchants and planters, and was 
also actively engaged in politics, representing St. Lucy for 
over thirty years, serving on a number of Government Boards, 
holding the post of Solicitor General, and for the last few 
years of his life serving in the Legislative Council.
From the background of these two figures which 
serve as representative examples of the coloured 'lawyer 
politicians', it is evident that they were staunchly con­
servative, establishment figures who were co-opted by the
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white oligarchy to maintain law and order and to protect 
their economic interests. As lawyers they handled all 
the briefs of the CityTs merchants and the planters in the 
country, which were controlled by the white solicitors.
Through holding key posts in the island's juridical and 
administrative system they were instrumental in enforcing 
the political will of the oligarchy. Reeves had the repu­
tation of being a stern Victorian autocrat; unduly harsh as 
a Chief Justice enforcing the articles of the Masters and 
Servants Act with a severity unlike any predecessor. For 
his part Reece openly attacked the attempts of the Demo­
cratic League to press for improvements in the social and 
economic conditions of the island, and was hostile to any 
progressive political ideas in his day. After losing his 
seat in the House of Assembly in the early 1930s, he con­
tinued his support for the white oligarchy through the 
Legislative Council, blocking any legislation proposed by 
progressive members of the Assembly. The strategy that 
emerges from these two case studies is that of co-option, 
whereby the white oligarchy co-opted the support of a highly 
selected minority of gifted coloured individuals, making it 
possible for them to penetrate the elite's citadel of power 
by offering them leadership roles normally reserved for 
whites. As to why they did not represent potential forces 
of liberalization in their time, the answer is to be found 
in the carefully controlled system of selection and their 
professional training. By dint of having been chosen for 
a particular destiny and risen into the ranks of the elect, 
and as a consequence of their legal training which imbued 
them with a respect for English traditions and constit­
utional government, they were ideal defenders of the 
colonial status quo.
I would argue that the same model of co-option can 
be applied-to the 'lawyer politicians' of the 1930s and 
after. Those returning from Oxbridge-and London in the inter­
war years did not all react.- in the same way to the situation 
they found in Barbados. However, even those who allied 
themselves to the radical- cause were later on to develop a 
more conservative outlook. If we accept the view advanced
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by one informant above, that the events of 1957 took the 
• initiative out of the hands of the 'lawyer politicians' 
and propelled them towards direct political action, once 
having gained an electorate through political reform, 
established themselves in power, organized labour and laid 
the foundations of a welfare state,  ^no serious attempt was 
made to bring some of the earlier promises of the 'lawyer 
politicians' to fruition. It is interesting to compare the 
contents of-the party political manifestoes of the two main 
parties over the last couple of decades. Echoing the 
recommendations made at the Trinidad Congress in 1958 and
3 Lplaced before the Moyne Commission in the following year, 
the Barbados Labour Party's Manifesto for 1944 stated the 
case for nationalization:
"We believe that wealth produced in this Island will 
not be equally distributed until the sources of 
wealth are owned and controlled by the Government 
on behalf of the community. Sugar factories...must 
be own§d by the state and/or controlled that their 
profits bear a just relation to the returns received 
by the growers of sugar cane and the labourers 
employed. The League also believes that a single 
government purchasing agency should be established 
as the sole exporter of sugar, so that unnecessary 
middle-men profits may be eliminated".
Over time, it is significant to note that the Party's stated 
intention to curtail the economic supremacy of the white 
elite evaporated very quickly. As early as 1951 the wording 
of those parts of the BLP's Manifesto relating to national­
ization had taken on a more ambiguous tone, being now 
contingent upon certain ill-defined conditions:
"The Barbados Labour Party adheres to the policy 
of public ownership...wherever and whenever the 
general welfare demands it..."
Throughout the 1950s nationalization of the sugar industry 
continued to be an official platform of the BLP's programme, 
but by 1961 it was a dead letter and did not receive a men­
tion. Documentary analysis of the BLP's Manifestoes of 
1961, 1966, 1971 and 1976, all indicate a drift towards 
adjustive policies within the given constitutional framework
at the expense of long-term strategies aimed at re-structuring
35Barbadian society and economy.
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It was not until 1956 that the first Manifesto of
the Democratic Labour Party appeared, the party only having
been created the year before as a dissident offshoot of the
36BLP. Personal reasons apart, although disenchanted with 
the drift towards manipulative and adjustive politics under 
Grantley Adams, Errol Barrow's party on the evidence of its 
Manifestoes does not appear to have produced policies which 
differ widely in substance from those of the BLP. From the 
Manifestoes of 1956, 1961 and 1966, however, it is apparent 
that from the very beginning the DLP was committed to a 
programme of modernizing the Barbadian economy, through 
industrialization, crop diversification and tourism, whereas 
the BLP seems to have been more willing to work with the 
traditional twin pillars of the economy: sugar and trading. 
Nevertheless, from their stated policies contained in party 
manifestoes and their record in office, it is apparent that 
the DLP like the BLP has not questioned the basic assumptions 
upon which the distribution of resources in Barbados are 
based (although unlike the BLP it has questioned the 
assumption that sugar necessarily plays a vital role in the 
island's economy).
Out of office the DLP in 1977 continued to question 
the importance of sugar and the desirability of maintaining 
the plantation system. This it did through a series of 
seminars at the "Academy of Politics" in its George Street 
headquarters. At one of these public seminars entitled 
"Public Ownership and Private Enterprise in a Strategy of 
National Development",^ members of the panel^8 refused to 
elaborate on the extent and nature of public ownership 
proposed, and whether or not the party had plans for land 
reform. Answers to questions from the floor were instead 
restricted to a re-statement of the established party plat­
form, which first appeared in the 1956 Manifesto. It is 
worth quoting a few extracts from an ambiguously worded 
hand-out given to members of the audience at this meeting.
The extracts selected concern the Party's concept of 
socialism, or more precisely its liberalized form, demo­
cratic socialism, and its view of state ownership to which 
it subscribes:
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"Question: What are the main components of democratic 
..socialism as your party practises it?
Barrow: Minimum standards of nourishment and shelter
and the ready availability of all the amenities of 
life to the total population...
Question: To what extent does your government believe 
in the view that the means of production should be 
state-owned?
Barrow: That the nineteenth century view of socialism 
is an extreme one which implies that justice can only 
be achieved if the means of production are owned by 
the state. We in our party do not subscribe to this 
Maraisb view that all the means of exchange, distribution 
and production should be owned and controlled by the 
state... We are not in favour of state ownership of 
everything. Our view is that government must not be 
unwilling to create the kinds of industry which can 
be boldly undertaken by government in the name of the 
people.
Question: Your aim is a delicate re-distribution of
the wealth of Barbados?
Barrow: Re-distribution of the wealth of a country
is done by accepted devices. For me the most important 
thing is not to infringe on the rights of private 
property. We do not believe that there is any sanctity 
about private property, but we can accommodate the 
concept of a man retaining what he has earned by the 
sweat of his brow..."
Behind this liberal 'Whiggish' view of government is a clue 
to what the seemingly radical-modernization programme of the 
DLP has really meant. It is significant to note that this 
programme has always been projected within the existing 
economic framework. Attempts to industrialize and diversify 
agricultural production under the DLP, have not competed 
with the white elite's interests in terms of capital, land 
and labour. Programmes of industrialization have been short­
term, taking the form of attracting overseas investment by 
the lure of 'tax-free holidays'. Investment by government 
in agriculture in an attempt to develop alternatives to 
sugar, has equally not posed a threat to established interests 
The commercialization of the tourist industry conceived by 
the Barrow Government in the 1960s as best being financed 
from- local capital, has benefited the white elite most by 
providing much needed new avenues for investment.
It is quite a sobering fact that in spite of all 
the political rhetoric of the two major parties, the pivotal
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institutions and symbols of power in Barbadian life, such 
as the elite schools, the white clubs-, honorific titles, 
the 'Big Six' and 'sugar estate capitalism' have survived 
intact, the values they represent never having been seriously 
questioned. This would indicate that within the social 
and cultural fabric of Barbadian life the elements of 
traditionalism are still very strong. The maintenance of 
this traditionalism long after the erosion of the white 
elite's formal political power, is a function of, the kind of 
adjustive politics described above. It is evident, for 
example, that the 'lawyer politicians' have shown no 
appetite for forging a new cultural identity by the pursuit 
of nationalist policies. Apart from those reforms initiated 
by the colonial government of the day, there has also been 
no attempt to remodel the constitution. In terms of the re­
distribution of power since the early 1940a, this has 
primarily benefited a small minority of middle-class 
professionals whose interests appear to be closely identi­
fied with those of the former power holders.
As to ways in which today's 'lawyer-politicians* 
can be regarded as having been co-opted by the white elite,
I would argue that the style of politics adopted over the 
past three decades is a reflection of the fact that power 
•per se still continues to be derived from traditional 
economic power. The most direct expression of this is the 
still prevalent practice for coloured lawyers to handle the 
legal business of the agri-business bourgeoisie. Henry 
Forde, for example, member for Christ Church West (which 
incidentally contains a high proportion of Bridgetown's 
merchants) and Attorney General, has as his most important 
client Barbados Shipping and Trading. Some of this group 
have been co-opted in other ways. For example, that former 
member of the Democratic League in the 1930s, Erskine Ward, . 
had been the Director of the Sugar Producers' Association 
for a number of years up to 1974, and their public relations 
consultant throughout the remainder of the 1970s. As the 
editor of the Barbados Sugar Industry Review his unflagging 
support for planter interests - is clearly demonstrated in 
his articles. His eulogistic homilies in the obituary
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section of the Review are fine exemplars of the Protestant 
Ethnic as practised under'sugar estate capitalism',^0 
indicating an unquestioning acceptance of "the pivotal 
institutions and symbols of power" referred to above. Res­
pondents in interviews indicated that it was a conscious 
policy of the sugar industry to "get coloured faces on the 
board", since as they argued: "It goes down well with our 
political masters". In this respect it should be added 
that their other success was in getting an ex-civil servant 
from the Treasury to fill the post of Financial Director.
What is probably more interesting is what might 
be regarded as an indirect expression of this power relation­
ship: a deference to established economic power in which the 
white elite are regarded as having an inherited aptitude 
for business. According to one respondent interviewed, it 
was this deference to traditional economic power which 
provided the planter/mercantile elite with the best opportunity ' 
of influencing the power holders:
"I think that the people who still have an interest 
in Barbados financially, in business houses and the 
land and so forth...do have an influence on those 
people who have been fortunate enough to gain the 
favour of the electorate".
Prompted as to at what level this influence operated, the 
respondent continued:
"It's done I think in all fairness through the 
reputation of stability that the majority who are 
running estates and businesses can say they do 
have, as far as the politician is concerned, 
although he doesn't like it".
Speaking about this deference to business acumen in a similar 
vein, another respondent made this contribution:
"I think I would be right in saying that the politicians
.still feel that if this planter or that businessman 
expressed an opinion then they would think that he had 
a case. There has been no feeling among these people 
that we are trying to undermine their authority in any 
way, and anything we have ever done or any opinions 
offered have been...for the good of the island. So 
if that is accepted, I think that the minority still 
wield a sort of unseen influence. This is maybe an 
unpopular thought in certain circles, but I have 
noticed that the people who have got the go-ahead
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from the electorate have always included the people 
in the country and the Sugar Producers1 Association, 
and the Chamber of Commerce in their deliberations.
At times they have been included in any delegation 
that has gone away to represent the island, which 
shows that they still believe that it is a good thing 
for the whites to involve themselves - although not 
politically, but in an advisory capacity".
At a.deeper level, there is evidence to suggest that 
co-option may be explained in terms of a psychological 
variable. Among a few older political figures who were 
active in the 1930s, there was the view that as a con­
sequence of the *lawyer-politicians* pursuit of manipulative 
politics, full independence had never been achieved in 
Barbados. The bias in political thinking towards elitist 
solutions and the elitism of the 1lawyer-politicians* them­
selves, who had not encouraged mass party political partic­
ipation in the process of national development, had produced 
a situation whereby the greater part of the black masses were 
still in a sense.unrepresented politically. According to 
one informant this was best described in terms of psycholog­
ical rather than socio-economic variables:
"Coloured politicians have not taken a consistently 
radical stand on behalf of the masses, since they 
have a built-in fear of being accused of having a 
colour complex. Secondly, because they don't like 
the idea of being identified with the 'barefoot 
man'. In both cases this leads to a loss of 
credibility as a public figure and can lead to 
ridicule in being so identified, within the context 
of the current situation in which the 'barefoot man' 
in Barbados is despised".
This fear of the coloured middle-class in being identified 
with the ’barefoot man' is rooted in the association this 
term has with extreme poverty, which is associated with 
being black and of pure African stock. This in turn gives 
rise to a perceived complex of cultural and genetic traits 
regarded as inferior and atavistic.. According to this 
informant's analysis, the extent to which the political 
parties can radicalize their appeal and be a force for 
change without losing their credibility is restricted.
As to ways in which the white elite has co-opted 
the support of the 'lawyer politicians' by suoh practices
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as party political funding and affiliation, it was difficult 
to come up with any concrete evidence. In the field one 
instance of funding did emerge which was•corroborated by 
several respondents in interviews. According to these 
respondents it has been a common enough practice at each 
general election since 1961 for the major Bridgetown commer­
cial houses to agree upon a 'political levy', to contribute 
towards the election expenses of the Barbados Labour Party. 
Isolated instances were also quoted in the cases of 
St. George and St. Thomas, where groups of planters and 
Barbados Shipping and Trading, which has holdings in the 
area, contributed to the election expenses of individual BLP 
members in 1976. However, this kind of information in it­
self is not particularly valuable, since more importantly 
it is not possible to get any idea of the extent of this 
funding. On the question of party political affiliation, 
ever since the demise of the short-lived Electors' Association 
and the Barbados National Party, the white elite have 
supported the BLP which they consider to be a conservative 
alternative to the extremism.of Errol Barrow's Democratic 
Labour Party. In spite of this just under a quarter of the 
sample interviewed stated that they were or had been DLP 
supporters. Support for the DLP in these cases was 
correlated with socio-economic background. All of this group 
were representatives of that upwardly mobile group of poor 
whites, who had risen from the ranks of plantation super­
visory staff to become planters, entrepreneurs and land 
speculators in the 1960s. From interviews it does not appear 
that their support for the DLP was necessarily based on 
political ideology. Investigations revealed that members of 
this group had been jointly involved with DLP politicians 
(including the Prime Minister and the Minister of Agriculture) 
in the sub-division of land and speculation already des­
cribed in Chapter 6. One of these figures who was closely 
involved with members of the DLP government in land deals 
was J.W. Corbin, who interestingly enough was a member for 
St. Andrew for two consecutive terms in the Barrow government. 
Evidence of this process today is to be found in a number of 
'bogus* estate and land development companies from which it
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is difficult to ascertain the real owners, some being 
'fronted1 by new members of the white planter elite.
9.6. Conclusion.
The fact that a highly developed, consistent 
strategy•of alliance formation and attendant forms of per­
sonalism can be observed in Martinique, whereas strategies 
of political power maintenance in Barbados rest upon a less 
consciously directed process of co-option aimed at specific 
goals, seems to indicate that the Bekes are more successful 
in maintaining covert forms of influence. In both cases 
models of power maintenance are a function of the different 
political status of the islands today, and are very much a 
logical culmination of the historical differences in 
colonial policy and practice. There is a sense in which the 
Bekes have been able to respond more effectively to the loss 
of a formal power base than the Barbadian elite, which is 
related inversely to the degree of autonomy each group 
enjoyed. Given the high degree of administrative central­
ization in the French Antillean case, it can be argued that 
the Bekes were never a ruling class in the same way that 
the white elite was in Barbados. Given the fact that the 
Martiniquan plantocracy was always dependent politically, 
they may be best characterized in one informant's words 
as "the agents of the metropolitan power".
Always having been a dependent elite the Bekes 
over time have developed an astuteness and a capacity for 
"jumping over all barriers". At every period of their 
history as the data on alliances indicates, they have shown 
great flexibility in being able to move with the changing 
tide of events. Their opportunism can be counted as an 
important factor of survival. As regards their Barbadian 
counterparts it is not so easy to arrive at such firm con­
clusions, primarily because their loss of power is of 
relative recency, which makes it difficult to build up a 
composite picture of the patterns which have emerged. If 
any conclusions are to be drawn about the strategies of 
power maintenance in the Barbadian case, I would tentatively
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suggest that they have not shown themselves to be as 
effective as the Bekes in mobilizing themselves in any con­
certed way. Always having had virtually complete control 
over the central political mechanisms of power, and there­
fore lacking the machivellian expertise acquired by the 
Bekes over three centuries of colonial and departmental rule, 
the loss of power came as a more profound psychological blow. 
That this was so is indicated by the departure from the 
island in the late 1940s and early 1950s of an estimated 
1,000 whites, and a further 300-400 whites in the years 
following independence. The traumatic effect that this loss 
of power had on certain families has already been described 
in Chapter 6. It would appear from the evidence of res­
pondents' comments that the deposed oligarchy suffered a 
loss of political will as the following comment suggests:
,fI think that the majority of the people at the 
time said that we're going to hell, but they mis­
judged the situation entirely...it hasn't turned 
out that way1'..
Having stated the above view, it is apparent that 
placed as they are in quite different circumstances, the 
Barbadian elite is constrained to act within much more 
narrowly defined limits than the Bekes: the difference in 
political status of each island determining the elites' free­
dom of choice in developing strategies. For example, if a 
decision taken at departmental level does not meet with the 
Bekes approval they have recourse to a higher authority out­
side the confines of island politics. The restricted choices 
available to the Barbadian elite may explain in part why 
their approach to wielding influence is a more passive and 
less directed one. From the data it is even doubtful whether 
the strategy of co-option can be regarded as a strategy as 
such, in the sense that it represents a conscious decision 
to achieve certain specific.goals. The source of its 
effectiveness would appear to be rooted outside the domain 
of party political life, within the realm of ideology.
Beneath the rhetoric of party political propaganda, the 
extent to which the 'lawyer politicians' subscribe to the 
traditional values and symbols of Anglo-white domination, 
attests to the power of the repressive hegemony of the past.
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NOTE'S AND' REFERENCES
1. The supporters of Burke argued that the sugar industry 
and the slave trade played an important role in 
financing the Industrial Revolution in the eighteenth 
century, through the repatriation of profits. Smith's 
supporters on the other hand asserted that the colonies 
cost more in terms of administrative and military 
expenses and private capital (which might have been 
otherwise used to finance industrialization at home),than 
the actual wealth generated by them. (Sheridan, 197^:5-11).
2. It can be argued that through the theory and practice 
of mercantilism, both metropolitan powers viewed their 
colonial possessions in terms of their economic utility. 
However, from an historical perspective the greater 
degree of autonomy accorded to the English islands by
the granting of. representative government, and conversely, 
the greater degree of centralization in the French case 
which evolved from the direct control assumed by the 
Crown after the collapse of the Compagnie des Indes 
Occidentales in 1674, resulted in a justification of 
assimilationist policies in terms of the realization 
of political ideals.
3. At the first^level in this system Guadeloupe, Martinique, 
Guyana and Reunion form the four Departements d'Outre-Mer, 
which^theoretically have a similar status to the ninety- 
six Departements Metropolitans. At a secondary level 
there are the Territoires d'Outre-Mer which are currently 
four in number: Nouvelle-Caledonie, Polynesie Francaise, 
St. Pierre and Miquelon (in the process of receiving
the status of departement), Wallis and Futuna. Former 
territoires which have recently become independent are 
Afars and des Issas (Djibouti) and Nouvelles Hebrides. 
■Collectively they are referred to as DOMTOM and come 
under the control of a^Minister in the French Government. 
However, whereas the departements are considered an 
inseparable part of France the territoires are con­
stitutionally able to accede to independence.
4. Source: Bulletin Officiel de la Martinique: 1828, 1833,
1854. ------------------------------ --------------
5. In line with the political equality and freedom of the 
Metropolis was one very important concession: the 
independence of the press. This had far reaching con­
sequences for the development of a competing political 
elite.
6. Primarily because it was not until the late 1870s that 
the mulattos had a medium- through which to express their 
views and interests.
7. The use of this term which gained common currency at this 
period is derived from an anecdote related by Governor 
Aube (1882: 85). At a banquet given by the Conseil
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General he relates how one mulatto conseiller proposed 
the toast: "I drink to fusion", to which a colleague
replied: "Never. I drink to substitution"; a toast 
which was[greeted with loud applause.
8. Source: Les Colonies. 15/3/1882.
9. Source: Le Propagateur, 25/3/1882.
10. Source: Les Colonies, 24/5/1882.
11. Ibid.
12. Estimated at an annual average cost of 304,050 francs, 
by a Commission set up in 1884 to study the economic 
viability of indentureship.
(Source: Deliberations du Conseil General.
Session Ordinaire, 17th December 1884).
13. Source: Le Propagateur. 24/6/1882.
14. Ibid.
15. Source: Les Colonies. 28/6/1882.
16. Source: Le Propagateur. 1/7/1882.
17. Source: Les Colonies, 12/7/1882.
18. Source: Les Colonies, 23/3/1878.
19. Source: Deliberations du Conseil General. Sessions 
Ordinaires, 17th-18th December 1884.
20. The Report of this Commission was published in the 
Colony's official newspaper: Journal Qfficiel de la 
Martinique. 16/6/1853.
21. Source: Deliberations du Conseil Prive. 24/1/1853.
22. 1848   18,125,948 kilograms.
1849 ........... 19,222,060
1850    15,068,980
1851 ........... 23,407,505
1852 ........... 26,115,577
(Source: Evidence of M. Duquesnay of the Financial 
Commission on indentureship, given to the Conseil General 
in session on 17/12/84)
23. A good analysis of the development of Cabinet Government 
in Barbados has been provided by Cheltenham (1970).
24. The- former system of nominating members had ensured the 
retention of the white oligarchy's surviving vestiges 
of political power. Up until 1961 the fifteen members 
were...entirely nominated by the Governor, and were drawn
’ from the leading planter/mercantile families of the 
island. Under the revised system of nomination, twelve
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were appointed by the Governor "acting on the advice 
of the. Premier", two were appointed by him "acting on 
the. advice of the Leader of the Opposition", and seven 
were discretionary appointments "chosen to represent 
the various social, economic, religious and other 
interests of the island".
25. There was no Act on the Statute Book to limit the 
delaying powers of the Legislative Council, i.e. There 
was no provision as in England after the.reform of the
House of Lords in 1911, for an Act passed three times
by the Lower House to proceed to the Statute Book.
26. Source: Barbados Herald, 28/3/1925.
27. Clement Payne arrived in Barbados from Trinidad in
March 1937. He was a close friend of Uriah Butler and 
came to Barbados with the intention of trying to con­
vince the working classes of the necessity of organ­
ization. Looking for some excuse to get rid of him, 
the Government found its answer in the immigration laws. 
Although Payne was of Barbadian parentage on both sides, 
he had been born in Trinidad. Since he had told the 
authorities upon his entry that he had been born in 
Barbados, he was charged before a magistrate with 
having wilfully made a false statement as to his place 
of birth* He was duly convicted and fined on July 22nd 
and a deportation order served. On July 26th the 
Court of Appeal quashed the conviction but Payne's 
counsel was unable to get the order rescinded. The 
riots started in protest at this treatment on the same 
day the conviction was quashed and Payne was deported, 
and went on into the second week of August.
28. Many plantation managers and overseers were special 
constables and were recruited into active service during 
the- disturbances.
The Solicitor General in September of that year informed 
the House of Assembly that the expenditure incurred 
during the disturbances was as follows:
Army volunteers £ 950. 0. 0.
Quartermaster services 872. 0. 0.
(Rations and Admin.)
Police and Fire Service 3,845. 13. 8.
(Extra pay)
Permanent employees of the
Volunteer Service 55. 16. 4.
(Extra pay)
242 Special Constables 617. 2. 0.
(at 3/- per day)
Rationing District
Police Stations 141. 0. 0.
Additional Stationery 15. 0. 0.
Total £ 6,496. 12. 0.
The legislature voted the necessary amount to 
meet this expenditure plus the following:
28. contd...
To extra clerical assistance
at Police Courts £ 7,000. 0. 0.
(Source: House of Assembly Debates, Official Gazette, 
Session 1937/38, 20/9/37)..
29. Source: Interview material, H.A. Vaughan (28/3/77).
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30. Two examples illustrate Adams' role in this respect.
Adams defended a libel suit in 1930 against Clennel 
Wickham, the editor of The Herald, on behalf of a white 
merchant Walter Bayley. Wickham lost the case and was 
financially ruined, and forced to sell The Herald to 
new proprietors who did not share Wickham's uncom­
promising hostility to the white oligarchy. A year 
later by running as an Independent in St. Philips,.
Adams effectively split the progressive vote and brought 
about the defeat of the Democratic League's candidate
at the hands of the white conservative Dr. J.W. Hawkins.
31. In spite of the fact that the cultural stereotypes
(See Chapter 8 ,p.264) which more or less approximated 
reality some twenty years ago, are no longer regarded 
as holding true, the Bekes still have a complex about 
not being learned, or at least being thought not to be 
learned. Being popularly regarded as being both 
learned and rich heightens an individual's estimation 
of himself in his own eyes and in others. In the case 
of exceptional individuals like Jean Bally, this
'doubling-up' of status (traditional status plus 
'usurped* status taken from the mulatto middle-class) 
may explain why some Bekes are able to succeed in 
political life.
32. In conceptualizing the phenomenon of the 'lawyer 
politicians' and gathering historical background 
material I. am indebted to H.A. Vaughan.
33. Achieved by the Trade Union Act of 1939 which led to the 
registration of the Barbados Workers' Union in October 
1941, and the following legislation which went through 
during the 1943/44 Session of the House of Assembly: 
Extension of the Franchise Act (by reducing the £50 
income qualification to £20 rural labour was effectively 
brought into the electorate), Trade Union Act (which 
made members exempt from liability), Workmen's Com­
pensation Act, Education Act, Establishment of a Wages 
Board and a Labour Department.
34. The recommendations made for submission to the Moyne 
Commission were as follows: Large sugar estates to 
be purchased by colonial governments for land reform;
No estate of over 50 acres to be owned by one individual 
or company; Nationalization of sugar factories; 
Establishment of a government agency in each colony to 
purchase and export sugar. As a representative of the 
Congress Adams put these recommendations to Moyne 
(Source: PRO.. West India Royal Commission, 1938-39,
C.O. 950/919).
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35. Examples of these policies include the following:
On the cost of living "...by means of subsidies, price 
and rent control, keep/the cost of living down..."
On finance and taxation: to take advantage of "overseas 
aid...for technical assistance..."; "...to create an 
atmosphere of confidence, and the_establishment of 
sound legislative and fiscal policies, in order to 
encourage investment..."
General economic policy: "...improvement of job 
opportunities to provide greater employment opport­
unities..."; "...encourage domestic savings to counter­
act on borrowing from abroad..."
(Source: Barbados Labour Party, Party Political 
Manifestoes: 1961, 1966, 1971, 1976).
36. There were,, however, deep ideological rifts between
Adams and a group of junior back-benchers led by Barrow,
going as far back as 1952 when the latter opposed a
Government plan to curb public spending in favour of 
investment overseas (See the debate on the Revenue 
Equalisation Fund Bill, 12/6/52). It is apparent, 
however, that this rift which progressively deepened
up to Barrow's formal resignation from the BLP on 14th 
April 1955, was exacerbated by Adams's authoritarian 
style of leadership. An example of this can be seen 
in Adams's acerbic response to the opposition to the 
Revenue Equalisation Fund Bill of 1952:
"A simple matter like this has taken four hours
or more of debate...If members feel that they 
cannot agree with the Government...let them form 
their own party, the Government will still get 
on..."
(Source: House of Assembly Debates, Official Gazette, 
Sessions 1951/53, 1955/56).
37. March 4th 1977.
38. Composed of Keith Hunts, Frank Walcott and Dr. Rameses 
Caddie.
39. A typical example is that of the tribute to Gilbert 
Darnley Bynoe:
"His career is an epitome of the solid middle- 
class virtues - thoroughness, thrift, persistence, 
patience, integrity, reliability and steadfast 
purpose - and their rewards. To these his fairy 
godmother added other gifts, a keen sense of humour, 
a head for figures, a love of fun and the sovereign 
gift of charm.. At the centre of his personality 
was a deeply rooted religious faith which illuminated 
all his actions..."
(Source: Barbados Sugar Producers' Association,
Barbados Sugar Industry Review, March 1974, p.9).
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40. Trust Deeds in Barbados don’t have to be registered
by law. It is therefore possible for someone to give 
a third party money to purchase land in that person's 
name, which ensures that the real owner remains 
anonymous. Examples of 'bogus' companies include the 
O'Neal Investment Trust (Pickerings sugar estate in 
St. Lucy owned by Errol Barrow), Barbados Estates Ltd. 
(Turners Hall and Swans estates in St. Andrew pur­
chased by Errol Barrow for development) and Norwood, 
Bagatelle and Blowers estates (St. Thomas, 700 acres) 
purchased by the DLP Minister of Agriculture Da Costa 
Edwards for the purposes of development.
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CHAPTER 10: CONCLUSIONS
10.1 Structural Pre-Requisites of Survival
10.2 Class, Status and Power: A Comparative 
Assessment
10.1. Structural Pre-requisites of Survival
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In attempting to account for the survival of 
indigenous white planter-mercantile elites in Barbados and 
Martinique, a working hypothesis central to my whole thesis 
has been that this survival is to be accounted for in terms 
of a series of consciously evolved strategies to maintain 
economic, social and political power. However, in spite of 
the fact that such strategies of power maintenance were 
indeed evolved, the final picture that emerges presents a 
number of unanswered questions. It may be asked, for example, 
precisely to what extent did certain structural pre-conditions 
contribute to these unique cases of survival. As I indicated 
at the beginning of Chapter 5, the established practice of 
financing the sugar industries of both islands from local 
sources of capital cannot be ignored as a contributory factor 
in the context of nineteenth century imperial relations. At 
various points throughout this study I have also stressed 
that the relatively limited degree to which absenteeism was 
practised, was equally an important factor of survival.
At a more general explanatory level, what I would 
argue is that an important variable to consider is the 
nature of these two societies, in which the white creole 
populations developed as an organic part of plantation 
society, spontaneously evolving variations upon the metropol­
itan model, and creating in Lewis’s words (1968: 69)
"a local culture almost utterly derivative of the 
most suburban of English values (and equally the 
most provincial French ones) although geographically 
remote from the ancestral sources".
In those islands where absenteeism was widely practised, it 
could be argued that the Europeans merely transplanted an 
artificial replica of metropolitan social and cultural life, 
and failed to develop a ’real' society in the organic sense 
of the term. An important variable to consider from this 
perspective, therefore, may be a cultural one: that of
the degree of creolization and development of strongly 
articulated local societies. As a corollary to this, social 
and cultural continuity and stability may be regarded as
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having played an important role in the organic growth of 
'strong* local societies. Unlike Trinidad, British Guiana 
and Jamaica, for example, Barbados has always been English 
and has not undergone the vagaries of colonial conquest and 
re-conquest and the corresponding influx of other European 
social and cultural influences. Thanks to the intervention 
of the British, Martinique was spared the social and political 
upheavals experienced by Guadeloupe during the Revolution, 
and as a consequence as well as surviving economically, 
important traditional elements of French creole society 
founded upon the social, cultural, political and religious 
values of the ancien regime, were retained. The retention 
of a traditionalist ideology had important repercussions 
upon the strategies evolved in the nineteenth century to 
maintain the status boundaries of ethnicity, patterns of 
social reproduction and intra-group segregation. As a 
result of this social and cultural continuity, Barbados has 
always been and still is today quintesentially the most 
English of all the former British West Indian colonies, just 
as Martinique is still the most French.
I have argued elsewhere in this study that the 
question of 'pre-conditions' or 'pre-requisites' are to be 
regarded as a separate aspect of power maintenance. The 
existence of a number of structural conditions which were 
conducive to the maintenance of power in the nineteenth cen­
tury, suggests a number of further areas in which research 
might be fruitfully pursued. One possible line of enquiry 
worthy of attention would focus upon the ways in which these 
white creole societies were actually articulated. Of 
central importance would be the impact of institutional life, 
with particular emphasis upon the role of the family, 
education, religion, associational life, and the relation­
ship of its individual members to the economic system.
10.2. Class. Status and Power : A Comparative Assessment.
However, whatever pre-conditions might have existed 
which favoured the survival of white creole elites and the 
maintenance of local interests, I have shown that social
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forces representing new economic interests in the second half 
of the nineteenth century, effected a transformation of elite 
composition and the passage of economic power into the hands 
of new social classes. I would argue that the emergence of 
these social classes with access to finance capital, was 
crucial to the survival of a white elite in each island at 
a period when metropolitan monopoly capital made inroads 
into plantation economies elsewhere. Significantly from a 
theoretical standpoint, the cases examined in this study 
indicate the mutability of elites and the way in which elite 
membership can change over time with the emergence of new 
social classes. From a comparative perspective the relation­
ship between elites and classes which merges from this study 
is subject to wide variation. In Martinique the elite status 
of the Grands Bekes in the twentieth century was not as 
easily assailable as that of the Bajan agri-business bourgeoisie. 
In Barbados the extent to which there were avenues of social 
mobility for plantation supervisory staff in estates and 
'redlegs1 in commerce, contrasts sharply with the rigidity 
of the socio-economic hierarchy in Beke society. In the 
latter case the economic supremacy of the usiniers went 
uncontested until the recent decline of the sugar industry, 
and the advent of alternative avenues of social mobility.
A factor of major importance which explains this 
variant situation was the degree of control which both groups 
were able to exert over the economy, which was a function of 
their financial coercive power. From the outset the active 
intervention of the French State made far greater capital 
resources available in Martinique, which contributed to a 
greater concentration of economic power in the hands of the 
usiniers. A comparative analysis of the forces which produced 
the Bridgetown mercantile class and the usiniers, and the 
success with which they were able to consolidate their class 
interests, highlights a major difference between the two cases 
arising out of the different colonial policies and practices 
of the two metropolitan powers. A continual theme in the 
Martiniquan case has been the active role played by France 
in all administrative and economic affairs, which has led the 
Bekes to seek alliances with those groups in the Metropolis
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best capable of serving their interests. The creation of an 
institution of finance capital in the nineteenth century by 
the state, and the extent to which a number of fiscal 
measures today are of direct economic benefit to the Bekes, 
have led some students to characterize the Bekes as a 
dependent bourgeoisie, their economic power having evolved 
from state monopoly capitalism rather than a purely local 
form. Although a study of the backgrounds of the founder 
members of the agri-business bourgeoisie in Barbados 
indicates that monopoly capitalism was not developed entirely 
by native Barbadians, it is relevant to note that outsiders 
in the Barbadian context ’went local’, and that these cases 
represented individual responses to capital formation and 
not the institutionalized intervention of the state.
From a comparative perspective the cases examined 
in this study are interesting, in so far as they indicate 
that the survival of white elite status has been achieved by 
quite different strategies of adaptation and modernization.
A major causal factor of these variant patterns and the 
different paths by which traditional colonial elites emerged 
in the modern world, has been shown to be rooted in 
differences in the colonial/metropolitan relationship. As 
a consequence of the quite different responses made to the 
threat to white creole economic supremacy in the nineteenth 
century, the core element of the new elite in each case was 
quite different. This in turn had consequences for the 
strategies of status boundary maintenance, mechanisms of 
social reproduction and patterns of associational life pur­
sued by each group. The evidence therefore suggests a close 
inter-relationship between the strategies generated to main­
tain economic and social power. At the same time it would 
appear that the inter-relationship between class and status 
is just as much a function of established cultural differences 
as it is one of a consciously evolved set of strategies. I 
would argue that national origins and the greater continuity 
of the Martiniquan plantocracy compared with the Barbadian 
one, has had a marked influence on the kinds of strategies 
adopted for social survival, which in each case represent a 
functional adaptation to uniquely evolved social and cultural 
patterns.
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With regard to political power it is only possible 
to show a close inter-relationship with class and status in 
the Barbadian case. Until the assault on the white oligarchy 
by a counter political elite in the 1930s, and the con­
stitutional reforms introduced by the home government in the 
following three decades, political power in Barbados was 
unambiguously related to wealth and ethnic status. In 
Martinique the Bekes even before 1871 seem to have been more 
narrowly an economic elite, since they did not govern as an 
autonomous ruling class. In a comparable situation today 
where the formal political power base of both elites has 
been completely eroded, both groups may now be regarded as 
being strictly economic elites. From the data it is evident 
that neither elite appears to seek political power as an end 
in itself, but uses instead covert' .means of. obtaining 
influence for quite limited ends: namely in the promotion 
of its economic interests and in the protection of its 
strategic elite status.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
372
SECTION II THEORY AND METHODS
BARTH, Fredrik (ed), Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The 
Social' Organization of ’Cultural' Difference.
London, George Allen and Unwin, 1970.
Burton, "Stratification in Plural Societies" in 
American Anthropologist: 64, 1962.
Gerald,. "Stratification, Pluralism and Interaction:
A Comparative Analysis of Caste" in A.de Reuck 
and J.Knight (eds), Caste and Race: Comparative 
Approaches. London, Churchill for the C.I.B.A. 
foundation, 1967-
Gerald, "Race Caste and Other Invidious Distinctions 
in Social Stratification" in Race: 13 (4), April 
1972, 385-414.
BETTELHEIM, Bruno, The Informed Heart: Autonomy in a Mass 
Age. Chicago, Free Press of Glencoe, i960.
BLAU, Peter, "Paramet.ers of Social Structure" in Blau (ed), 
Approaches to the Study of Social Structure.
London, Open Books- Publishing Ltd., 1976.
B0TT0M0RE, T.B., Elites and Society. Harmondsworth, Penguin 
Books, 1966/
BURKE, Edmund, Reflections on the Revolution in France, and 
on the proceedings in certain societies in London 
relative to that event... (edited by Conor Cruise 
O'Brien). Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1969. [1793].
BURNHAM, James, The Managerial Revolution,' London, Putnam and 
Co. ,. i p t :
COSER, Lewis, Greedy Institutions: Patterns of Undivided
Commitment'. New York, The Free Press, 1974.
CROSS, Malcolm^ "On Conflict, Race Relations, and the Theory 
of the Plural Society" in Race: 12(4), April 1971, 
477-494.
DAHL, Robert A, "A Critique of the Ruling Elite Model" in 
American Sociological Review: 52(2), June 1958.
DAHRENDORF, Ralf, Class and Class Conflict in an Industrial 
Society. Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1959.
DE TOCQUEVILLE, Alexis, Democracy in America (2vols) (edited 
by Francis Bowen and Phillips Bradley). New York, 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1954 [1835].
BENEDICT, 
BERREMAN,
BERREMAN,
373
DOMHOFF, G.W. , Who Rules America? Englewood Cliffs, Prentice- 
Hall, 1967.
DUMONT, Louis, Homo Hierarchicus: The Caste System and its 
Implications. London, Paladin, 1972.
DURKHEIM, Emile, The Division of Labour in Society. New 
York, The Free Press, 1964 [18931.
FURNIYALL, J.S.,. Colonial Policy and Practice. London, 
Cambridge University Press, 1946.
GERTH, H.H. and MILLS, C. Wright. From Max Weber: Essays in- 
Sociology. London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
International Library of Sociology and Social 
Reconstruction, 1970.
GOFFMAN, Erving, Asylums: Essays on-the Social Situation of 
Mental Patients and. Other In'ma'tes; Garden City,
New York, Doubleday-Anchor, 1961.
GOLDMANN, Lucien, The Hidden Godt London, Routledge and Kegan 
Paul, The International Library of Philosophy and 
Scientific Method, 1964.
HOETINK, Harmannus, Caribbean Race Relations. London, Oxford 
University Press for the Institute of Race Re­
lations, 1967.
KELLER, Suzanne, Beyond the Ruling Class: Strategic Elites 
in Modern Society. New York, Random House, 1963.
MAINE, Sir Henry Sumner, Lectures on the Early History, of 
Institutions. London, John Murray, 1897 (7th 
edition).
MILIBAND, Rj. The State in Capitalist Society, London, 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969.
MILL, John Stuart, Principles of Political Economy, with 
some of their applications to social philosophy.
(2 voIs). Boston, Beacon Books, 1958 [l848].
MILLS, C.Wright, The Power Elite, New York, Oxford University 
Press, 1956. ■
MORGAN, Lewis Henry, Ancient Society. London, Macmillan,
1877.
MOSCA, Gaetano, The Ruling Class. New York, McGraw-Hill.
1939.
NEWBY, Howard, "Agricultural Workers in the Class Structure" 
in Sociological Review: 20(3), 1972, 413-439.
NEWBY, Howard, "The Deferential Dialectic" in Comparative
Studies in Society and History: 17(2), April 1975, 
139-164';
374
NEWBY, Howard, The Deferential Worker': A Study of Farm
Workers in' East Anglia. London, Allen Lane, 1977*
NEWBY, Howard et al., Property, Paternalism and Power-:
Class and Control in Rural England. London, 
Hutchinson and Co., 197&.
NOEL, Donald, ’A Theory of the Origins of Ethnic Strati­
fication* in Social Problems: 16, 1968, 157-172.
PARETO, Vilfredo, The Mind and Society. (4 vols) London, 
Jonathan Cape, 1935.
REX, John, "The Concept of Race in Sociological Theory"
in Sami Zubaida (ed), Race and Racialism. London, 
Tavistock Publications, 1970.
RUNCIMAN, W.G., "Class, Status and Power" in Sociology 
In Its Place and Other Essays. Cambridge, 
University Press, 1970.
SAINT-SIMON,^Claude Henri de (Comte), • Oeuvres Choisies...
precgdees d'un essai sur sa doctrine. Brussels, 
Meenen et cie., 1&59.
SHILS, Edward, "'Deference" in J.A. Jackson (ed) Social
Stratification. Cambridge, University Press, 1968.
SIMMEL, Georg, Conflict and The Web of Group Affiliations. 
New York, The Free Press, 1955*
SMITH, M.G., The Plural Society in the British West Indies.
Berkeley, University of California Press, 1965.
SMITH, Raymond T., "Social Stratification, Cultural
Pluralism and Integration in West Indian Societies"
in Lewis and Mathews (eds), Caribbean Integration. 
Rio Piedras, Institute of Caribbean Studies, 
University of Puerto Rico, 19-67* 22.6-258.
SMITH, Raymond T., 'Social Stratification in the Caribbean* 
in L.Plotnicov and A. Tuden (eds), Essays in 
Comparative Social Stratification. Pittsburgh, 
University Press, 1970.
STANWORTH, P and GIDDENS, A., Elites and Power in British
Society, London, Cambridge University Press, 1974.
TONNIES, Ferdinand, Community and Association. London,
Routledge and Kegan Paul, International Library of 
Sociology, 1974 [1915].
VAN DEN BERGHE, Pierre, "Distance Mechanisms of Strati­
fication" in Sociology and Social Research:
44(3), Jan/Feb I960.
VEBLEN, Thorstein, The Engineers and the Price System. New 
York, The Viking Press, 1921.
375
WEBER, Max, Economy and Society:' Ah Outline of Interpretive 
Sociology (3 vols)' (edited fry Guenther Roth and 
Claus Wittich). New York, Bedminster Press, 1968.
WESTERGAARD, J. and RESLER, H., Class in a Capitalist
Society: a Study of Contemporary Britain. London, 
Heinemann, 1975•
SECTION II: OFFICIAL PUBLISHED SOURCES
(a) BARBADOS
Official Gazettes: House of‘.Assembly Debates j I89O-I897,
1930-1944, 1951-1953, 1955-56, 1975-76.
Blue Books of Statistics: 1838-1849, 1870-1875, I88O-I885, 
1891-,■ 1895-1899, 1909-1913,1920-1921, 1935-1947.
Acts: 1830-1837, 1837-1841, 1841-1845, 1887-1888, 1942.
Reports on the Census: l86l, ,1871, 1881, 1891, 1911, 1921, 
1946, I960," 1970.
Economic Surveys: 1962-1972. Bridgetown, Government Printery,
published annually.
Development -Plans: 1960-65, 1965-68, 1969-72, 1973-77.
Bridgetown,Government Printery, 1961, 1965, 1969, 
and 1973.
The Barbados Disturbances (1937). Reproduction of the
Evidence and the Report of the (Deane) Commission 
(compiled by W.A. Beckles). Bridgetown, The Advocate 
Co. Ltd., 1937.
BARBADOS PROGRESSIVE LEAGUE Manifesto for 1944
BARBADOS LABOUR PARTY Manifestoes for 1951, 1956, 1961, 1966, 
1971 and 1976.
DEMOCRATIC LABOUR PARTY Manifestoes for 1956, 1961, 1966,
1971 and 1976.
BARBADOS CENTRAL BANK Annual Reports: 1971-1976. Bridgetown, 
Central Bank of Barbados.
Annual Digest of Statistics: 1975, 1976.Bridgetown, 
Cent-ral Bank of Barbados.
BARBADOS STATISTICAL SERVICE Monthly Digest of Statistics: 
1975, 1976. The Garrison, Barbados Statistical 
Service,published intermittently several times a 
year.
. Financial Statistics 1964-1974. The Garrison, 
Barbados Statistical Service, 1975.
376
BARBADOS LABOUR DEPARTMENT -Annual Survey of Registered 
Workers in - the' Sugar Industry: 19691' 1975. 
Bridgetown, Barbados Labour Dept.
DEPARTMENT OF SCIENCE AND AGRICULTURE Annual. Reports: 
T90'0‘-T9'40. Bridgetown, Government Printery.
The Condition' of Peasant' Agriculture in' Barbados 
(C.C.Skeete). Bridgetown, Government-Printery, 1930. 
Agricultural Development' 'in' Barbados (A.J.- 
Wakefield). Bridgetown, Government Printery, 1942. 
"Peasant Agriculture in Barbados" (Halcrow and 
Cave)in Science and Agricultural Bulletin, No.11, 
Bridget own, Advocate Co. Ltd., 1947.
Report of an Inquiry into the Sugar Industry of 
Barbad'o s (A. F. McKenzie). Bridget ownGovernment 
Printery, 1958. .....
Agr i c ult ur'a'l Census ,' 1'9'61. Bridgetown, Governmnent 
Printery, 1961
Commission of Enquiry into the' Sugar Industry, 1962- 
63 (Farley). Bridgetown, Government Printery. 1964.
MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY Vegetable
Production in Barbados (Bulletin No. 3)»Bridgetown, 
Government Printery, 1969.- 
Small-scale Farming in Barbados- (J. Nurse). 
Bridgetown, Government Printery, 1972.
The Yield of Sugar Cane' in' Barbados' in 1976 (Mimeo). 
Edgehill (Barbados) 1976.
AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION Auditor's: and' Additional 
In format ion' R'e'p o'rt s . Christ Church, A.D.C. 1969/70.
(b) WEST INDIES
GREAT BRITAIN: COLONIAL OFFICE Report on the West Indian
Encumbered Estates Court (C.3982).London, H.M.S.O., 
1884.
Report of the West India Royal' Commission,' 1897 
(Norman) (C78"657). London, H.M.S.O., 1898.
Report of the West India Royal Commi's’sion, 1938/39 
(Moyne) (Cmd. 6607). London, H.M.S.0. ,'1945-.
Report of the West India Sugar-Cdmmissidn,' 1'929 
(Olivier) (Cmd. 3517). London, H.M.S.O., 1930. 
Economic Surveys of the Colonial' Empire Issued by 
the Colonl'af 'Offices' for the' Years 19321' 1933.
1935V T9'3 6'. London. ff.M.S.O.. 1933-1938..
377
(c) MARTINIQUE
MINISTERE DE LA MARINE ET DES COLONIES Deliberations du 
Conseil General:' 1833-1947. Fort-de-France,
Imprimerie du Gouvernement.
Deliberations du Conseil Prive: 1826-1945. Fort-de- 
France, Imprimerie du Gouvernement.
Budgets: 1850-1860
Bulletin Offioiel de la Martinique: 1828-1940.Fort- 
de-France, Imprimerie du Gouvernement.
BUREAU POUR LE DEVELOPPEMENT DES MIGRATIONS INTERESSANT 
LES DOM. Resultats E'nregistres au 31 decembre 
1973.Paris, B.U.M.I.D.0.ML, 191h .
CHAMBRE DEPARTEMENTALE D TAGRICULTURE DE LA MARTINIQUE 
Livre Yert de 1'Agriculture MartiniqUalse:
Conference de 1 'agriculture de’ Ta Martinique, 
l6 et 17’ decembre 1978.
COMMISSARIAT GENERAL DU PLAN D'EQUIPEMENT ET DE LA PRODUCTIYITE 
ybmepqari (1966-1970), Rapport 'General’ d'e la Comm­
ission Centrale des P.O. MY du C.G.P. Paris,
Dopumentat ion Frangaise ,' 1966 .
Viemepian (1971-1975), Rapport de la Commissions 
Centrale des D.Q.M. du C.G.P: Preparation du yieme 
Plan. Paris, Documentation Francaise, 1972. 
yilbmepian (1976-I98Q), Rapport de la Commission 
Centrale des D'.O.M. du C.G.P: ' Preparation du 
Y U  erne pq an. Paris, Documentation Francaise, 1976.
INSTITUT D»EMISSION DES DEPARTEMENTS D 'OUTRE-MER
Rapports d'Activites (Martinique): 1965-1976 .
Paris, I.E.D.D.0.M., Annual "Exercises".
INSTITUT NATIONAL DE LA STATISTIQUE ET DES ETUDES ECONOMIQUES 
Resultats Statistiques d'u Recensement General 
de.la Population des' Departements d'Outre-Mer 
effectu§ le 9 octobre 19'6l. Paris, Imprimerie 
- Nationale, 1962.
Bulletin Trimestriel de Statistique (Martinique): 
July/Sept 1965 —  April/June 1977. . Paris,
Imprimerie Nationale, published quarterly.
L'E'mploi en Martinique: Resultats des Enquetes de 
1971 a 1972. Fort-de-France, I.N.S.E.E., 1972.
PREFECTURE DE LA MARTINIQUE
Bulletin de Con.joncture Economique: 1973-1977. 
Fort-de-France, Prefecture de la Martinique,, 
published quarterly.
La Martinique. Fort-de-France, Prefecture de la 
Martinique, 1972.
Martinique: 25 annees de departe'me'ntalisation.
Paris, Imprimerie National, 1975.
378
SERVICE CENTRAL DES ENQUETES ET ETUDES STATISIQUES
Recensemeht General de 1 ' Agriculture,' 1974. Paris, 
Imprimerie Nationale, 1975.
SOCIETE D 'AIDE TECHNIQUE ET DE COOPERATION
Compte Rendu des Activites' Pour 1' Annee T97° • 
Martinique,S.A.T.E.C., 1971.
Reforme Ponciere: les Lotissements Agricoles 
reallsee par les S7T.C.A .A.P.R. Martinique,
S.A.T.E.C. , 1974". '
SECTION III: OFFICIAL UNPUBLISHED SOURCES
(a) BARBADOS
Location: Public Record Office, Kew, Surrey.
Calendar-of State Papers.
Colonial Series: America and West Indies (1574-
T z m r.-------------------------------------
The Barbados Census of 1680 (C.O.1/44, 142-379).
An Account of His Majesty's Island of Barbados 
in 1676 (C.O. 29/2).
Proceedings, of Council and Assembly (C.O. 31).West India Royal Commission, I93'8-±939 (Moyne).
(i) Memorandum of Evidence: West India Committee 
(C.07 950/52)
(ii) Memorandum of Evidence: Sugar Producers' Assn. 
(C.O. 950/586)
(iii) Oral Evidence, Barbados Vol 1 (C.O. 950/919)
(iv) Oral Evidence, Barbados Vol II (C.O. 950/920)
(v) Written Evidence, Barbados (C.O. 950/938)
Location: Barbados Archives, Black Rock, St. Michael.
Barbados Chancery Court. Chancery Sales' Ledgers 
(5 vols):1879-1885 1885-1893 1894-1901
1901-1904 1 9 0 0 -1 9 W I ‘
Location: Barbados Fire Service, Bridgetown.
Cane Fire records: Jan 1967-June 1977.- (Cane Fire 
Board: FolioNo. BFS- 48/55, Vol.III).
Location: Ministry of Agriculture, Science and Technology, 
Bridgetown.
Map Showing Plantation Boundaries and the Location 
of Small-holdings. (Complied by the Land Valuation 
Division, Ministry of Agriculture Planning Unit, 
December 1976).
(b) MARTINIQUE
Location: Archives D'Outre-Mer, Paris (Fonds Martinique). 
Recensement, 1709 (Gl-47b"b.is) .
379
Etats de Population, 1831-1847 (G232).
Tableaux de Po'puTation,' de Culture, de Commerce et 
de Navigation, l883-87. (Carton 5 Dossier 59)
Chemins de Fer k Voie Etroite de la Martinique 
(Jourj on). (Carton 20 Dossier 180).
Tdlbgrammes: Saint-Pierre (Carton 25 Dossier 228). 
Societe de Credit Colonial. Decr'et d fAutorisation, 
pi&ces annexes, i860 (Carton 32 Dossier 265). 
Bulletins de Cultures, l8'94-1900 (Carton 34). 
Recenseirient de Population e'n 1910 (Carton 48 
Dossier 384).
Abolition de l’Esclavage, Correspondence Politique, 
1848/491 (Carton 56 Dossier^464).
Travail. Regime du Livret. Decret 4-9-2852. Voeu 
du Conseil General Demandant la Suppression du 
Livret: 1871-737 (Carton 91 Dossier 767).
Finances, Budgets Local, 1850-1860 (Carton 160 
Dossier 1469)7
Statistique des Cultures pour l ’annee l870; (Carton 
597T:
Location: Centre de Recherches Caraibes, Fonds Saint-Jacques, 
Martinique.
Politique et Economie Sucriere (1952-72). Source: 
Direction Departementale de 1 ’Agriculture: Service 
Departementale de Statistique Agricole, Fort-de- 
France (Collection of filed loose pieces).
Production Agricole (1952-72)..Source: Direction 
Departementale de 1 ’Agriculture: Service Departe- 
mentale de Statistique Agricole, Fort-de-France 
(Collection of filed loose pieces).
Rapport sur 1 ’Industrie de la Canne a la Martinique, 
1935. (Complied by D. Kervegant). Source: Service 
de 1 ’Agriculture, Direction des Services Agricoles, 
Fort-de-France, 1935,(Typescript, 163 pp.).
Carte de la Structure Fonciere de la Martinique a 
1/50 Q00e . Produced by Jacques- Desruisseaux with 
•the aid of the Direction Departementale de 1 ’ 
Agriculture Fort-de-France, 1973.
Location: Conservation des Hypotheques, Fort-de-France. 
Registers of Property Transactions, 1886.
Location: Direction Departementale de 1 ’Agriculture, Fort- 
de-France,
Map of Martinique in 1671. Produced by M.Sobesky, 
chef de la section topographique du Service de 1 ’ 
Agriculture, after the land survey of 1671 by 
Pelissier, Fort-de-France, 1941.
Location: Prefecture de la Martinique.
Direction Regionales des Douanes et Droits Indirectes 
de la Martinique: Resultats Generaux (Document C/2 
No’. 2773). Secretariat General des Affaires 
Economiques, Fort-de-France, August 1975.
380
SECTION IV: OTHER MANUSCRIPT MATERIAL
ANON The Island of Barbadoes by "an old Planter and
Friend to Agriculture". l844V (Typescript) The ' 
Garrison, Barbados Museum and Historiaal Society.
BARBADOS AGRICULTURAL SOCIETY
Minutes of Barbados Agricultural Society (2vols):
1842-1929V 1930-1956. Black Rock, Barbados Arc­
hives .
BARBADOS ARCHIVES Index of Estates in Chancery (Mimeo - 
undated). Black Rock, Barbados Archives.
Deed's, Wills and Registers of Births, Deaths and 
Marriages. '  ^ " ^
BARBADOS MUTUAL LIFE ASSURANCE SOCIETY BMLA Records.
Beckwith Place (Bridgetown), BMLA Building.
BARBADOS REGISTRY OFFICE
Company Files: Barbados Shipping and Trading,
Plantations Ltd., Kingsland Estates Ltd., Vaucluse 
Estates Ltd., Foursquare Estates Ltd., Ridge Ltd., 
Sunbury Ltd., Springhall Ltd. Bridgetown, Registry 
Office.
CHANDLER, W.K., "A List of Sugar Plantations which at the
31st December 1895 had been in Chancery for 2 years 
at least, showing the Revenue and Expenditure for 
each completed year of management by a Receiver.’! 
Item of Cottle and Catford Deposit. List compiled 
by the Master-in-Chancery, l6th February, 1897.
The Garrison, Barbados Museum and Historical 
Society.
COLLETON, Sir Peter, "List of the most eminent planters in 
Barbados (1673)” . Shaftesbury Papers, 30/2,.
Bundle 49/3. Kew, Public Record Office.
DASH, William, Personal Journal. Compiled by a Barbadian
agriculturist and sugar planter between 1880s and 
1918. Black Rock, Barbados Archives.
DESRUISSEAUX, Jacques, "Proprietes de .la Martinique" (Mimeo).
Principales donnees obtenues par 1 'exploitation du 
cadastre:. Pt.ITI, La Matrice Cadastrale, 1975. 
Fort-de-France, Service Cadastral de la Martinique.
MICKLEM, Christine, The Newton Papers: A Handlist (Mimeo).
University of London Library, Senate House, 1969.
NEWTON PAPERS The Newton Estate Papers: concerned with the
Barbadian 'plantations which' belonged' to the Newton 
(I7th century)' and' then to the Lane families in the 
18th and' 19th' century (M.S.S. 523). University of
J. London Library, Senate House.
381
NORRIS, Raymond, "The West Indian Sugar Industry, 1950-
1970" Mimeo). Unpublished paper prepared for the 
Sugar Asso.elation of the Caribbean , 1972.
PLANTATION ACCOUNTS' AND RECORD’S BOOKS Newton Ltd.
Applewhaites LtdSearles ( Barb ados),Us ine Centrale 
de Sainte-Marie(Martinique).
SAINT, Sir John, Presidential Address' —  Proceedings of the 
International Society of Sugarcane Technologists' 
Eighth Congress, 1953 (Mimeo). Edgehill (Barbados), 
1953.
SHILSTONE, E.W., Record of Members of the General Assembly:
1640 ---  in progress. House of Assembly, Bridgetown.
MARTINIQUE: CHAMBRE DE COMMERCE
Dossiers on Corporations in Martinique. Fort-de- 
France, Chamber of Commerce.
SECTION V: PRINTED BOOKS
(a) SELECT-SECONDARY SOURCES
ACHEEN, Rene.
BUFFON, A, Encyclopedia Antillaise: Economie et Perspectives.
CRUSOL, Jean et al. Pointe-a-Pitre, Editions Desormeaux, 1973.
ADAMSON, A , Sugar Without Slaves: The Political Economy of 
British Guiana, 1838-1904 . New.Haven and London,
Yale University Press, 1972.'
BANBUCK, C.A., Histoire Politique, Economique et Sociale de 
la Martinique sous 1' ancien regime (163'5-1"789).
Paris, Marcel Riviere, 1935.
BEACHEY, R.W., The British West Indies Sugar Industry in
the Late Nineteenth Century. Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 
1957.
BECKFORD, George, Persistent Poverty: Underdevelopment in
plantation economies of the Third World. New York,
. Oxford University Press, 1972.
BENOIST, Jean, L'Archipel Inacheve: Culture et societe aux 
Antilles Francaises. Montreal, Les Presses de 
L TUniversity de Montreal, 1972.
BLOCH, Marc, Les Caracteres Originaux de 1''Histoire R'urale 
Francaise. Paris, Armand Colin, i960..
382
BOUCKSON, Germain, EDOUARD, Bertrand, Les Antilles en
Question: Assimilation et ConfTit de 'Culture dans 
les D.O.M. Port-de-France, Imprimerie St. Paul, 1972.
BRIDE NBAUGH, Carl, No Peace Beyond the Line: The Engish in 
the Caribbean, 1624-1690. New York, Oxford Univer- 
sity Press, 1972.
BUFFON, Alain, Monnale et Credit en Economie Coloniale:
Contribution " £ 1 ’Histoire Economfque de la Guadeloupe, 
1635-1919. Basse-Terre, Societe d ’Histoire de la 
Guadeloupe, 1979*
BURAC, Maurice, Les Plantations d.’ananas dans la region du
Gros-Morne. Bordeaux, University of Bordeaux, 1970.
L ’economie rurale dans le Centre-Nord de la 
Martinique (Marigot, Sainte-Marie , G'ros-Morne,
Irinite) . Contribution a 1 ’etude de la crise d ’une 
economie de plantation. Bordeaux, University of 
Bordeaux, 1975.
BURN, W.L., Emancipation and Apprenticeship in the British 
West Indies. London, Jonathan Cape, 1937.
CALMONT, Andre, La Canne a sucre et ses problemes' dans le Sud-
Est de la Martinique. Bordeaux, University of Bordeaux, 
1970.
CAMPBELL, Peter, Commercial Hall. Bridgetown, Advocate Commer­
cial Printing, 1969.
CHAULEAU, Liliane, Histoire Antillaise, Pointe-a-Pitre, Editions 
Desormeaux, 1975.
CHOMEREAU LAMOTTE, Marie, Saint-Pierre en ce temps la. Fort- 
de-France, Editions Caraibes, 1975.
CLARK, Truman, Puerto Rico and the United States, 1917-1933. 
•Pittsburgh, University Press, 1975.
CRATON, Michael and WALVIN, James, A Jamaican Plantation:
The History of Worthy Park,1670-1970. London, W.H. 
Allen, 1970.
CROUSE, Nellis M. , French Pioneers in the West Indies, 1624- 
1664. New York, Columbia University Press, 1940.
The French Struggle for the. West Indies, 1665-1713.
New York, Columbia University Press, 1943.
DAGENAIS, H., Une Plantation de Canne a la Guadeloupe.
Paris, L ’Harmattan, 1969.
DANEY, Sidney, Histoire de la Martinique Depuis la Colonisation 
jusqu’en l'8l5 (6 vols). Fort-Royal, Imprimerie du
Gouvernement, 1850.
DARSIERES, Camille, Des Origines de la Nation Martiniquaise. 
Pointe-a-Pitre', Editions Desormeaux, 1974.
DAVIS, N. Darnell, Cavaliers and Roundheads of Barbados -
1650-1652', With Some Account of the Early History 
of Barbados.Georgetown, Argosy Press, 1883.
DEERR, Noel, The History of Sugar (2 vols). London, Chapman 
and Hall Ltd., 1949.
DELAUNEY-BELLEVILLE, Andre, Choses et Gens de la. Martinique: 
ce que la Martinique demand'e la France, Paris, 
Nouvelles Editions Debresse, 1964.
DOOKHAN, Isaac, A Post Emancipation History of the West Indies. 
London, Collins, 1977.
DUNN, Richard, Sugar and Slaves: The Rise of the Planter Class 
in the English West Indies. London, Jonathan Cape,
1973.
FANON, Frantz, Peau Noire, Masques BTancs. Paris, Editions de 
Seuil, 1952.
FABRE, Michel (ed), Esclaves et Planteurs . Paris, Collection 
Archives, Julliard, 1970.
FAY, C .R ., Imperial Economy, and its Place In the Formation 
of~~Economic Doctrine, 1600-1932. Oxford^University 
Press, 19347 ~
FERRE, Jean Francois, La Canne a Sucre. Les Industries de 
Sucre et du Rhum & la Martinique: Evolution 
Contemporaine (1950-1974) . Bordeaux, University of 
Bordeaux, 1976.
FRAGINALS, Manuel Moreno, The Sugarmill: The Socio-Economic 
Complex of Sugar in Cuba. New York and London,
Monthly Review Press, 1976.
GENOVESE, Eugene, In Red.and Black. London, Allen Lane, 1971.
GIRAULT, Arthur, Principes de Colonisation et de Legislation 
Coloniale. Paris, Larose, 1927. ^
GRATIANT, Gilbert, lie Federee de la Martinique. Paris, L. 
Soulanges, 1961.
GREENFIELD, Sidney M., English Rustics in Black Skins.New Haven, 
College and University Press, 1966. — —
GUERRA, Y SANCHEZ, Ramiro, Sugar and Society -In the Caribbean.
New Haven, Yale University Press, 1964. ’
GUTIERREZ., Dr. Viriato, World Sugar Problem, T926-1935 .
London, Norman Rodger, 1935.
HALLIMANS, M.G.W. and IVANOV, A.S., Review of Recent Developments 
in the World Sugar Market, T9:6Q-19'65 7 London, Inter- 
national Sugar, 1966'.
HAMSHERE, Cyril, British in the' Caribbean. London, Weidenfeld 
and Nicholson, 1972*
383
384
HANDLER, Jerome, The Unappropriated People: Fr'eedmen in the 
Slave Society, of Barbados. Baltimore, John Hopkins 
University Press, 197^.
HARDY, Georges, Histoire Sociale .de la Colonisation Francaise. 
Paris, Larose, 1953. 5
HARLOW, Vincent, A History of Barbados: 1625-1685. Oxford, 
University' Press, 1926.
HAWKINS, Irene, The Changing Face of the Caribbean. Bridgetown, 
Cedar Press, 1976.
HAYOT, Emile, Les Officiers du Conseil Souverain de la
Martinique et- Leurs Successeurs les C'on'seillers de la 
Cour d'Appel, 1665-1830': Notices Bi'ograph'iques et 
Genealogiques. Fort-de-France, Societe d''Histoire de 
la Martinique, 1964.
Les Gens de Couleur Libres du Fort-Royal, 1679-1823. 
Paris, Societe Francaise d’Histoire d T0utre-Mer,1969.
HOROWITZ, Michael, Morne-Paysan: A Peasant Community in
Martinique. New York, Reinhardt and Winston, 1967.
HOTTEN, John Camden (ed), The Original ‘Lists of Persons of 
Quality... and others who went from Great Britain 
to the American Plantations, 1600-1700. London, 1874.
HOYOS, F.A., .The Road to Responsible Government. Barbados, 
Letchworth Press Ltd.,. 1961.
Grantley Adams and the Social Revolution. London, 
Macmillan, 1978.
HUTCHINSON, H.W., Village and Plantation Life in North-Eastern
Brazil. Seattle,. University of Washington. Press, 1957
HUTCHINSON, Lionel, One Touch of Nature (Novel). London, W.H. 
Allen, 1972.-
JOSA, G., Les Industries de Sucre et du Rhum a la Martinique 
(1639-1931). Paris, Les Presses Modernes, 1931.
LASSERRE, ’Guy, La Guadeloupe: Etude Geographi'q'ue (2 vols). 
Bordeaux, Union Francaise dT Impression, 1961.
LEIRIS, Michel, Contacts de Civilisations en Martinique et en 
Guadeloupe. Paris, Unesco/Gallimard, 1955.
LEMERY, Henri (ed), Martinique Terre Francaise:' Le Conflit des. 
Races et L'Opinion Metropolitaine (Writings of 
Victor Schoelcher). Paris, Maisonneuve et Larose, 1962
LEWIS, Arthur, Labour in the West Indies. London, New Beacon 
- Books, 1977. [1938].
LEWIS, Gordon, The Growth of the Modern West' Indies.
New York and London, Monthly Review Press, 1969.
MARK, Francis, The History of Barbados Workers' Union. Bridge- . 
town, Barbados Workers' Union, 1966.
385
MARTIN, Gaston, L'Abolition de l'Esclavag'e dans l'e's' Colonies 
Fran'ca'Ises. Paris, Presses Universitaires de France,
T P ? -----
MIMS, Stewart L., Colbert's West India Policy. London, Oxford 
University Press, 1912.
MINTZ, Sidney, W., Caribbean Transformations. Chicago, Aldine,
1974.
OLIVIER, Lord, White Capital and Coloured Labour. London, 
Hogarth Press, 1929.
PARRY, J.H. and SHERLOCK, P., A Short History of the West 
Indies (3rd Edition). London, Macmillan, 1971.,
PATTERSON, Orlando, The Sociology of Slavery. London, MacGibbon 
and Kee, 19S7V
PETIT-JEAN ROGET, Jacques, La Gaoule: La Revolte de la
Martinique en 1717. Fort-de-France, Societd d'Histoire 
dela Martinique, 1966.
PHILEMON, Cesaire, Galeries Martiniquaises. Fort-de-France,
published for Exposition Coloniale Internationale, .
1931.
PHILIPPE-MAY, Louis, Histoire Economique de la Martinique . 
Fort-de-France, Socidtd de Distribution et de 
Culture, 1972.
PITMAN, F.W., The Development of the British West Indies,
1700- 1763. Hamden, Archon Books, 1917 • (Reprinted
1967).
RABB, T .K ., Enterprise and Empire: Merchant and.Gentry
Investment in the Expansion of England, 1575-1630. 
Pittsburgh, University Press, 1967.
RAGATZ, W., The Fall of the Planter Class in .the British
Caribbean, 1763-1833: A Study in Social and Economic 
History] New York, Octagon Books, 1963.
REVERT, Eugene, La Martinique. Etude de Geo'graphie Humaine . 
Paris, Nouvelles Editions Latines, 1949..
SABLE, Victor,^ Les Antilles Sans Complexes: une Experience 
de Decolonisation. Paris, Maisonneuve et Larose.
1972.
SHEPPARD, Jill, The 'Redlegs' of Barbados. New York, Kraus- 
Thomson Organization Ltd., 1977.
SHERIDAN, Richard, Sugar- and Slavery: An Economic History
of the British West Indies, 1623-1775. Aylesbury,
Ginn and Co. Ltd., 1974.
SINGH, Paul G., Local Democracy in- the Commonwealth Caribbean:
A study of adaptation and growth. London, Longman 
Caribbean, 1972.
386
SMITH, Abbot Emerson, Colonists in Bondage-: White S'ervifude 
and' Convict Labour in' America, 1607-1776.
Gloucester (Mass►), P . Smith, 1965.
SPURDLE, Frederick G., Early West Indies Government, Showing 
the Progress of Government in Barbados, Jamaica and 
the Leeward Islands, 1660-1783. Palmerston North, 
published' privately, 1963.
STARKEY, Otis Paul, The Economic Geography of Barbados . New 
York, Columbia University, 1939.
THESEE, Fran^oise, Negociants Bordelais -et Colons de Saint- 
Domingue Paris, Societe Francaise d'Histoire 
d'Outre Mer, 1972.
TYBURN, Paul, Plantations de Bananes dans la Region du Gros- 
Morne. Bordeaux, University of Bordeaux, 1970.
WAGLEY, Charles, Race and Class in Rural Brazil. Paris, UNESCO, 
1952.
WILLIAMS, Eric, Capitalism and Slavery. New York, Russell and 
Russell, 1961.
(b) CONTEMPORARY ACCOUNTS
AUBE, Rear-Admiral, "La Martinique: Son Present et Son Avenir" 
in Revue Maritime et Coloniale: 188l.
BARBADOS MUTUAL LIFE, A Century of Service :the B.M.L.A. Society, 
1840-1940. Bridgetown, Barbados Mutual Life, 1940.
CARMICHAEL, A.C., Domestic Manners and Social Conditions of
the White, Coloured and Negro Population of the' West 
Indies (2 vols). London, 1834.
CAVE:SHEPHERD, Barbados: (illustrated) Historical, Descriptive
and Commercial. Bridgetown, Cave Shepherd and Co., 1911.
CHEMIN-DUPONTES, Les Petites Antilles: Etude Sur Leur Evolution
Economique'. Paris, Guilmoto Editeur, 1908.
COULON, C., Le fabrication du Rhum a la Martinique . Paris, Larose, 1886. — —
Culture du Cafe et du Cacao aux Antilles . Saint- 
Pierre, Imprimerie des Antilles, 1894.
DA COSTA, A Short Historical Sketch of the Firm of Da' Costa 
from its Foundation in Barbados in 1868' until' 1948. 
Liverpool, Easton Press, 1948.
DAVY, J ., The West Indies,' Before and' After Emancipation. 
London, 185 4 (Cass Reprint^1971).
387
DE CROZE, F., La Martinique: Catastrophe d'e Saint-Pierre.
Limoges, Librairie du XX® siecle, 1903.
DE LA CORNILLIERE, le comte, De La Martinique' en 1842 (Interets 
Coloniaux, Souvenirs de' Voyage), Paris, published 
privately, 1843.
DU TERTRE, Pere J.B., Histoire Generale des Antilles (3 vols). 
Paris, 1667-71.
EDWARDS, Bryan, The History Civil and Commercial of the British 
Colonies in the West Indies (3 vols). London, John 
Stockdale, 1807 (4th edition).
EVANS, W.J., Sugar Planter’s Manual. Being a Treatise on the
Art of Obtaining Sugar from the Sugar Cane. London,
Longman,. Brawn, Gr e en, 184 7.
FRERE, George, A short history of Barbados, from its first
discovery and settlement, to the end of the Year 1767.
London, J.Dodsley, 1768.
FROUDE, James Anthony, The English in the West Indies: or the 
Bow of Ulysses" London, Longmans, l888[.
GARAUD, Louis, Trois ans a la Martinique. Paris, A. Picard et 
Kaan, 1895-
HALL, Richard, General Account of the First Settlement and of
■ to8 Trade and Constitution of the' Island of Barbados
(Written in 1755). Barbados, 1924.
HARLOW, Vincent (ed), Colonising Expeditions in the West Indies
and Guiana, 1623-16677 London, TheHakluyt Society,
1925.
HAYNES, General Robert Notes of New Castle and Clifton Hall 
Plantations, Barbados and Other Documents of Family 
Interest. London, Argus Printing Co., 1912.
HAYOT, Octave, Materiaux Pour 1 ’Histoire de la Martinique 
AgricoXe~ (2 vols). Fort-de-France, Imprimerie du 
Gouvernement, 1881 (Reprint 1938).
HEARNE, Lafcadio, Esquisses. Martiniquaises. Paris, Mercure 
de France, 1924.
Contes de Tropiques . Paris, Mercure de France, 1927.
Un voyage d ’ete aux Tropiques. Paris,. Mercure de 
France, 1931.
HESS, Jean, La Catastrophe de la Martinique: Notes d ’un Reporter. 
Paris, Charpentier et Fasquelle, 1902'.
LABAT, Pere Jean, Nouveau Voyage aux Isles de r ’Amerique (6 
vols), Paris, Pierre-Francois Giffart, 1722.
LANDES, Gaston, Colonies et Pays de Protectorate': Section de
la Martinique. Paris, published for the Exposition 
Universelle, 1900.
388
LASCELLES, Edwin, COLLETON, James, DRAX, Edward et al.,
Instructions for the Management' of a Plantation in 
Barbados and for the Treatment of Negroes etc etc . 
London, 1786.
LEGIER, E., La Martinique et la Guadeloupe. ' Considerations 
Economiques sur 1*Avenir et la Culture d'e la 
Canne, la Production de Sucre et du Rhum et les 
Cultures Secondaires dans les Antilles Francaises. 
Paris, Bureaux de la Sucrerie Indigene et Coloniale, 
1905.
LIGON, Richard, A True and Exact History of the Island of 
Barbados. London 1657 (Cass Reprint, 1970).
LONG, Edward, History of Jamaica (3 vols). London, 1774 (Cass 
Reprint,1970),
MCLLELAN, George, Some Phases o.f Barbados Life . Demarara, The 
Argosy Co. Ltd., 1909.
POYER, John, The history of Barbados from the first discovery 
of the island in the Year l605» till the accession 
of, Lord Seaforth l801. London, Mawman, l8o8 (Cass 
Reprint,' 1971) .
RAYNAL, abbe,‘ Histoire Philosophique et politique, des
etablissements et du Commerce des E'uropeeris dans les 
deux Indes. Paris, 1770.
REECE, R., Hints to Young Barbados Planters. Barbados, Israel 
Bowen, 1857.
RENOUARD, Felix, Statistique de la Martinique (2 vols).
Paris, Chaumerot, 1822.
SALAVINA,' 30 Ans a Saint-Pierre. Souvenirs. Fort-de-France, 1910.
SCHOMBURGK, Sir R.H., History of Barbados: Comprising a
Geographical and' Statistical Description o'f the 
Island: A Sketch of the Historical Events since
the Settlement. And an Account of Its Geology and 
Natural Productions. London, 1848 (Cass Reprint, 
1971)•
SEWELL, W.G., The Ordeal of Free Labour in the West Indies.
New York, Harper and Bros., 1861 (Cass Reprint, 1968)
SOUQUET-BASIEGE, G ., Le Prejuge d'e Couleur aux Antilles
Francaises.Saint-Pierre, Imprimerie de Propagateur. 
1882?
STARK, James H ., History and Guide to' Barbados and-- the
Caribbee Islands. Boston, Bowen and Sons, r8"93.
STURGE, Joseph and HARVEY, Thomas, The West Indies' in 1837. 
London, 1838 (Cass Reprint, 1968)♦
THOME, J.A. and KIMBALL, J.H.,- Emancipation 'in the' West Indies. 
New York, 1838. ' .^—
TREVES, Sir Frederick, The Cradle of the Deep. London, Smith, 
Elder and Co., 1908.
TROLLOPE, Anthony, The West Indies and the Spanish Main. 
London, Chapman and Hall, 1859.
SECTION VI: PUBLISHED ARTICLES, PAPERS', PAMPHLETS' AND TRACTS
(a) ARTICLES AND PAPERS
ACHEEN, Rene, flLe probleme de Immigration indienne devant 
1 ’opinion martiniquaise dans les annees 1882-1885" 
in Les Cahiers du Cerag: 27, 1972, 1-34.
^'Conflits des institutions republicains francaise 
a la Martinique: les blancs creoles et la question 
du pouvoir (1870-1885)” in Les Cahiers du Cerag:
30, 1974, 15-60.
ADELAIDE MERLANDE, Jacques, "Recherches sur l ’economie de la 
Martinique a la fin du 198 siecle” in Etudes et 
Documents du Cerag: 1, 1969, 1-48.
tTLes Origines du Mouvement Ouvrier a la Martinique, 
de 1870 h .la Greve de 1900” in Les Cahiers du Cerag 
26, 1972, 195pp.
ALBERTINI J., !tLe fausse croissance” 
163, Sept/Oct 1965, 16-27.
in Economie et Human!sme
ALLEYNE "Alleyne of Barbados” in Journal of the Barbados
Museum and Historical Society: 3 (2), February 1936- 
5 (4), August' 1938.
ANON, "Rapport anonyme sur la Martinique ecrit vers 1753” 
in Bulletin de la Societe d*Histoire de la 
Martinique: 15, 1970, 93-106.
ANON, "Commerce Roi et Big Bazar" in Le Monde: June 21st
1973. ,
BATIE, Robert Carlyle, "Why Sugar? Economic cycles and the
changing of staples in the English and French Antilles, 
1624-54" in Journal of Caribbean History: 5,
November 1972, 1-41.
BENOIST, Jean, "Les Martiniquais, anthropologie d'une population 
metissee" in Bulletin et Memolres de la Societe 
d ’Anthropologie de Paris: 4(2), 1963, 241-432.
BENOIST, Jean, "Types de Plantations et Groupes sociaux a la 
Martinique" in Cahiers des Amer'ique's 'Latlnes:
2, 1968, 130-159.
BICKERTON, Derek, "The Redlegs of Barbados" in The Sunday 
Advocate: May 28th - July 2nd 1961.
BOUTON, Jacques, "Relation d 'etablissement des Francais en 
l'isle Martinique" in Bulletin de la Societe 
d 1Hist oire de la Mart inique:11, 19 6 3 > 9 7-103 .
CAZES, Georges, "Problemes de population et perspectives 
economiques en Martinique et en Guadeloupe" in 
Cahiers d *Qutre-Mer:92, Oct/Dec 1970, 379-424.
GERAG, "Le VIIe Plan de developpement economique et social 
b. la Martinique" in Les Cahiers du Cerag:Document 
No. 2, 1975, 1-40.
CRABOT, Christian, "Chomage, racisme et centralisation
excessive, sont a l'origine du malaise a la Martinique 
Le Monde: December 29th, 1959.
CRUSOL, Jean, ^"La croissance economique de la Martinique depui 
la departementalisation (1949t1969)" in Les Cahiers 
du Cerag: Document-No. 2, 1971, 1-25.
’*La Martinique, economie de plantation: survol 
historique" in Les Cahiers du Cerag: 28, 1973, 1-31.
DEBIEN, G., "Plantations d'Amerique et papiers de familie"
in Bulletin de la Societe d THistoire de la Martinique 
2, 1955, 1-16. ■
DESPORTES, Guy, "Mode d 'appropriation des terres" in Bulletin 
de la Societe d'Histoire de la Martinique: 2, 1955,
71-88.
DESRUISSEAUX, Jacques, "La Propriete Rurale en Martinique: 
Principales donnees obtenues par 1 'exploitation du 
cadastre" in Le's Cahiers du Cerag: 32, October, 1975, 
3-29.
DUNN, Richard, "The Barbados Census of 1680: Profile of the 
Richest Colony in English America" in William and 
Mary Quarterly: 26(1), January 1969.
DURHAM, Harriet, "The Earl of Harewood, K.G. and the Relation­
ship of the Lascelles family with Barbados" in 
Journal of the Barbados Museum and Historical Society 
4(2), February 1937, 83-84.
FALLOPE-ARNASSALON, J., "Le probleme sucrier en Guadeloupe 
dans la premiere moitie du XIX siecle (1815-1860)" 
in Bulletin de la Societe d'fHistoire de la Guadeloupe 
24, T975.
FLORENT, Claude, ”Les Antilles, iles incertaines" in Le Monde: 
January 8th, 1970 . '
HALL, Neville, "Law and Society in Barbados at the turn of the 
nineteenth century" in Journal of Caribbean History: 5, November 1972, 20-451-----------------------------
391
HANDLER, Jerome, "Some aspects of work organization on sugar 
plantations in Barbados’^ in Journal of the Barbados 
Muse urn and' Historical' Society’: 31(2) , May' 1965, 7 8- 
103.
\HAYOT, Emile, "Noblesse des Isles. Les annoblis a la
Martinique avant 1789" in Bulletin d'e la Societe 
d*Histoire de la Martinique! 12, 196 5, 9-40.
HOROWITZ, Michael, "Metropolitan influences in the Caribbean: 
the French Antilles" in V. Rubin (ed), Social and' 
Cultural Pluralism in the Caribbean: Annals, 83 
(Art 577 I960, 802-8'oB.
HUNTE, Keith D., "Church and Society in Barbados in the
Eighteenth Century" in Mathews (ed), Social 'Groups * 
and Institutions in the History of the Caribbean.
Rio PiedrasInstitute of Caribbean Studies,
University of Puerto Rico, 1975. .
INNES, F.C., "The pre-sugar era of European settlement in 
Barbados" in Journal of Caribbean History: 1,
November 1970,'1-22.
KERVEGANT, Denis, "Notes de statistique et d ’economie agricole" 
in Bulletin Agricole de la Martinique: 5(2), June
1936, 95-112.
LEWIS, Martin Denning, "One hundred million Frenchmen,
■ assimilation theory in French colonial policy" in 
Comparative Studies in Society and Hi'story:4, 1961/62 , 
129-153.
LOBDELL, Richard, "Pattern of Investment and Sources of Credit 
in the British West Indies Sugar Industry: 1838- 
97" in Journal of Caribbean History: 4, May 1972, 
31-53.
MARGRY, Pierre, "Origines francaises des pays d Toutre-mer, 
les seigneurs de la Martinique" in Revue Maritime 
et Coloniale, 1878.
MARSHALL, Woodville, "Notes on Peasant Development in the West 
Indies since 1838" in Social and Economic Studies: 
17(3), July/Sept 1968, 252-263.
"The termination of the apprenticeship system in 
Barbados and the Windward Islands: An Essay in 
Colonial Administration and Politics" in Journal of 
Caribbean History:2, May 1971, 1-45.
"The Establishment of a Peasantry in Barbados, 1840- 
1920" in Mathews (ed), Social Groups and Institutions 
in the History of the Caribbean. Rio Piedras,
Institute of Caribbean Studies, University of Puerto 
Rico, 1975. ‘
PARES, Richard, "A London West India. Merchant House, 1740- 
1769" in R.Pares and A.J.P. Taylor (eds), Essays 
Presented to Sir Lewis Namier. London, Macmillan,
19567 ........... . ........ ..............
"Merchants and Planters", Economic History Review 
Supplement: 4, i960, 91pp.
392
PATTERSON, Orlando "Social Aspects of the Sugar Industry" in 
Girvan and Jefferson - (eds), -Readings in the 
■ Political Economy' of the 'Caribbean. Jamaica, New 
World Publications, 1971.
PERRET, F.J., "Antilles et Guyane: Ces Departements Desen-
chantes" in Le Figaro: October 16th, 17th and l8th 
1972.
PETITJEAN-ROGET, Jacques, "Les noms des families creoles
k la Martinique" in Revue Internationale d TOnomastique 
1-2, Mar/June 1949, 105-119.
"Courants de migration et courants commerciaux vers 
la Martinique, 1635-1789" in Bulletin de la Societe 
d THistoire de la Martinique: 2, 1955, 17-65•
PLENEL, Alain, "Liberation Nationale et Assimilation a la
Martinique et a la Guadeloupe" in Les Temps Modernes: 
205, June 1963, 2197-2235.
REVERT, Eugene, "LTeconomie martiniquaise" in Les Cahiers 
d'Outre-Mer: 1, 1948, 28-39.
"L'economie martiniquaise pendant la guerre" in Les 
Cahiers du Cerag: 33, 1977, 4-11.
SCHNAKENBOURG, Christian, "Statistiques pour 1 'histoire de 
1'economie de plantation en Guadeloupe et en 
Martinique (1635-1835)" in Bulletin de la Societe 
d'Histoire de la Guadeloupe: 31, 1977, 121pp.
SHILSTONE, E.M., "The Evolution of the General Assembly of 
Barbados" in Journal of the Barbados Museum and 
Historical Society': l(4), August, 193^, 187-191.
WILL, H.A., "Colonial Policy and Economic Development in the 
British West Indies, 1895-1903" in Economic History 
Review: 23(1), 1970. 129-147.
(b) PAMPHLETS AND TRACTS
ANON, Memoirs of the first' settlement of the island of 
Barbados, and other Caribbee' islands', with the 
succession of the 'Governor's' and Commanders in Chief 
of Barbados to the' Year 17'42. London, E.Owen and 
W .Meadows, 1743.
ANON, Candid and' Impartial Considerations of the. Nature of the 
Sugar Trade: The Comparative Importance' of -the 
British and' French Islands to' the West' Indies. 
London, 1763. ~
ANTI-BOUNTY LEAGUE, Report of the Anti-Bounty' Meeting' Held at' Bridgetowrr, barbados, west indies on i)ecemDe~rr
14', 18'97: Bridgetown, lo97.
BARBADOS, A List' of Estates' in Barbados, 1929. Bridgetown,
The Advocate Co. Ltd., 1929*
BARBADOS SUGAR PRODUCERS5 ASSOCIATION, Notes on the Barbados 
Sugar Industry. Warrens, B.S.P.A., May 1973*
BAUDE, Theodore, La Martinique a 1 'Exposition Coloniale
Internationale de Paris', 1931. Paris, L.de Plas et 
G. Alexandre, 1931.
BRATHWAITE. R .A .I ., Cropping Recommendations for Barbados .
Bridgetown, Caribbean Agricultural Research and 
Development Institute, 1976.
BURSLEM, Dora and MANNING, Audrie, An Old Colonial Family: 
1685-1900 (History of the Austin family of 
Barbados and British Guiana). Bridgetown, published 
by the’ authors, undated.
CAIL (J.F.) et c. e , Mesures pour,Changer la Situation de nos 
Colonies des Antilles^ Paris, I838.
CENTRAL FACTORIES COMMITTEE (BARBADOS), Report of the Committee 
on Central Factories. Bridgetown, 1895. ~
CHARRON, Vistor, Rapport presente au nom de la commission des
equipements sur la question sucriere (Rapport Charron). 
Fort-de-France, April 7, 1976.
DAUBREE, Paul, La Question de sucre du Point de Vue Industrielle. 
Paris, 1843. " '
DESRUISSEAUX, Jacques, La Structure Fonciere de' la
.Martinique Fonds • Saint.-Jacquesy Centre, de Recherches 
Caraibes de 1 'Universite 'de Montreal, 1975.
FOREIGN AND COLONIAL INVESTMENT TRUST COMPANY LTD., The Case 
for Central Factories in Barbados. London, 1898.
FRANCIS, Gloria, Food.crop production in Barbados and its 
response to Carifta/Caricom and the agricultural 
marketing protocol. Cave Hill, I.S.E.R., 1975.
HALL Douglas, A Brief History of the West India Committee. 
Barbados, Caribbean Universities Press, 1971.
HURARD, Marius, Questions Coloniales --- Lettre a M.Paul
Leroy Beaulieu. Les Noirs et les' Blancs k la 
Martinique. Paris, R. Bonnet et Cie5 1882.
LASSERRE, Guy, La petite propriete des Antilles franpaises 
dans la crise de 1'economie de plantation.
Fonds Saint-Jacques, Centre de Recherches Caraibes 
de 1 'Universite de Montreal, 1972.
393
394
SCHOELCHER, Victor, Evenements des 18' et 19' ,1'uiTl'ef l8'8l 
' k St-Pi'er're~ Paris, Dentu, 1882.'
SCHWARTZ, ' Reflexions' Sur T TE's'cTava'g'e' des Negred.Neufch&tel,
1781.
SYNDICAT GENERALE DES PLANTEURS ET MANIPULATEURS DE LA CANNE, 
Notes preliminai'res sur' le projet' d'e 'concentration 
de 1 ’Industrie sUcr'ik'r'e k la Marti'n'iq'ue . Fort-de- 
France , Imprimerie Bezaudin, 1946.
SYNDICAT DES^FABRICANTS DE SUCRE DE LA MARTINIQUE, Note
presentee a M. le Gouverneur. Saint-Pierre, 1898.
SECTION VII; THESES AND UNPUBLISHED PAPERS
BERNISSANT, P., Etude sur le Regime Agrico'l'e des Antilles
Francaises.Doctoral thesis, University of Paris, 1916.
CHELTENHAM, Richard, Politics in Barbados up till 1968.
Doctoral thesis, University of Manchester, 1970.
CROSS, Malcolm, "Through Sweetness to Light: The Origins of 
Trinidad Labour Protest in the 1930s" (Mimeo).
Paper presented at the Fourth' Annual Conference of the 
Society for Caribbean Studies, Swanwick (Derbyshire), 
May 1980.
DESRUISSEAUX, Jacques, Contribution cartographique a 1 ’etude 
de la vie ru'rale en Ma'r't'ihi'q'ue. Doctoral thesis, 
University of Bordeaux, 1970.
HAMILTON, Bruce, Barbados and the Confederation Question,
1871-85. Doctoral Thesis, University of London, 1947.
KARCH, Celia, "Changes in Barbadian Social Structure, 1860-
1937" (Mimeo). Paper presented at an T.SVE'.R. Staff 
Seminar. Cave Hill, June 1977.
KOVATS, Edith, Une Minorite Dominante: les Blancs Creoles de 
la Martinique. Doctoral thesis, University of Paris,
19 w .
MARSHALL, Woodville, "Rock Hall, St. Thomas. The Search for
the first Free Village in Barbados". Paper presented 
at the Ninth Annual Conference of Caribbean Historians 
Cave Hill, University of the West Indies, April 1977-
PARRIS, Ronald, Race, Inequality and Underdevelopment in
Barbados. Doctoral thesis, University of Florida, 1975
RENARD, Raymond, La Martinique de 18'48 a l8'70 (Mimeo). Pointe- 
k-Pitre, Centre Universitaire Antilles-Guyane: Groupe 
Universit&ire de Recherche inter-Caraib.es, 1973.
SCHNAKENBOURG,Christi.an, "Note sur 1 ’histoire de 1 Tusine du 
Galion (Martinique) 1865-1939" (Mimeo). U.E.R. 
d ’Economie et de Gestion, Amiens, 1977.
395
WATSON, Karl Stewart, The Re'dl'eg's' of Barbados . Master thesis, 
University of Florida, 1971.
SECTION VIII: YEARBOOKS, DIRECTORIES AND ANNUAL REPORTS
(a) BARBADOS AND WEST INDIES
BARBADOS, The Barbados General Almanac for the Year 1848. 
Bridgetown, Joseph Bayley, 1848.
The Barbados Almanac for the Year i860. Liverpool,
C. Tinby, undated. ..
Barbados Almanack for 1870. Bridgetown, 1870.
The Barbados Business and General Directory, 1887. 
Barbados, Barbados Globe, 1887.
The Barbados Almanac and Diary for the Year 1888. 
Bridgetown, Bowen and Sons, 1888. -
FRASER, S.J., The Barbados Diamond-Jubilee - Directory; And West 
India‘General Advertiser 1899. Bridgetown, King and 
Co., 1899.
SINCKLER, E.G., Handbook of Barbados, London, Duckworth and 
Co., I9T2 (1st edition).
LEVERICK, Percy Sinclair, Leverick':s Directory of Barbados,
1921. Barbados, T.E.King and Co., 1921.
ASPINALL. Sir Algernon, The Handbook of the British West Indies, 
British Guiana and British Honduras, T9‘2'9-30.
London, West India Committee, 1929.
CANADA, The Commercial Register of Canada (the Barbados
Supplement). London, Globe Encyclopaedia Company 
and Globe Commercial Register Co., 1931.
BARBAD OS, Barbados Business Directory and Tourist Guide, 1934 , 
Barbados, Reid and Linton, 1934.
BARBADOS, Barbados Year Book and Who's Who for (i) 1934,
(ii) 19373 (iii) 195L. Bridgetown, The Advocate 
Press, 1934, 1937 and 1951.
-WEST INDIES, West Indies and Caribbean Year Book (i) 1954/55
(ii) 1958/59 *' (iii) 1966, (ivl 1976/77.
London /New York, Thomas Skinner and Co. L t d , 1955, 1959. 
1966 and 1977.
WEST INDIES, Personalities Caribbean: The International Guide 
to Who- 's Who in' the West Indies, Bahamas', Bermuda"] 
Kingston,. 1972/73 (5th edition).
396
BARBADOS SHIPPING AND TRADING CO. LTD., Report' and Accounts: 
1'960-1977 . Bridgetown, Barbados Shipping and Trading 
published, annually. -
BARBADOS SUGAR PRODUCERS’ ASSOCIATION, Annual Reports: 1966- 
1976 (Mimeo). Warrens, B.S.P.A., published annually.
BRITISH WEST INDIES SUGAR ASSOCIATION, Sugar in the West Indies 
and British Guiana: 1961 Handbook of the British 
West Indies Sugar Association. Bridgetown, W.I.S.A.,
I96T.
BRITISH WEST INDIES SUGAR ASSOCIATION (from 1/12/75: SUGAR 
ASSOCIATION OP THE CARIBBEAN), Chairman’s Annual Report,
1956-1975. Bridgetown, W.I.S.A./S.A.C., published . 
annually.
(b) MARTINIQUE
MARTINIQUE, Annuaire de la Martinique: 1870-1914 (44 vols).
Fort-de-France, Imprimerie du Gouvernement, published 
annually.
SAVON, Raoul, Petit Almanach Commercial de la Martinique. 
Fort-de-France, Imprimerie Deslandes, 1912.
SYLVESTRE, Emile, LOTAUT, Eustache, Annuaire de la vie
Martiniquaise, 1936. Fort-de-France, Imprimerie du 
Gouvernement, 1936.
MARTINIQUE, Almanach de■la Martinique, i960 . Fort-de-France, 
I960.
DOMTOM. Annuaire des Entreprises et Organismes D ’Outre-Mer, 
1976. Paris, Ren£ Moreaux et Cle, 1976.
SECTION IX: NEWSPAPERS AND PERIODICALS
(a) NEWSPAPERS 
BARBADOS
Advocate-News (Daily, in progress).
Sunday Advocate-News (Sunday, in progress) 
The Nation (Weekly, in progress). 
Agricultural Reporter (Daily, 1834-1946). 
Barbados Herald (Daily, 1919-1931)*
MARTINIQUE
Le Monde (Daily, in progress).
Le Figaro (Daily, in progress).
Les Antilles (Twice weekly, 1843-1902). 
Le Bien Public (Twice weekly, 1874-78),
397
MARTINIQUE' co'nt.
Les Colonies (Twice weekly, 1878-1902).
Le Moniteur: Journal Officiel de la Martinique (Twice 
weekly, 1834-1947).
Le Propagateur (Twice weekly, 1853-1894).
(b) SPECIALIST PERIODICALS 
BARBADOS
Barbados Manufacturer (Quarterly, in progress).
Barbados Sugar Industry Review (Quarterly, in progress)
MARTINIQUE
"Bulletin Agricole de la Martinique (Monthly, 1918-1952) 
Bulletin de la Chambre de Commerce de la Martinique 
(Monthly,. 1934-43).
Cenaddom: Bulletin d 1 Information (6 times a year, in 
progress).
Information Caraibe (Weekly, in progress).
Revue Maritime et Coloniale (Monthly, 1861-1896).
398
The fieldwork for this study was carried out during the 
period February - December 1977, and was broken down in the fallow­
ing way:
Barbados - first week of February to the second week of 
July;
Martinique - third week of July to the first week of 
December.
Data Collection
In Barbados the main research methodology employed was 
that of a structured interview, incorporating both closed and open- 
ended questions. Ths interviews were recorded and the results later 
transcribed. The Interview Schedule which is reproduced below was 
fairly extensive, the formulation and selection of questions being 
determined primarily with reference to the three main independent 
variables in this study.
In Martinique the use of a similar extended Interview 
Schedule and recording techniques had to be abandoned at the Pilot 
Study stage, since they were discovered to be inappropriate. Certain 
social and cultural characteristics of Beke society, namely a high 
degree of personalism and the kinds of expectations which surround 
every encounter (each being regarded as a social event in itself), 
made the use of recorded, formal interviews a highly-obtrusive method 
of collecting data. For this reason less formal methods of data 
collection had to be employed in Martinique, utilizing anthropo­
logical fieldwork methods. This took two forms. Firstly, in what 
was principally a work situation as opposed to a formally construct­
ed interview situation, driving or walking around an owner’s plan­
tation on a ’tour of inspection', whilst administering an abridged 
version of the Interview Schedule from memory, the results being 
later written up as field notes in a book kept specially for that 
purpose. Secondly, Participant Observation in situations involving 
discussions with respondents and their families, extensive social­
izing being essential in the Martiniquan context, often involving 
several visits.
In addition to the methods described above which formed 
the principal methods of data collection in the field, the use of 
informants and observational techniques were also widely employed.
A Diary was kept for each island in which data gathered from
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informants and observational studies was recorded. In both islands 
the use of informant sources involved the tapping of a wide variety 
of expertise and knowledge, of which longevity itself in certain 
cases was the principal qualification (Examples: areas concerning 
changes in estate ownership in Barbados between 1880 and 1920 and 
the workings of the Chancery Court, and the composition of 
pierrotine society before 1902).. In some cases members of the 
sample interviewed also acted as informants on return visits.
The use of observational techniques was confined principally to 
the study:of'work, organization on sugar and banana plantations, and 
to an analysis of planter/labour relations as an interactional 
process which I have referred to in Chapter 7 as the operation of 
the ’deferential dialectic1. Although it can be said that this 
methodology was utilized in formally constructed situations, such 
as guided tours of tenantries in Barbados, and field, factory and 
packing station visits, a great deal of observation was casually 
carried out in estate yards immediately prior to interviews.. In 
some respects this was more valuable than formally constructed 
events, sinrce it was possible to observe a lot of 'off-stage* 
behaviour which did hot surface in organized situations.
Sampling
In both islands a Quota sample was selected for inter­
viewing purposes. In Barbados the sample size was 4j0^ and in 
Martinique 2JDr and confined to men. With the exception of six 
cases in.Barbados and two in Martinique, the sample was aged forty- 
five and over* In each island the minimum requirement for 
selection to the Quota was the. ownership of a large estate, which 
in Barbados meant the ownership of an estate of 100 acres and over, 
and in Martinique an estate of 40 hectares and over. Although the 
Quota was originally conceived of as being drawn from the core elite 
of the agri-business bourgeoisie, that is to say members with inter­
locking interests in agri-business, the prevalence of social mobilty 
in the twentieth century and the corresponding high degree of 
internal stratification in white creole society, occasioned a 
re-appraisal of the selection process. Hence three separate groups 
can be distinguished within the Barbadian sample: representatives 
of the Bridgetown mercantile class with inter-locking commercial 
and agricultural interests, who are not involved in the day to day 
runniqjg of estates, but merely represent them in a financial 
capacity from an office in Bridgetown; established "practical
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planters" or owner/managers, ©ho live on and run their o©n estates, 
(some members of this group also act as estate attorneys for 
absentees or merchants in Bridgetown); a "ne© Blite" of poor white, 
and 'Iredleg 1 entrepreneurs who have financial interests outside the 
traditional.sphere of agri-business, in the construction industry, 
real estate, manufacturing and tourism. Each sub-group accounts for 
roughly one-third of ths overall Quota*
In Martinique the substitution of sugar for bananas as a 
major export crop also occasioned a re-assessment of the selection 
process* In choosing the Quota, therefore, particular attention 
was paid to selecting prominent banana planters* As a result of 
this two-thirds of the Quota can be regarded as nouveau riche 
members of the Beke elite, incorporated into the ranks of the Grands 
Bekes over the past twenty years. The remaining one-third were 
descendants of the nineteenth century usinier class, who in addition 
to their commercial interests had transferred their assets from 
sugar to bananas. Only two of these continued to be directly 
involved in the. sugar industry.
Sampling was carried out in two stages. Firstly, samples 
were drawn from, lists of members of the Sugar Producers' Association 
in Barbados and SICABAM in Martinique. Secondly, the accuracy of 
each sample was cross-checked by the reputational technique. In 
both cases this involved the presentation of the chosen sample to 
'knowledgeables*. In Barbados the President of the Sugar Producers* 
Association and a prominent estate attorney were chosen for this 
task* In Martinique this task was performed by the President of 
SICABAM. Help was also obtained from' the head of one of the most 
illustrious Grand Beke families in the island* At the Pilot stage 
of the study the ’’snowball technique* was also attempted as a means 
cf obtaining a Quota* This, however, failed to produce positive 
results in both islands.
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Interview Schedule
Before I begin I want to emphasize one important point concerning 
confidentiality. I must stress that all the replies that you may 
give to the following questions are, quite naturally, entirely 
confidential. After all my interviews have been completed, all 
the replies will be taken off the completed questionnaires and 
tapes and combined into statistical tables, so that it will not 
be possible to isolate details of particular individuals for 
inspection., What I am really interested in is how many people say 
one thing and how many say something else, rather than who it is 
who holds these different opinions and makes these different - 
statements. Perhaps we can begin, and start off with a few 
questions about the estate or estates which you are responsible for.
1 *. Firstly, could you tell me the total area and arable acreage
covered by the estate/estates which you own or are responsible 
for?
2. Is the estate/are any of these estates fragmented into two
or more separate parcels?
1. Yes 0. No
(Probe: Any land split up into lots and sold in recent years)
3.. Is the estate/are these estates 1. Individually air 0* Company
owned?
(Probe: If 1 * Check owner/owners.
If 0. Obtain details about the company: family and 
public shareholdings and nature and extent of holdings 
of respondent)
4. Is the estate/are the estates still primarily geared to sugar
production?
1*. Yes 0. No
(Prompt: Obtain specific: information on each estate)
If No Go to Q.6
5. What factory/are your canes sent to?
Go to Q . 7
6. Would it therefore be true to say that you have moved away
on ...... estate/estates from dependence on one crop towards
greater diversification?
(Probe: Land utilization breakdown in terms of percentages 
given over to different activities)
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The next couple of questions are concerned with wider family 
involvement in estate ownership and representation.
7. For individual estate ownership
(i) Can you tell me how long you have owned ......?
(ii) If it has/they have been in the family for some time 
before you assumed ownership, for how long has it/have 
they been held in the family name?
For company estate ownership
(i) Can you tell me how long you have held interests in ....?
(ii) Do other members of your family hold interests in ••••••?
1*. Yes 0 . N o
If Yes Was/were   ever held by your family outright?
1# Yes 0. l\lo
8. If any of the properties discussed above in Q.7 have been 
owned by the respondents family for some time
If not go to Q.9.
Can you tall me anything about the circumstances surrounding 
the acquisition of this property/these properties, and how it
*has/they have been transferred f,5,0m one generation .to-the
next?
(Probe: Different kinds of commercial transactions involved, 
and local systems of inheritance with actual reference to
three generations if possible)
I would now like to gain a broader picture of your working career 
and experience in agriculture.
9. Firstly, can you tell me if you have ever owned or represented
another or other estates in any capacity?
1. Yes 0. No
If Yes take details: If No Go to Q.TO.
(i) Estate/s
(ii) Parish
(iii) Role: Owner/Attorney/Manager/Overseer/Representative
(iv) Dates
10. Have you ever followed any occupation outside of agriculture?
1.. Yes 0. No
If Yes take details: If No Go to Q. 11.
(i) Occupation/s
(ii) Dates
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11. Do you happen to have any business interests outside of 
agriculture? .
1.. Yes 0. No
If Yes Could you say quite briefly what these other interests 
are?
If No Go to Q.13.
12. How important are these other interests to you?
(Prompts in financial, familial, emotional terms etc)
13. with reference to what you have said about your working 
career, agricultural experience and pursuit of any other 
business interests that you might have, what stands out as 
the most satisfying in terms of interest and personal 
fulfilment?
(Probe: Any further information on business interests)
In asking the next set of questions, I am particularly interested
in your own personal views and opinions upon the subject matter.
None of your replies will therefore be necessarily right or wrong.
14. How do you- view the future of the sugar industry, say over
the next ten years?
15. How would you react to the prospect of other landowners or 
companies selling out to overseas buyers or Government?
16. A great deal has been written and said over the last ten years 
about the declining fortunes of the sugar industry. Which of 
the following (if any) do you regard as providing a solution 
to the present problems (i) diversification in agriculture;
(ii) industrial development: (iii) expansion of the tourist 
industry with hotel and property development?
17. Alternatively, to what extent do you believe that-in the long
run the health of the economy is dependent upon the main- -
tenance and support of sugar?
18. Given the many problems that have affected the sugar industry 
in Barbados lately, how willing would you be to sell up your 
property or shares and re-deploy your capital elsewhere?
19. Could you indicate possible alternatives for capital invest­
ment, either in the Barbadian economy or overseas?
20. Can you envisage any viable alternative to the present
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20. contd...
plantation system, in terms of land re-distribution and 
changes in ownership?
21. What contribution do you think the planting community in
Barbados has made to island society, apart from the purely
economic?
22.. Comparing today with that of your father’s time, say thirty
years ago or more, what sort of changes do you think have
come about at the local village level and in the plantation 
community?
(Probe: Attitudes towards the decline or preservation of 
’traditional authority-', and peasant/landowner relations 
within this context)
23. In the past local communities were usually run by a small
handful of men — - such as the landowner, parson and local 
doctor or lawyer — - and one or more was possibly represented 
in the Legislative Council, held office in the Vestry or was 
elected to the island Assembly. The landowner in those days 
behaved very much like an English squire. Do landowners and 
estate representatives included still behave like squires 
today?
(Probe: Respondent’s view of white landowner’s role and status 
in present day Barbadian society, and whether the group of 
company representatives and attorneys managing and running 
today's corporately owned estates have taken on ’traditional’ 
social roles and functions)
24. What do you think it is that decides people’s social standing 
here?
25. How easy do you think it is for a person’s social standing 
to be improved or worsened?
I would now like to ask you some questions about the various clubs
and societies on the island.
26. Firstly, could you tell me something about the clubs, societies
and associations of which you are a member (if any)?
(Prompt: Elicit responses by reference to type: social, sport­
ing, political, trade and occupational)
If member of a political party: If Not Go to Q.28.
Which one?
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27. Do you hold or have you ever held any office in the party?
1. Yes 0. No
If Yes What office?
Go to Q. 29.
28. (i) Have you ever belonged to any political party?
1. Yes 0.. No
" If Yes When? If No Go to Q..29.
(ii) Did you ever hold office?
1* Yes 0. No
If Yes What office? If No Go to Q.29.
And finally in this section,
29. Do you hold or have you ever held in the past any positions 
of responsibility locally?..
(Prompt with examples: 3.P., Vestryman, Member of the House of 
Assembly and Legislative Councils etc)
I would now like to ask you several questions with respect to
specific aspects of the workings of Government.
30., Do you think Government is responsive to the needs of land­
owning interests?
(Prompt: Needs primarily conceived of in economic terms)
31*. If you wanted to make your views known to Government in the 
hope of influencing it, how would you go about it?
I would like to close this interview by returning to the subject of 
the estate/estates for which you are responsible.
32. With regard to the land belonging to the estate/sstates, is it:
(i) Fully owned freehold?
(ii) Leasehold?
(iii) Mortgaged?
If leasehold Can you tell me something about the landlord? 
(Prompt: private individual, company or institution)
If Not Go to Q.,33.
33. (i) How much land is let off into tenantries?
(ii) How many tenants does that involve?
34. Do you ever meet any of these tenants socially?
1. Yes □. No
If Yes Where and under what circumstances?
If No Go to Q.35.
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35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
And
40.
klhat is the size of the seasonal workforce employed on this 
estate/these estates at such crucial times in the year as 
harvesting?
(Prompts Specify by individual estates)
Where is this seasonal workforce drawn from?
(Prompt: Occupational groups)
(i) Can you tell me how many full-time workers are employed 
on this estate/these estates?
(ii) Could you break this down into different types of employee? 
(Prompt: oreman, overseer etc)
Do you think the possession of formal qualifications by 
supervisory staff makes an employee a better worker?
Can you indicate as briefly as possible the extent to which 
operations on this estate/these estates have been mechanized? 
(Prompt:. Indicate.by reference to specific operations such as 
cutting, loading, transportation etc)
finally,
Do you think the ownership of land gives one a particular 
view of life, which is different from that of say a company 
shareholder or a salaried manager?
1. Yes 0. No
If Yss What would you say was special about this view of life?
-END-
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APPENDIX II : A LIST OF THE 91 LARGEST LANDOWNERS IN
■ • - * • BARBADOS-IN-1680 OWNING■ 200 ACRES AND OVER.
(acres)
Parish of St. Michael
James Codrington Esq. 300 137
Richard' Horstall 294 129
James Griggory 204 85
James Hallot Esq. 220 84
Richard Howells Guy Esq. 605 405
Thomas Jelly 200 70
Thomas Lees 234 160
Nicholas Prideaux 230 76
Parish of St. Georges
Robert Danvers Esq 305 200
Edward Pye Esq. 400 190
Edward Claypole 325 186
Lady Ann Willoughby - 3 1 7  160
Mrs. Grace Silvester 515 220
Sir Peter Leare 336 123
Mr. George Green 258 52
Colonel M. Drax 705 327
William Bulkely Esq. 380 174
Parish of Christ Church
Joan Bishop 202 65
Menryn Bently Esq. 245 154
Tobias Frere Esq. 395 150
John Gunning 267 47
Henry Reed Harding 220 90
Nathan Knisland Esq. 340 170
Phillip Kirron (deceased) 360 130
Esmond Lewis 214 72
Samuel Newton Esq. 581 260
John Pears Esq. 910 180
Robert Richnell 315 140
Richard Sewell Esq. 550 206
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APPENDIX II contd....
Parish of Christ Church 
contd.
John Searle Esq 365 184
Thomas Walrond 340 170
Richard Williams 406 200
Parish of St. Philip
John Becks Esq. 390 90
Benjamin Cryor: 220 105
Mr. Peter Evans 215 80
Capt. Robert Hackett 440 98
John Jonson 302 122
John Jones (Senior) 448 290
Thomas Lucumbe • 288 135
(indicated "for Bedhill House Plantation")
Granado Nightingale 288 95
Phillip Price 230 84
George Rice 301 31
John Rouse ■ 278 142
Parish of St. James
Richard Baylye 228
Capt. Josias Cox 247 122
William Dyer 317 120
Henry Feake 245 120
John Standfast 351 238
Timothy Thornhill 268 150
James Walwynd Esq. 305 160
Richard Waltorf 206 140
Boniface Knight Esq. 300 150
Edward Littleton Esq. 205 120
Parish of St. Joseph
William Sharpe 'Esq.. 220 260
John Worsham Esq. 270 150
Name Landholding Slaveholding
(acres)
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APPENDIX II contd... 
Name
Parish of St. Joseph 
contd...
Mr. Seger de Hem
John Waterman Esq.
Capt. John Davis
632
447
340
Landholding
(acres)
Parish of St. Lucy
Capt. Thomas Dowdon 233
Simon Lambarte 300
Capt. Thomas Maycocke 399
Elizabeth Pickorin Estate 220
Samuel Tidcomb 300
Capt. Michael Terrill 210
Parish of St. Thomas
Lieutenant J. Applewhite 272
James Carter 207
Thomas C    ? 295
John E ......  ? 200
Elizabeth Farinor 310
Nicholas Prideaux Esq. 278
Capt. John Sampson 327
William Sharpe Esq. 260
 ?   200
Thomas Wardell Esq. 220
Parish of St. John
Sir Peter Colleton (Bart) 425
Christopher Codrington 618
Richard Estwicke (Senior) 330
Henry George , 381
John Hothersall 528
John Kendal 470
Capt.- John Pearnell 348
Thomas Gurney Plantation 295
(Sans Plaisir)
Henry Walrond (Senior) Esq. 424
Slaveholding
190
85
100
69
150
129
95
135
98
216
92
100
136
250
48
202
90
90
179
300
118
80
150
150
106
157
198
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Parish of St. Peter
Capt. James Balls 211 80
Marcy Olutterbuck 230 70
John Hosier 240 77
Richard Morgan 200 74
Parish of St. Andrew
John Forde Esq. 280 120
Capt. John Gibbes 200 93
Capt. Abel Alleyne 316 115
John Bodson Esq. 250 143
John Merrick Esq. 266 167
Lieutenant John Mills 260 90
Totals 30.032 12.790
APPENDIX II contd___
Name Landholding Slaveholding
(acres)
(Source: Public Records1 Office, C.O. 1/44, 142-379).
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APPENDIX III: SUGAR PROPRIETORS IN MARTINIQUE IN 1709
SAINT-PIERRE: DE JQRNA REGIMENT
TOWN AND ENVIRONS OF SAINT-PIERRE
PIERRE ANTHEAUME 
CHABERE
BERNARD DARBEINS 
PAUL ALEXANDRE SERMON 
*PIERRE EMMANUEL NASCARIS DE JAUNA (MARSEILLES) 
FRANCOIS NICOLAS* ROY DE COURPON DE LA fyERNADE: 
*JACQUES LOUIE LE JEUNE DE MALHERBE (TOURAINE)
LOUIE MIRBEAUX 
LEE JESUITES
LES RELIOIRUX DE LA CHARITE 
VEUVE PIERRE CROCqUET 
JEAN PERINELLE DUMAY (PARISl 
veuve: REMY LE ROY
    v •*
v RRECOTJR1 i ■: —T "...
*MICHEL. CROSNIER DE BELLAISTRE [CAPTAIN]
*CLAUDE BELLEVILLE (MEAUX)
FRANCOIS NINET 
*URBAIN CHERY DE LA CHAUSEE 
CAPESTERRE: DE SURVILLIERS REGIMENT
MACOUBA
*DE BOURCK [CAPTAIN ] (/IRELAND)
*HARDY DU BOCCAGE [CAPTAIN]
*MARRAUD [ENSIGN]
JULIEN PLISSONEAU 
ALEXIS SIGALONY 
PIERRE LAUJOL
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EDME MIRBEAUX 
HERICHER
BASSE POINTE
*MATHIEU DE PRUNES [CAPTAIN]
ANDRE COURTOIS
*MICHEL LEYRITZ [LIEUTENANT] (BORDEAUX] (Family ’anobli1 1759) 
FRANCOIS HACKAERT 
MINEURS A. HERICHER
'GRANDE ANSE
PIERRE. CROCHEMORE
*SIMON DE. MASS IAS [ENSIGN] (BESSINEl
T$6RLGQT
DE JAHAM ’'anqbli:’' 17751
LE. yASSOR BE LA CHARDONNIERE Canqbli’' 17051
RAFFI.N
SAINTE-MARIE 
*DE JORNA [.COLONEI] (Family ’anobli" 17681 
*LAGUARIGUE BE SURyiLLIERS [COLONEL]
^FRANCOIS BIROT DE LA POMME RAYE [CAPTAIN]
*NICOLAS GROUT [LIEUTENANT]
*PIERRE LACQUANT [LIEUTENANT]
VEUYE -MARIN DE LA HOUSSAYE
TRINITE
JACQUES GALLET 
*CHARLES CAFPLER 
PIERRE MARCEE 
*BUBUCQ [[LT. COLONEL] Canobli’ 1701)
BALTHAZAR DUBUCQ 
*BUBUCQ LETANG [CAPTAIN]
HERITIERS DUBUCQ
THE SOUTH AND EAST COAST: COLLART REGIMENT
ROBERT
*RAGUIENNE [LIEUTENANT]
DESNOTS 
*RENE MENANT (ANGERS)
PIERRE GAIGNERON 
BEAU DE LA NOUE 
FEBVRIER MEZAXLLET 
FEBVRIER
VEUVE NICOLAS BOUTAUT 
TOUZAY
*GERMAIN ARBOUSSET (LiyOURNEl 
HERITIERB FRANCOIS ARBOUSSET 
*LYNCH (IRELAND X.
*,J0YEUX [CAPTAIN 1
FRANCOIS
^GABRIEL DE LAyiGNE [CAPTAIN]
*PXERRE CARREAU 
JULIEN LE B.QEUF 
MICHEL L’HERMINIER 
^LAMBERT DOENS (FLESSTNGURl 
ROLLAND DESyAUX 
JULIEN AUBIN 
PIERRE LE yiEUX 
PIERRE HARDY 
* CHARLES yAULTIER DE MOYENCOURT [COLONEL] 
CHRISTOPHE DUPLESSIS (PARIS)
CHARLES DES yERGERS D'AUROY CSAINT-CHRISTOPHEl 
JEAN-BAPTISTE LE ROUX GHAPELLE 
JEAN BANCHEREAU
*LOUIS HUTCHES
*HUBERT HUYGHES [CAVALRY CAPTAIN]
HERITTERS DANIEL ROUSSANE
MARIN, RIVIERE PILQTE, SAINTE LUCE 
PIERRE DE LA MOTTE DES SOLIERS [FORMER OFFICER OF THE KING] 
JEAN OLIVIER 
DOMINIQUE CARRE RE 
*JEAN-FRANCOIS LAURENT
* JACQUES DE ROUSSEL DE SAINT-AIME [LT. COLONEL]
MARC VOLCART DES SABLONS
*PIERRE LE MESLE
*PIEREE. LE MESLE MORADEL (SAINT-MALO)
^FRANCOIS VILLAIN [LIEUTENANT]
VEUVE FRANCOIS BORDIER 
PIERRE LE SUEUR 
SULPICE OZIER LA FONTAINE 
^FRANCOIS DE PINCHERY [CAPTAIN]
^NICOLAS COULANGE [MAJOR]
MOYSE POMMIERS
*JEAN DUYAL DE GRENONVILLE (ROUEN) [FORMER OFFICER OF THE KING] 
BANCHEREAU ET MAILLET 
RAYMOND COTTIER [MAJOR]
*JEAN-BAPTISTE YTIER DE CALBRY 
*MARC ANTOINE BELLAY 
*RAYMOND LE CANU D ’ESCAVERIE
* JACQUES DE LA HANTE [ENSIGN]
JEAN LE MARCQ
*LfHOMME DE MONTIGNY [CAPTAIN]
LfHOMME D TAUBIGNY 
*JEAN ROSSIGNOL (SAINT-CHRISTOPHE)
*PIERRE GANTEAUME (MARSEILLES)
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FORT ROYAL AND LAMENTIN: DE LA TOUCHE REGIMENT
LAMENTIN
*MICHEL RENAUDIN [CAPTAIN]
CHARLES BAILLARDEL (family 'anobli1 1779)
VEUVE PAPIN DE LEPINE 
*JEAN-BAPTISTE GAIGNERON [ENSIGN]
RAHAUT DE CEOISY 
HERITIERS LOUIS DE. VAUCOURTOIS 
HERITIERS FRANCOIS LE BOUCHER 
JEAN LALLEMAND 
ANTOINE DESME
*PIERRE GIRAUD DE CRESOL (SAINT-CHRISTOPHEl [FORMER OFFICER OF THE KING] 
JEAN PETIT BELQNCLE
* GABRIEL DESCLIEUX [OFFICER OF THE KING]
*THQMAS GAMIER LA ROCHE (SAINT-MALQl
VEUVE FRANCOIS LE MERLE 
NICOLAS LE MERLE 
DE LA TOUCHE BEAUREGARD 
RICHARD JOURDAIN 
DE LA TOUCHE LQNGPRE 
*DE LA TOUCH [CQLQNEL]
^JACQUES FRANCESQUI (MARSEILLES!
TRQ.UrAXHCHAT
*NIC0LAE CORNETTE [ CARTAIN ] (family *anoBliT 16761 
LAURENCEAU D'HAUTERIVE
* GUILLAUME GEFFRIER [OFFICER IN COLLART'S REGIMENT ]
SIMON DUVAL,. SENIOR
SIMON DUVAL, JUNIOR 
ETIENNE DE LUCY 
GABRIEL RIVE 
PIERRE CHENELONG
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JEAN-JACQUES LA BORDE 
VEUVE SERIGHET 
JEAN BENOIST CORBINY 
VEUVE PIERRE DU COURTOIS
FORT ROYAL
DE GIRADIN
*LOUIS DE CACQUERAY DE VALMENIERES [OFFICER OF THE KING] 
^FRANCOIS DE COLLART [COLONEL]
*DUPREY [COLONEL]
*JACQUES DATHYE [LIEUTENANT]
GUILLAUME DESVAUX 
PIERRE MALGUICHE 
HENRYET DESFOURNEAUX 
VEUVE LOUIS CQQUIGNY'
CASE PILQTE
*LE PELLETIER
*MARC VOLCART DES SABLONS [ENSIGN]
VEUVE LE PALU ET GIRAUDEL
JOSEPH DESNIER
MICHEL LE FORT
VEUVE DE LA HAYE
JEAN BOUDET
CHRISTOPHE MICRON
LOUIS DROUIN
* OFFICER IN LOCAL REGIMENT OR IN THE KING’S SERVICE. 
BIRTH PLACE IF NOT CREOLE GIVEN IN ROUND BRACKETS. 
RANK OF OFFICER GIVEN SHEWN IN SQUARE BRACKETS
[SOURCE: Archives D ’Outre-Mer, Carton Gl, Dossier 470 bis)
417
APPENDIX IV : A DESCRIPTION OF THE OPEN TAYCHE METHOD 
 . OF-SUGAR-PRODUCTION-
11 The cane is carried from the field in ox carts, 
then passed through the rollers of the grinding mill which 
is worked by the' wind, nearly every estate depending upon 
its windmill for its power. Passing through the rollers 
the cane is deprived of its juice, and the fibre or ftrash* 
is carried on by an endless band to fall into a cart below, 
from which it is spread out in the fields to dry, and in due 
time finds its way back to the furnaces in the boiling-house. 
Meanwhile, the juice runs through strainers, and is lifted 
by a force-pump to oblong troughs which stand near the 
chimneys of the furnace. In these troughs it is allowed to 
settle, and the scum rises in a few minutes to the surface, 
a gentle heat being applied meanwhile. The syrup is then 
drawn off into a train of copper kettles below, to be con­
verted into sugar. In the first of these kettles it is 
treated to a little milk of lime, which causes the scum to 
rise to the surface in a dense body, when it is removed by ■ 
the negroes with a common strainer or skimmer. From this 
pan it is passed to others, according to its advance towards 
crystalization, nearer, and nearer, to the mouth of the 
furnace, boiling furiously until it reaches at last, after 
a passage of several hours, the 'strike pan’ over the mouth 
of the furnace. As the entire contents of one pan is dis­
charged into the next, at the same time that a fresh supply 
of juice is introduced from those behind it, all are kept 
full, and the scene is very lively when the fires are good 
and the syrup boils briskly. A negro watches each pan, or 
more frequently has two under his care, and is actively at 
work tossing the syrup into the air when the bubbles become 
too large and run over into the next pan, thus showing that 
there is danger of burning the sugar. At other times the 
negroes are busy skimming off, with a light hand, any scum 
that might arise.
The most delicate process in the manufacture of 
sugar, is the test of it when it reaches the last pan and 
becomes thick. In the last few minutes before it is fit to
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be removed from the fire, the crystals form with great 
rapidity, and the sugar-master is constantly trying the 
sugar with his finger and thumb, the ’touch test’. When 
the sugar reaches this state, there is much danger of burning, 
and upon the skill of the sugar-master, in making the 'strike’ 
at the right moment, will depend the quality of the sugar.
From the strike-pan the sugar is run into shallow 
coolers where it remains for about twenty-four hours, and is 
then transferred to cones, such as are used in sugar- 
refineries, to drain off the molasses. Sometimes the ’strike’ 
is passed into a long narrow box with fenders six feet high 
on two sides of it. Two negroes, taking their position at 
either end, toss the syrup into'the air with copper ladles 
working on pivots, until it is so exposed to the air to be
frothy, and crusts the side of the box like the spongy lava
around the crater of a volcano. It is then passed directly 
into the cones and crystallizes in a few hours.
The object of crystallizing in shallow pans is that 
the crystals, floating loosely in a greater space may- form 
freely and of a large grain. Those who crystallize in cones 
say that the same object is obtained by gently stirring the 
cooling syrup once or twice on the first day.. On the second
day the cone is moved into the purging-house, and is not
touched again for three weeks, except once to remove the plug 
at the bottom of the inverted cone that the molasses may 
drain off into the proper receptacles, to be boiled again and 
dried as muscovado sugar. A cloth is laid over the top of 
the oone while the molasses is draining, and soft mud or 
clay spread upon it.
This draining of the contained water through the 
sugar drives the molasses before it to the apex of the cone, 
and after twenty days the loaf of sugar in. the cone is found 
to be hard, white at the base, brown in the middle and yellow 
at the top with molasses at the apex".
(Source: Stark, History and Guide to Barbados and the 
Caribbee Islands, 1893: 154-157).
APPENDIX IV contd...
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APPENDIX V : ESTATES IN BARBADOS OWNED BY THE SAME FAMILY 
 - - - FOR AT-LEAST-100 YEARS-UP TO 1846.
Estate
Adams Castle
Alleyndale Hall
Applewhaites
Ashford
Ashton Hall
Ayshford
Bawdens
Baxters
Boarded Hall
Bromefield
Bulkeley
Byde Mill
Carrington
Colleton
Conger Road
Consetts
Constant
Drax Hall
Golden Ridge
Hannays (Christ Church)
Hanson
Hillaby
Holders
Horefield
Hothersall
Joes River
Lancaster
Lears
Lemon Arbor 
Lower Estate 
Lowthers
Mangrove (St. Peter) 
Mangrove (St. Philip)'
Approximate
Size
200+ acres 
150+
300+
200+
250+
100+
250+
250+
250+
250+
350+
300+
200+
400+
200+
400+
300+
800+
150+
350+
200+
250+
200+
150+
400+
250+
300+
350+
100+
400+
300+
200+
250+
Actual length of 
time owned by 
same family
166 years 
124 
122 
110 
110 
110 
100 
100 
182 
182 
130 
170 
140 
196 
182 
182 
190 
200 
140 
160 
110 
120 
120 
182 
210 
150 
100 
120 
150 
120 
160 
110 
110
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Estate Approximate Actual length of
Size time owned by
same family
Mellowes 250+ acres 110 years
Mount Alleyne 250+ 130
Newcastle 200+ 200
Newton 400+ 190
Ridge 300+ 130
Salter’s 200+ 150
Searles 400+ 120
Society 250+ 200
Springhead 300+ 130
Taitts 200+ 120
Three Houses 200+ 140
Turner Hall 350+ - 180
Waterford 250+ 130
Westmoreland 250+ 100
(Source: Barbados Archives, Data based upon a study of 
Wills and Deeds carried out by Ronnie Hughes).
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MULTIPLE HOLDINGS IN BARBADOS IN 1888: THE FOURTEEN MOST PROMINENT
LANDOWNERS (of 1,000 acres and over)
APPENDIX VI:
The Alleyne family 
Alleyne Dale Hall (St. Peter) 295 
Bawdens and the River (St. Andrew) 521 
Buttals (St. George) 219.
Carmichael's (St. George) 257 
Dunscombe (St. Thomas) 381 
Gregg Farm CSt. Andrew) 223 
Hannay’s [Christ Church) 404 
Harrow [St. Philip) 370 
Lancaster [St. James) 480 
Locust Hall (St. George) 340 
Mount Standfast [St. James) 370 
Mullineux (St. James) 268 
Porters (St. James) 266 
Three Houses (Et. Philip) 440 
Total Acreage = 4,834
E.L. Bellasyse 
Bowmanston (St. John) 248 
Spring Hall (Et. Lucy) 384 
Spring Head (St. Andrew) 311 
Taits (St. James) 312 
Total Acreage - 1,255
The Briggs Family
Briggs, Dayrells and Searles
(Christ Church) 880
The Clarke Family 
Bakers (St. Peter) 301 
Cane Field (St. Joseph) 238 
Cane Garden (St. Philip) 36 
Coverley (Christ Church) 319 
Enterprise (Christ Church) 310 
Foursquare (Christ Church) 42 
Total Acreage - 1,246
Thomas Daniel and Co. Ltd.
Bath (St. John) 426
Blowers (St. James) 433
Bushey Park (St. Philip) 356
Cambridge (St. Joseph) 302
Hope (St. George) 141
Joes River (St. Joseph) 554
Kent (Christ Church) 240
Mangrove Pond (St. Thomas) 234
Marchfield (St. Philip) 150
Springfield (St. Joseph) 39.5
Sunbury and Hampton (St. Philip) 761
Total Acreage - 3,992
N. Foderingham 
Carlton (St. James) 446 
Colleton (St. Peter) 216 
Rock Dundo (St. James) 118
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Bright Hall (St. Lucy) 178 
Collins (St. Lucy) 194 
Hope (St. Lucy) 266 
Maynards (St. Peter) 233 
Six Men (St. Peter) 240 
Welch Town [St. Peter) 427 
Total Acreage - 2,418
Earl of Harewood
Belle (St. Michael) 549
Mount (St. George) 292
Thicket and Fortescue (St. Philip) 725
Total Acreage - 1,566
The Haynes Family 
Airy Cot (St. Thomas) 33 
Bissex Hill (St. Joseph) 226 
Bush Hall (St. Michael) 147 
Clifden [St. Philip) 200 
Clifton Hall (St. John)
Easy Hall (St. Joseph) 19.5 
Guinea (St. John) 384 
Newcastle (St. John). 655 
New Zealand (St. George) 39 
Total Acreage - 2,29.7
The Hinkson Family 
Loam Field (Christ Church) 57 
Pegwell (Christ Church) 182 
Rugby (St. Thomas) 162 
Small Hope (St. John) 29
Sion Hill (St. James) 239 
Total Acreage =» 1,019
Capt. Nathaniel Forte 
Bennetts (St. Thomas) 279 
Clifton [St. Thomas) 241 
Frizers (St. Joseph) 404 
*Lears (St. Michael) 621 
*Lower Estate (St. Michael) 474 
Malvern (St. John) 315 
Yaughans (St, Joseph) 132 
Total Acreage » 2,466
The Parris Family 
Ayshford (St. Thomas) 165 
Dukes (St. Thomas) 181 
Fortress (St. Thomas) 87 
Highland (St. Thomas) 158 
Hilbury (St. George) 31 
Lion Castle (St. Thomas) 230 
Sturges (St. Thomas) 150 
Walker’s (St. Andrew) 708 
Total Acreage = 1,710
The Pile Family 
Brighton (St. George) 341 
*Farm (St. Peter) 177 
Greens (St. George) 109 
Hayman’s (St. Peter) 288 
*Hilloby (St. Thomas) 297 
*Stepney (St. George) 365
Spencer’s (Christ Church) 473 
Ventnor (Christ Church) 146 
Wildey (St. Michael) 178 
Total Acreage - 1,227
T.U. O'Neale
Friendship (St. Lucy) 335 
Mount Prospect (St. Peter) 206 
Rugby (St. Philip) 418 
Valentia (Christ Church) 353 
Wilcox (Christ Church) 212 
Total Acreage - 1,524
Warleigh (St. Peter) 146 
Total Acreage - 1,723
The Yearwood Family 
Edgehill (St. Thomas) 230 
Hanson (St. George) 274 
Holder’s (St. James) 203 
Olive Branch (St. Thomas) 110 
Orange Hill (St. Peter) 355 
Prospect (St. James) 150 
Total Acreage = 1,322
Grand Total - 28,599 acres 
(*estates rented)
(Source: The Barbados Almanac and Diary for the Year 1888)
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APPENDIX VIII : SALES OF SUGAR ESTATES IN BARBADOS BETWEEN
- • - 1875 AND 1896, - INDICATING- THE ANNUAL
AVERAGE PRICE !PER ACRE FETCHED 0
Year Estates; Acreage Total Sales Per Acre
1875 7 1,892 £93,239 £ 49. 5. 7
1876 5 1,283 89,500 69. 15. 2
1877 7 811 52,050 64. 3. 7
1878 2 808’ 38,150 47. 4. 4
1879 2 808 38,150 47. 4. 4
1880 19 3,076 209,713 68. 3. 7
1881 12 1,613 74,028 45. 17. 9
1882 3 308 16,766 54. 8. 8
1885 3 519 27,685 53. 6. 10
1884 7 1,261 81,785 64. 17. 2
1885 7 1,261 81,785 64. 17. 2
1886 9 1,164 73,210 62. 17. 11
1887 3 413 10,785 26. 2. 3
1888 12 1,329 52,396 39. 8. 6
1889 36 5,629 235,808 41. 17. 10
1890 32 4,270 188,024 44. 0. 8
1891 7 1,442 37,991 16. 6. 11
1892 11 1,563 40,454 25. 17. 8
1893 23 4,899 169,825 34. 13. 4
1894 17 2,425 84,507 34. 16. 7
1895 5 522 14,577 27. 18. 6
1896 16 2,291 62,946 27. 9. 6
(Source: Barbados Archives, The Personal Journal of 
William Dash).
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APPENDIX IX : MAJOR PIERROTINE AND METROPOLITAN
 --- -■ COMMISSIONNAIRES IN * SAINT-PIERRE ■
IN-THE MID-NINETEENTH CENTURY -
Beyssac et Maxwell (St. Pierre)
Beyssac et Gautier (Bordeaux)
Bourrouet et Mahon (St. Pierre)
Cochet - Becue et Compagnie (St. Pierre) 
Benjamin Gradis (Bordeaux)
Germa et Compagnie (St.- Pierre)
P. Herve et Compagnie (St. Pierre) 
Levesque-Durostu et Compagnie (Paris)
Lanascol et de Ravel (France)
Levasseur Freres (Le Havre)
Masurier et Bonfils (Le Havre)
Morin fils (St. Pierre)
Mulanyer et Compagnie (St. Pierre)
Peu-Duvallon et Compagnie (St. Pierre)
Reynaud et Sarlin (St. Pierre)
Th. Reynal et Compagnie (St. Pierre)
3/1/1853).
Martinique
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APPENDIX X: SUGAR PROPRIETORS OF MARTINIQUE IN 1820
I Arrondisement of Fort Royal
Fort Royal: Total sucreries = 19;
Proprietors:
MM. Barthouil 
Veuve Bedoux
Berry et Gigon de Pommerau 
Basset (Nicolas)
Desfourneaux 
Gamier et Richard 
Jorna (Henri)
Jorna (Louis)
Kirwan et Lucy
Case Pilote: Total sucreries = 14;
Proprietors:
MM. Le Pelletier Saint-Remy 
Veuve Doeuse Beaufond 
Veuve Duquesne Melkior 
Veuve Pelletier du Clary 
Clauzel Benoist 
Cronier Belaistre 
Lajus Mont Serein
Lamentin: Total sucreries =43;
Proprietors:
MM. Jacquin et societe 
Veuve Jorna (Charles)
Saulager de Saint-Maurice
Slave work force = 1,000.
MM. Lacoste [aine)
Lacoste le Febure 
Le Pelletier du Clary 
Veuve Maug^f Raimond
Passerat de la Chapelle 
Yeuve Raynal Sainte-Croix 
Sinson Seneville 
Tiberge (freres)
Valmenieres Caquery 
Cools (Louis Bernard)
Slave work force = 728.
MM. Comette de Saint-Cyr 
La Faye Saint-Hilaire 
Le Chevalier de Perein 
Sinson
De Percin (Claude Bernard) 
Yeuve Crosnier la Sichere
Slave work force = 3,538.
MM. Gaigneron Marol de Sainte-Rose 
Veuve Gaigneron Morin
Gaigneron Joliment
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Seguin (Louis)
Veuve Soudon
Leroi de Premorant 
Jorna de la Calle 
Veuve Quesurin Montrosier 
Poquet
Platelet de la Grange 
Papin
La Thuillerie
Hodebourg Dace*
Millon Saint-Claire
MM. Gallet Saint-Auriii
Hodebourg Desbrosses (fils)
/»Desme Sarnte-Marie 
Baillardel Magloire 
Berthelot Chadirac 
Baillardel la Reinty 
Veuve Bourke
Riviere Salea: Total sucreries = 20;
Proprietors:
MM. Huyghues Hugues 
Veuve Huyghues des Etages 
De Maupou (le Comte)
Montigny Louis-Marie 1*Homme 
Percin Cornette 
Veuve Duquesne 
Prevoteau 
Pinel de la Palun 
Prevoteau de Sainte-Marie 
Rabaine Cherimont
Le Merle d’Arnaud 
Le Vassor Beauregard 
Rampan Sennecour 
Laguarrigues 
Veuve Fernagu
Eyma (James)
Veuve Dennery (Comtesse)
D'Umont Monnet 
Darblade de S^ailles 
Claye (freres)
Yeuve Croize*
MM. Bence, Arthur et societe*
Bence (pere)
Veuve Barthouil
La Salle Seguin
Le Vassor Beaure*gard (heritiers) 
Le Jeune (Louis)
Le Jeune Saulger 
La Janverie, Claye et societe
Slave work force = 809
MM. Doublet 
Veuye Nougier
Duprey (heritiers)
Begue Francois Camus 
Laugier Mont-Desir 
Desportes, Benoist et compagnie 
Gourselas Montauvert 
Hodebourg Dace 
Jorna (Chevalier)
Pinel de la Palun
Trois-Ilets: Total sucreries = 9 ;
Proprietors:
MM. D ’Audifredy (Charles)
Veuve Marlet
Veuve Leyritz (Louis)
Veuve Vatahle
Anse D'Arlets: Total sucreries = 3;
Proprietors:
MM. Deligne (Jean-Baptiste)
Hayo t-Beauf ond-Cordier 
Veuve Percin-Lavigne et societe
Saint-Esprit: Total sucreries ■** 9_;
Proprietors:
MM. Soudon de Riyecourt 
Capoulant (Gabriel)
Maillet (Louise).
Veuve Tartenson
Trou-Au-Chat: Total sucreries = 13;
Proprietors:
MM. Rampon de Surville 
Dugue et societe 
Dame Caill de Bonnerre et Pupier 
De Geofroy Cesar 
Gallet Symphorian 
Fabrique
Hodehourg Faldaty
Slave work force = 737
MM. Huygues Blaufond (Louis) 
Veuve La Pagerie 
Veuve Poquet de Jeanville 
Lalung Montrop
Slave work force = 164
Slave work force = 49.3
MM. Huygues Lacour (her i tier) 
Durant (Jean-Baptiste) 
Yeuve Denoyers Bourneuf
Le Breton (Charles).
Slaye work force =680
MM. Morin 
Veuve Lafaye
Champigny (heritiers) 
Yeuve Rivai.1
De Turpin (Louis)
Veuve Yergeron
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II Arrondissement of Marin
Le Marin: Total sucreries = 8; Slave work force = 480
Proprietors:
MM. Pinel Ferol 
Veuve Duval Sainte-Claire 
Gonnier Mont-Desir 
Hubert du Gainville
MM. Jean Huygues 
Maison-Leuve 
Varcin (Jean-Baptiste) 
Duprey (Charles)
Sainte-Anne: Total sucreries - 18;
Proprietors:
MM. Madey des Couhlancs 
Veuve Trabaud
Preaux, mineurs et societe
Villarson (le Chevalier) 
Monnoel Bardoulet 
Marraud des Grottes 
La Pierre Rochabonne 
Hodebourg Nicolas;
Gonnier Mont-Desir
Slave work force - 2,241
MM« Dubuc de Bellefond 
yeuye Dillon
Du Casse, Darbelade et societe 
Blondel-la-Rougerie (fils'!
Du Caase (heritiers)!
Yeuye Blondel Phillepeau Caritan 
Blondel Marius 
Yeuye Blondel-1a-Rou ger ie 
Beauregard
Vauclin: Total sucreries ■= -17; Slave work, force ~ 1,9.50
proprietors;
MM, Le Cheyalier de la Broun 
Tascher de la Pagerie 
Meynard et societe 
De Puif erat (le Marquisl 
Haudry da Soucy 
Doens Lambert et societe 
Perpigna de Sigy
MM. Tho^e (freresl
De Grenonville (Le Comtal 
Du Cassou 
Perpigna (freres) 
Dasnoyers
Fonrosa Chausaulme 
Bataille Pomiro
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Preaux (heritiers)
Veuve de Malvault (Comtesse)
Riviere Pilote: Total sucreries = 13;
Proprietors:
MM. Bruere (Aubin)
Veuve Prefontaine (Charles)
Jaussaud
De Mouny (heritier)
Arthur Duplessis Armand 
Litte (freres)
Veuve Dupieu
Slave work force = 937
MM. Rouxel de Lecouet 
Veuve Cornette de Venancourt 
Froidefond des Farges 
Grand Dutreuil 
Fouquainville
Desmartinieres (Charles Philippe) 
Germon et Delhorme
Sainte-Luce: Total sucreries = 6; Slave work force = 355
Proprietors:
MM. Colon Gervais MM. Volcart Saint-Omer Thyery
Veuve Dillon (et heritiers.) Yeuye Tourneau
Veyssiere Beaulieu (Jean-FrancoisX5
Diamant: Total sucreries = 8 ;  Slave work force =673
Proprietors
MM. De Monnoel MM. De la Tournelle QLe Comte)
Caverot Roy Mahault
D'Audifredy (Pierre-Francois) O'Mulan (John)
Le Camus et societe Desrnamon
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III Arrondissement of Trinite
La Trinite; Total sucreries = 24; Slave work 
Proprietors;
MM. De Neufville (pere) MM.
Richer (Michel) Veuve
Hostein (Jean)
Veuve Barret
La Grace Cfteres et soeurs)
X*
Veuve
yeuveLitte Anselin 
Veuve Eelleyue Blanchtierre 
Bassignac, Le Sinson 
Montet (Joseph).
Gaubert Bouillon ("Jean Baptiste)
Barbot (Jean) yeuve
Morin (Mathieu)
Veuve Coppens
Sauvignon (Jean)
Poquet (Louis-Claude)
Gallet (Augustin et Symphorien) 
la Bussiere, Taillandier 
Richard (heritiers) 
la Reinty Saint-Prix 
Dubuq (heritiers)
Dubuq du Ferret 
Lalanne
Bonneville Bonneterre 
Darnaudat
force = 1,770
Le Francois; Total sucreries = 26; 
Proprietors;
MM. Hiiygues Dasriyery 
Verger
Aubin Belleyue
Dabadie et Bonnaire (Marie).
Desyouyes
Desvergera de Chaiphry 
Desyergera d'Auroise 
FournjQia et Fontanes de ll Lie 
Anb.ert (Thonjas-X 
De Grenonyille (le ConitaX 
Hbdafiourg des Brosses
Slaya work force » 1,844
MM. Bellegarda et Bouille" 
Bonnaire de Grenonyille 
JDelayigna Marie-rSainte 
Da Laguarigues (Jacques!
Le jeuna Lamothe (heritier) 
Raj ancourt 
Vigne Laurent 
Macarty (James)
La Vigne (heritiers)
Briere de lTrle 
De Grenonyille Cle Comte)
Aubin Blanpre* Arbousset (Guillaume)
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Aubin (freres et soeurs)
Slave work, force » 1,480Robert: Total sucreries = 20; 
Proprietors:
MM. Charlon (heritiers)
Simonet (Charles)
Huygues Despointes.
Gaigneron (heritiers!
Pontalary, Payiot et societe 
*Gaschet de l’ile 
Veuye Desgatieres, Potheau 
Percin Cornette 
Reynoird (Josephrpierre)_
"Marlet Rose
MM. Boutaud
Monnereau (heritiers)
De Calalogne
Potheau Desgatieres (Alexandre) 
La Guigneraye (Louis)
De Luppe (Michel)
Manceau la Thifordiere 
Hay et Coterel 
potheau La Grange 
Manceau
Gros-Mprna: Total sucreries - 8; Slaye work, force = 513
Proprietors:
MM. Catala
De Saint
Dumas (E-tienne-Royl 
Perpigna Soter (heritiers!
Dangle Berme (fils!
Gigon (Alexisl 
Joaneot Couryille 
Thehault
Saint e-Marie: Total sucreries — 16.; Slaye i^ orR. farce-=-1,868
Proprietors: 
MM. Birot
Romanet
MM. Damian et societe
Lagusyigues' Suryilliars'
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The Colony (Habitation Saint-Jacques) 
Mery de Neufville (Pierre)
La Salle, Seguin et societe 
Veuve Recules et societe 
Veuve le Vassor (mkre)
Martineau et societe
Veuve Litte (Michel)
Veuve Le Vassor (Ferdinand) 
Veuve de Salles et fils
Dangle Berme et societe
Veuve ChJnaux (heritiers) 
Costet
Marigot: Total sucreries = 6; Slave work, force •= 678
Proprietors:
MM. Eyma et societe
Picart et Crassous 
Lahoussaye du yigny
MM. Lagrange et societe
Jaham de Haumont et societe
Le Yassor et societe
Grande-Ansa: Total sucreries -» 17; Slaye work force = 1,2H7
Proprietors;
MM. Lesueur fils et societa 
Yeuve Lesade
Herve et societe 
Segufneau Lognac 
Ferrant (Antoine).
Haurre (Charles).
De Gentille 
Desabaye 
Yeuve Duval Dugue
MM* Assier Montrose.
Assier (freres et neyeuX.
Duyal yalnLont
yeuye Clauzel et societe
Eehault (Antoine DesirX
Lointain Sainte-Marthe 
/  /Marault et societe 
Yeuye Clauzel CcadetX
XV Arrondissement of Saint-Pierre
(Mouillaga)
Saint-Pierre: Total sucreries
Proprietors:
MM. Blondel la Rougery 
Valery Garrou
= 4; Slaye work force = 39.1
MM. Lafaye des Guerres 
Veuve Leblanc Monplaisir
(Le Fort)
Saint-Pierre: Total sucreries - 12; Slave work force •= 1,785
Proprietors:
MM. Croquet Legrand 
Veuve Demassias 
Veuve Dariste
MM. Le Jeune Larochtierre
The Colony (Habitation Trouvaillant)
Veuve Pecoul
MM. Le Jeune Clermont
Le Jeune Larochetierre 
Croquet Beligny 
MM. De Perinelle 
Raousset 
Sorin CCharles)
Carbet: Total sucreries — 13; Slaye work force * 869
Proprietors:
MM. Aubin Bellevue 
Anselin
Clarck (Le Cheyalier)
Cornette de Venancourt 
Beuze (Charles-Edmond)
Douens Desmornay 
De Lajus
MM. Deyille (Marie Joseph) 
Du Casse (Nicolas) 
Molandrin 
Potheau (Alexis1 
Poulain. (Joseph! 
perein (fils!
Prescheur: Total sucreries — 6; Slaye VQ£k. force — 5,Q57 • 
Proprietors:
MM. La Baltut d’Encaussea 
Bourck de Boiyille Macarty (James!
Despinose la Caillerie Ranee (Charles!
MM. Rellaistre (Crpniar Francois!
Macouba: Total sucreries =10; Slaye work force = 1,266
Proprietors;
MM. Briere (Jacques).
Briere (Jacques, heritiers! 
Chamberlent
Desgrottes (Sainte-Marie)
MM. Fortier
Preyille (Alexia) 
P erp igna (Henry) 
Desgrottes (Paul)
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Desgrottes (Saint-Girille)
Basse-Pointe: Total sucreries =
Proprietors:
MM. Assier Pompignan 
Veuve Siron 
Veuve Pecoul
Chalvet (Etienne)
Eyma
Pont (Roger)
9; Slave work force = 1,703
MM. Fortier 
Leyritz 
Gradis
Latouche, Treville et FitzJames
(Source: Renouard, Statistique de la Martinique, 1822: Ch.. VIII)
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APPENDIX XI: HABITATIONS SUCRERIES IN MARTINIQUE IN 1882
SUCRERIES 
Saint-Pierre (whites)
Fond Canonyille 
Riviere Blanche 
Habitation des Peres 
(no information)
Ancienne Habitation Bardury 
(no information)
Plaisance*
La Montagne*
Petit-Reduit*
Grand-Reduit
Tet
Belisiers 
Chateau-Gaillard 
L1Etoile
Ancienne Habitation Sahlon 
(no information)
Trouvaillant*
Ancienne Habitation de Guerre
Morne d*Orange
Morne des Cadets*
Habitation Mary
(no information)
L*Usine Centrale de la 
Riviere Blanche
(mulattos)
Champflore
PROPRIETORS
Rufz de Layison 
Isnard
de Rerinelle 
Charles Rousseau 
Isnard
Papin Dupont
Eugene des Grottes
Heritiers Pecoul
Laguarigue de Suryilliers
Yictor des Grottes
Arthur Assier de Pompignan
Henri Assier de Pompignan
Saillant
Littee freye-S
de la Ruffinijhye
Thehault
des Grpttas et de Meillac 
Praden
des Fontaines 
de Gentile freres 
(no information), 
de la Rochatiere
MM. E. Eustache at Guerin 
Chaperon
SUGAR PRODUCTION IN
HOGSHEADS OF 500
KILOGRAMS
(no information on 
individual habitations 
see total)
Total 4,545
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SUCRERIES
Macouba (whites)
Grand1Riyiere
Ancienne Habitation 
Chambrelent
Potiche*
Ancienne Habitation Perpigna 
Macouba*
Desgrottes
Bellevue
Dupotiche
Habitation Prey file*
Bijou*
Basse-Pointe (whites!
Hackaert
Gradis
Basse-Pointe
Leyritz
Moulin I'Etang 
Pecoul*
Chalvet
La Capot Fortier 
Aj oupa-Bouillon
PROPRIETORS
Chazot
Reynaud
Demarre
Beauxis
Cheneaux
Lsaie des Grottes
Heritiers Sainte-Marie 
des Grottes
Heritiers Duyal Dughe
Chanel
Heritiers Mayraud de 
Sigalony
yignal at JBayssac
Benjamin Gradis
Arthur Assier da Pojqpignan
Compte d'Epinay Saint-Lue 
Comte de Chasteignier
Comte de Fitz Jamas
Heritiers Pecoul
Comte de Monty 
Comte de Naneth.
Heritiers Fortiers et des 
Grottes
Gloss
SUGAR. PRODUCTION IN
HOGSHEADS OF 500
KILOGRAMS
(ho information on 
individual habitations 
see total)
Total 3a000
Total 6,000
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La Capot
La Seran
Beaubr. Valmont
Ancienne Habitation Desabaye
Hardy*
La Montagne*
Lalung 
Assier 
Fond Brule*
Presbourg 
Seguineau 
Duval Dughe 
Castla-Brands*
L'Etoile*
Lorrain 
de Hautmont 
de Lagrange 
Crassous 
Bellevue 
Charpentier
(mulattos!
Cardin 
Macedoine *
La Dominant e
SUCRERIES
Lorrain (whites)
de Meillac 
de Meillac 
Dormoy 
Dormoy 
Audroin
Heritiers Hayre 
Dormoy
Arthur Assier de pompignan 
Heritiers. de yirginy 
Cbeneaux
Heritiers? de Begniiieau
Bourdon
Cbeneaux
Heritiers Joyau
Lantibois
Assier de Pompignan 
Assier de Pompignan 
Heritiers Crassous 
Heritiers Assier de Pompignan 
Heritiers de Fer beaux
(no information).
Ramphile
Endorcat
PROPRIETORS
SUGAR PRODUCTION IN
HOGSHEADS OF 500
KILOGRAMS
(no information on 
individual Habitations 
see total)’
Total 5,91)0
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Anse Ceron 
Grand’Case 
Girard*
Mont-Louis
Boisville
Sainte-Marie (whitesX 
Saint-Jacques
Pain-de-Sucre
Thebault*
Recules*
Belle Yue
Limhe
Fourniols*
Combat 
L ’Union
(no information)
Nouvelle Cite
Cafeyere
Concorde
Morne des Esses
Ramville
Viremont
Bellevue
Fonds Brule
Reaucar
(no information)
SUCRERIES
Precheur (whites)
SUGAR PRODUCTION IN
HOGSHEADS OF 500PROPRIETORS KILOGRAMS
Albert 200
Dujon 250
Eugene Eustache 150
Preville 100
Saillant 250
Total 950
Habitation Domaniale leased
put for 25 years to M.
Preyoteau Duclary 8Q0
Crassous et Cheneaux 350
Thebault 250
Ruf z de Layi,son 200
Laguarigue de Suryilliers 200
Horde 250
Gustave Littee 250
Jules Littee 200
de Lothony 500
de Lassalla 300
Lalaurette 400
Lalaurette 150
Aubery 400
Poullet 150
Tanon 70
de Thore 250
Bonneville et Borde 150
Hardy 80
Pra 350
de la Housaye 125
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SUCRERIES 
(mulattos) 
Fonds Verville* 
Anse-Azeraut*
Daudin
Trinite (whiteal 
Petite Riviere Salee 
La Crique 
Saint-Joseph 
La Resaource 
Bassignac 
Bagatelle 
Tete de Galion 
La Richard 
La Camille 
Duferrat 
Desmarinieres+
Spoutourne 
Tartane*
Blin
Ferret
Grand-Fond
Grand-Galion
Fond-Galion *
Malgre-Tout
La Tracee+
La Gegand
(mulattos)
Duferrat
Eustache
Thaly
Agricole
PROPRIETORS
Chanel
Depaz
Depaz
Mathieu
De There
Copenq
Bougenqt
Eugene Eustache
Augustin Fortier
Bailly (11
Eugene Eustache
Eugene Eustache
Bonneyille
de Neuville
Blpt
Eugene Eustache 
Eugene Eustache 
Eugene Eustache 
Eugkne Eustache 
Chevy Lamartiniere 
Poullet MessouhaitS'
Aristide Barret (£1
100
80
150
Total 5,755
400
200
400
700
300
250
80
150
350
375
400
500
250
250
150
1
1
)1,400
1
1
150
300
SUGAR PRODUCTION IN
HOGSHEADS OF 500
KILOGRAMS
80
442
SUCRERIES
Beausej our 
Grosse-Ravine* . 
Galion
Robert (whites).
Petit Galion 
Pothuau 
La Digue 
La Collignon 
La Manseau 
La Gaschat 
La Pointe-Mijiche 
La Reunion 
La Pointa-Sayane 
Fond-Nicolas 
La Raynouard 
De Pontalery 
La Mansarde 
La Desrozeaux 
La Haut 
Moulin-a-eau 
Beausej our 
Mont-Louis 
Sainte-Croix 
La Providence
(mulattos)
La Pointe-Laronsse 
La Pointe-Royale
PROPRIETORS 
Nicolas Beaupre 
Adrien Julienne 
Mpnrose Sarote
400
2.00
350
Total 7,760
SUGAR PRODUCTION IN
HOGSHEADS OF 500
KILOGRAMS
Eugene Eustache 250
Eug'ene Eustache 250
Copens 300
Eugene Eustache 250
Paulet 350
Giggn 400
Gigon 200
Usine du Robert 200
Martineau 150
Heritiers Simcnnet 5Q0
Duplessis 250
Dieudonne et des Mousseaux 250
Heritiers Simonnet 500
Gigon 250
Yilain • 250
De Thore 400
Eugene Eustache 200
Lieutenant de Reyna1 )
)
Lieutenant de Reynal ) 400
Simonnet 200
Belus Lucien
Belus. Lucien 300
SUCRERIES PROPRIETORS
Monnerot (ou Laboutaud) 
Morne-dfOrange
Silvestre
Telimard
Francois (whites)
Grand-Fond)
)
Trianon )
)
Bonair )
)
Gamelie )
Bellegarde
Vapeur
Bellevue
Deroses (ou d'Heause) 
Marcey
(no information)
Esperance
Petite-France
Palmistes
Fontane
La Digue*
Lapointe 
Mansarde 
Grand’Case 
La Victoire 
Saint-Roch 
Adolphe
(paulattosX
Casse-Cou*
La Chambry
Heritiers de Grenonville 
Pereyre
Heritiers Desbrosses 
Veuve E Martineau 
Eugene Eustache 
Eugene Eustache 
Yeuye Mhillet 
Beauxis 
Walle Clerc 
Briere. de l'Isle.
Veuye BeryiLlot 
Fabre?
Comte d’Andlau
Gigon
Gigon
Desyouyesaine 
Lantibois 
Eugene Eustache
Doatsly 
Veuye Bidaud
35
50
Total 6,135
SUGAR PRODUCTION IN
HOGSHEADS OF 500
KILOGRAMS
800
350
200
300
225
300
300
300
250
250
250
450
100
300
150
200
75
75
150
80
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SUGAR PRODUCTION IN
HOGSHEADS OF 500SUCRERIES PROPRIETORS KILOGRAMS
Petite-Gamelle A Constantin 100
La Dumaine* Th. Lubin 150
Malar me Th. Lubin 150
Monnerot Th. Lubin 100
Descriviers (no information) 60
(no information!: Periolat 100
Beauregard Monville 55
Total 5,820
Carbet (whites)
LfAnse~Latouche Augustin Fortier 550
Bellevue Grassous 250
Beauregard* Mme. Le Lorrain 700
Dariste Dariste 350
Laj us* Heritiers Crassous 450
Relevant* Heritiers Mahon 250
(no information). Le Maistre 50
Fond-Capot* Pradeu 125
(no information). Heritiers Hubert 100
Man ib a Salleron 50
(mulattos)
Fond-Moulin* yeuye Telephe 125
(no information) Altenor Payot 5
Total 3,005
Case-Pilote (whites)
Bellevue Mangee 40
Fond-Layette* Du Quesne 300
Le Cap Cornette de Saint-Cyr 90
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Morne-Vente
Maniba
Fond-Bourlet*
La Demarche 
Fond-Plumet
(mulattos)
(no information) 
Morne-Case 
Fond-Boucher+ 
Moulin-a-eau 
Marie Jean 
Mo rne-Cho is eu 1 
Fond-Bellemare 
Fond-Lahaye+
Hauteurs du Fond-Lehaye 
L'Enclos
Vauclin (whites)
Grand'Case
Sans Souci*
Petite-Grenade
Habitation Vauclin
Pomiro
Massy-Massy
(mulattos)
Bellevue
(no information)
Union
Guerin
Doens
Pothuau
G Mayne de Sainte-Luce 
Lapeyre
Fonciere
A de Belaistre
A Severe
Lapeyre
Paul Leger
Labadie
B de Belaistre
J Severe
Doryal
Desarmes
150
85
200
350
50
20
15
175
80
5
25
35
150
20
15
Total 1,805
SUGAR PRODUCTION IN
HOGSHEADS OF 500
KILOGRAMS
Heritiers de Grenonville 100
Charles Cleize 100
Eugene Eustache 50
Briere de l'lsle 250
Alain 150
Odry de Souci 100
A Folard 50
A Leiris 30
Eucher 75
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SUGAR PRODUCTION IN
HOGSHEADS OF 500
SUCRERIES PROPRIETORS KILOGRAMS
Sigy Nicolas Beaupre 250
La Brou Desormeaux 100
Paquemar Bourrouet 150
Petit-Macabou Desormeaux 80
Grand-Macabou Desormeaux 60
Puyferrat Duquesnay 150
Gr ande-Savane Desormeaux 50
Coulee-d* Or* Desormeaux 100
Mome-Raquette Desormeaux 60
Total 1,905
Riviere-Pilote (whites)
Regall Desmartinieres 20
Baudelle S Cazall 80
Ravine Melon Esch 100
Concorde* Gonnier 175
Rohlot Rohlot Coulanges 40
Anse-Figuier* Ducanet 45
Saint-Pons Lafosse 175
Fougainville Borde et fils 200
Societe Mme. Le Lorrain 100
Palmistes D 1Anglehermes 100
(mulattos)
(no information) Rene Corail 50
Mauny* Ninet et Saint^Leger Lalung 150
Bellefontaine Pomponne 75
Diamant Iman et Pomponne 160
Lescouet Gros Desormeaux 70
Total 1,540
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SUGAR PRODUCTION IN
HOGSHEADS OF 500
L? Union
Bochet
Desme
P o inte-Riviere 
Lahaut
Mou1in-a-eau 
Durocher*
Soudon
Rivi'ere-Lezard
Grand-Champ
Plaisance )
)Saint-Maurice )
Bois Carre*
Choisy
Rives
Maugee
Jonction
Riviere Blanche
Belle Etoile
La Jambette
La Rosiere
Seailles*
(no information). 
Acajou*
Grand'Case 
Petit-Morne 
Place d'Armes 
Moncepa
SUCRERIES
Lamentin (whites)
Heritiers H Assier de Pompignan 
Heritiers H Assier de Pompignan 
Crassous
Mae. G de Sainte-Luce 
Villain 
de Thore 
de Marolles 
E Duchamp 
Cassius de Linval 
Demere
Usine de Soudon 
Heritiers Rostolsn 
Reyna1 et Cheneaux 
de Chancel 
Gigon 
Monigard 
L de Feissal 
Cheyy de Lamartiniere 
Auher 
Collin 
Dorn 
Yiyes 
Quennesson
Heritiers de Marolles 
de Polignac 
Quennesson 
de yenancourt
PROPRIETORS KILOGRAMS
700
650
350
200
350
350
400
600
380
600
500
210
200
70
200
375
250
300
100
100
250
100
700
500
500
400
250
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SUCRERIES PROPRIETORS
SUGAR PRODUCTION IN
HOGSHEADS OF 500
KILOGRAMS
Riviere Galion Quennesson 200
Marly Quennesson ou de Lareinty 300
(no information) de Lareinty 200
Carrere de Lareinty 300
Trou Maringouins de Gaigneron 600
Mo rne-pavi11on Bougenot 300
Petit Manoire Quennesson 30
Bois-Rouge de Lareinty 300
Esperance de Lareinty 200
Poterie de Lareinty 200
Sans nom de Lareinty 200
Fenelon L Desahaye 300
Pays noye Quennesson 250
Fond d1Orange Quennesson 250
La Ressource de Lareinty 400
(no information). Belley 3,00
(mulattos!
Desirade Desroses 330
Roches-Carres* Desroses 20Q
(no information! Philintra Saint-Yyes 50
Choco Ernest Andre 200
Longpre* Heritiers Barraud 100
La Reunion Merce 200
LTAll£e+ Clement 150
Prosperite Ninet 150
Balleu J Binet 200
Charmelle Thaly 80
Total 15575
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SUCRERIES 
Trois Islets (whites)
t
Chateau-Gaillard )
)Poterie* )
Sarcelle 
Vatable*
Des Grottes 
Esperance*
Anse Mitan 
Ans e-a-1’ane *
La Pagerie
(mulattos)
La Pointe
(no information)
Gabriel Hayot
Quennesson
Quennesson (tenant)
Quennesson
Quennesson
Braud
Quennesson
Quennesson
Mezin
Mezin
PROPRIETORS
Sainte-Luce (whites) 
Desert
Ans e-Mah ouya 
Ceron
Trois-Rivieres*
(no information)
Montravail
(mulattos)
Deville 
Pavilion 
Petit-Fond*
(no information) 
Ladour*
Huygues des Etages 
Usine des Trois-Rivi^res 
Guillaud
Huygues des Etages 
Volcart
Raboutet-Milius
Humhert 
yeuve Perrier 
Lefort 
Jules 
Jules
SUGAR PRODUCTION IN
HOGSHEADS OF 500
KILOGRAMS
400
250
200
225
250
60
225
50
30
20
Total -1,710
50
80
450
250
150
150
100
30
25
30
15
Total 1,330
450
SUCRERIES 
Sainte-Anne (whites) 
Maison Rouge 
Petit Versailles 
Union 
Beliefond 
Val dT0r 
Fond-Moustique 
Malgre 
Creve Coeur 
Les Salines 
Les Anglais 
Caritan*
(mulattos)
Les Anglais (Anglais des 
(Grottes)
Hodebourg
Saint-Esprit (whites)
La Guedon 
Du Chastel 
Bellevue 
(no information)
(no information)
De Rivery 
La D'Orzol 
La Masson 
Quentin )
i(no information) j 
(no information)
Heritiers de Reyna1 
de Lavison 
W Huygues 
Usine du Marin 
Richomme Lacour 
E Suin 
M Birot
Duperrier des Fortes 
Assier de Pompignan 
M Birot 
Iman et Vignal
PROPRIETORS
75
70
50
70
75
70
40
200
80
80
80
SUGAR PRODUCTION IN
HOGSHEADS OF 500
KILOGRAMS
des Grottes Duprey et Desportes
80
Aleide Educ 80
Total 1,050
Dubois loo
Du Chastel 200
Bellevue le Breton 200
D'Abadie de Lurbes 200
Eugene Eustache 50
Jacquemot 200
Cazale 80
Sebastien Laud 200
Charles de l'Epine 35
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SUCRERIES
(mulattos)
(no information)
Montenor
Le Phorien
Peter Maillet
Roussanie
Valet
Compere
Fond-Capoul
Fort-de-France (whites)
Case-Navire
Touchinbert
Cocotiers
Ancinel
FondHDore
(no information)
Moulin—a-Vent 
N de Pevein (?)
Beausej our 
La Trompeuse 
Valemenieres 
Dillon
Desfourneaux 
La Reynal
(mulattos)
Sainte-Catherine
Kerwan
(no information)
PROPRIETORS
E Capoul 
Heritiers Rodin 
Heritiers Rodin 
Beaupre
Depuis de Majoubert 
Leandre Claveau 
Firmin 
P Helene
60
60
60
300
30
60
30
150
Total 2,015
SUGAR PRODUCTION IN
HOGSHEADS OF 500
KILOGRAMS
Yeuye Duyeau . 300
Compagnie Generate
Transatlantique 150
Ancinel 80
Yeuye Tiherge 150
Beuzeli.n 150
Pinchery et Pinard 250
A Duchamp 200
Calbiac 80
(no information) 100
L Duchamp 170
L Duchamp 500
Bailly et Gie 200
Bally 60
Heritiers Roy 200
Duquesnay 150
Slv^re 125
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SUGAR PRODUCTION IN
HOGSHEADS OF 500
(no information) Jules Fanfan 150
Totals 3,015
Anses D'Arlets (whites)
Anses D’Arlets Quennesson 200
Grand'Anse Quennesson 100
(mulattos)
Palmistes Veuve Saint-Yves 180
Chalet Montant Alexandre 100
Total 580
Marin (whites)
Grand-Fond et Balata Pelet de Lautrec 350
Malgretout T Dupre 75
Baie-du-Marin Duperrier dasr Portes 220
La Source (Sonnier Mondesir 40
Morne-Flambeau Deluc 40
Agnes Fleury 25
Petit-Macabou Molinard 150
Diomath* yeuve Feuillet 25
Dispagne Dispagne 25
Smallholders supplying cane t'o the Usine du Marin 70
(mulattos)
Riviere Vaudreuil 70
Smallholders supplying cane to the Usine du Marin 80
SUCRERIES PROPRIETORS KILOGRAMS
Total 1,150
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SUCRERIES 
Diamant (whites) 
Saint-Charles 
Plage du Bramant 
Grand-Fond
(mulattos)
Le Camus
Bonneterre
Marigot
Riviere-Salee (whites) 
Doublet
L 1 Homme de Mereil
Torail
Maupeon
Figuier Desportes*
Dupuy
Val d'Or
Begue
Trenelle Lapalun 
Les Digues 
Reprise 
Leterrier 
Suffren
(mulattos)
Le Simon
Courbarie
Lynus
Kiquandon 
Heritiers Dizac 
Guillot
Chery Beaufond 
Dame Boyer 
Deterville Larelier
PROPRIETORS
' 350 
300 
100
80
25
100
Total 955
SUGAR PRODUCTION IN
HOGSHEADS OF 500
KILOGRAMS
Octaye Hayot 200
Preyoteau 150
Prevoteau 200
Saint-Pee 250
Chaumont Desportes 75
Usine de la Riviere-Salee 75
Saint-Pee 250
Saint-Pee 450
Octave Hayot. 800
Hayot et Gallet de Saint-Aurin 350
Mauconduit 200
Garnier Laroche 200
Suffren 50
Odele Simon 50
Louizi 150
Lynus 50
Total 3,500
SUGAR PRODUCTION IN
HOGSHEADS OF 500
SUCRERIES PROPRIETORS KILOGRAMS
Ducos (whites)
Genipa* Octave Hayot 500
Bonne Mere Usine du Petit Bourg 200
Cocotte E Lafage 150
Champigny Quennesson 250
La Marie Veuve de Yassoigna 200
Sindic de la Grange Chancel 200
Grande Savane* Garny de la Riyiere 300
(mulattos)
Petite Rochelle Reauharnais Cadeau 300
(no information) Barrington 25
Total 2,125
Gros-Morne (whites!
Desnelles* Guir ouard-Bonnaire 250
La Source Pou 11 e t~Mes souhait a 80
Saint-Etienne* Monguy 400
Bagatelle Eugene Eustache. 80
Thibault* Eugene Eustache 200
/NLa Fraicheur Couryille 120
(mulattos)
(no information) Girard 20
(no information) E Yonyon 100
(no information) Barbe 100
La Dessaint Thaly 250
Belleyue Almanzir 30
(no information) Gregoire 40
Dominante Louis yautor 40
(no information) Nezaire 80
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SUGAR PRODUCTION IN
SUCRERIES 
(no information)
(no information)
(no information)
(no information)
PROPRIETORS 
Amedee Virein 
Cfrery Saint-Prix 
Ismin
A Rellemare
HOGSHEADS OF 500 
KILOGRAMS
30
25
20
60
Total 1,925
KEY: ^TRANSFORMED INTO DISTILLERIES AGRICOLES IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY. 
^ACQUIRED BY THE COLONY FOR SUB-DIVISION IN 1900.
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EQUIVALENT TO UNITS OF 500 KGS) BROKEN DOWN BY COMMUNE AND RACE:
SUMMARY: SUCRERIES AND THEIR PRODUCTION (IN BRACKETS EXPRESSED IN HOGSHEADS
Commune Total Whites Mulattos
Saint-Pierre 23 22 (4,500) 1 (45)
Macouba 10 10 (3,000) 0 (-)
Basse-Pointe 9 9. (6,000) o (-)
Lorrain 23 20 (5,650) 3 (250)
Precheur 5 5 (950) 0 Crl
Sainte-Marie 22 19. 0,4251 3 (330)
Trinite 24 21 0,6851 3 0,075)
Robert 24 20 (5,750). 4 (3851
Francois 30 21 (4,8751 9- C9-451
Carhat 12 10 (2,8751 2 0301
Casa-pilote 18 8 (1,2651 10 C5401
yauclin 18 6 (7501 12 0,1551
Riyiera-Pilota 15 10 0,0351 5 (3051
Lamentin 56 46 OS, 915) 10 (1,660)
Trois Ilets 11 9 0,660) 2 (50)
Sainte-Luce 11 6 (.1,130) 5 (200)
Sainte-Anne 13 11 (890) 2 (160)
Saint-Esprit 19 11 0,265) 8 (750)
Fort-de-France 18 14 (2,390) 4 (625)
Anses d'Arlets 4 2 (300) 2 (280)
Marin 10 9 0,000) 1 050)
Diamant 6 3 (750) 3 (205)
Riviere-Salee 16 13 C3,2501 3 (250)
Ducos 9. 7 0,800) 2 (325)
Gros-Morne 18 6 0,130) 12 (795)
Totals 424 318 (78,240). 106 (10,810)
CSource: Le Propagateur, March 25th, April 1st, 5th, 12th, 15th, 19th, 22nd,
26th. and 29 th 1882).
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APPENDIX XII: LIST OF DISTILLERS IN MARTINIQUE ON JANUARY 1ST, 1896
Names Communes
Adesir, Pacome Carbet
Adolphe, Paul Gros-Morne
Albert, Victor Precheur
Aries, Charles Grand’Riviere
Arthur Saint-Joseph
Aubert, Henri Saint-Joseph
Audale, Leandre Lamentin
Banque de la 
Martinique Saint-Joseph
Beaujolais, Arthur Fqrt-de-France
Berte, Hippolyte Cl) Saint-Pierre
C2) Saint-Pierre
C3) Saint-Pierre
C4) Saint-Pierre
Blaisemont, Ttu Carbet1
Borde et fils CD Saint-Pierre
C2) Lorrain
Bougenot, Emile Trinite
Brugier, Alfred CD Saint-Pierre
C2) Saint-Pierre
Caffie, Adrien Trinite
Capron, Corneille Carbet
Cardinet, Alexandre Trinite"
Cassius de Linval Lamentin
Cecina, Cesar Macouba
Chatenay, Aristide Saint-Pierre
Chery, Honorius Riviere-Pilote
Chrone, Faustin Gros-Morne
Towns/Villages/ Type of Distillery*
Plantations
Morne-Vert A
Petite-Lezarde A
Anse-Ceron A
Beausejour A
Belem A
Jambette A
Fayorite T
Seailles A
Riviere Laure A
Saint-Pierre I
Saint-Pierre I
Saint-Pierre I
Saint-Pierre I
L'Anse I
Ste-Philomene I
Fonds-Brule" A
Galion A
Rue Bouille* I
Rue Victor Hugo I
Gros s e-Ravine A
Beauregard A
Maximin I
Roches Carrees I
Fonds-Preville A
Saint-Joseph I
Honore A
Borelie A
Names Communes
458
Towns/Villages/ Type of Distillery*
Plantations
Clere, Fernand (1) Trinite Usine Trinite A
G! Lorrain Usine Vive A
Clos, Bernard (Dame! Aj oupa-Bouillon Aj oupa-Bouillon A
Coridon, Alexandre Lamentin Bourg I
Corneille, Octayius Gros-Morne Thierry ' A
Couffe, Marie-Noel Gros-Morne La Source I
Crassous, Ernest Marigot Crassous A
Cremy, Jules de Yauclin Paquemar I
D'Anglebermes Saint-Joseph Rosiere A
Dayioud et fils Riyiere-Salee Grand'Case I
Debue, Jules Sainte-Luce Trois Rivieres I
Devin, Adolphe Carbet Fonds-Capot I
Donatien, Altlhor Marigot Lagrange I
Dulieu, Henry Saint-Pierre Geron I
Dupouy, Raphael Saint-Pierre Avenue du Carbet I
Erembert, Gaston Fort-de-France La Digue I
Esch, Rene Riyiere-Pilote Prefontaine A
Etienne, Gustave Robert Riviere-Cacao A
Eucher, Marie-Sainte Sainte-Marie Bezaudin A
Eugene, Antoine Riv ier e-P i lo t e Fonds-Moulin A
Eustache, Fernand Lamentin Bourg I
Fortier, Augustin Carbet Anse-Latouche A
Francillette Marigot Mome-Papin A
Furnon, Raoul Saint-Pierre Rivier e-Blanche I
Furnon, Victor Saint-Pierre Riviere-Blanche I
Garnier, Laroche Riviere-Salee Le Terrier A
Gaston, Etienne Trinite Bagatelle I
Gentile, Theobald Saint-Pierre Morne des Cadets A
Gerard freres Marin Grands-Fonds-Balata A
Germany, Ludovic Gros-Morne Saint-Etienne I
Names Communes Towns/Villages/ Type of Distillery*
Plantations
459
Girard, Louis Saint-pierre 'Rue Victor Hugo T
Gomard, Marie Saint-Pierre Le Verger r
Grottes, V des Morne-Rouge . Grand-Reduit A
Grottes, Jules des Morne-Rouge Bellevue A
J»«
Grottes, Isaie des Morne-Rouge Macouba A
Grottes, Eugene des Saint-Pierre Plaisance A
Hannibel et Bonard Robert Four-a-Chaux r
Hayot, Andre Diamant La Plage A
Hayot, Marius Fort-de-France Riviere-Mons ieur I
Hayot, Simon et Cie Ducos Genipa I
Henri, Frederic Fort-de-France Raynal-Sarcus I
Houdeleck, Leopold Precheur Boisville A
Hubert, Louis Michel Rivier e-P i1ot e Baudelle I
Isnard, Emmanuel Saint-Pierre Morne-Saint-Martin A
Jusselain, Leon Carbet Plantation du Carbet I
Knight, LTRM Saint-Pierre Rue Victor Hugo I
Knight, LTKF Saint-Pierre Rue Victor Hugo I
Labonne, Benoit Gros-Morne Banlieue I
Lalung Saint-Leger Saint-Pierre Rue Saint-Louis I
Laroehetiere (jdel Saint-Pierre L 'Union A
Laudarin, Martin Gros-Morne Mornes des Olives A
Leyritz (heritiers del Basse-Pointe Leyritz A
Littee Morne-Rouge Morne-1'Etoile A
Louisy, Cesaire Case-Pilote Morne-Capot A
Lucien, Georges Robert La Monvert I
Madkaud, Auguste Saint-Joseph. Bellan I
Madkaud, Augustin Lorrain Bois-Riyiere A
Madkaud, Felicien Cl) Carbet Grand1Anse I
C2) Case-Pilote Bellevue A
Magency, Gustave Gros-Morne Saint-Nicolas A
Names Communes Towns/Villages/ Type of Distillery*
Plantations
460
Maj oubert (de) Saint-Esprit Roussane A
Marnet, Constant Case-Pilote Moulin-a-Eau I
Marraud, de Sigalony Basse-Pointe Bijou I
Martineau, Georgea Sainte-Marie Usine Sainte-Marie I
Mauconduit, Paul Saint-Joseph Reunion I
Meillac, Philippe de Lorrain Assier 1
Merol, Emeliua Robert Bourg A
Meyer, Louis et Cie Saint-Pierre Rue Saint-Louis I
Mezin (yeuve). Trois Xlets Mezin A
Macret, Darius Saint-Joseph Riviere-Blanche A
Neuyille, 
(heritiers de) Trinite Blin A
Ninet, Felix Saint-Pierre A
Olivier, Modeste Fort-de-France Chateauboeuf I
Osmey, Ely see Saint-Pierre S aint e-Phi1 omene I
Ozier, Lafontaine Riy ier e-Pila t e Mauny I
Papin-Dupont Q.) Saint-Pierre Beausejour A
(21 Saint-Pierre Morne d'Orange A
pecoul (heritierslO-1 Baase-pointe Pecoul A
(21 Saint-pierre La Montagne A
Perinelle 
(heritiers del Saint-Pierre Perinelle A
Pinard, Pierre Morne-Rouge Surprise I
Pinard, Ernest Grand'Riyiere Les Potiches A
Preyoteau-Duclary 
(heritiersl Sainte-Marie Usine Saint-Jacques A
Pulchery, Saint-Louis Lorrain Morne Ceron A
Quinsedo, Casimir Marigot Morne Papin A
Raibaud, Eugsene Saint-Pierre Trouvaillant A
Rhummerie de la 
Galere Saint-Pierre Rue Saint-Louis I
Roe, Justin Diamant Bois Carre A
Names Communes
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T o w n s /V illa g e s / Type o f  D i s t i l l e r y *
Plantations
Rousseau (tieritiersl Saint-Pierre Rue Saint-Louis I
Sarote, Elie Robert La-Haut X
Severe, Alexandre Schoeleher Pointe des Negres I
Severe, Jules Case-Pilote ManiBa A
Sylvanie, Pauline Sainte-Marie Saint-Laurent A
Thaly, Frederic Gros-Morne Dessaint A
Theresin, Louis Trinite Petit Galion X
Usine Basse-Pointe Basse-Pointe Gradis I
Yarein, Ludger Saint-Pierre Place du Fort I
Vautor, Georges Gros-Morne Denelle I
Vautor, Edouard Gros-Morne Petite Lezarde r
Yautor, Hermann Grps-Morne Lasource I
Villegegu, G de la Morne-Rouge Petit Reduit I
yiyieis, Edmond Lamentin Californie X
Winter, Fernand Saint-Pierre Rue Victor Hugo I
Zonzon et Roseau Rivier e-Salee La Masson A
Zoque, Leonard Gros-Morne ’Malgre I
(Source: Le Moniteur? Journal Official de la Martinique, 11/2/1896, i
(*A = Distillerie Agricole 
I = Distillerie Tndustrielle).
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APPENDIX XIII : COMMISSION MERCHANTS AND WHOLESALE AND 
• - ' •'* * RETAIL . FIRMS-IN- BRIDGETOWN- IN 1921.
Commission Merchants
A. Cameron (Prince William Henry Street).
R. and G. Challenor (Wharf).
Da Costa and Co. (Broad Street).
Evelyn, Roach and Co. (Rickett Street).
Gardiner Austin and Co. Ltd. (Cavan’s Lane).
T.S. Garraway and Co. (McGregor Street).
Hanschell and Co. (McGregor Street).
Jones and Swan (Wharf).
C.H. Kinch (Palmetto Street).
Leacock and Co. Ltd. (Broad Street).
J.A. Lynch and Co. (McGregor Street).
Manning and Co. Ltd. (Bay Street and Cavan’s Lane).
S.P. Musson and Co. (Broad Street).
V. Parravicino and Co. (McGregor Street).
Thom and Cameron (Prince William Henry Street). 
Wilkinson and Haynes Co. Ltd. (Lower Broad Street).
Provision Dealers (Wholesale)
Arthur Alleyne and Co. (High Street).
W.H. Bryden and Co. (Roebuck Street).
J.W. Croney* (Roebuck Street).
Martin Doorley (Palmetto Street).
Gittens, Croney and Co. (Palmetto Street).
J.H. Inniss (High Street).
Ince and Co. (Roebuck Street).
Johnson and Redman* (Roebuck Street).
John Mayers (Roebuck Street).
Smith and Atwell1 (Roebuck Street).
Grocery and Provisions Retailers
Arthur Alleyne and Co. (High Street).
C.H. Brathwaite (Roebuck Street).
C.D. Bourne- (Roebuck Street).
J.R. Bourne and Co. (Roebuck Street).
Grocery 'and Provision Retailers contd...
APPENDIX XIII contd...
W.H. Bryden and Co. (Roebuck Street, Broad Street and
Speightstown).
D. Carmichael (Roebuck Street).
Victor Chase (Tudor Street).
A.A. Cole (Roebuck Street).
S.A. Cole (Roebuck Street).
ftRufus Fields (Roebuck Street).
P.C. Fields and Co. (Roebuck Street).
Gittens, Croney and Co. (Palmetto Street).
E.C. Hill (Tudor Street).
Hutchinson and Corbin (Prince William Henry Street). 
Ince and Co. (Roebuck Street).
James H.. Innis Son and Co. (High Street).
Johnson and Redman (Roebuck Street and Broad Street)
ftC.A. King and Co. (Broad Street).
E.L. Kirton (Roebuck Street).
A. Lewis (Roebuck Street).
B.D. Licorish and Co. (Broad Street).
John Mayers and Son Ltd. Roebuck Street).
W.I. MoConney (Roebuck Street).
George Moore (Roebuck Street).
Nightingale & Co. (Broad Street).
C.S. Pitcher and Co. (Roebuck Street).
D. Hope Ross and Co. (Roebuck Street).
ftPercy Roach (Roebuck Street and Swan Street).
*F. Norman Roach and Co. (Broad Street).
Percy Roberts (Roebuck Street).
J.S. Rock (Roebuck Street).
C.A. Rogers and Co. (Roebuck Street).
Smith and Atwell (Roebuck Street).
H.A. Smith (Tudor Street).
Stuart and Sampson (Roebuck Street).
W.S. Ward and Co. (High Street).
(* Redleg firms. 1 Joint white/coloured firm). 
(Source: Percy Leverick, Directory of Barbados, 1921)
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APPENDIX XIV: THE IMPACT OF 'PANAMA MONEY1 IN BARBADOS
Between 1891 and 1921 a total of 74,000 black Barbadians emigrated. About
49,000 left in the period up to 1911 and just over 24,000 between 1911 and 
19.21. ^ According to the compiler of the 1911 Census the rapid exodus from 
Barbados began
"Immediately after work had begun on the Isthmus of Panama, in 
connection with, the canal ... So great was the demand for labour, 
and so eager were the people to obtain work, that large numbers paid 
their passages to Colon without entering into contracts, and of 
these there is no record, but on referring to the register kept by 
the Police Magistrate of Bridgetown of contracts entered into before 
them, between emigration agents and emigrants ... between 1905 and 
1909 ... 20,507 male adults (were contracted) for employment in 
Colon ..."
The compiler also noted that between 1901 and 1911 a further 983 emigrants 
had contracted to go to St. Croix, Peru, Brazil and Surinam. However, these 
figures only represent a fraction of the total which emigrated during these 
years. Where intending emigrants did not enter into employment contracts 
on the spot and where they did not take adyantage of the statutory schemes 
to aid emigration, there is no record of their departure in emigration 
statistics. Precise and accurate information provided by the Colonial 
Postmaster is available on remittances sent from abroad, which, helps to give 
some idea of the impact that 'Panama Money’ must have had upon the domestic 
economy of the island:
TABLE I: VALUE. OF MONEY FROM THE CANAL ZONE, 1906-1910
1906 £7,500. 15. 2 (Note: Additional information
supplied by the Harbour Master
19.07 46,160. 1 . 2 increased this total to
£347,887. 19. 8. "... 13,002
19.08 63,210. 6. 0 Barbadians? returned from-Panama
_ bringing with, then* sums? amountii
lipSL 66,272. 1. 5 in the aggregate, tq
£102,456. 3. 6, .."'I
19JL0 62,280. 12.. 5
£245,431. 16. 2
CSTource; Report on the Census for 1911, p. -7L
1. Source: Reports on the Census for 1891, 1911 and 1921.
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Similar information contained in the Census for 1921 gives some idea 
of the relative importance that different countries played in the role 
of emigration:
TABLE II: VALUE QF MONEY ORDERS' RECEIVED AND PAID IN AT THE GENERAL POST OFFICE,
1911-1920
Provenance
British Guiana £23,981
Trinidad 30,082
United States 351,151
Canal Zone 300,501
Canada 64,721
£770,436
(Source: Report of the Census for 1921, p. 13)
TRADERS IN BARBADOS, 1900-1919
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APPENDIX XV: RECORD OF ESTATES PURCHASED OUT OF. CHANCERY BY MERCHANTS AND
Year Plantation Acreage Purchaser Price
1900 Springfield (St. Joseph) 311 R Challenor £5,469
Groves (St. Andrew) 124 S Manning 2,350
Guinea (St. John) 384 D M Simpson 7,850
Yorkshire (Christ Church) 321 G H Arthur 6,416 12. 8
Mangrove (St. Peter) 229 J C Lynch 3,470
Bath (St. John) 426 C A Yearwood 5,564 16.
1901 Frere Pilgrim (Christ Church) 226 T B Evelyn 6,334
Clifden (St. John) 200 D M  Simpson 4,370
1902 Bowmanston (St. John) 242 R Challenor 6,552
1904 Ashford (St. Thomas) 165 J W Parris 2,586
Lodge (St. Michael) 170 T N McConney 2,351
Prior Park (St. James) 207 S Manning 3,720
Harrisons (St. Lucy) 381 W A Collins ?
Mullineux (St. James) 259 R Arthur 4,020
Oxford (St. Peter) 223 S Manning 3,060
1907 Chimborazo (St. Joseph) 38 T N McConney 2,141
Trents (St. Lucy) 188 I Boyce ?
1908 Strong Hope (St. Thomas) 123 I W Roach 2,011
Black Bess (St. Peter) 264 T Parris 4,250
Worthing View (Christ Church) 61 B E Bynoe 9
Grazettes (St. Michael) 181 D C DaCosta 9f
1909 Haynes Field (St. John) 300 R H Taylor 8,530
Halton (St. Philip) 307 T Mayers 4,511
1911 Charnocks (Christ Church) 220 J and E I Baeza 5,400
Balls (Christ Church) 405 G A Yearwood 10,000
1915 Hopefield (Christ Church) 170 F F Ince 7,100
1916 Andrews (St. Joseph) 312 R Challenor 21,000
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Year Plantation Acreage Purchaser Price
Bennetts (St. Thomas) 279 Sandy Lane Co. £16,850
1917 Fisherpond (St. Thomas) 314 R Challenor 17,000
Blackmans [St. Joseph) 375 R Challenor 20,250
Haggatt Hall (St. Michael) 367 T N McConney 27,225
Mount Brevitor CSt. Peter) 243 R Parris 10,500
1918 Pilgrim Place (Christ Church) 274 H G Yearwood 23,500
Golden Ridge CSt. George) 
Kent,. Staple and
178 R H Taylor 18,000
Grove CChrist Church) 585 G A Yearwood 70,000
Locust Hall CSt. George) 340 Applewhaites Ltd. 50,000
Bucks CSt. Thomas) 60 T N McConney 5,000
Applewhaites CSt. Thomas) 456 Applewhaites Ltd. 55,000
Waterford CSt. Michael) 632 Applewhaites Ltd. 80,000
Lears (St. Michael) 626 Applewhaites Ltd. 70,000
iai9_ Castle CSt. Peter) 620 Springhall Ltd. 33,000
Lower Estate CSt. Michael). 474 T N McConney 62,000
Orange Hill CSt. Peter) 355 T N McConney 22,000
Lamberts (St. Lucy) 518 Springhall Ltd. 35,000
Hothersal CSt. John! 407 R H Taylor 40,000
Chimborazo CSt. Joseph) 28 D D C Emtage 3,000
Eastbourne (St. Philip) 88 H L Johnson 1,700
(Source: Barbados Chancery Court, Chancery Sales Ledgers, 1894-19.01, 1901-19.04
and 1900-19.56.5
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APPENDIX XVI: EXTRACT OP A MEMORANDUM SUBMITTED BY THE FOREIGN AND
COLONIAL INVESTMENT TRUST COMPANY LTD., DATED MARCH 
1898, CONCERNING THE ERECTION OF CENTRAL FACTORIES 
IN BARBADOS.
1. The Colony of Barbados is in an exceptional position both as to the 
density of its population, the configuration of the island and the 
fact that cultivation of Sugar Cane is the only possible industry.....
2. The ownership of the land is very much sub-divided; the continued 
depreciation in the value of sugar has impoverished the planters,
for at present prices they can scarcely continue planting, and cannot 
improve their plantations or their sugar mills, and have not the means 
to provide for maintenance, which daily becomes more imperatively 
necessary.
Only by the introduction of the most improved machinery, coupled 
with the establishment of economic methods for transport and manu­
facture, can a. marked improvement of the present condition be obtained.
3. The Royal Commission in their report recommend a subvention of £120,000, 
and suggest the establishment of Central Factories.
4. The accompanying map shows the location of a series of narrow-guage 
railroads that should radiate over the island in order to convey the 
cane by gravitation to one or more Central Factories; the idea being 
to purchase for cash, from the planter the cane as soon as matured and 
delivered to a railway station, and to distribute in addition amongst 
the planters, in proportion to their deliveries, a part portion of the 
profit of the Central Factory at the end of each season.....
6....... while the planting and growing of the cane would entirely be left to
the individual planter to attend to, the industrial manipulation of the 
product would be centralised, and practically the production of the 
whole island would be dealt with as coming from one estate, thus 
securing economies and perfection in manufacture.
7. The subvention indicated by the Royal Commission, however, is inadequate.
8. To construct about 47| miles of railway, the many sidings required, 
sufficient rolling stock and motive power, a Central Factory capable of 
producing '250 tons of sugar in the twenty-four hours would entail an 
outlay of ... £500,000.....
12...... Once the capital invested is reimbursed, the net proceeds of the
factories and railways would accrue to the Colony, thus replacing 
taxation, at least in part.
13. On the same principle as the Colony has become the owner of Waterworks, 
which now constitute a source of revenue, the establishment of Central 
factories and railways would add to the. prosperity of the Colony.....
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£ Subsidiaries of public corporations:
Bulkeley Estates Ltd. (^Barbados Shipping and Trading)
Boarded Hall and Stepney (St. George) 526 arable acres
Bulkeley and Jordans (St. George) 544.55
Buttals and Windsor (St. George) 440.25
Castle and Lamberts (St. Peter) 690.75
2,201.55
Applewhaites Ltd. (Barbados Shipping and Trading)
Applewhaites (St. Thomas) 328
Locust Hall and Moonshine (St. George) 372
Lears (St. Michael) 472
1,172
Dacosta and Musson Estates Ltd. (Barbados Shipping and Trading)
Bennetts CSt. Thomas) 476.75
River (St. Philip) 411
Wallces Spring CSt. Thomas) 327.50
1,215.25
Manning, Wilkinson and Challenor Ltd. CBarbados Shipping and Trading)
Orange Hill CSt. Peter) 178
Foursquare Estates Ltd. (Plantations Ltd.)
Foursquare CSt. Philip) 542.50
Grove CSt. Philip) 470
Hannays (Christ Church) 532.50
1,545
II Government of Barbados:
APPENDIX XVII: STRUCTURE OF LANDOWNERSHIP IN BARBADOS (1977)
Barbados Agricultural Development Corporhtipn
Bawden and River CSt. Andrew! 233,25
Haggatts C$t. Andrew! 405
Greenland and Overhill (St. Andrew) 320 arable acres
Sedge Pond and The Hill (St. Andrew) 200
Bath (St. John) 203
Dodds (St. Philip) 175.25
Husbands (St. James) 160
Friendship, Hope and Spring Hall (St. Lucy) 644
Wildey (St. Michael) 197
Graeme Hall (Christ Church) 219
Fairy Valley (Christ Church) 186
Spencers (Christ Church) 350
Pine (St. Michael) 107
3,399.50
111 Private corporations owned by commercial families or associated with 
mercantile interests through shareholdings and directorships; 
Carrington Estates Ltd. (Wilkinson family)
Carrington (St. Philip) 870
(incorporating Chapel and Woodbourne)
Plus
Lancaster (St. James) 283
Challenor Estates Ltd. (Challenor family)
Easy Hall (St. Joseph) (incorporating Blackmans) 607
Fisherpond (St. Thomas) (incorporating Andrews) 528
1,135
Todds Estates Ltd. (Chandler family)
Todds (St. John) 654
(incorporating Lemon Arbor and Henley)
Alleynedale and Portland Estates Ltd. (Chandler family)
Alleynedale (St. Peter) 475
(incorporating Six Mens and Hopeland)
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Portland 175
650
Plus
Bowmanston (St. John)
Newton Ltd. (Parent Company) comprising:
Guinea Ltd. (Ward and Simpson families)
Guinea (St. John)
Mount Pleasant and Oughterson (St. Philip)
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Staple Groye Estates Ltd. (Ward family)
Newton (Christ Church)
Staple Grove (Christ Church)
Thicket Plantations Ltd. (two thirds to Ward family)
Thicket (St. Philip)
(incorporating Three Houses and Fortescue)
Edgecumbe Ltd. (Skeete family)
Edgecumbe (St. Philip)
(incorporating Byde Mill, Frenches and Bentley)
Dunscombe Estates Ltd. (Clarke family and Plantations Ltd.)
Dunscombe (St. Thomas) 572.25
(incorporating Farmers and Content)
Vaucluse Estates Ltd. (Clarke family, Plantations Ltd. and
Robert Arthur and Company Ltd.)
Vaucluse (St. Thomas) 505
Fairfield and Mount Gay Company Ltd. (Ward family)
Bourbon (St. Lucy) 430
Colleton (St. Peter) 144
Harrison (St. Lucy) 203
Mount Gay (St. Lucy) 430
Rock Hall (St. Peter) 190
Bromefield (St. Lucy) 410
1,807
200 arable acres 
453
333.75
786.75
292.50 
500
792.50 
780
912
Kingsland Estates Ltd. (Deane family)
Adams Castle CChrist Church) 220 arable acres
Bannatyne CChrist Church) 184
Hanson (St. George) 312
Wotton CChrist Church) 440
1,156
Ridge Ltd. (Majority shareholders: Arthur, Bynoe, Leacock and
Simpson families plus the Barbados Mutual Life Association)
Ridge Cincorporating Balls) 1,013.75
Sunbury Ltd. CCameron family)
Sunbury (St. Philip) 302
Hampton (St. Philip) 309
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Constant Estates Ltd. (Ian Robinson)
Constant (St. George) 437.50
Brighton Investment Company Ltd. (Pile family)
Brighton CSt. George) 274
Valley Estates Ltd. CLyall Seally)
Valley (St. George) 222.75
if
Dowding Estates and Trading Company Ltd. (T.O. Dowding)
Hopewell (St. Thomas) 496.25
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IV Private corporations independent of Bridgetown mercantile interests:
Ashford Ltd.
Ashbury (St. George) 240
Ashford (St. John) 166
Belle Farms Ltd. 406
Belle (St. Michael) 638
(incorporating Belleview and part of Waterford and Neils)
Best Properties Ltd.
Frere Pilgrim CChrist Church) 103
Bakers Ltd.
Bakers (St. Peter)
Burnt House Ltd.
Burnt House (St. Andrew) 
Castle Grant Ltd.
Castle Grant (St. Joseph) 
Redland (St. Joseph)
Congo Road Ltd.
Congo Road (St. Philip) 
Cliff Ltd.
Cliff (St. John)
Fairview Ltd.
Fairview (St. George)
Plus
Walkers (St. George) 
Coverley Estates Ltd. 
Coverley (Christ Church) 
Dixie Farms Ltd.
Canefield (St. Thomas) 
(incorporating Highland) 
Forster Hall Estates Ltd. 
Bushey Hall (St. Philip) 
Farm Estates Ltd.
Farm (St. George)
Golden Grove Ltd.
Golden Grove (St. Philip) 
Waterha11 Ltd.
Waterhall (St. James)
Halton Ltd.
Halton (St. Philip)
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Harrow Ltd.
Harrow (St. Philip) 309 arable acres
Hinkson and Rock Trading Company Ltd.
Bissex, Parks and Seniors (St. Andrew) 456.50
Lion Castle Ltd.
Lion Castle (St. Thomas) 164.50
Mount Estates Ltd.
Mount (St. George) 180
O'Neal Investment Trust Ltd.
Pickerings (St. Lucy) 260
Panama Estates
Four Hill CSt. Peter) 270
(incorporating Mount Prospect)
Victoria Estates Ltd.
Victoria (St. John) 84
Welchtown Estates Ltd.
Welchtown (St. Peter) 233
Westmoreland Ltd.
Westmoreland 473
(incorporating Mount Standfast)
Richard Williams and Company Ltd.
Oldbury (St. Philip) 200
Yorkshire Ltd.
Yorkshire (Christ Church) 319
Remaining arahle acreage of 8,652.54 acres (30 estates) owned by individuals 
and not organized into corporations.
(Source: Barbados Sugar Producers1 Association)
APPENDIX XVIII; RUM PRODUCTION IN MARTINIQUE, 1931-1935 (in litres)
1931 1932 1933 1934 1935
Usines Ahciennes
Basse-Pointe 261,715 226,432 244,147 217,685 148,654
Bassignac 328,168 276,8891 318,268 250,038 246,858
Franco is- 402,252 416,447 534,601 262,682 337,749:
Galion 538,927 373,926 374,446 326,000 388,418
Lareinty 598,439 640,219. 602,324 588,790 474,592
Lorrain 288,609 353,652 292,816 233,910 215,351
Marin 203,887 185,478 414,663 129,342 228,650
Petit B.qurg 1,146,255 986,376 1,294,149 879,380 563,588
Riviere Salee 385,691 563,739. 536,962 378,078 396,656
Robert 543,671 437,909 415,224 248,494 412,414
Sainte-Marie 618,616 780,798 766,773 473,172 359,239
Soudon 644,29.3 741,626 816,529 531,921 494,759
Vauclin 185,312 217,929. 317,776 181,580 178,998
yiye 299,203 273,358 289,453 301,329 268,980
Totals 6,245,038 6,201,420 7,218,131 5,002,401 4,714,906
Usines Nouyelles
Dillon 206,591 129,142 174,361 183,688 173,961
La Favorite 181,289 133,557 149,772 173,292 192,854
Maniba 102,635 73,343 45,349 52,090 20,695
Maynard 85,676 70,722 42,048 54,123 53,442
Simon 261,388 134,659 176,092 214,714 174,081
Totals 837,579 541,423 587,622 677,907 615,033
Distilleries Tndustrielles
Riviere Leyassor 73,9.26 125,067 103,066 101,768 69,620
Riviere Monsieur 68,610 64,177 69,422 39,075 190,252
Totals 142,536 189,244 172,488 140,843 259,872
Total Production 
of rhum industrielle
7,225,153 6,932,087 7,978,241 5,821,151 5,589,811
In addition to these factories and two distilleries producing rum from 
molasses, in 19_35 a total of 160 distilleries agricoles were to be found 
in Martinique, producing a rum directly from sugar cane. The size of 
these distilleries varied; the smallest produced 10-15,000 litres per 
annum and the largest oyer 300,000 litres. About one-third of these 
distilleries were the adaptations of nineteenth century habitations 
sucreries.
LIST OF DISTILLERIES AGRICOLES IN 1935 (Production of most important - over
100,000 litres per annum - indicated in brackets. Those marked with an 
asterisk were producers of sugar in 1882).
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Ajoupa Bouillon Ajoupa Bouillon Morne Coco
Anses D ’Arlets Sucrerie
Basse-Pointe Eyma Pecoul* (121,384)
Carbet Beauregard* Bel-Event*
Belfond Dominante
Fonds Capot* Fonds Moulin*
La jus* 051,3171 
yigie
Carbet
Case-Filote Fonds Bourlet* Fonds Layette*
Moulin a Eau*
Diamant Toraille Dizac
Ducoa Genipa* Grande Savane*
Fort-de-France Alice Aroelie Ravine-Vilaine
Raynel-Sarcua Riyiere-Monsieur* (190,252)
Route Didier Valencienne
Francois Acajou* 0211,447) 
La Digue*
Casse Cou*
Grand1-Riviere Beausejour '
Gros-Morne Denel* Gros Pitons
Malgre* 0305,555) Petite Tracee
Lamentin
Lorrain
Maequba
Marigot
Marin.
Morne Rouge
Prfecheur
Riv i er e-P il o t e
Riviere-Lezarde (1) Riviere Lezarde (2)
Saint-Etienne* (193,205) Saint-Michel 
Union Chatel
Acajou* (120,4591
California
Duracher*
Long-Pre*
Rqche-Carree*
Carabin
Castel-Byand*
Dnrocber
Fond® Gyand'Ansa
La Montagna* 
Etolle*
Macedqine (2)_
Sol ell
D il lo n
bijou*
Bois Carre* (126,576) 
Directoire 
Gondeau* (106,825) 
Maraud
Castel
Dupuis
Fonds Brule*
Hardy*
La Digue*
Sade
Macedoine (1)*
Esle
Saint-Julien
Fonds Potiche* (108,410)
Fonds Preyilia* (134,486)Macouba* 
Perpigna 
Belleyue 
Diomatb*
Baydury 
Boneparte 
Grand Reduit 
Morne Btoila (2)_
Sainte-Cecile 
Ansa Couleuyra 
Ansa Figurey*
Fonds-Monliffi
Durand
Beauyallon 
Champ Flore 
Morne Etoile (1) 
Mont Beni
Gerard*
Concorde*
La Fenee
Riviere-Salee
Robert 
Sainte-Anne 
Seboelcber
Saint-Esprit
Saint-JqgepIiL.
Sainte-Luce 
Sainte-Marje 
Saint-Pierre
Trinite
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La Vignette
Saingaule
Desmarinieres
Figuier (11
Masson
Ca£e
Beauregard
Case-Nayire
Fonds Rousseau
La Felix
Belle Etoile
Cbalet
Fantaisie
Prosperite
Riviere Blanche C2)_
Rosiere
Serail
Beole
Ladour*
Maunie* (226,143)
Dufresnes 
Figuier (2)
Mont-Fort
Vert Pre
Caritan* 
Fonds Nigaud
Tr o is-Rry i'er e s* (161, Q7 9) 
Anse Azerot*
Fonds Ve^yille* 
Saint-Laurent 
Anse Cartouche 
La Galere 
Morne des Cadets* 
Petit-Reduit*
Anse Isambert 
Bourg
Seroeilleuse
Capoul
Durand
Hotel des Plaisirs 
Riviere Blanche (1) 
Riviere d ’Or 
Salubre
Jacques 
Petit-Fonds*
I
Beaufort 
Morne a roches 
Thihault*
Desfontaines 
La Montagna*
Pain
Plaisance*
Saint-James* (121,463) 
Fonds Galion*
Tartane*
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Trois-Ilets Anse a l'Ane* Esperance*
Poterie* Vatable*
Vauclin Coulee d’Qr* (141,720) La Pointe
Sans Souci*
Total Production of 
rhum agricole: 1931-35
1931 1932 1933 1934 1935
6 , 4 4 4 , m  6,684,085 5,516,389, 5,835,811 5,785,401
(Source: Seryice de 1*Agriculture, Rapport sur 1'Industrie de la Canne
a la Martinique, (Keryegant), Part IX; "Traitement des cannes par les 
usines'a sucre", pp 80, 134-137).
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APPENDIX XIX : THE WEST INDIAN SUGAR INDUSTRY. 1920-1977
TABLE I: SUGAR PRODUCTION QF SUGAR ASSOCIATION OF THE CARIBBEAN MEMBER STATES, 1920/24 -
1973/77 (Long tons tel quel).
Five-year moving averages*
PERIOD TOTAL ANTI­
GUA
BARBA­
DOS
ST.
KITTS
GUYANA JAMAICA TRINI­
DAD
PERCENTAGE
CHANGE
1920/24 267,830 11,034 57,499 9,479 96,36.8 40,058 53,392 ---
21/25 280,275 11,682 60,970 10,548 100,447 40,993 55,635 + 4.65
22/26 293,737 11,792 66,655 12,242 97,880 45,808 59,360 + 4.80
23/27 305,381 14,633 70,901 14,171 100,460 . 47,449 57,767 + 3.96
24/28 329,261 16,058 74,347 15,912 105,606 51,584 65,754 + 7.82
25/29 353,296 16,694 80,118 16,617 110,700 55,837 73,330 + 7.30
26/30 366,754 16,639 82,347 17,241 114,737 60 ,,416 75,374 4* 3.38
27/31 371,962 14,940 80,767 16,387 120,335 59,157 80,376 + 1.42
28/32 391,292 14,026 85,390 16,768 127,256 58,353 89,499 4* 5.12
29/33 411,169 14,867 91,436 17,712 132,350 57,462 97,342 4* 5.08
1930/34 429,735 16,851 95,654 20,631 135,347 60,827 100,425 4- 4.52
31/35 450,836 16,9.99 95,209 22,594 134,802 62,620 108,011 *§• 4.91
32/36 503,881 20,230 108,353 25,824 159,363 70,881 119,230 +11.77
33/37 542,947 22,665 113,518 28,685 167,011 80,501 130,567 + 7.36
34/38 568,008 22,059. 112,366 29,438 177,920 93,085 133,140 + 4.62
35/39 603,936 22,053 121,368 31,241 189,321 102,177 137,776 + 6.33
36/40 603,883 21,050 124,515 31,722 187,242 106,683 132,671 - 0.10
37/41 606,283 20,595 118,739 33,524 185,655 119,710 128,060 + 0.40
38/42 599., 269 18,669 113,165 33,282 186,634 129,442 118,077 - 1.20
39/43 595,702 18,950 117,537 34,128 180,614 138,938 105,535 - 0.60
1940/44 568,356 18,140 107,149 32,185 170,460 145,739 94,683 4.60
41/45 579,355 19,847 111,594 31,715 168,371 156,327 91,501 +• 1.90
42/46 583,572 21,665 118,263 30,980 164,979 160,585 87,100 + 0.73
43/47 585,549 21,898 120,435 31,239 160,154 163,583 88,240 + 0.34
44/48 588,194 19,884 109,426 31,085 161,543 169,012 97,244 + 0.45
45/49 641,080 20,216 119,071 32,695 168,694 186,185 114,219 + 8.99
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PERIOD TOTAL ANTI­
GUA
BARBA­
DOS
ST.
KITTS
GUYANA JAMAICA TRINI­
DAD
PERCENTAC
CHANGE
1946/50 698,873 22,239 126,818 35,227 176,282 210,056 128,251 + 9.01
47/51 743,730 20,687 137,603 37,379 185,533 228,064 134,464 + 6.42
48/52 800,189 22,945 148,931 40,630 200,573 247,188 139,922 + 7.59
49/53 872,919 26,933 165,437 44,610 214,010 274,672 147,257 + 9.09
1950/54 920,582 25,810 170,682 47,373 226,949 299,784 149,984 + 5.46
51/55 967,340 23,522 173,048 48,910 237,841 324,778 159,241 + 5.08
52/56 993,869 25,435 165,754 50,026 247,047 342,454 163,153 + 2.74
53/57 1,032,620 24,918 173,084 48,779 255,503 361,093 169,243 + 3.90
54/58 1 047,369 22,312 171,503 46,954 268,740 361,641 176,219 + 1.42
1955759. 1 065,355 26,110 172,541 46,345 277,841 364,626 177,892 + 1.72
56760 1 088,498 26,170 169,273 46,511 294,707 368,971 182,866 + 2.17
57761 1 132,988 24,681 170,947 45,865 306,989 384,550 199,956 + 4.09
58/62 1 151,434 22,171 161,734 45,567 315,199 400,150 206,613 + 1.63
59763 1 199,001 23,607 169,304 45,046 317,354 429,108 214,582 + 4.13
1960/64 1 214,787 21,504 164,773 44,385 312,145 448,318 223,662 + 1.32
61/65 1 239,220 20,307 173,234 42,131 307,146 465,932 230,470 + 2.01
62/66 1 243,446 17,644 175, 707 40,357 310,981 475,567 223,190 + 0.34
63767 1 253,373 14,769 184,138 39,486 314,561 477,877 222,542 0.80
64/68 1 239,063 9,742 177,814 38,539 314,503 473,481 224,984 - 1.14
65/69. 1 223,170 5,527 173,406 36,983 324,710 . 455,221 227,323 - 1.28
66/70 1 190,401 4,719 164,931 35,293 335,821 429,221 220,416 - 2.68
67/71 1 160,972 157,736 32,095 341,045 409,037 221,060 - 2.47
68772 1 127,172 139,882 29,576 335,181 394,8.66 227,666 - 2.91
69/73 1 071,194 131,339 27,274 324,952 371,127 216,502 - 4.97
1970/74 1 045,015 125,159 25,298 320,222 368,807 205,529 - 2.44
71/75 1 016,811 113,541 24,859 318,062 366,116 194,233 - 2.70
72/76 995,126 107,064 26,817 310,785 358,773 191,686 - 2.13
73/77 974,011 108,395 29,831 313,865 341,770 180,148 - 2.12
(Source; Monthly and Annual Returns made to S.A.C. by Member Associations. 
Statistics reproduced by Raymond Norris in an unpublished paper prepared 
for the Sugar Association of the Caribbean, "The West Indian Sugar Industry, 
1 9 5 0 -1 9 7 0 ", 1972).
(Note*: In attempting to give some idea of the trend in sugar production
oyer a long period, the use of five-year moving averages is 
preferable to annual production figures, since wide variations 
from year to year would be revealed in the case of annual figures 
which, would present a distorted picture if one year were compared 
with, another. Fiye-year moying averages are a far more useful 
guide to general trends, since the effect of important environmental 
factors such as rainfall and drought tend to be evened out over 
a five year period.)
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TABLE II: CANE PRODUCTION (West Indies and Guyana)
Year Acreages under Acreages Cane
cane cultivation reaped milled
( T000 tons)
1966 436,458 411,227 12,394
1967 438,031 427,216 12,514
19.68 441,552 418,897 . 12,021
1969 445,652 424,291 12,211
1970 457,652 414,873 12,254
1971 463,226 440,531 12,085
1972 467,397 425,421 11,488
1973 454,726 405,686 10,117
1974 443,726 420,095 10,986
1975 444,499 382,836 9,755
APPENDIX XIX
Tons cane per 
acre reaped
30.14 
29.29 
28,70 
28.78 
29.54 
27.43 
27.03 
24.91
26.15 
25.48
TABLE III: CANE PRODUCTION (Barbados)
Year Acreages under Acreages Cane
cane cultivation reaped milled
O '000 tons)
1966 60,000 51,462 1,559
1967 60,000 52,170 1,826
1968 60,000 50,648 1,369
1969 60,000 50,479 1,264
1970 60,000 49,777 1,433
1971 60,000 48,735 1,214
1972 60,000 43,906 1,043
1973 58,000 46,000 1,072
1974 50,000 41,439 941
1975 46,000 39,799 832
Tons eane per 
acre reaped
30.29
35.00
27.03
25.04 
28.79 
24.91 
23.76 
23.14 
22.71 
20.89
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TABLE IV: SUGAR PRODUCTION (West Indies and Guyana)
Year Sugar Produced 
(in tons)
Tons sugar 
per acre 
reaped
Tons cane 
per ton of 
sugar
Sugar recovery 
rate (% of cane)
1966 1,19.1,304 2.90 10.40 9.62
19.67 1,237,163 2.90 10,11 9.89
19.68 1,206,097 2.88 9_, 97 10.03
19.69. 1,135,869_ 2.68 10,75 9.32
1970 1,076,684 2.60 11.38 8.79.
1971 1,131,020 2.57 10.68 9.36
1972 1,059,723 2.49 10,84 9.22
1973 926,209 2.28 10,92 9.16
1974 1,029,576- 2.45 10.67 9.37
1975 936,723 2.45 10.41 9.60
TABLE Y: SUGAR PRODUCTION (Barbados]
Year Sugar Produced 
Cin tons!
Tons sugar Tons cane Sugar recovery
per acre 
reaped
per ton of 
sugar
rate (% of cane)
19.66 171,910 3.34 9.07 11.03
1967 200,612 3.85 9.10 10.99
19.68 159,078 3.14 8.61 11.62
19_69 138,521 2.74 9.12 10.96
1970 153,923 3.09 9.31 10.74
1971 134,553 2.76 9.02 11.08
1972 110.539. 2.52 9.43 10.60
1973 116,359. 2.51 9.21 10.86
1974 108,560 2.62 8.66 11.55
1975 96,889 2.43 8.58 11.65
(Source: The Sugar Association of the Caribbean, Abstract of Production and
Commercial Statistics appended to the Chairman's Annual Report, Dec. 1975).
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Plantations bought specifically for agricultural purposes:
Dodds (St. Philip) 243 acres
Operating as a commercial enterprise growing sugar cane and ground 
provisions.
Friendship, Springhall and Hope (St. Lucy) 650 acres
Puechased orginally for a rural development scheme: plan to create forty
twenty acre farms with irrigation, infrastructure, housing and services 
financed by the Caribbean Development Bank. The development scheme never 
went ahead. At the moment (1979) Friendship and Springhall are used for 
sugar cane production and Hope is a dairy farm.
The other plantations were not bought specifically for agriculture.
However, after haying seryed a specific purpose the remaining land was used 
for agriculture. It is possible that this land may go out of agriculture 
in the future and he used for something else.
The first two estates were bought specifically for airport development, 
and the remaining acreage was handed oyer for management to the Agricultural 
Development Corporation:
Fairy Valley (Christ Church) 240 acres
Fifty acres utilized for airport development at Seawell. Eighty acres 
under irrigated vegetables. Remainder of land backing onto Spencers 
Plantation used for a developmental project rather than a commercial one: 
growing of sorghum and peanuts.
Spencers (St. Philip) 450 acres
350 acres used for commercial production of sea-island cotton. Remainder 
of land backing onto Fairy Valley taken up with above mentioned developmental 
project.
The next two estates were bought specifically for housing and industrial 
development:
Wildey (St. Michael) 490 acres
Used for both, private and government housing. Site of the Caribbean
APPENDIX XXI: Estates Acquired by the Government of Barbados since 1967
Development Bank and the Industrial Development Corporation. The remaining 
land, 211 acres, now'under sugar cane.
Husbands (St. James! 386 acres
Used for private housing, 130 acres left arable for commercial sugar cane. 
The following estates were vested in the Agricultural Development 
Corporation and are now run specifically for agricultural purposes:
Bawdens and Rjyer (St. Andrew) 475 acres 
Commercial sugar cane grown.
Greenland and Overhi11 (St. Andrew) 622 acres
Commercial sugar cane grown. The Ministry of Agriculture has taken over 
100 acres for heifer rearing and for growing Pangola grass.
Sedge Pond and The Hill (St. Andrew) 363 acres 
Commercial sugar cane grown.
Bath (St. John) 426 acres
Previously sold out to a tourist development scheme. Government has now 
acquired it and it is in the process of being brought back into sugar.
Pine (St. Michael) 107 acres 
Central Livestock Station.
Haggatts (St. Andrew) 642 acres
Run jointly by the Agricultural Development Corporation and the Ministry of 
Agriculture. 104 acres taken out for fruit tree production (avoeadoes, 
mangoes and cherries) to develop various varieties. Developmental rather 
than commercial.
The following are vested in the Agricultural Development Corporation but 
run by the Ministry of Agriculture:
Graeme Hall (Christ Church) 298 acres 
Location of the following:
Central Agronomic Research Station 
Sugar Cane Variety Testing Station 
Plant Propagation Unit
488
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(Subsidiary function: motor pool for small farmers on a hire basis)
(Source: Agricultural Development Corporation, Barbados)
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APPENDIX XXII: SHAREHOLDINGS AND DIRECTORSHIPS IN BARBADOS SHIPPING AND
TRADING AND PLANTATIONS LTD.
BARBADOS SHIPPING AND TRADING
Nominal share capital of $BDS 12 million.
Divided into: 250,000 Preference Shares of $BDS 4.80.
10*800,000 Ordinary Shares of $BDS 1.00 
Total number of shares taken up to June 12th 1976: 
Preference: 133,850 @ $BDS 4.80
Ordinary: 6,375,000 @ $BDS 1.00
Employees: 19,500 @ 61.4 #
Total Amount = $BDS 7,029.,453
DIRECTORS:
Bertram Leroy BANFI.ELD 
Christopher Arthur BLACKMAN 
John William CHANDLER 
Stanley Keith. CHAPMAN 
Stanley Parker EDGHXLL 
Gerald Haynes KING 
Douglas Percy LYNCH 
Laurie John SEALY (Chairman) 
George Colin Charles THOMAS 
Edward Keith. THORNTON 
Thomas Hadley WILKINSON
Highgate Gardens, (St. Michael) 
Black Rock (St. Michael)
Todds Plantation (St. John) 
Haggatt Hall (St. Michael)
St. Lawrence Gap (Christ Church) 
Pine Hill (St. Michael)
Golf Club Road (Christ Church) 
Brittons Hill (St. Michael)
Golf Club Road (Christ Church) 
Lodge Hill (St. Michael) 
Highgate Gardens (St. Michael)
Selection of Preference Shareholders: 
Barbados Eire Insurance Company 
Barbados Mutual Life Association
Barclays D.C.O. 
Confederation Life 
Edgecumbe Ltd.
10,000
15,000
Barbados Shipping and Trading Pension Fund 12,512
4,800
6,725
5,000
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Geoffrey Everard Barrow 150
Edwin Leon Kellmann 400
John Douglas Manning 600
Manufacturers' Life Insurance Company 3,670
Thomas Hadley Wilkinson 300
K.E. McKenzie 700
T.E. McKenzie 600
E.S. Robinson 1,000
Selection of Ordinary Shareholders
Barclays D.C.0. 502,000
Canadian Bank of Commerce
Trust Company (Caribbean) 41,322
Barbados Mutual Life Association 354,210
Manufacturers' Life Insurance Company 289,866
Lynch Investment Trust Ltd. 105,300
Barbados Fire Insurance Company 12,990
Confederation Life 36,300
Applewhaites Ltd. 840
Charles O'Neal Armstrong 420
Gerald Campbell Armstong 7,367
Philip De Courcey Armstrong 3,935
Robert Arthur and Company Ltd. 15,49.7
R.S. Bancroft 3,071
G.L. Challenor 7,860
G.M. Challeno-r 28,121
Robert Challenor 52,500
J.N. Goddard and Sons Ltd. 43,000
William Lyall Haynes 71,730
Kenneth De Lisle Jones 2,700
Theodore Woodley Alleyne 600
Thomas Hadley Wilkinson 54,000
Thomas Nathaniel McKenzie 11,490
Robert De Courcey O'Neal (England) 27,851
Ridge Ltd. 840
Stanley Robinson 12,185
F.D.G. Simpson 12,425
N.C. Thornton 17,770
A. de Vera Ward 4,110
Elliot Lisle Ward 12,772
T.G. Yearwood (England) 1,500
D.P. Lynch 10,000
PLANTATIONS LIMITED
Nominal Share Capital of $BDS 5,280,000 
Divided into: 400,000 Preference Shares of $BDS 1.20
4,800,000 Ordinary Shares of $BDS 1.00 
Total number of shares taken up 23rd April 1976: 
Preference: 300,000 @ $BDS 1.20
Ordinary: 3,389,084 <§ $BDS 1.00
Selection of Preference Shareholders:
Barclays DC0 12,853
Barbados Shipping and Trading Pension Fund 23,420 
Philip De Courcey Armstrong 7,000
O.R. Hunter 1,333
Kingsland Estates Ltd. 2,000
Vaucluse Factory Ltd. 300
493
Selection of Ordinary Shareholders:
Canadian Bank of Commerce 52,007
The Gill Trust Company 92,928
Ashley Gordon Gale 10,220
Cliff Ltd. 4,180
Mrs. Patricia Cox 8,517
The General Agency Co. Ltd. 2,933
John Allen Challenor Hutson 1,393
Francis Challenor Hutson 27,877
Lawden Ltd. (K.R. Hnnte & Co. Ltd.) 73,497
Lodge Hill Inyestment Ltd. 10,685
M.C. Mahon 462
John Douglas Manning 4,414
D.A. Marshall 806
Newton Limited (Staple Groyel 1391,39:2
Nicholls and Edgehrll Ltd. (Jyeye. PilgriipOL 78,308
Chas. Lyall Laurie Sealy (Buckeley! 37,170-
Frederick Donald Grafton Simpson 22,997
C.C. Skeete 20,521
C.A. Thornton (Pleasant Hall) 36,537
Alan De Yere Ward 17,810
E. Leroy Ward (Bourbon! 11,925
Elliot Llewellen Ward (Mount Gay)_ 7,122
Elliot Lisle Ward 97,340
Lionel Allan Ward 24,160
(.Source; BARBADOS REGISTRY OFFICE, COMPANY FILES? Barbados Shipping and 
Trading, Plantations Ltd.)
DIRECTORS:
(St. George) 433 acres.
Attorney for Ridge Ltd. (Christ Church) 1,013 acres. 
Attorney and Board Director for Foursquare Estates 
Ltd. (St. Philip/Christ Church) 1,570 acres.
Attorney for Applewhaites Ltd. (St. Michael/St. Thomas) 
1,168 acres.
Attorney for Hothersal Ltd. (St. John) 310 acres. 
Chairman of the Barbados Sugar Producers' Association. 
Cecil Carrington Skeete Managing Director and shareholder of Edgecuinbe Ltd.
9.12 acres.
Eliot Lisle Hard Majority shareholder and managing director of
Faitfield and Mount Gay Company Ltd.: estates and
rum distillery (St. Lucy/St. Peter) 1,807 acres.
Owner of Harrisons (St. Lucy) 203 acres.
Lionel Allen Ward Substantial shareholder of Guinea Ltd. (St. John)
789. acres.
Staple Groya Estates Ltd. (Christ Church) 800 acres 
and Thicket Plantations Ltd. (St. Philip) 780 acres. 
Eric Ashby Bent ham Deane Shareholder in Kfngsland Estates Ltd. (Christ Church)
1,156 acres.
Representative for Foursquare Estates Ltd.
Assistant General Manager of Plantations Ltd.
Geoffrey Charles General Manager, Attorney and Board Director of
Armstrong
Edgecumbe Ltd. (St. Philip) 912 acres.
Shareholder in Halton Ltd. (St. Philip) 192 acres, 
and Coverley Estates Ltd. (Christ Church) 142 acres. 
Attorney for Searles (Christ Church) 514 acres,
Dukes (St. Thomas) 180 acres, Colleton (St. John)
360 acres, Yorkshire Ltd. (Christ Church) 319 acres,
494
Ian Stanley Robinson Majority shareholder of Constant Estates Ltd.
Vaucluse Estates Ltd. (St. Thomas) 505 acres,
Lion Castle Ltd. (St. Thomas) 164 acres,
Halton Ltd. (St. Philip) 192 acres, Dunscombe 
Estates Ltd. (St. Thomas) 572 acres,- Coverley 
Estates Ltd. (Christ Church) 142 acres, Congo Road 
Ltd. (St. Philip) 200 acres.
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(SOURCE: Interview Material)
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PRODUCERS VIA PUBLIC FUNDS, AS RECOMMENDED IN FIVE YEAR 
DEVELOPMENT PLANS
Sugar
Cane planting: 1966-1972   13,510,000 francs
1976 -—  1,370,000
- Mechanization   topographical alteration in preparation for
mechanized harvesting and cultivation:
1966-19.73   14,887,000 francs
cane loading equipment and transportation :
1968-1973 ——  1,714,494 francs
1974-1977 -----  2 ,7 5 0 ,0 0 0
Factory modernization and further centralization:
19.63-1966 -----  1 2 ,500 ,00 0  francs
19.67-1972 —  110 ,000 ,000  francs
Bananas
Programme of support for the banana industry --- creation and
improvement of cen tral packing f a c i l i t i e s  and preparation of 
fr u it  for export; subsidy to coyer part of the running costs  
of SICABAM:
19.67-1972 —  29,157,000 francs
1973 _  500,000
3,200,000 (allocated in a lump sum 
to Martinique and Guadeloupe)
1975 —  14,100,000 (Martinique and Guadeloupe)
1976 —  12,535,000
APPENDIX XXIV: SUMMARY OF AGRICULTURAL AID ACCORDED TO MARTINIQUAN
Pineapple (Canned)
Programme to redress shortcomings in the production of canned pineapple *—  
subsidy to cover part of the running costs of APCA, publicity, introduction 
of new varieties, introduction of new methods of cultivation, 
transportation and modernization and further centralization of canning 
factories:
1964-19.72 --- 17,141,000 francs
1973-1976 --- 18,651,000
Market Garden crops (cultures maraieheres)
Programme to aid principally the cultivation for export of avocado
pears from X967, and from 1975, the cultivation of aubergines.
* \Aid also extended to collectives of growers, "SICA Maraichere":
19.67-1972    1,640,000 francs
1973-197 6 -----  4 ,9 .60,000
Programme, to aid crop diversification in general;
1974^1977 — - 4,591,000 francs
Cattle Rearing
Programme to encourage local milk, production; principally through. tbe 
organization of collection and storage by refrigerated tanks. Aid 
advanced to a collective of producers - la Cooperative des Producteurs 
de Lait de la Martinique (CQPR0LAM);
19.71-1976-- 329,000 francs
1974-1976-- 116,000
Programme to increase local meat production, principally beef.
Aid primarily devoted to development of breeds through technical 
assistance, research and insemination facilities.
1967-1977  7,320,000 francs
1976 - 2,452,000
Total aids, subsidies and loans accorded under the 4th, 5th and 6th
Five Year Development Plans for Martinique;
273,423,994 francs
498
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[Notes: Public funds advanced through a number of official organizations,
of which the principal here are FIDOM (Fonds d’Investissement pour 
les Departements d'Outre-Mer) and FDES (Fonds de Developpement 
Economique et Social).
(Sources: Direction Departementale de 1’Agriculture, Files on Agricultural
Policy. Prefecture de la Martinique, FIDOM)
5 0 0
APPENDIX XXV: CONCENTRATION OF OWNERSHIP IN WHITE CREOLE FIRMS IN
MARTINIQUE, 1977
TABLE I: PERCENTAGES OF BEKES CONTROLLING SHARES IN WHITE CREOLE
COMPANIES BY SECTOR OF ACTIVITY
Sector of 
Activity
Commission Agencies 
and Import/Export 
Houses
Sugar Factories 
and Distilleries
Industrial
Enterprises
Tourist Industry 
(Hotels)
Number of 
Companies
59
15
21
9
% of Beke 
Population
58
32
45
25
% of 
Shareholding
100
100
100
100
TABLE II: INVESTMENT OF WHITE CREOLE CAPITAL BY DIFFERENT SECTORS
OF BEKE SOCIETY, ACCORDING TO NUMBERS OF ENTERPRISES
NUMBER OF COMPANIES 
1 2  3 4
GRANDS BEKES
’Old1 Families: 
Descendants of 
the Usinier Class
Nouveau Riche 
Bourgeoisie
BEKES MOYENS 
TOTALS
40%
34%
26%
100%
47%
34%
19%
100%
61%
12%
27%
100%
56%
40%
'4%
100%
5 and over
86%
14%
100%
(Calculated from data on company shareholdings. Source: Chambre de Commerce, 
Fort-de France, Dossiers on Corporations in Martinique).
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TABLE 1:
Imports
% imports 
France
Exports
Balance o: 
D eficit
(Source:
APPENDIX XXVI; ASPECTS OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DISEQUILIBRIUM IN MARTINIQUE
MARTINIQUE’ S BALANCE OF TRADE DEFICIT, 1967-1976 
(in millions, of francs)
1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976
521 538 652 810 850 892 1083 1405 1454 1965
from
72.9 71.2 70.7 72.6 70.7 72.5 74.6 66.1 69.3 61.0
211 197 182 166 189 259 . 244 347 407 594
: Trade
-310 -341 -470 -644 -662 -633 -839 -1058 -1047 -1371
Direction Regionale Des Douanes et Droits Indirects de la Martinique, 
Resultats Generaux, 1967-1976)
TABLE 2; BREAKDOWN OF GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IN MARTINIQUE BY SECTORS 
OF ACTIVITY, 1963-1975.
1963 1971 1975
Primary 22.3% 10% 7.4%
Secondary 13.1 13 15.1
Tertiary 64.6 77 77.5
(Source; Bureau d’ Etudes et de Documentation Economiques, Principales 
Donnees Demographiques et Economiques, 1975)
TABLE 3: BREAKDOWN OF WORKING POPULATION IN MARTINIQUE BY SECTORS
OF ACTIVITY, 1961-1972.
1961 1967 1972
Primary 39.7% 30% 18%
Secondary 21.6 21.4 19
Tertiary 38.7 48.5 63
(Source: L’ Institut Nationale de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques)
1962
1963
1964
1965
19.66
19.67
1968
1969
19.70
1971
1972
1973
502
TABLE 4: ANNUAL PRICE RISES IN MARTINIQUE, 1971-1975
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975
Food 8.5% 3.3% 13.3% 20.2% 11.1%
Housing 6.5 2.0 15.0 19.9 12.7
Clothing 3.2 4.1 7.5 19.6 16.7
Health 8.0 9,0 4.8 13.9 20.7
Transport 10.7 12.3 7.6 30.3 10.4
Enter tainment 4.2 8.2 5.4 15.9 19.2
Overall annual 
increase 7.4 4.7 11.3 20.2 13.6
(Metropolitan 
annual increase) 6.0 6.9 8.5 15.0 9.6
(Source: Institut D'Emission Des Departements D'Outre-Mer, Rapports
DfA ctivites, 1971-1975).
TABLE 5: ASSISTED MIGRATION FROM OVERSEAS DEPARTMENTS TO THE METROPOLIS,
19.62-1973
Martinique Guadeloupe Reunion Guyane Totals
492 367 135 10 1,004
721 622 685 63 2,091
1,635 1,946 9.21 30 4,532
2,398 2,601 1,897 110 7,006
2,439 2,457 2,577 138 7,611
2,433 2,389 3,011 129 7,9.62
2,210 2,046 3,103 155 7,514
2,513 2,478 3,314 93 8,39.8
2,470 2,534 3,719 84 8,807
2,457 2,552 4,021 135 9,165
2,667 2,512 4,401 132 9,712
2,684 2,550 4,722 108 10,064
2 5 ,1191 25,054 32,506 1,1872 83,866
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Notes:
(Source:
. Total reached 29,000 by the end of 1975.
. Low figure by comparison with other DOM accounted for by the fact  
that assisted migration is only given in "exceptional circumstances".
Bureau pour le  Developpement des Migrations Interessant les DOM, 
Resultats enregistres au 31 decembre 1973)
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I. Sporting 
Riding
Societe Hippique Martiniquaise 
La Gourmette de Fort-de-France
Yachting
Yachting-Club de la Martinique
Tennis
Tennis-Club de Fort-de-France
Hunting
Federation des Chasseurs de la Martinique
Societe de Chasse Saint-Hubert
Societe de Chasse Nemrod-Club Martiniquais
J
Shooting
Societe L ’Arquebuse
Football and athletics (about 40 in all which are not usually 
patronized by Bekes)
II. "Cercles"
Le Cercle Martiniquais 
Cercle de Fort-de-France 
Rotary Club de la Martinique
Cercle Victor+Schoelcher (Honorary President: Aime Cesaire)
Cercle Des Officiers (Association for officers at the
garrison of Fort Saint-Louis.
President: Colonel Commandant Superieur des Troupes 
Antilles-Guyane)
III. Associations of ex-servicemen
Association Generale des Anciens Combattants 
Union Nationals des Combattants 
Association Nationale des Prisonniers de Guerre 
Union Nationale des Medailles Militaires 
Union Nationale des Mutiles de Guerre 
Union Nationale des FFL
APPENDIX XXX : VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONS IN MARTINIQUE.
Associations of ex-servicemen contd.
Union Des Volontaires Antillais Combattants
Association des Officiers de Reserve
Association Departementale des Prisonniers de Guerre
APPENDIX XXX con td .. .
(Source: Interview material).
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APPENDIX XXXI: CONSEIL GENERAL MEMBERS IN MARTINIQUE IN 1882 AND 1901
1882
Fort-de-France
Ernest Deproge 
Jules Fanfan 
Alexandre N o llet  
Flavius Hayot*
Lamentin
Ernest Jaham-Desrivaux* 
Raoul Coatet 
Cyrus Thaly
Saint E sprit
Theodore. Luhin 
D. Luhin
Beauharnai's: Cadeau 
Albert S a in t -? e lix  
J. de Thore*
Djamant
Marius Hayot*
Charles Denis
Marin
Horatius Pomponne 
Auguste Cecina 
Auguste Waddy 
Clavius Marius 
Fort (S a in t-P ierre)
D. Duquesnay 
A. Lacourne 
Numa Viluce  
Arthur Mouvert
1901
Henri Audemar
Maximilien Deslandes
Jose Iyanes
Leonides Binet
Arthur Cayol 
JDorya 1 D ’ Ang 1 abermaa* 
Fernand Eustache* 
Joseph De Laguarigue*
Dr. Homere Clement 
Antoine Si'ger 
F e lik  Costet 
Alexandre A lex is  
Alexandre Zonzon
I satire Genty 
Gabriel Hayot*
Dr. Thomas Iman 
Horatius Pomponne 
Dr. Osman Duquesnay 
Albert Trenelle
Georges Ninet 
Ryacinthe N icole  
Jean-Marie Carassus 
F elix  Grelet
Oscar Dupuy 
Jules Duquesnay 
Auguste Lapeyre 
Jean Laborde*
Basse-Pointe
Cesar Laine 
Theodore Lafontaine 
Bernard C elestin  
Eugene A gricole  
T rin ite
Jules Binet 
Lucien Belus 
H ila ire  Thaly 
Emmanuel Qsenat 
M ezelle Daude 
Monrose Sarotte
KEY: *Indicates Beke c o n se ille r s .
Mouillage (Saint-Pierre)
Jules Severe 
Joseph Yotte  
V ictor Severe 
Louis Percin
Eugene Agricole  
Amedee Knight 
Louisy Seyerin
fernard Clerc*
Lucien Belus 
Jules Ponk-Tsong 
Amelius Vaufor 
Joseph Clavius-Marius 
Amedee Despointes*
(Source: Annuaire de la  M artinique, 1882 and 1901)
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Registered E lectors
Constituency 1883 1895 1930 1946 1951
Bridgetown 318 587 784 1,742 6,281
S t. Michael 185 425 1,656 4,755 32,735
C hrist Church 87 180 725 2,376 12 ,612
S t. P hilip 186 319 308 1,531 7,146
S t. George 106 143 255 1,740 7,301
S t. John 57 46 119 986 4,791
S t. Joseph 86 139 142 972 3,583
S t. Andrew 24 56 276 1,223 3 ,363
S t. Thomas 105 78 256 823 4,125
S t. James 91 98 234' 1,857 5,744
S t. Peter 69. 143 ‘ 266 1,045 4,333
S t. Lucy 132 127 132 1,023 3 ,925
Totals 1,446 2,341 5,153 20,073 95,939
(Sources: Barbados Blue Books, 1883, 1895, 19.30, 1946.
O ff ic ia l  G azette, December 17th  19.51)
Q u a lifica tio n s of Voters in 1895 (under 'The Representation of the People’ s
A ct, 1891’ )
1. Any freehold E state in his own l i f e  or in  the l i f e  of another, or in  
rig h t of marriage or the dower o f h is  w ife or any larger E state of the 
yearly  yalue of not le s s  than £5.
2 . Rents and p r o fits  arisin g  out of land in  his own rig h t or in  rig h t of 
h is  w ife  of the amount of £5 per annum.
3 . Occupancy of any land or building assessed paroch ially  at the annual 
value of £15.
4 . Parochial taxes -  The payment of in St. M ichael’ s P arish £2 , and in  
the other parishes 11.
5. Salary -  Any a g ricu ltu ra l attorney, manager, book keeper, c le rk ,
agent or upper servant in  receip t o f a salary of £ 4 .3 .4 .  per month.
6. Income -  The receip t of an annual income of £50 derived from any
pension, occupation, o f f ic e  or trade, other than that o f a servant.
7 . Income -  The receip t of £15 charged on real e s ta te , or being the
in te re st on money invested in re a l S ecu rities or being Dividends 
derived from debentures or shares in  any company.
8 . Any B a rr iste r , s o l i c i t o r ,  p hysician , surgeon, BA or MA of any U niversity  
in  Great B rita in  and Ireland , or any one haying the "testa m u r" of 
Codrington C ollege.
9_. Any hona f id e  lodger in  a house rated a t no le s s  than £50 per annum
who pays £15 fo r  h is lodgings.
(Source: Barbados Blue Book., 189.5, "Q u a lific a tio n s  of V o te r s " !
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APPENDIX XXXIV: NUMBER Of CANDIDATES WHO CONTESTED SEATS IN THE BARBADOS
GENERAL ELECTION OR 19.51 BROKEN DOWN BY PARTY POLITICAL 
AFFILIATION.
E lectors*
Bridgetown 
S t. Michael • 
Christ Church. 
S t. George 
S t. P hilip  
S t. John 
S t. Joseph 
S t. James 
S t . Thomas 
S t. Andrew 
S t. Lucy 
T otals
Barbados ____________
Labour Party A ssociation
Congress
Party
1
2
2
1
1
2
1
2
2
2
16
2
2 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
2
16
Indepen- T o ta ls  
-dent
2 5 
4
3 5
3
4
3 5
3 
3 
3 
3
1 5
9 43
(Source: Official Gazette, December 17th 1951)
